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Abstract
What is social democracy in the Latin American and what has been its impact on public policy? I 
argue that it is a government's origins and its use of the state and related institutions that shape 
the nature and content of social democracy. To illustrate this, three cases using governments and 
their approach to educational policy to 2007 are presented: the Concertacion (since 1990) in Chile 
and the Cardoso (1995-2002) and Lula (since 2003) governments in Brazil.
The first part situates social democracy within the Latin American context. First, social 
democracy is defined ideologically and sociologically in relation to the wider Left-Right divide. 
Second, social democracy is distinguished between two models: the Third Way (which is more 
tolerant of inequality resulting from difference, the market and less associated with class concerns) 
and the Participatory Left (which has deeper roots in socialist ideology, state intervention and 
social movements). The section establishes that despite differences between each, Third Way and 
Participatory Left social democrats adopt elite-based policymaking in government.
The second part analyses the impact of Third Way and Participatory Left social democracy 
on public (education) policy. The findings reveal broadly similar policy approaches, including a 
broader role for the state, curricular reform within the prevailing economic/education paradigm; 
increased (targeted) public spending; extensive use of evaluation/assessment mechanisms; and 
adoption of more representative means of participation with (organised) stakeholders. At the same 
time, policy content and relations with particular stakeholders (i.e. private interests, teachers and 
students) was also shaped by the institutional constraints and historical contexts faced by each 
government.
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Glossary
abertura
A B M E S
A G E C H
Alianza por Chile
A N D E S -S N
A N D IFE S
Articulagao
Basic education
Bloque Social por la Educacibn
Bolsa escola
Bolsa familia
carre ira/carrera 
C A ED
Calm on am endm ent
Carta ao Povo Brasileiro 
C D E S
C FE
C NE  
Cl A C
C ID E
C IE P
CNB B
CNI
C N TE
Colegio de Profesores
C O N A C EP
Concertacion
Attempt at controlled political liberalisation by military regime in Brazil from mid- 
1970s
Associagao Brasileira de Mantenadores de Ensino Superior (Brazilian Association of 
Higher Education Managers)
Asociacion Gremial de Educadores de Chile (Association of Chilean Educators)
Right-wing coalition consisting of the UDI and RN in Chile, in place since the return 
to democracy in 1990 -  although the current name dates to 2000
Sindicato Nacional dos Docentes das Instituigbes de Ensino Superior (National 
Union of Teachers in Higher Education Institutions)
Associagao Nacional dos Dirigentes das Instituigdes Federais de Ensino Superior 
(National Association of Federal Higher Education Institution Leaders)
Largest internal faction within the PT; it is social democratic-oriented and is 
associated with the party leadership around Lula
Pre-higher education
Left-wing network of groups and organisations associated with the Fuerza Social that 
participated in the 2006 presidential advisory commission on education
School grant; cash-conditional transfer introduced in Brazil during the 1990s and paid 
to household heads for sending their primary school-age children to school
Family grant; an amalgamation of new and existing grants and benefits provided to 
poorer households, introduced during Lula’s first term
career path (Portuguese/Spanish)
Commisseio de Assuntos Educacionais (Education Issues Commission)
1983 constitutional am endm ent named after Senator Pedro Calmon that 
hypothecated 13% of federal and 25%  of state and municipal tax revenues to 
education
Letter to the Brazilian People; PT 2002 election manifesto
Conselho de Desenvolvimento Econbmico e Social (Council for Social and Economic 
Development)
Conselho Federal de Educagao (Federal Education Council); replaced by C NE in 
1995
Conselho Nacional de E ducagio  (National Education Council)
Centro Integral de Apoio a Crianga e ao Adolescente (Integrated Support Centre for 
Children and Adolescents)
Centro de Investigation y Desarrollo de la Education (Centre of Education Research 
and Development)
Centro Integrado de Educagao Publica (Integrated Public Education Centre)
Conferencia Nacional dos Bispos do Brasil (National Conference of Brazilian 
Bishops)
Confederagao Nacional da Industria (National Industry Confederation)
Confederagbo Nacional dos Trabalhadores em Educagao (National Confederation of 
Education Workers)
Chilean teachers' union
Colegio Particulares de Chile (Private Colleges of Chile)
Concertacion de Partidos por la Democracia (Coalition of Parties for Democracy); 
centre-left coalition of parties that campaigned against extending Pinochet’s mandate 
in the 1988 constitution and then from 1989 as a coalition of political parties. The  
main parties include the Christian Democrats (PD C), Socialists and the Party for 
Democracy (PPD).
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concertacionista
C O N F E C H
C O N F E M U C H
C O N S E D
CPB
C P PB
C U T
EN EM
ENU
FE C E C H
FEC H
FE U C
FID E
FLA C SO
Fuerza Social y Democratica 
FU N D E B
FU N D E F
gremio
HEI
IALS
IDEB
IFI
ILO
IMF
IN E P
ISI
JEC
La M oneda  
LDB
LO CE
Member of the Concertacion coalition
Confederacion de Estudiantes de Chile (Confederation of Chilean Students); 
association of student unions from the 14 traditional universities
Confederacion Nacional de Asociaciones de Funcionarios de Educacion 
Municipalizada de Chile (National Confederation of Chilean Associations of Municipal 
education Workers)
Conselho Nacional de Secretarios de Educagao (National Council of Education 
Secretaries)
Confederag3o dos Professores do Brasil (Confederation of Brazilian Teachers); 
succeeded by CNTE
Confederagao dos Professores Primeirios do Brasil (Confederation of Brazilian 
Primary School Teachers); succeeded by CPB
Central Unica dos Trabalhadores (Central Trade Union)
Exam e Nacional do Ensino Medio (National Secondary School Exam)
Escuela Nacional Unificada (National Unified School)
Federacion de Centros de Estudiantes de la Universidad de Chile (Federation of 
University of Chile Student Centres); replaced in 1984 by FECH
Federacion de Estudiantes de la Universidad de Chile (Federation of University of 
Chile Students)
Federacion de Estudiantes de la Pontificia Universidad Catblica de Chile (Federation 
of Catholic University of Chile Students)
Federacion de Instituciones de Educacion Particular (Federation of Private Education 
Institutions)
Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (Latin American Faculty of Social 
Sciences)
Network of Chilean social movements, including Colegio de Profesores and FECH
Fundo de Manutengao e Desenvolvimento da EducagSo Basica e de ValorizagSo 
dos Profissionais da Educagao (Fund for the Maintenance and Development of Basic 
Education and Valuation of Education Professionals)
Fundo de Manuteng§o e Desenvolvimento do Ensino Fundamental e de Valorizag§o 
do Magisterio (Fund for the Maintenance and Development of Basic Education and 
Valuation of Teachers)
association of individuals organised by sector in Chile during the military period; the 
military alternative to trade unionism
Higher education institution
International Adult Literacy Survey
indice de Desenvolvimento da EducagSo Basica (Basic Education Development 
Index)
International financial institution 
International Labour Organisation 
International Monetary Fund
Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisas Educacionais Anisio Teixeira (National 
Institute of Educational Studies and Research)
import substitution industrialisation
Jornada Escolar Completa (W hole School Day)
Chilean presidential palace; bombed during the 1973 coup
Lei de Diretrizes e Bases da Educagdo Nacional (National Education Law Guidelines 
and Directives)
Ley Organica Constitucional de Ensenanza (Constitutional Statutory Law of 
Education)
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M EC Ministerio da Educagao (Ministry of Education)
M E C E  Programa de Mejoramiento de la Calidad y Equidad de la Educacion (Improvement
of Educational Quality and Equality Programme)
M ineduc Ministerio de Educacion de Chile (Chilean Ministry of Education)
M S T Movimento dos Trabalhadore Rurais Sem  Terra (Landless W orkers’ Movem ent)
New Republic Political regime in Brazil after 1985
O D E PLA N  Oficina de Planificacion (Planning Office)
Participatory Budget (PB) form of democratic and deliberative decision-making, in which residents can
influence (mainly municipal) spending decisions
PC Partido Comunista de Chile (Chilean Communist Party)
PCB Partido Comunista Brasileiro (Brazilian Communist Party)
PCdoB Partido Comunista do Brasil (Communist Party of Brazil)
P D T Partido Democratico Trabalhista (Democratic W orkers’ Party)
PER  Chilean evaluation system for schools in 1982 and 1984
petista M em ber of the PT
PFL Partido da Frente Liberal (Liberal Front Party)
PIIE  Programa Interdisciplinario de Investigaciones (Interdisciplinary Research
Programme)
P ISA  Programme for International Student Assessment
PPA Plano Plurianual (Multiyear Plan)
PPD  Partido por la Democracia (Party for Democracy)
Prova Brasil Primary school test for Brazilian fourth and eight graders, established in 2005
Provao Literally 'big test’, although official name was Exam e Nacional de Cursos (National
Examination of Courses), 1996-2003
ProUni Programa Universidade para Todos (University for All Programme)
P R S D  Partido Radical Socialdemdcrata (Radical Social Democratic Party)
PM D B  Partido do Movimento Democreitico Brasileiro (Brazilian Democratic Movem ent Party)
PSD B  Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira (Brazilian Social Democratic Party)
PSU  Prueba de Selection Universitaria (University Selection Test)
P T  Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers' Party)
P 900 Programme of funding for poorest performing 900 schools in Chile
Real Plan Anti-inflation and economic stabilisation programme introduced in Brazil in 1993-94
RN Renovation Nacional (National Renovation party)
R E U N I Programa de Apoio a Pianos de Reestruturagao e Expansao das Universidades
Federais (Support Programme to the Plans for Restructuring and Expanding of 
Federal Universities)
S AEB Sistema de Avaliagao da Educag§o Beisica (Basic Education Evaluation System)
salario-educagao Payroll tax on businesses introduced by Brazilian military regime to provide funds for
education
S IM C E  Sistema de Medicion de la Calidad de la Educacion (Quality of Education
Measurem ent System)
Sinaes Sistema Nacional de AvaliagSo da Educagao Superior (National System of Higher
Education Evaluation)
S U T E  Sindicato Unico de Trabajadores de la Educacidn (Education W orkers’ Union)
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tendencia term for internal political faction within the PT
T IM M S  Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study
UBES Uniao Brasileira dos Estudantes Secundaristas (Brazilian Union of Secondary School
Students)
UDI Union Democrata Independiente (Independent Democratic Union party)
U N D IM E  Uniao Nacional dos Dirigentes Municipals de Educagao (National Union of Municipal
Education Leaders)
UNE Uniao Nacional dos Estudantes (National Union of Students)
U N TE Uniao Nacional dos Trabalhadores em Educagao (National Union of Education
W orkers)
UP Unidad Popular (Popular Unity)
Zero Hunger Programme introduced by Lula government to eradicate extreme hunger and poverty
(‘Fome Zero’)
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1. Introduction
‘Si no hay educacion pa los pobres, no hay paz pa los ricos’ 
‘If there’s no education for the poor, there’s no peace for the rich’
-  Graffiti scrawled on Santiago wall, Chile
In January 2006 Chileans elected Michelle Bachelet to the presidency. She was the country’s first
woman president to be elected and the fourth since democracy had returned to the country 16 years
previously. A few months later, the capital city, Santiago, was rocked by widespread demonstrations,
estimated at up to a million-strong and led by secondary school students. It had started as protests
against rising prices for university entrance exams and transport costs, and developed into a critique of
the Chilean education system and its associated social stratification. For several weeks, students
occupied schools and clashed with police, conjuring in the minds of the older generation images of
social and political polarisation under the Socialist presidency of Salvador Allende, which culminated in
the bloody military coup on 11 September 1973.
It was during the autumn of 2006 that the above quote was sprayed on a wall near the offices 
of the national teachers’ union, the Colegio de Profesores. It neatly captured the essence of social 
democracy, which emphasised both the demand for social development and redistribution (through its 
reference to education for the poor) and the need for class compromise (for the mutual benefit of both 
rich and poor). Soon after, President Bachelet announced the formation of a presidential advisory 
commission on education, including representatives from across the educational community. The 
commission published its final report in December 2006, the same month that General Augusto 
Pinochet, the man who presided over the military regime after 1973, died.
Two months earlier, in October 2006, President Lula of the Workers’ Party (PT), had been re­
elected in Brazil, beating the Social Democrat (PSDB) candidate. It was the fourth time that these two 
parties had faced off for the country’s top executive post. The PT government’s family grant (bolsa 
familia) programme was deemed especially important in Lula’s victory, the core component of which 
was the school grant (bolsa escola), a cash conditional transfer that poorer families received in 
exchange for sending their children to school. The role of social policy, education and redistribution 
was recognised by the government as making the difference: as he began his second term in January 
2007, Lula stated that the government’s aim would be to prioritise education.
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The 2006 Brazilian presidential election was also among the last of the 2005-06 election cycle 
that had swept across Latin America; a cycle which many observers anticipated being dominated by 
left-wing candidates. Indeed, since the beginning of the century, from Argentina to Brazil, Bolivia to 
Chile, Uruguay to Venezuela, presidential candidates from the Left have been elected to government. 
Yet the emphasis of much scholarly analysis has been in distinguishing between two main versions: 
what Castaneda (2006) suggested in a polemical article prior to the region’s elections, between a 
‘close-minded’, nationalistic and populist version on the one hand, and a more modern, ‘open-minded’ 
and cosmopolitan alternative on the other. This approach is problematic in that it is impressionistic 
and has largely obscured differences that can exist within each. Furthermore, while there have been 
recent attempts to introduce a more empirical dimension into this comparison (see Tussie and Heidrich 
2008; Merino 2008), the reformist branch has tended to attract lower levels of public attention than that 
of its more populist relation, especially with regard to Venezuela and Bolivia in recent years.
A comparison of Castaneda’s analysis of the reformist Left between the end of the Cold War 
and the present illustrates this uncertainty. Recently, Castaneda and Morales (2008) suggested that 
the most notable examples of this Left have not only included the Frente Amplio in Uruguay, APRA in 
Peru and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, but also Lula’s Workers’ Party (PT) government in Brazil and 
the Lagos and Bachelet Socialist Party-led administrations in Chile since 2000. Omitted from this list 
of reformist governments were Lula’s and Bachelet’s predecessors but one; that is, Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso in Brazil and Patricio Aylwin and Eduardo Frei in Chile respectively.
That the Cardoso and earlier Concertacion governments should be overlooked sits oddly with 
Castaneda’s previous survey of the Latin American Left, Utopia Unarmed. It was published shortly 
after the end of the Cold War and the apparent collapse of socialism. In that seminal publication 
Castaneda (1994: 136, 143-4, 166) had suggested that Cardoso’s party, the Brazilian Social 
Democratic Party (PSDB) and the Chilean Socialist Party’s participation in the pre-2000 Concertacion 
coalition governments, placed them both in this more reformist, social democratic camp. The omission 
-  or oversight -  of these earlier governments in Brazil and Chile is reflected by both scholars and 
voters remaining uncertain about the exact nature of the differences that exist between them and their 
contemporaries (Castaneda 2008: 238).
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At the same time, the reservation against including these cases from the 1990s within the 
contemporary Latin American Left may well be attributed to their apparent failure to achieve economic 
and social improvement for their peoples. This is reinforced by many (formerly Marxist) observers who 
see the impossibility of this occurring within the context of electoral politics or the capitalist system 
(Petras 2005b, Ellner 2004, Harnecker 2005). Yet the three governments in Brazil and Chile arguably 
present useful -  if different -  examples of the Left generally and social democracy in particular, within 
the region. While Cammack (1993) claims that Latin America is distinct from the more commonly 
associated experience of social democracy (in terms of greater social exclusion and less established 
political party development), a broader perspective of social democracy would encompass both 
countries. Although the Chilean social democratic Left encompasses criteria such as class 
compromise and alliance with market interests, both the Cardoso and Lula governments represent 
examples of ‘social democratic politics’, by pursuing redistributive policies (Sandbrook et al 2007). 
Furthermore, the value of studying social democracy in Latin America is especially relevant given the 
finding that such governments appeared to outperform more populist, nationalist ones in social policy 
terms during the 1990s and 2000s (Merino 2008).
That social democratic governments might be more effective than other versions of the Left is 
given added importance given leftists’ prioritisation of social policy. Social policy, in the guise of the 
welfare state, is an area that Left parties and labour organisations have been especially influential, 
being involved in the development of policies to achieve greater equality and redistribution (Pierson 
1996; Bobbio 1996; Merino 2008). That concern has persisted, despite the 1980s retrenchment 
across the developed and developing world (Huber et al 1993; Allan and Scruggs 2004). Indeed, it 
could be argued that the importance of social over economic policy as a way of distinguishing 
partisanship has become even greater as the scope for alternate macroeconomic paths has declined 
(Hibbs 1977; Boix 2000). Tavares (2004), for example, has observed that the Left tends to remain 
credible in times of fiscal adjustment when it goes against its expansionary instincts by cutting public 
spending.
Of the welfare state’s various dimensions, while health, pensions and social benefits may all 
serve to equalise differences between individuals, the role of education is of a different order. States 
can use it as a means of transmitting and controlling a society’s values, knowledge and beliefs (Carnoy
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and Samoff 1990; Kivinen and Rinne 2000; Lawton and Gordon 2002; Hall 2003). The state’s use of 
power, including its relations with other social, political and economic groups, is therefore at the heart 
of the debate about education and how it should be shaped (Apple 2003; Popkewitz 1999; Torres 
1999). An empirical analysis of comparative education policies in social democratic governments, both 
before and after 2000, can consequently reveal much about the nature of such administration in Latin 
America. Indeed, by using the cases of Brazil and Chile in particular, it is possible to draw a more 
contextualised understanding of the supposed merits of the reforming, non-populist, social democratic 
Left. This includes the relative differences in values, motivations and practices adopted by the 
different governments.
The study of education policy under different governments therefore addresses two key 
questions posed throughout this dissertation. First, what is social democracy in Latin America? 
Second, what is the impact of social democracy on public policy? The empirical evidence presented 
shows that like the wider Left, social democracy in Latin America after 1989 can also be distinguished 
between two kinds: a market-oriented, more middle class Third Way and a Participatory Left, which is 
more closely associated with socialist ideology, social movements and the poor. In power however, 
the differences between each are diminished by the formation of policymaking elites that, owing to 
institutional constraints, result in broadly similar policy outcomes. Of the two social democratic types, 
the Participatory Left has the furthest route to travel in this regard, opting for electoral success over 
social representation. In terms of public policy -  and education specifically -  this includes a broader 
state, more public spending and critically-inclined curricular and evaluation policies. While the policy 
preferences and practical considerations also influence elites’ relations to seek collaboration with the 
private sector, other social actors’ (i.e. teachers and students) relations with government depends on 
past association -  being more conciliatory under Participatory Left governments more confrontational 
with Third Way administrations.
These findings are shaped around several hypotheses related to the two research questions. 
The rest of this introduction therefore accounts for the nature of education systems in Latin America, 
upon which the hypotheses regarding social democracy and social democratic policy are constructed. 
Consequently, I first examine the Latin American welfare state and the education system from the 
1930s to the 1980s. I consider the main challenges to the region’s educational approach, from the Left
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via the Cuban Revolution and, following the various political, economic and social pressures of the 
1970s and 1980s, the New Right. This section finishes by outlining the main features of the New Right 
education system in the 1980s and 1990s and which social democratic governments in the region 
inherited. The following section then examines the state of social democracy in Latin America in the 
1990s, including its ideological and social roots and its relative internal and external weaknesses. In 
this section I account for the main typological distinction that may be drawn in Latin American social 
democracy: between the Participatory Left and the Third Way. Using this typology I set out a series of 
hypotheses relating to social democratic governments and their expected impact on education policy. 
The final section provides an outline of the dissertation and its subsequent chapters, the empirical 
evidence in each which will test the proposed hypotheses.
1.1. The features of Latin American education systems, 1930s-1970s
The Latin American education model reflected the wider welfare system over this period. That is, it 
was expensive, poorly administered, inefficient and with few links between contributions and 
beneficiaries (Angell and Graham 1995:197-8). In many respects the model of education maintained 
high levels of social exclusion. Education had traditionally been seen -  and largely remained -  as a 
means of preparing the elite rather than a general democratic or universal right (Albornoz 1993; Brint 
2006). But the expansion of education in this period also coincided with a more general 
‘modernisation’ process, consisting of a state-led import substitution industrialisation (ISI) economic 
policy which sought the development of technically proficient labour (Lopez 1999; Ramos 1999). This 
contributed to the introduction of a basic education model to bring up levels of literacy, greater levels of 
vocational training and an expansion in educational coverage (Graham 1972; Havighurst and Moreira 
1965; Edholm 1982; Souza 2001; Anderson and Randall 1999).
The increase in educational access was achieved through the use of both the public and 
private sectors (Puryear and Olivios 1995; Birdsall et al 1996; Cunha 2004; Brint 2006). Despite their 
involvement, the results were few. Both the quality and quantity (especially in rural areas) of public 
education was relatively poor, with considerable ‘wastage’ of educational cohorts within the system. 
While there were substantial increases in the amount invested and enrolments in the decades 
following 1945, expansion was focused on primary education with insufficient attention paid to
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secondary school. Despite the attendance rate of secondary school age students, rising from 30% to 
60% between 1970 and 1997, this compared poorly with an increase from 80% to 100% in 
industrialised countries (Lopez and Tedesco 2002). Teachers were under-qualified, class sizes were 
large, students frequently repeated grades and the amount of time available for schooling was limited. 
Politically, the system was authoritarian, with students adopting a subordinate position to teachers in 
the classroom and teachers tied into a clientelistic relationship with the state (Havighurst and Moreira 
1965).
2. Challenges to the Latin American Educational Model
Despite the limitations of the system, this Latin American educational model remained viable so long 
as sufficient numbers of qualified and trained people were able to emerge from it and meet the needs 
of the economy. However, this system was soon to be challenged. This came from two quarters: first, 
from the Cuban alternative which suggested that both a new political course and ‘progressive’ 
education were possible; and second, a series of economic and political pressures throughout the 
region during the 1970s.
2.1. Challenging the Consensus (1): The Cuban Revolution and ‘progressive’ education
The initial challenge to this dominant Latin American political and educational model was the Cuban 
Revolution which sought a more ‘progressive’, or socialist, education system at state level. This was in 
contrast to previous small-scale, local attempts by the Left across the region.
Although the Cuban Revolution had primarily been a nationalist victory and its cadres 
concerned with breaking political and economic dependence on the United States, the Cold War 
context of a bipolar world meant that the new government had only limited capacity to steer an 
independent course. The only alternative was alliance with the Soviet Union and entry into the 
socialist economic bloc (Leogrande and Thomas 2002). Domestically, the new regime focused on the 
establishment of a comprehensive welfare state, increasing spending on education and health.
While other Latin American states had pursued education models that involved expansion of 
the public system with space for private initiative, in Cuba basic education was made a universal right 
and both basic and post-secondary education state-provided. Private schools were nationalised, 
which reflected dependency theory advocates’ views that the previous educational model had failed to
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benefit the poor and disadvantaged while serving only the interests of the landowning and commercial 
classes (Brint 2006).
Among the first educational actions taken by the government was the 1961 literacy campaign 
which reached nearly one million people. This was achieved by placing greater emphasis on 
education in rural areas (an issue much overlooked in other Latin American states) and sending both 
teachers and literate students into the countryside to participate in the programme. Alongside this, 
curricular changes were made to encourage collective working between students and co-ordination 
between educational institutions and the local economy (Sack et al 1978; Carnoy and Wertheim 1979; 
Rojas et al 1983). Investment, enrolment and both teacher and student performance in Cuban 
education remained noticeably high in comparison to the rest of the region. This owed much to the 
regime’s willingness to invest in education: in 1965 Cuba was spending 7% of GNP on education; by 
1975 it was spending 12%. As a comparison, although Colombia’s education spending had doubled 
between 1960 and 1969, this meant a rise from 1.7% to 3.4% of GNP (Sack et al 1978).
By the 1990s Cuba’s education system was seen as an anomaly, outperforming other Latin 
American models in attainment levels (Nikandrov 1997; Lopez 1999; Ramos 1999; Ratliff 2003; 
Lutjens 1998). Despite the regime’s loss of its international sponsorship after the end of the Cold War, 
the Cuban Revolution’s educational achievements ensured its continued support by the masses and 
its position as a model for the wider Latin American Left. Yet Cuban education also faced several 
challenges. Neither the regime nor the educational system was sufficiently democratic; like the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe, a single-party state had directed these changes from above. There was 
little wider involvement in its development. Second, the tension between ideological, pedagogical and 
economic objectives was seen as compromising the educational system. For example, the best 
schools tend to select students from the elite while the system remained ‘closed’ to Western 
educational theories and values (Gasperini 2000). Indeed, since 2001 the regime has adopted a 
series of educational measures that appear designed to bolster its legitimacy, by co-opting mobilised 
youth movements and introducing distance learning and outreach higher education to wider sections of 
the population (Kapcia 2005). However, many of these practices reinforce how economic concerns 
have triumphed over social ones, since they emerged in response to the country’s economic crisis 
during the 1990s (Vasquez 2002; Mesa-Lago 2005).
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2.2. Challenging the consensus (2): New Right education
While the Cuban Revolution and its education system represented a distinct alternative to the Latin 
American mainstream, governments in the North and South continued to concentrate efforts on 
‘modernising’ their educational systems to produce labour forces that were capable of meeting the 
demands of industrialisation, especially in the manufacturing sector (Cowan 1997). This 
‘modernisation’ was seen as expanding access to formal schooling and increasing state investment in 
education. In the Latin American context (with the exception of Cuba), the result had been a larger 
system, but of questionable merit (Brock 1985).
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, developed and developing states were subject to various 
economic, social and political challenges which put pressure on welfare states and their education 
systems globally. In the North, countries faced declining productivity as a result of a decade-long rise 
in input prices, rising wage demands and external competition. In the South -  and Latin America 
specifically -  the period of ISI had been financed by recourse to private loans and their repayment via 
favourable terms of trade. With the rise of inputs such as oil exceeding these states’ revenue they 
began to find repayment of these loans increasingly difficult, eventually defaulting in 1982. At the 
same time Latin American societies were becoming more diverse and complex. Social class was 
becoming just one identifier amongst others, as non-material concerns came to the fore (Kitschelt 
1993, 1994; Inglehart and Carballo 1997). These included religious views, ethnicity, environmental 
and gender issues. There was growing support for human rights as societies tired of the torture and 
disappearances that military-led governments had pursued since the 1960s, instilling support for 
democracy and human rights (Portantiero 1992; Ellner 1993; Hurtado 1994; Castaneda 1994; Shifter 
1997; Oxhorn 2003; Cardoso, interview, 20081).
In education it was the (New) Right that benefited from these changes during the 1980s. It 
introduced various policies which reflected two distinct and apparently contradictory tendencies: neo­
liberalism and neo-conservatism (Giddens 1994; Apple 1997; Trowler 1998; Whitty 1997). The neo­
liberal strand emphasised the use of competition, consumerism and diversity in the educational sector, 
to enable greater individual choice. The neo-conservative element was more communitarian, drawing
1 Details of all interviews cited in this dissertation are located in Appendix 6: Interview methodology and 
schedule.
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on a traditional vision of education which included a concern with government intervention, a 
commitment to public morality, tradition and order in society (Trowler 1998; Manzer 2003).
Despite the contradictions, the New Right coalition was more durable than it otherwise 
appeared. Both neo-liberals and neo-conservatives could agree on the importance of preparing 
individuals for the world of work. Arguing that ‘progressive’ education was inefficient, the New Right 
sought to revise the role of education so that it could meet the changing demands of the labour market. 
Given the economic crisis, this meant a greater emphasis being placed on vocational forms of 
education (Moore 1987; Fernan 1997). In addition, the New Right also presented its objectives in non­
partisan language, thereby glossing over potential tensions. Apple (1997) notes the use of terms such 
as ‘choice’ (via vouchers and tax credits for schools), ‘raising standards’ (through tests and 
assessments of both students and teachers) and concentrating its fire on the old curriculum as anti­
family, anti-business and secular.
Although the bulk of Latin American educational systems could not be identified as 
‘progressive’, the New Right’s analysis and policy prescriptions nevertheless carried great weight 
amongst the region’s elite during the 1980s and 1990s. The economic crisis meant a tightening of 
government spending, including on the welfare state and hence education. Furthermore, the collapse 
of the economic model meant that curricular changes were necessary. The acceptance of the New 
Right critique did not mean a complete reversal of the prevailing Latin American educational model. 
By the 1980s the public sector was substantial, owing to the expansion of the system over previous 
decades. Rather the New Right ‘revolution’ across the region heralded a shift towards the role of the 
market in providing solutions, owing to falling public expenditure following recession and domestic and 
external pressure for structural readjustment (Aasen 2003; Lindbom 2001; Mitler 1997; Cowan 1997; 
Carnoy 2002; Gray and Wilcox 1995; McLeish and Phillips 1998).
The New Right ‘revolution’ included privatisation, administrative decentralisation and 
performance standardisation. First, privatisation was seen as a means of paying for a public service 
that was undergoing retrenchment, by attracting alternative sources of revenue beyond the state. 
Privatisation would also provide a way to achieve greater diversity in provision while also empowering 
parents by offering them choice (Lopez 1999; Carnoy 2002; Belfield and Levin 2002). Second, 
decentralisation would reduce bureaucracy while giving consumers and local administrators greater
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influence over the running of schools (Ratliff 2003). Accountability was tied up in this process, by 
ensuring that it was schools that would become directly responsible to consumers (parents) for their 
performance, rather than to a faceless bureaucracy. However, as critics have since observed, in the 
absence of any increase in funding, Latin American schools or regions suffered from having increased 
responsibility without the means to act (Lopez 1999; Anderson and Randall 1999; di Gropello 1999). 
Third, the state would maintain overall standards in two key ways: through a national curriculum and 
nationwide testing of students, teachers and schools. Nation-wide testing could also serve as a form 
of achieving accountability which would benefit the economic interests at the centre of power, by 
identifying ‘better’ or ‘worse’ schools for consumers and providing a clear indicator of prospective 
workers’ technical competences (Carlson 2000; Gray and Wilcox 1995). But contrary to its emphasis 
on educational quality, the measures largely resulted in managerialism rather than any substantive 
differences in results and pedagogical change (Casassus 2007).
Following the New Right changes, the public education systems of the 1980s and 1990s 
presented a mixed picture. Politically, decentralisation was intended to open up the education system. 
Yet without the transfer of adequate funds to the local or school level, it was not entirely apparent how 
schools were supposed to respond to consumer demands. Furthermore, the neo-liberal model was 
accused of maintaining an authoritarian fagade; teachers continued to be largely excluded from 
decision-making. Economically, public spending declined which put pressure on a system that was 
continuing to expand during the period. Socially, the quality of much Latin American education 
continued to be poor, with teachers remaining under-trained and underpaid and social stratification 
setting in between areas and schools (di Gropello 1999; Anderson and Randall 1999; Lopez 1999; 
Ramos 1999; Fischman 2000; Marin 2001; Carnoy 2002). The poorest social sectors, which had the 
most to complain about regarding this system, were also the least organised; thereby weakening the 
importance or urgency associated with social sector reform (Angell and Graham 1995).
3. Social democratic governments and education policies in Latin America
If the New Right measures taken in the 1980s did not dramatically improve the state of Latin American 
education, the Left did not appear to be in a position to take advantage. Despite the symbolic value of 
the Cuban revolution, the end of the Cold War not only seemed to represent socialism’s last gasp; it
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had also deprived Cuba of its sponsor. The only other left-wing option, the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, 
was meanwhile proving problematic, as the country suffered an ongoing civil war against the US- 
backed Contras. The anti-Sandinista strategy soon proved itself, following their loss in the 1990 
elections.
But if the end of the Cold War and the Sandinistas’ defeat was the Left’s low point, after 1990 
the situation paradoxically improved for the Left. The Cold War’s end meant there was no longer a 
direct threat from the Soviet Union, thereby removing the grounds for direct US intervention in Latin 
American states’ internal politics. In addition, the re-establishment of representative democracy and 
persisting inequality and poverty provided the space for left-wing governments to be elected 
(Castaneda 2008: 233). This began in the 1990s with what Castaneda called ‘reformers’, who were 
distinct from other sections of the Left, including traditional communists, armed groups and 
intellectuals. These reformers were broadly social democratic and, given the nature of the period, 
were distinguishable from the New Right in particular ideological and sociological terms. Ideologically, 
while social democrats saw themselves as located on the left of the political spectrum, this was 
complicated both by the apparent decline of socialism and its greater acceptance of the market. 
However, Bobbio (1996) argued for the continuing relevance of the left-right dichotomy by examining 
the values at the root of each. Although the socialist-capitalist distinction seemed redundant, Bobbio 
observed that the distinction between each was related to that between egalitarianism and difference. 
While the Left tended to favour measures that increased equality among people, the Right was more 
accepting of difference -  and the resulting inequality. Sociologically, the Left tended to distinguish 
between different social constituencies: one that was dominant and another that was subordinate (or 
for the more socialist-inclined, the working class) (Miliband 1982). The dominant class was more 
closely identified with the Right, since it was made up of those who control the means of production 
and coercion, while the subordinate classes -  or the Left -  consist of those without access to either. 
The existence of these ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ meant two groups structurally determined to struggle 
against each other (Miliband 1989). Furthermore, despite its smaller size the dominant class remained 
politically powerful, owing to its ability to build coalitions across society, including the bourgeoisie, 
sections of the new working class and the politically uncommitted. By contrast, the larger subordinate 
class remained politically weak because it was internally divided and heterogeneous, making it more
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difficult to build cohesive alliances (Miliband 1989; Middlebrook 2000; Hanley 2005; Adonis and 
Hames 1994; Demmers et al 2001).
The distinction between Left and Right can be applied to the Latin American welfare state and 
education system outlined above between the 1930s and 1980s. Although the welfare state is 
commonly perceived as being an emancipative entity, designed to reduce social and economic 
inequality (Pierson 1998; Giddens 1994), its development has tended to reflect class concerns and 
capacity to form coalitions (Esping-Andersen 1990; Daniels and Trebilcock 2005; Bloch et al 2003). 
Where the middle (or dominant) classes failed to find common cause with the working class, the 
outcome were more conservative welfare states which maintained social difference and hierarchy. 
This was certainly the case in Latin America, where efforts since the 1930s had been directed at 
dividing the working classes by appealing to, and patronising, their more industrialised sectors. The 
welfare states (and the education systems) were tailored primarily to the middle classes and limited 
numbers of the working class elite, ensuring corporatist control of these sections of society and failing 
to reduce overall social inequality (Archetti 1987; Huber 1996; Conliff 1999). This was all in a marked 
contrast to the more Scandinavian-style social democratic welfare state, which reflected a more cross­
class consensus in favour of improving the lot of the subordinate class, through universal rights. 
Instead, the Right had largely dictated the parameters of the welfare state and education policy since 
the 1930s. Despite the various economic, political and social challenges between the 1960s and 
1980s across the region, the Right had remained dominant. Along the way it had taken up a new neo­
liberal discourse alongside conservatism, which was reflected in the New Right’s construction of class 
alliances to support its approach to public policy (and education) during the 1980s.
More specifically, in education the difference between Left and Right is apparent in the 
contrasts that may be drawn between different educational approaches and objectives, all of which 
may be superimposed over Bobbio’s equality-difference spectrum. Loveless (2001) distinguishes 
between educational models that emphasise traditional subject matter, methods of teaching and 
agreed standards and objectives against another that is more student-centered in its content, teaching 
and goals. Caston (2006) likens the difference to be between educational forms that are ‘linear and 
sequenced (‘traditional’) and flexible and open-ended (‘progressive’). The latter is perhaps most 
visible in the critical pedagogy of Paulo Freire (1978,1985), who distinguishes between education as a
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‘banking process’ and as a dialogue. The former portrays education as a process by which teachers 
‘deposit’ information into students and maintain the established structure of power relations within 
society. This is in contrast to Freire’s approach where the difference between students and teachers 
becomes indistinguishable as both engage in critical thinking and problem solving. The effect of this 
more challenging approach is to undermine both the prevailing system and the authority that oversees 
it (Sarup 1982). Applied to the left-right dichotomy, it is those educational models that most challenge 
the status quo and that are closest to the Left, since they pursue greater equity. By contrast, the Right, 
given its more comfortable relationship with difference -  and hence resulting inequality -  tends to be 
more identifiable with more traditional versions of education (figure 1).
Tied into the ideological and educational variation between the Left and Right were also those 
that existed within the Left -  and social democracy in particular. Once again, the features and values 
associated with left-right dichotomy aided comprehension by providing a way of understanding the 
relative differences between them. By the early 1990s, the prospect for social democrats in Latin 
America did not look promising. What existed was complicated by the apparent division within this 
reformist, social democratic Left, between a politically centrist form and a more radically inclined type 
(Castaneda 1994). Kirby (2003:148) subsequently delineated the two, distinguishing between a Third 
Way’ -  which included those groups that largely accepted the neo-liberal reforms and believed it could 
be managed more effectively through regulation, tax reform and the use of targeted social 
programmes -  and ‘popular radicals’, who aimed to introduce more popular forms of participation and 
innovative social programmes.
The contrast between these two groups of reformers pointed to a qualitative difference between 
them. The radicals’ emphasis on socialism prior to 1989 placed them at the more egalitarian end of 
the Bobbio left-right dichotomy in the post-socialist 1990s. Meanwhile the centrist or Third Way’s 
accommodation of some of the features associated with the New Right -  including the role of the 
market -  meant that it was less troubled by the differences that resulted from such policies (Giddens 
2000, 2003). But both still maintained a role for the state that was more substantial than that proposed 
by the New Right, although this was more comprehensive in the Participatory Left than the Third Way. 
The Third Way’s stance was arguably helped by its relatively narrow base of support, which was drawn 
mainly from the middle classes and thereby ensured a greater weight within the party to the
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leadership. By contrast, the more popular, radical version -  what I choose to term the ‘Participatory 
Left’ -  emerged from a wider constellation of groups and social movements. They included workers’ 
groups, trade unions, progressive sections of the Catholic Church, indigenous peoples and social 
activists, all of which provided internal and external support to such parties.
Figure 1: Differences between the Left, Right and social democrats on the welfare state and 
education
:icipatory Left Third Way
RightLeft
• Equality/Reject difference
• Subordinate class concerns
• Universal rights
• Challenge status quo 
(‘progressive’ education)
• Flexible, open-ended curriculum
• Alternative student-teacher 
dialogue
• Accept difference
• Dominant class concerns
• Selective rights
• Accept status quo (education as 
‘banking process’)
• Linear, structured curriculum
• Traditional student-teacher 
relationship
Despite its difference to the Third Way version, the Participatory Left can arguably be associated with 
social democracy, mainly owing to the contrast between it and the nationalistic, populist version that 
has emerged in the first decade of this century and its use of power (Castaneda and Morales 2008; 
Castaneda 2008). These various factors suggest the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: The Left and Right in Latin America may be distinguished between a more 
equality-inclined Left that is supported by the subordinate class and uses the state to 
challenge the status quo and a Right that accepts social differences (and hence inequality), 
less state intervention and favours dominant class concerns and the status quo.
Hypothesis 2: Social democracy in Latin America may be distinguished between a more 
egalitarian Participatory Left and a more elite-driven Third Way, which should have an 
impact on public policy outcomes.
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The two hypotheses above delineate the relative position of Latin American social democrats, both 
from the Right as well as within the Left. But what should be the implications of these distinctions 
when it comes to public policy? More specifically, how should social democrats -  whether they are 
Third Way or Participatory Left -  compare to each other (and the Right) when they enact policy? 
Presumably the relative differences between each should be played out in the way they make policy. 
To assess this in relation to education therefore requires an account of social democrats in relation to 
four main actors: the state, civil society, the private sector and international development agencies 
(Hall and Midgeley 2004). As state actors, given the relatively discredited status of the Left after 1989, 
social democrats were unlikely to pursue a model similar to that presented by the Cuban Revolution, in 
which the state acted as a monopoly provider of education. At the same time, social democrats do not 
subscribe to the deregulated, privatised version espoused by the New Right. Rather the state plays an 
active role in education, as a provider of resources, licensor, regulator and guarantor of performance 
(Giddens 1998, 2003; Jary 2002). Yet there should be some distinction between the two types of 
social democracy: given the Third Way’s greater acceptance of the market and differences in terms of 
providers means that it should adopt a less state-oriented approach relative to that of the Participatory 
Left. This can be summarised as follows:
Hypothesis 3: Social democratic governments are inclined towards greater state 
involvement and intervention in policymaking, although the Third Way version is less state- 
oriented than that of the Participatory Left.
The differences in the role of the state for Third Way and Participatory Left social democrats should be 
reflected in the types of specific education policies they pursue. The framework for this will arguably 
be found in the function or purpose of education, which is perhaps best expressed in curricular content 
and its reform. The Right, as observed above, tends to accept the prevailing educational structure and 
modes of teaching, especially those that promote rote-learning and order within the classroom. By 
contrast, the various currents of the Latin American Left have tended to draw on more ‘progressive’ 
Freire-related critical pedagogy, where educators and learners seek to challenge and transform the
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existing model jointly. Within the social democratic Left, however, there was much greater 
commitment to such ideas by those groups that made up the Participatory Left, while policymakers in 
general (including those in the Third Way) became increasingly concerned with the development of 
human capital to promote economic growth during the 1980s.
Given the primacy of New Right thinking in the 1980s and 1990s, it was perhaps unsurprising that 
policymakers increasingly took account of such theories. This was especially evident at the global 
level where international organisations such as the World Bank, International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) and others have stressed the need for education reforms to facilitate ‘knowledge’ that would 
assist economic development (Dale and Robertson 2007: 205). Among Third Way social democrats, 
such ideas were increasingly accepted and were expressed in the following: a broader interpretation of 
education, emphasising greater flexibility, more lifelong learning and the use of different approaches 
other than formal schooling (Giddens 1998; Anderson 2001; Bottery 2000; Fitzsimmons 2006; 
Delorenzi 2007). Consequently:
Hypothesis 4: Social democratic governments have increasingly adopted human capital 
development theories associated with the New Right (i.e. markets, entrepreneurship and 
social order); but Participatory Left governments are more inclined to pursue policies that 
maintain aspects of ‘progressive’ critical pedagogy than Third Way ones.
Unlike New Right governments, social democrats differ in that they are more inclined to increase 
investment in education (Nuttal 2004). This may be attributed to their different sense of the size and 
role of the state. However, this may come at a price, with other government services being squeezed 
elsewhere (Glyn and Wood 2001). Arguably Third Way governments are more susceptible to this than 
Participatory Left ones, since they are more accommodating of other, non-state providers to make up 
the shortfall. Meanwhile, Participatory Left governments would presumably be more inclined to 
substantially greater investment in education by comparison, especially given their broader vision of 
the state. This suggests that:
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Hypothesis 5: Social democratic governments support increased social spending in 
education; but Participatory Left governments will spend proportionately more than Third 
Way ones.
Just as social democrats encountered changed perceptions of the role of the state, public spending 
and the purpose of curricular reforms, a similar situation may be found regarding the role and nature of 
evaluation. New Right reforms, including the deregulation and privatisation of education, not only 
prompted thinking about students and parents as customers, but also required a mechanism to ensure 
that educational quality was achieved. Social democrats could either accept or reject them. Given the 
Third Way’s broad acceptance of some of the themes associated with the New Right, including the 
need for wider provision and different providers, some degree of assessment would remain necessary. 
However, they were disinclined to adopt them wholesale, instead preferring to adapt them. This 
appears most apparent when considering the use of New Right test scores as a means of providing a 
market indicator for students and parents and the Third Way’s greater concern with establishing 
‘standards’ (Bottery 2000). The other approach is to reject the use of evaluation and assessment, 
which would be more likely by Participatory Left governments, whose base of support includes 
teachers and their unions who would be on the receiving end of such assessments. This suggests 
then, that:
Hypothesis 6: Social democratic governments can either accept or reject evaluation and 
assessment regimes; Third Way governments accept them, Participatory Left governments 
reject them.
the  role of the state, curricular reform, public spending and evaluation constitute the substance of 
governments’ education policies. However, to develop and implement them, they require the support 
of other actors in the education policy process. These include those beyond the government itself, to 
include interest groups such as teachers, students, parents (Harman 1984; Andrain 1985). How 
governments engage with such groups is therefore of particular importance. Indeed those that are 
better organised would be more likely to capture the attention of government. At the same time
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though, given the social bases of Third Way and Participatory Left governments, one would expect 
substantial differences in the way that each would interact with interest groups. Given the Participatory 
Left’s greater sense of egalitarianism and roots in social movements and groups, one might expect 
them to adopt a more participatory approach compared to the Third Way’s more limited base of 
support.
Furthermore, the distinction between Participatory Left and Third Way relations with interest 
groups overlooks the preferences that each may have regarding specific groups. Given their 
ideological position on the Left, one would expect social democratic governments to identify more 
closely with groups that share their position. In the case of education, this means that Participatory 
Left governments, with their historic association with teachers’ unions and student movements, would 
have a ‘better’ relationship with such leaderships compared to Third Way governments. The latter, 
meanwhile, given its rejection of a less dichotomous world view, may be more inclined to 
accommodate actors not traditionally associated with the Left, such as private interests and business 
(Jary 2002; Driver and Martell 2002). This would indicate then that:
Hypothesis 7: Social democratic governments tend to recognise and pay attention to 
interest groups that are more organised and cohesive; but Participatory Left governments 
tend to have closer relations with teachers and students; Third Way governments tend to 
have closer relations with private interests.
4. Outline of the Dissertation
This purpose of this dissertation is to establish what social democracy is and its impact on public policy 
in the Latin American context. So far this introduction has outlined a loose, working definition for the 
Left, especially in the post-Cold War environment. Drawing on the impact of previous challenges from 
both the Left (the Cuban Revolution) and the (New) Right (during the 1980s) to Latin American welfare 
states and education systems, the chapter presented the emergence of two main social democratic 
tendencies in the region in the 1990s: the Third Way and the Participatory Left. This included a 
comparison of the values and features associated with each within the wider left-right spectrum.
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Drawing on previous scholarly analysis, it also promoted several hypotheses related both to the nature 
of social democracy (and the wider Left-Right debate) and its impact on public policy, with particular 
reference to education.
To test the hypotheses and hence answer the research questions, the dissertation is divided 
into two parts. The first comprises two chapters (chapters 2 and 3), which examine what kind of 
governments emerged and why. The first chapter provides a general overview that considers the 
particular historical contexts surrounding the rise to power of the Concertacion, PSDB and PT 
governments in Chile and Brazil. The second chapter then draws out the implications of these 
governments being in power, through the emergence of the educational policymaking core that came 
about in each. The second part of the thesis (chapters 4-11) addresses the impact of the three 
governments and their policymaking cores on educational policy. These include: the role of the state, 
the purpose of education for each government (and expressed through curricular development), public 
expenditure, forms of assessment or evaluation, approaches to participation generally, followed by 
specific accounts of the governments’ relations with key educational actors (the private sector, 
teachers and students).
The concluding chapter not only brings together the various findings but also assesses the 
extent to which the hypotheses finally hold. While they are largely found to conform to expectation, 
certain qualifications have to be made, mainly as a result of various political, social and economic 
constraints that the three governments have found themselves in. Through contextualisation it 
becomes apparent that social democrats do not operate in a vacuum. Instead they have to take into 
account pre-existing educational structures and arrangements, obliging them to operate in a pragmatic 
fashion. That this occurs, whereby social democratic theory is translated into social democratic 
practice, is most evident in the development of policymaking elites when in government. These have a 
causational effect on the nature of policy formation.
The dissertation therefore concludes that despite the presence of two social democratic 
tendencies in Latin America, when in government they tend to conform towards a similar elite-driven 
form of policymaking that privileges certain groups (i.e. private interests) over others (i.e. students and 
teachers) and adopts a broadly comparable set of policy prescriptions in relation to the state, curricular 
reform, public spending and evaluation. Notwithstanding recent efforts by the Left -  in particular the
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anti-globalisation movement -  to pursue a different form of policymaking, the dissertation concludes 
that taking power results in an internal imbalance regarding the relationship between leaders and 
supporters in social democratic parties. This is manifested in the formation of policy elites with policy 
preferences that are framed by the institutional constraints and historical contexts in which they find 
themselves, rather than reflecting the division between Third Way and Participatory Left social 
democracy.
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2. Latin American social democracy: Third Way and Participatory Lefts 
in Brazil and Chile
The Left that emerged in Latin America after the 1970s and 1980s reflected the various social, 
economic and political changes that had occurred. Since the 1990s there has been much scholarly 
effort in characterising these changes. This arguably began with Castaneda’s Utopia Unarmed (1994), 
in which four historic groups were identified: traditional communists, national populists (such as Vargas 
in Brazil and Cardenas in Mexico), political-military coalitions and reformers. By the late 1990s this 
had shifted into three main groups: intransigent communists, populist radicals and the Third Way 
reformers (Kirby 2003:148, 200). However, despite the persistence of the Cuban regime, during the 
1990s Marxism was becoming less credible as a viable ideology for the Left, especially following first 
the tearing down of the Berlin Wall followed by the rejection of communism in Eastern Europe and 
finally the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. In the absence of a programmatic political and 
economic model that Marxism offered, the emergence of the two remaining alternatives, the populist 
radicals and the Third Way reformers constituted the most visible options for the Latin American Left. 
Consequently, their respective approaches formed the basis of contemporary social democratic 
practice in Latin American today -  although owing to the ambiguous nature of the term ‘populism’, I 
prefer to use an alternative term, the ‘Participatory Left’, rather than populist radicals.
The emergence of the Participatory Left and Third Way owed more to the reformist branch 
suggested by Castaneda (1994) than the intransigent or traditionally-minded communists. This was 
evident in the change between reformers and communists, whereby the reformers adjusted their 
thinking on social and economic positions while the communists generally failed to shift. The 
Participatory Left adopted a socially and politically pluralist stance. Unlike the hegemony espoused by 
the communists, it sought to distinguish itself from the elitist stance of the Cuban Revolution by 
introducing a more collegial form of leadership. In part this was due to the Participatory Left’s structure 
of support that went beyond class, to include a wide range of social movements and actors, including 
human rights activists, independent trade unionists, neighbourhood associations, feminists, indigenous 
peoples and sympathetic members of the Church. Furthermore, these activists played a more direct 
role in policy development and management within these parties; the party generally tended to be an
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umbrella organisation under which various forms of action and causes were pursued (Petras 1999). 
Economically, it initially aimed to revive the state-led approach to development that had been prevalent 
in the region prior to the 1980s. However, in the 1990s as they shifted from opposition to government 
they came to accept the prevailing free-market orthodoxy (Roberts 1998; Soares et al 2004; Coggiola 
2004; Katz 2005; Couto and Baia 2006). Increasingly, the Participatory Left within the state sought 
alternative solutions to the limitations of the public sector, including space for private interests.
If the Participatory Left gradually came around to the free market, the Third Way Left in Latin 
America had largely adopted this approach from the outset. Although its adherents identified with the 
redefined social democratic values and principles outlined by Giddens (1998) and others during the 
1990s, it felt relatively more comfortable with the market. This was reflected in part both by such 
parties’ membership and leadership styles. Third Way politicians constituted a small cadre that was 
not generally drawn from social movements. Lacking such support, this arguably gave them more 
freedom of movement, both in terms of electoral strategy and policymaking. Strategically, with 
socialism discredited after 1989, they sought the political centre. This delivered them electoral 
success at the cost of compromise with advocates of neo-liberal reform, failure to respond to growing 
inequality or represent effectively the most disadvantaged sectors of society (Roberts 1998; Goertzel 
1999; de Souza 1999; Ellner 2004). The absence of a grassroots check on the positions led to a more 
elitist position by Third Way leaders, which was reflected in a tendency towards technocratic 
policymaking.
By the mid-2000s the distinction between the Participatory and Third Way Lefts was less than it 
appeared. Castaneda (2006) reported the existence of two Lefts in the region, in which the Third Way 
and the Participatory Left shared similar traits and were distinct from a more reactionary project 
espoused by Hugo Chavez in Venezuela and Evo Morales in Bolivia. This was reaffirmed by 
Sandbrook et al (2007) who asserted that since the 1990s Brazil had experienced social democratic 
politics under both Cardoso and Lula.
Given the apparent divergences in approach between the Participatory and Third Way Lefts in 
the 1980s, what had happened over the subsequent two decades to bring them closer together? 
Furthermore, to what extent did the Lefts that emerged in Brazil and Chile in this period fit these 
models and represent a form of social democracy?
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To answer these questions, this chapter examines the nature of the military regime in each 
country and its transition to democracy. Particular attention is paid to the relationship between political 
parties and social movements associated with the Left in this period. This is followed by the form that 
the Left took in each country after democracy’s return along with the political Right. In doing so, it will 
become apparent that in Chile the Left was based largely on political parties and social movements 
that formed a Third Way coalition known as the Concertacion that took power after 1990. In Brazil it 
was split between a grassroots-based, social movement-oriented PT and a narrower, less class-based 
PSDB. Whereas the Concertacion faced a strongly organised and identifiable Right after 1990, in 
Brazil the Right was more fluid and reliant on support from across the political spectrum.
The reasons for these contrasting developments in the Chilean and Brazilian cases may be 
summarised briefly. First, the effect of democratisation in each country varied, which had implications 
for the nature of the governments that emerged. In Chile the transition from military rule was 
accompanied by an immediate change in government and ideological slant, from the New Right under 
Pinochet to the social democratic Concertacion. In Brazil by contrast, the democratisation process 
was staggered. Democracy’s return in 1985 did not mean an immediate transfer of power from Right 
to Left, since supporters of the military regime continued to remain in government. This was not to 
happen until 1995 (or 2003 for those observers who consider the Cardoso government to have not 
been sufficiently social democratic). The effect of this meant that initially social democracy was 
achieved through a Third Way PSDB under Cardoso -  who relied on a governing coalition with former 
supporters of the military regime -  and which was then followed by a more Participatory Left PT after 
2003.
Second, the social composition of the three governments illustrate the tendency of each 
towards either the more elite-based Third Way or the Participatory Left. In Chile although the 
movement for democracy had included both social movements and political parties, after 1990 parties 
became the more dominant actors. Within the Concertacion this gave the party leaders greater 
leverage and contributed towards a more elite-based form of social democracy. In Brazil the PSDB 
was similarly elitist as a result of a relatively strong party leadership over its members. This was 
exacerbated by a relatively narrow membership base that was largely drawn from the middle classes. 
By contrast, the PT not only had a strong grassroots membership that was drawn from a wide range of
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social movements, it also had a range of internal institutional mechanisms to ensure that these 
members were able to participate actively in the direction of the party. This had the effect of 
constraining the party leadership.
Third, electoral pressures contributed towards more elite-driven forms of policymaking. In the 
cases of the Concertacion and the PSDB already powerful party leaderships in each were further 
strengthened, initially by the search for votes and then subsequently by being in government. A similar 
process was faced by the PT, although the distance travelled was greater than that faced by the 
Concertacion and the PSDB. Its internally participatory nature and critical stance against government 
was increasingly challenged as it achieved electoral success. Many of the recipients were party 
leaders who took up executive posts at the subnational level as mayors and governors, affording them 
greater weight within the PT.
1. Chile
This section examines the various aspects that led to the rise and shape of the predominant 
contemporary social democratic form in Chile today, the Concertacion. To comprehend its nature, 
particular attention is paid to the preceding military regime and its base of support, which contributed to 
the formal rules related to political parties under which the Concertacion and its rivals on the Right 
emerged. In addition, particular emphasis is placed on the relative weakness of civil society vis-a-vis 
political society after 1990, despite its emergence as a vehicle for protest against the Pinochet regime 
during the 1980s. Instead social movements for change were subsumed under the political leadership 
of the Concertacion parties, creating the party-oriented form of Chilean social democracy that has 
persisted to this day to this day.
Chile’s status as a social democracy is controversial given the heavily market-oriented 
approach to development in that country. Against this though, the Concertacion appears relatively 
socially democratic, emphasising some increase in the role of the state to tackle inequality, expand 
social services and promote development. The result is a form of social democracy that is more 
closely associated with the Third Way version (Sandbrook et al 2007: 147-8), which places 
considerable emphasis on elite control, led primarily by the president, cabinet and key advisors. That 
this occurred illustrates the depth of the changes that occurred in that country between the early 1970s
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and 1990s, since the Chilean Left had been one of the most class-oriented and Marxist-inspired prior 
to the coup.
1.1. Chilean politics until 1990
The shape of the social democratic approach has its roots in the military regime and the immediate 
period before, from the 1960s until 1973. Angell (1972: 3) noted that representative government in 
Chile had strong constitutional and popular roots. The Pinochet years reversed the apparent progress 
and liberalisation within Chilean politics and society that had persisted until then. Another view 
maintains that the progressive governments of the 1960s and early 1970s are the exception rather 
than the rule: until the Frei (1964-70) and Allende (1970-73) governments, Chilean politics had been 
largely authoritarian and military intervention was common. Loveman (1979) observes that this was 
the case under the Alessandri and Ibanez governments in the 1920s and 1930s, which was repeated 
when General Augusto Pinochet took power in the 1970s.
The Alessandri and Ibanez experiences highlights the extent to which authoritarianism in Chile 
transcends political ideology. Whereas Pinochet was closely identified with the political Right, the 
authoritarians of the earlier period were associated with the political Left, especially through the 
Popular Front government that was eventually established in the 1930s. Indeed, this authoritarianism 
never completely vanished: despite its democratic and participatory rhetoric, the Allende government 
was underpinned by an increasingly polarised and militant set of forces and supporters. Indeed, 
Chilean politics was affected by a tension between political parties and anti-party movements that 
challenged the system (Angell 1993: 153). Where the Pinochet regime broke with previous 
authoritarian projects was in the emphasis it assigned to the market. On one side the regime drew 
support from the traditional elite in Chilean society who were socially conservative and favoured a 
return to social order and stability; on the other, it broke new ground by appealing to an emerging class 
of entrepreneurs and their academic allies, the Chicago Boys, who supported economic liberalisation 
and the use of the market in the social sphere.
This coalition between social conservatives and economic liberals coalesced throughout the 
mid- and late-1970s. Opposition was minimised by an extreme level of repression against groups 
associated with the pre-1973 period. Indeed, the level of persecution that followed the coup took many
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in Chile by surprise, including the Christian Democrats who had opposed Allende and initially 
supported the military takeover. The exile and disappearances of many associated with the past 
meant that by 1980 the Pinochet regime reached its apogee with the formalisation of a new order 
through a new constitution. In particular, the constitution envisaged a protected form of democracy 
that would result at some point in the future, buttressed by the various neo-liberal changes introduced 
in the latter half of the 1970s (Boeninger 1998).
After 1980 the military regime increasingly began to experience opposition. At first this was 
economic in character, following the 1982 debt crisis. Later it became political, with the 1988 plebiscite 
on the continuation of Pinochet’s presidency acting as a focus for dissent. Initially this opposition 
originated in social movements and groups, since political party activity was banned. The rise of such 
social mobilisation had implications on the regime, contributing towards itsde-legitimisation, especially 
as it began resorting to the use of repression and coercion, while failing to improve living conditions 
(Varas 1989).
However, unlike Brazil where the social movements achieved a strong, independent position, in 
Chile they were eventually subsumed by the political parties (Garcia-Huidobro, interview, 2007). 
Initially forced to operate clandestinely, the parties increasingly took a leading role in organising the 
protests. This may have been due to the relatively deep roots that political parties had in Chile: prior to 
1973 the two main parties, the Socialists and Christian Democrats (PDC), retained strong class-based 
support. While the former drew support from poorer sections of society, the latter was more prominent 
amongst the middle class.
The 1980 constitution allowed for the eventual return of political parties to electoral competition 
-  although in a new format. It provided for an electoral system which would encourage the creation of 
coalitions (Herrera 2005); this, it was envisaged, would also prevent extremism in favour of 
compromise and moderation. Yet there was also continuity in the party system that had preceded 
1973. This was apparent in the three cleavages that persisted in the party system from 1987 on: 
clerical and anticlerical parties, parties identified as either Left or Right and those that supported or 
rejected key political leaders and their legacies (Valenzuela 1995). Indeed, the main political 
distinction remained the Left-Right axis, which owed much to the polarities and history each side
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represented: in favour of equality, democracy, freedom and Allende on the Left and for development, 
order, security and Pinochet on the Right (Fontaine 1995).
Amongst the opposition parties, during 1985 the Christian Democrats secured control of the 
mainstream by sponsoring a National Accord for Democracy; the signatories included most opposition 
parties and excluded the more militant ones. Two years later the repeal of the law against political 
parties was finally overturned (Herrera 2005). Electoral competition was close to returning. However, 
before that could happen, a transition was needed from military to civilian rule, which occurred as a 
result of the 1988 plebiscite on Pinochet’s continued rule.
Despite Pinochet’s defeat, the transfer of power to civilian authority was not controlled by the 
parties and especially the opposition ones; the regime remained strong, resulting in a transition based 
on accords and consensus between the various political actors (Santa Cruz 1996). The result was an 
incomplete transition in which authoritarian enclaves remained (e.g. the presence of life senators 
appointed by the military, Pinochet’s continued role as chief of the armed forces), meaning that the 
new government had not only to complete the transition, but begin the process of democratic 
consolidation at the same time (Garreton 1990). This approach was reflected in the new government’s 
method of policymaking, by seeking accords with the opposition and relevant actors (Santa Cruz 1991, 
1995).
If the political opposition was obliged to accommodate these dimensions of the ‘pacted’ 
transition, this illustrated the extent to which ‘political society’ had trumped ‘civil society’ in Chile’s re- 
democratisation. Following the 1988 plebiscite, a cross-societal organisation of different social 
movements and groups examined the differences that existed between themselves and the political 
parties: while the parties would focus on trying to change the constitution, the former would focus on 
finding solutions to urgent social problems (Acuerdo Social por el ‘No’ 1988). However, given the 
overlap that existed in party and social movement memberships (e.g. the leadership of the Colegio de 
Profesores and the student unions tended to be members of Concertacion parties), the priorities of the 
political class invariably trumped those of the movements.
Within that political class, the mainstream opposition on the Left (or more accurately, the 
Centre-Left) comprised the parties that had joined together in the Concertacion coalition that had 
campaigned against the Pinochet regime in the 1988 constitution. It included both clerical parties such
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as the Christian Democrats and anticlerical parties like the Socialists, the Party for Democracy (PPD) 
and the smaller Social Democratic Radical Party (PRSD). Its experience of the repressive nature of 
the military regime as well as the ‘pacted’ nature of the transition meant that it was disinclined to 
tamper with the outcomes of the various policies that had been undertaken during the 1980s. But this 
was not the result of any overt pressure or coercion by the regime; indeed, some of the leading 
concertacionistas came to profoundly believe in the objectives of those policies (Sandbrook et al 2007: 
165).
1.2. Main Chilean political actors after 1990: the political parties
The two leading parties within the Concertacion, the Christian Democrats (PDC) and Socialists, held 
contrasting positions at the time of the 1973 coup. The PDC had supported the military takeover while 
leading Socialists were largely persecuted. During the 1980s, however, the two parties’ leaderships 
came to share the view that democracy should return, along with individual liberty and greater scope 
for public participation. While the Socialists experienced a shift from a previously radical stance to a 
more moderate ideological position, the PDC underwent no substantial transformation, other than a 
general distancing from the Church’s teachings and becoming closer to business (Hofmeister 1995; 
Roberts 1997; Herrera 2005). Nevertheless, though it maintained support from the more religious 
sectors of society, its base began to shift in the 1990s: not only were PDC voters likely to have lower 
education levels than other Concertacion parties, they were also more likely to split their vote between 
presidential and parliamentary candidates (Morales and Poveda 2007). Indeed, the looser attachment 
of PDC voters to the party has worked against it since 1997, when it saw votes shift from it to the 
ideologically conservative Independent Democratic Union (UDI) (Huneeus 2007).
Although the PDC and Socialists comprised the main forces within the Left in the 1980s, this 
was a notable contrast to the period before 1973. Until the military coup the Left was dominated by the 
Socialists and the Communists. Since the 1980s the two began to move apart: the Socialists became 
more moderate while the Communists were radicalised (Herrera 2005; Valenzuela 1995; Benavente 
1988; Roberts 1997). The result was that while the two parties operated clandestinely during the 
movement for democracy in the 1980s, by the 1989 elections the Socialists were part of the 
Concertacion bloc while the Communists remained outside. Despite this trend, some on the political
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Right remained unconvinced of the change in the Left, claiming that its spokespeople rejected 
individualism, criticised the market and remained wedded to a stronger role for the state (Caceres and 
Santa Cruz 1996; Camhi et al 1999). In part this may reflect the presence of a wide range of personal 
and ideological factions that exist within the party (Salcedo and Fuente 2007). Indeed, by the late 
1990s the Socialists’ accommodation of such interests was reflected in its acceptance of diversity 
within educational provision, despite demands for greater state control of privately run (i.e. state- 
subsidised private) schools and more scrutiny of private bodies using public funds (Comision Nacional 
de Educacion 1997).
Alongside the Socialists was a new party that shared their increasingly centrist stance in the 
late 1980s: the PPD. The PPD is called an ‘instrumental’ party owing to its origins. Following the 1973 
coup, the military regime had banned political party activity. This had an adverse effect on the two 
strongest parties on the Left, the Communists and Socialists, especially as many of their members 
either disappeared or were forced into exile. Despite repealing the ban in 1987, the order remained on 
both the Socialist and Communist parties until 1989. To circumvent the measure, left-wing activists 
formed the PPD as a way of getting involved in political party activity during these years. Indeed, until 
1992 Socialist Party members were also able to be active within the PPD (Valenzuela 1995).
In contrast to the Socialists with its long history in Chilean politics, the PPD is seen to represent 
a new form of politics and culture. As a result it has been portrayed as a pragmatic, modern party of 
the Left (Salcedo and Fuente 2007; Klugmann 1991). This perspective yielded substantial electoral 
dividends, ensuring that during the first part of the 1990s it received a greater share of votes cast than 
those won by the Socialists (Herrera 2005). However, since its founding the party has struggled and 
continues to be bedevilled by a lack of strong organisation. This has made it easier for particular 
leaders to impose themselves and their positions on the party over that of the wider membership. 
Such a situation may be due less to a sense of ideological pragmatism than a lack of programmatic 
coherence resulting in a paralysis between its activists who support a centre-left or a centre-right 
stance (Salcedo and Fuente 2007).
Against the heterogeneous Left that the Concertacion represented, Chile retained a relatively 
strong political Right. As noted above, the Pinochet regime was distinct from previous military 
interventions in that it had brought together both social conservatives and economic liberals. These
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perspectives were given institutional form through the creation of new political parties in the late 1980s. 
They included the formation of the Independent Democratic Union (UDI) and National Renovation 
(RN). Of the two, the UDI is arguably the more successful, having increased its vote share at the 
expense of the Christian Democrats (Huneeus 2007). However, whether this constitutes wider growth 
for the Right at the ballot box during the 1990s is debatable, although Lehmann and Hinzpeter (2001) 
do claim that it has done so despite the regime’s defeat in 1989. This, they argue, may be attributed to 
a shift in the parties’ focussing less on social concerns such as liberty and equality (the main issues 
during the 1988 plebiscite) in favour of those regarding social delinquency and crime.
The origins of the UDI and the RN can be traced to the 1983 protests against the government. 
The UDI has tended to be seen as the main supporter of the military regime, although Pinochet’s 
detention in London in 1998 enabled the party to put greater distance between it and the former 
dictator (Berrios 2007). Ideologically, the UDI fuses together conservative social Catholicism and neo­
liberalism (Valenzuela 1995), although the former was arguably stronger in its formation than the latter. 
Its leaders were drawn from those who had worked within the military regime while its base included 
substantial sections of the poor and working class. This support was achieved through the strategy of 
its regime’s chief ideologue and UDI leader, Jaime Guzman, both by promoting the organisation of the 
party in poorer neighbourhoods and participating in assistance programmes in needy communities 
during the 1980s (Pinto 2006). This strategy, coupled with close contacts in the business community, 
provided the party with substantial resources. Meanwhile, after 1989 party cohesion and discipline 
was further aided by the social homogeneity of its parliamentarians, which contributed towards the 
party’s growth during the 1990s. The result was an increase in its vote share, from 9.8% in 1989 to 
25.2% in 2001. Indeed, by the 2005 elections it was picking up middle class support alongside its 
more established support base amongst the working class, making it the largest party on the Right 
(Joignant and Navia 2003; Berrios 2007).
The RN comprised the remnants of the old Partido Nacional, the Frente Nacional de Trabajo 
led by a former Pinochet interior minister, Sergio Onofre Jarpa and -  until 1988 -  the UDI (Valenzuela 
1995; Gamboa 2007). The split with the UDI occurred over its decision not to support Pinochet in the 
1988 plebiscite. Yet even with the UDI’s departure, the RN has never been cohesive, owing to its 
division between those who supported a more ‘progressive’, less authoritarian and centrist approach
40
led by Andres Allamand and the more corporatist, conservative tendency initially headed by Jarpa. 
Despite Allamand’s leadership, during the first half of the 1990s he could not count on the support of 
his deputies in Congress; Pinochet’s arrest in 1997 similarly divided the party (Gamboa 2007). The 
result has been a decline in the RN’s electoral fortunes in favour of the UDI since 1989.
2. Brazil
In Brazil the factors that led to the rise of social democratic governments was, on the surface, similar to 
that in Chile: a military regime gave way to democracy that eventually enabled social democratic 
governments to take power: first under Cardoso and the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB) and 
since 2003 under Lula and the Workers’ Party (PT). However, this process was less linear than it 
seems. This section therefore examines not only the difference between the two types of social 
democracy that the Cardoso and Lula governments represent, but also the pathway travelled to that 
point. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the Brazilian road to democracy was a more drawn 
out process than in Chile. The relatively lower levels of repression under the military regime, the 
continuing presence of congressional and political party activity all contributed to a much more 
ambiguous state of affairs in Brazil. This made defining the Left and Right in Brazil much more 
complicated, since there has been considerable overlap between actors associated with each since 
Brazil’s return to democracy in 1985.
2.1. Brazilian politics until 1994
As in Chile, the military regime provided formal rules which helped shape the nature of political activity 
prior to re-democratisation in 1985. However, unlike Chile, the situation faced by both civil and political 
society was noticeably different. First, in the decade before 1985 the regime had begun a process of 
'abertura’ (political liberalisation or ‘opening’) which was designed to control the transition. This had 
been instituted after the peak of military repression, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and when the 
regime appeared confident that it had rooted out what it considered to be subversive activity. Second, 
the process soon took on its own dynamic, making it difficult for the regime to control or contain it. The 
results were growing social and political demands which were exacerbated by the debt crisis after 
1980s.
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The military regime which resulted in the 1964 coup occurred with the support and organisation 
of prominent sections among the economic, political and social elites (Green 2003; Alimonda 1984; 
Levine 1979). Although it initially closed Congress and banned political party activity, the regime 
subsequently changed tack and reinstituted political party activity shortly after the 1964 coup. 
However, this was directed from above and limited to only two new political parties: the National 
Renovation Alliance (ARENA) which represented government supporters and the Brazilian Democratic 
Movement (MDB) (Skidmore 1988). Until the mid-1970s this two-party system was secured by 
relatively easy victories for the regime’s candidates in indirect presidential elections.
The military regime sought to keep a firm grip on both the political system and society, even as 
its control from the late 1970s began to unravel. In part the coercive nature of the state and its 
suppression of debate opened up a cleavage within its ruling group, between the upper bourgeoisie 
and the military. The divide also provided growing space for other social and political actors to emerge 
(O’Donnell 1999; Stepan 1988). At the same time the military-led governments were becoming less 
hardline following the defeat of subversive activity undertaken by left-wing guerrillas by the mid-1970s. 
These less militant elements in the regime began to press for political liberalisation which they sought 
to manage (Cammack 1991).
In the latter half of the 1970s the MDB provided a political forum for opposition to the military 
regime to coalesce. But at the same time social movements were either organising or reconstituting 
themselves from the late 1970s -  and doing so in ways that were independent of the political parties. 
In Sao Paulo and the developed South, a ‘new unionism’ was emerging in the manufacturing and 
industrial sectors. Unlike the older trade unions, which had been officially recognised and co-opted 
under the pre- and post-1964 governments, the new unions were relatively autonomous (Branford and 
Kucinski 2003). Alongside were the rise of other, diverse sets of actors, such as social Christian 
activists and identity-based movements. Like the new unions, these groups were independent, but 
willing to co-operate with the MDB, most notably in the cross-societal demand for rights and direct 
elections for the presidency during the early 1980s.
Brazil returned to democracy in 1985 when the last military president handed power back to 
civilians. However, the transition was pacted and did not herald a complete break with the past. There 
was considerable overlap between the two regimes, most notably in members of the political class that
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straddled both. The first democratic vice-president, Jose Sarney, took over the presidency in March 
1985, following the death of Tancredo Neves, who had been the first civilian to be indirectly elected by 
Congress to the post. Unlike Neves, Sarney had been a former supporter of the military government, 
highlighting the degree of continuity with the previous regime. Sarney’s governing coalition included 
both former political supporters of the military from the Liberal Front Party (PFL) and its opponents 
from the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) (Power 1991; Menguello 1998). Following 
electoral changes at the end of the military regime the MDB had renamed itself the PMDB and 
remained the largest political party in Brazil. As a result it became increasingly a catch-all party, with 
messages that accommodated a wide variety of social groups.
Although the post-1985 political environment was more democratic, this created problems for 
the new government. The association of some of its leading members with the previous regime de­
legitimised it in the eyes of many in the opposition, especially those social movements associated with 
the Workers’ Party (PT). Furthermore, democracy had opened space both for the more clientelist and 
populist political actors at the subnational level and civil society demands. The government proved 
largely unable to address them, resulting in the abandonment of strategic long-term planning in favour 
of short-term political fixes (Sola 1991; NEPP 1988; Power 1991). The situation was exacerbated by 
the economic deterioration of the country, as hyperinflation took hold of Brazil and various stabilisation 
packages repeatedly failed.
Despite democracy’s return in 1985, the government and its supporters had remained largely 
committed to state-led forms of economic development. In 1990 this consensus was challenged by 
the prospect of a more market-oriented approach offered by the new, directly elected president, 
Fernando Collor de Mello. The role of the state was to be reduced through deregulation and the use of 
the market (Brasil 1991). The shift appeared different in political terms as well: the new government 
constituted a break with previous governments and their supporters by eschewing compromise or the 
construction of a coalition in Congress (Menguello 1998). For contemporary observers, Collor 
represented the ‘New Right’ (Bresser Pereira 1991). He was different from other politicians on the 
Brazilian Right, which largely consisted of social and economic conservatives at the time (Cardoso, 
interview, 2008). During the 1990s though, while these politicians increasingly came to embrace the 
market, they remained largely conservative on social issues. They were significant enough in
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Congress that it has provided a substantial and important base to government stability throughout the 
1990s and 2000s. Both Cardoso and Lula have relied on electoral and congressional coalitions with 
such actors: Cardoso’s alliance with the Liberal Front Party (PFL) and Lula, initially with the Liberal 
Party (PL) and more recently with the PMDB.
However, in the early 1990s Collor’s neo-liberal drive was too aggressive, fundamentally 
challenging the tenants of the established political spectrum. While the Left rejected his privatisation 
proposals, the conservatives feared society’s marketisation (Costa 1996). When a corruption scandal 
involving the president’s family and associates broke in 1992, he was without support to avoid 
impeachment and eventual resignation. His departure was hastened by the growing tide of opposition 
beyond the political class and directed by the media and other social groups such as secondary school 
students. The succeeding president, former vice-president Itamar Franco (1992-94), did continue to 
press ahead with some key reforms, including economic stabilisation through the Real Plan (under 
Cardoso’s management) and some initial privatisations. However, unlike Collor he ensured the 
passage of these reforms -  and his presidency -  through the construction of a stable government 
coalition (Menguello 1998). This latter point was not lost on his successors, both of whom would do 
the same.
2.2. Third Way social democracy in Brazil: Cardoso and the PSDB
Upon his succession to the presidency, Itamar Franco had appointed Fernando Henrique Cardoso to 
the foreign ministry. Soon afterwards he was invited to become finance minister and tackle the 
persisting economic crisis which included hyperinflation. It was a challenging task: since 1985 no 
government had achieved more than temporary success. Despite the risk, the new minister soon 
produced and implemented an economic stabilisation plan that achieved the desired effect in 1993-94. 
Six months after the Real Plan had taken effect Cardoso was elected president. Today Brazil’s 
economic and financial situation remains largely stable (minus a slight blip in 1999-2002) and the 
policies associated with the Real Plan have been maintained.
The Real Plan’s achievements won the presidency for Cardoso in 1994 and 1998. In so doing 
it also made his party, the PSDB, among the most important in Brazilian politics, alongside the PT, 
PMDB and PFL. Despite its national role, the party’s origins remained primarily regional, in Sao Paulo.
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The PSDB was an offshoot from the PMDB, forming officially in 1988. However, its origins may be 
found earlier, at the end of the 1970s, as wider political opposition to the military regime was growing.
In 1978 the PMDB nominated Cardoso to run for the Senate. Among those involved with the 
campaign were members of the academic community, including Francisco Weffort, Sergio Motta and 
Alino Afonso; Gilda Gouvea was the campaign secretary. Alongside the intellectuals in Cardoso’s 
campaign were also included some of the new union movement, including Lula and those around him 
(Gouvea, interview, 2008). After 1980 the rules on political parties were changed, prompting sections 
of those involved with the Cardoso campaign to separate and form the PT. This division was 
cemented by the 1982 direct election for Sao Paulo governor when Cardoso’s PMDB ally, Franco 
Montoro, beat Lula (Gouvea, interview, 2008).
During the 1980s the PMDB shifted from the party of opposition to the party of government. Its 
identity had become increasingly blurred; indeed by the 2000s its supporters tended to identify 
themselves as centre-right on the political spectrum, whereas those who voted for the PSDB 
positioned themselves in the centre (Samuels 2006). By 1988 this oppositional wing within the party 
opted for separation, forming the PSDB. The new party had four main groups: the social democrats 
that formed the main bulk, a more conservative wing, democratic socialists (who favoured dialogue 
with the PT) and Christian Democrats (Furtado 1996). Gouvea concurs that the social democrats were 
the largest group within the party and that Cardoso’s ideas, including those associated with 
dependency theory, were prominent from its foundation (interview, 2008). By contrast, Jaguaribe 
(1998) has claimed that as well as being internally split, the social democratic wing of the party was a 
minority; its eventual dominance may be attributable to its supporters occupying the presidency after 
1994 and access to the state.
Indeed, the tensions within the PSDB are evident from its early years. Following the first round 
of the 1989 presidential election, the party leadership was faced with choosing between Collor and 
Lula. It ultimately offered ‘critical support’ to the PT, while remaining concerned at (the then radical) 
petista demands for workers’ power over public and representative institutions. This uneasy balance 
was made less problematic after 1990 when the democratic socialists -  those most closely associated 
with the PT -w on fewer congressional seats, thereby losing influence (Furtado 1996).
45
The emphasis on institutional and representational concerns highlights the nature of the 
PSDB’s support base. Being dominated by intellectuals, university leaders and the middle class, it had 
fewer links with grassroots social movements (although this was common with most Brazilian political 
parties other than the PT; Samuels 2006). Cardoso (interview, 2008) sees this as a virtue: since it is 
not tied to traditional Brazilian politics and practices, it is more ‘puritan’ and less tolerant of clientelism. 
However, this may possibly weaken the party’s social democratic identity and make it more susceptible 
to other interests. For example, although dominated by its Sao Paulo membership, the PSDB also has 
a Northeast wing, the base of which is a ‘modernising’ business elite (Tendler 1997; Burton, 
forthcoming). These was a group of young industrialists and entrepreneurs within the PMDB 
associated with the new governor of Ceara state, Tasso Jereisatti. Joining the PSDB at the time of its 
formation, they had a more market-oriented approach to government, including laying off state 
employees and privatisation of state assets. This did not constitute any notable differences within the 
party; indeed, only since the mid-2000s have splits emerged within the Ceara PSDB and between it 
and the Sao Paulo-based party, mainly as a result of regional and personal differences (Cardoso, 
interview, 2008).
The PSDB’s susceptibility to the market and business support has elicited criticism that it is not 
socially democratic, but rather neo-liberal. However, it differs from the neo-liberal model in that it is 
‘integrative’ or ‘modernising’ (Arroyo, interview, 2008). Whereas neo-liberals see withdrawal of the 
state to set individuals free, those associated with the PSDB see a legacy of inherited social problems 
as the reasons for individuals being constrained. The solution is therefore not for less state, but rather 
an ‘enabling’ state to address those imbalances (Giddens 1998). This ‘new’ Left may be what 
Sandbrook et al (2007: 238) are getting at when they portray the Cardoso (and Lula) governments as 
examples of social democratic governments in a country lacking the criteria for social democracy, such 
as class compromises and an alliance with market interests.
Underpinning the PSDB’s approach was a commitment to institutional means and addressing 
problems through formal channels. This was reflected in Cardoso’s construction of his government. 
Although he sought to keep the social policy areas (education, health, agrarian reform) in the hands of 
his associates (Cardoso, interview, 2008), the construction of Cardoso’s governing coalition suggested 
that he understood the need for political compromise. Former presidents, Collor and (before the 1964
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military coup) Janio Quadros, had forsaken coalition politics and sought to impose their policies using 
charisma alone; both had failed. Cardoso saw an alliance with the centre-right PFL as necessary to 
avoid congressional defeat. Although he acknowledged the party as socially and culturally 
conservative, its attitude to power had changed. Like the PSDB it was less inclined towards patronage 
and more willing to embrace the new roles required for the market and state (Pompeu de Toledo 
1998). Yet the size of the coalition meant that it could not be permanently united or disciplined (de 
Souza 1999). The result was what Shifter (1997) called a choice between democracy and efficiency: 
the government’s search for macroeconomic stability meant that both efficiency and prompt solutions 
to social problems were sacrificed in favour of consensus-building and the institutionalisation of 
representative democracy.
2.3. The Participatory Left in Brazil: Lula and the PT
Cardoso’s senatorial campaign in 1978 was a multi-class activity. It included his own support from the 
‘new middle class’ and the new and independent union movement emerging in the industrial and 
manufacturing sector of Sao Paulo. But rather than heralding the beginning of a new class alliance, 
Cardoso’s electoral campaign marked its highpoint. Following the change of electoral law that allowed 
new political parties to be created, the opportunity for a workers’ party became possible. The effect 
was to divide the most influential actors on the Left in Brazil formally across different party lines. This 
was most apparent a decade later when the PSDB offered ‘critical support’ to Lula and the PT in the 
1989 presidential election run-off. The separation was then reinforced by the PT’s opposition to the 
Cardoso government after 1994. The national rivalry that exists between the two parties owes much to 
their joint origins in Sao Paulo state during the 1970s (Costa, interview, 2008).
Of course the PT had its own supporters in the middle class and intellectual community after its 
formation in February 1980. But in contrast to those who had stayed with the PMDB, the new party’s 
radical demands and rhetoric challenged the new regime instituted after the 1985 transition. Whereas 
the Concertacion assumed the leadership of both civil and political society opposition to the military 
regime in Chile, during the 1980s when the PT was at its most militant -  and when its positions were 
arguably closest to opposition-based social movements -  it failed to take power. Instead a new faction 
within the elite, Collor’s New Right, took power. During this time the PSDB had pursued a less directly
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confrontational stance: it had accepted the rules of the game after 1985 and remained an opposition 
force within the system. By contrast, during the 1980s the PT was viewed as a more radical party than 
it is now. There was considerable fear about the direction the PT would take if it won the 1989 
presidential election; this fear contributed to the substantial support that Collor received as a relatively 
unknown candidate in the second round against Lula.
If the MDB and its supporters (including the future leaders of the PSDB) constituted the reform 
wing of the opposition at the end of the military period, the PT encompassed a broad spectrum of more 
radical reformists who sought to transform the foundations of Brazilian politics, society and economy 
(Arelaro, interview, 2008). Unlike the PSDB it drew its support from across society rather than just the 
economic and intellectual elites. Its origins were to be found in many grassroots movements in the late 
1970s and early 1980s. These included the new unionism in the manufacturing and industrial sectors 
of Sao Paulo, social activists in the Church and former guerrillas.
The PT’s foundation presented a new kind of political representation in Brazilian politics (at 
least in its early years). First, the PT adopted a clear oppositional stance and avoided co-optation by 
the state. Co-optation of labour-related organisations had been common during the populist period in 
the 1940s and 1950s, when trade unions appeared to act less as independent organisations than as a 
branch of government. Second, although the PT was a ‘workers’ party’, it had a more socially diverse 
constituency than its name suggested, including a wide range of social movements and activists other 
than those associated with labour. Furthermore, just as the party sought political autonomy from the 
state, so did the PT also seek to provide it to the various groups that made it up. Membership between 
the party and social movements tended to overlap, although there were institutional mechanisms to 
ensure that one did not dominate the other. This was most evident in the institutionalisation of various 
factions within the party called tendencias and of various forums and party bodies formed to enable 
internal dialogue and participation to occur. Such behaviour was in marked contrast to other Brazilian 
parties, where the bulk of activism was concentrated in the leadership rather than throughout the party 
as a whole (Baiocchi and Checa 2008). Third, the PT increasingly came to have a stronger sense of 
affiliation by both its members and supporters (Samuels 2006). Activists’ sense of being a part of a 
political process rather than just a foot soldier is arguably shown in the anecdote that whereas most 
Brazilian parties employ people to distribute their materials during election campaigns, the PT can rely
on its volunteers to do so. Such support owes much to the relatively open and participatory nature of 
the party.
If the PT presented a challenge to conventional party politics in the 1980s, it has also faced an 
internal dilemma since its foundation. As Przeworski (1985) observed, electoral competition generally 
undermines socialist parties and their association with the working class. Elections encourage 
compromise, which weakens radical goals (such as the overthrow of the capitalist system) and 
prompts more reformist and pragmatic goals (such as material benefits for workers). The PT was no 
different in this respect, other than in the nature of its support base being broader than simply class 
interest. Since engaging in elections, the PT had to ask itself if its primary aim is to represent its 
constituent base or to maximise votes. (Keck 1992:18; Leal 2004) Between 1980 and 2003 the party 
was closely associated with opposition groups and individuals, many of whom identified with socialism. 
This was complicated by the election of PT activists to executive positions, first as mayors and then 
governors; since 2003 this has come to include the national level, through control of the presidency.
Critics claim that PT mayors and governors fail to respond to the social demands and needs of 
the previously excluded. As Sposati (1999) observed, ‘socialists’ should champion an alternative 
vision for society that involves not just universal entitlements, but goes beyond the constraints of the 
state and social policies as they are presently understood. This wide, expansive vision of what the PT 
should strive for created difficulties for those in elected positions: not only were they constrained by the 
structure of the state (and the wider capitalist system underpinning it), they stressed the need to 
govern for everyone, including those groups and interests not associated with the party.
Even when the party has sought to accommodate this more radical vision, it has been 
uncertain what the party’s relationship was to representative versus participatory institutions (Nylen 
1995). As the experience of the first PT administration in Sao Paulo showed (1989-92), while the party 
could create new institutions to run alongside the existing ones in health, it was uncertain whether they 
were to be merely consultative or deliberative (Keck 1992: 232-4).
Given the openness of the party, the uncertainty caused considerable tension within the PT. It 
also prompted debate about a 'modo petista de governar’ (petista way of governing) that laid out 
general aims and themes which elected officials could follow (Bittar 1992). Perhaps the most notable 
of these efforts was the introduction of the participatory budget (PB) in PT-run Porto Alegre city after
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1989. Its operation has been outlined extensively elsewhere (see Baiocchi 2003a; Koonings 2004; 
Bruce 2004). For the purpose of this dissertation, it is sufficient to observe that the mechanism sought 
to balance the demands of both the representative and participatory branches of the party. Set up by 
the municipality, it provided formal rules by which greater participation -  principally those otherwise 
overlooked groups -  could take part in public investment decisions by local authorities. The PB 
consequently provided a new space away from representative institutions themselves where 
differences between petistas and their supporters could be played out (Macaulay and Burton 2003; 
Goldfrank and Schneider 2006). In addition, the PT-run executives similarly benefited, since the PB 
never adversely affected their ability to influence the bulk of public expenditure. At no point has the PB 
ever constituted more than 10% of a municipal or state budget in any Brazilian municipality or state 
since its introduction (Schneider 2008).
Although differences would persist between the party and its activists in executive positions, 
during the 1990s these were relatively modest compared to the previous decade. This reflected 
several changes that were occurring simultaneously within the PT. First, the choice between electoral 
maximisation and social representation had not gone away. However, during this period they were 
held in check as a result of the groups associated with each being relatively evenly matched. This 
remained the case so long as the prospect of a PT national election victory remained reasonably 
remote (Leal 2004).
Second, after 1994 there was a shift in the base of the party between its representative and 
participatory wings at the local level. Activism and dialogue were drying up (Arelaro, interview, 2008). 
This was to have a greater impact on those associated with greater participation within the party, who 
were also the most Marxist-oriented in ideological terms (Petras 2005a), thereby reducing their relative 
influence.
Third, changes were occurring further up the party structures which had an impact on the 
representative and participatory sections of the party. On the one hand, the leadership around Lula 
was adopting stances in the economic sphere that it had previously rejected. From being critical of the 
Real Plan in 1994, by 2002 it not only accepted, but embraced, the macroeconomic policy 
implemented under Cardoso. The then PT governor of Brasilia, Cristovam Buarque, recalls in 1998 
voicing support for Cardoso’s finance minister, Pedro Malan, when he devalued the Brazilian real. He
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expected to be disciplined by the party for doing so, only to receive an acknowledgement from Lula in 
2001 that he concurred with his view (interview, 2008). On the other hand, the social composition 
across the party was changing. The party’s membership was becoming more middle class and white- 
collared as well as increasingly professionalized and bureaucratic (Samuels 2004). This was due in 
part to changes in the union and social movements that made up the party’s membership: according to 
Samuels (2004), industrial unions have declined just as those in the public sector have grown. 
Meanwhile, social movements are more inclined to work with the state than confront them. Such a 
perspective is in contrast to those such as Petras (2005a), who claim that the PT has seen its support 
shift away from the old social movements to those with less class-based associations.
Fourth, the ideological sharpness of the party was being blunted, just as the leadership was 
strengthening its grip on the party. This was no doubt aided by the more professional and bureaucratic 
party that existed in the 1990s. But it also owed much to the coalitions that the PT formed, especially 
after 1998. Until 2002 the leadership played down the use of Marxist terminology in its rhetoric (Petras 
2005a). Electoral campaigns generally involve coalitions between parties in Brazil, especially for the 
executive posts of mayor, governor and president. Similar ones had been undertaken by the PT 
before 1994, but after Lula’s defeat of that year he demanded that he and his team have greater 
control over the party’s strategic direction. This was formalised in 2001 when the prospect of a Lula 
victory looked possible. The PT’s National Meeting effectively passed the power to make electoral 
alliances to the National Directorate, which was dominated by Lula’s faction. Their choice was to align 
with the market-friendly Liberal Party (Leal 2004). This shift was also influenced by the growing 
preference of rank-and-file members for moderation in the party after 1995 as the party increasingly 
won executive positions at the subnational level where the PT was obliged to administer cities and 
states rather than merely criticising the government (Samuels 2004).
By 2003 then, the PT seemed a noticeably different party from the one that had been founded 
in 1980. Although the party could still draw on the support of social movements and organisations in a 
way that other political parties could not, the nature of its membership, internal structures and the 
relationship between the leadership and grassroots had changed. Furthermore, ideological differences 
had been lessened, even if the rhetoric of change still remained during the election campaign. Yet it 
was still identifiable as a leftist party: both its members and supporters placed themselves to the left of
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the political spectrum. In addition, like Cardoso’s ‘puritan’ middle class base, the PT’s support also 
showed a rejection of traditional and clientelist ways of conducting politics and a commitment towards 
representative institutions (Samuels 2006).
The PT’s internal changes continued into government. Like the Cardoso government before it, 
the party pursued the creation of a stable and effective governing coalition by attracting the support of 
other political parties. Initially the government showed itself inclined towards partisan support: it 
sought partners from within its electoral and congressional alliances, although showing a reticence to 
share power in the cabinet (Samuels 2007, Baiocchi and Checa 2008). This changed following the 
mensalao scandal in mid-2005, when the party’s use of state funds to buy political support was 
exposed. The impact was substantial as a number of party leaders were implicated, meaning that Lula 
lost several key allies, including his chief of staff, Jose Dirceu, and party president Jose Genoino. 
Several months later, in an unrelated scandal, his finance minister, Antonio Palocci, was also forced to 
resign. Increasingly, the PT came to be associated with the figure of Lula himself (Bourne 2008; 
Baiocchi and Checa 2008). Lula’s response to the scandals was to build an oversized coalition with 
the participation of the PMDB to provide greater government stability. The result was the PT pursuing 
an ‘aggressive centralism’ (Power 2007), which pulled the leadership increasingly away from its 
already weakened participatory-minded and ideologically socialist grassroots. More recently, this 
search for stability provided by coalition has meant the rise of more clientelist forces within the 
government, thereby weakening the extent to which the PT has achieved a break with traditional 
political activity (Cardoso, interview, 2008).
At the same time the leadership was taking active steps to impose order on the party. During 
the government’s first year dissident voices were either disciplined or expelled from the party (Petras 
2005a). Several, including the Alagoas senator, Heloisa Helena, set up a new socialist party, PSOL. 
However, their capacity to influence both the PT and the wider Left remained limited, owing in 
considerable part to the relative size and hegemony of the PT. This was reinforced by the party’s 
weak showing in the 2006 elections. The situation means that while the PT’s old support base of 
social movements and organisations may express frustration at the party’s changes and offer 
sympathy to such efforts, the PT remains the only sizeable and effective party available to form a
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government. As Costa (interview, 2008), observes, there currently is no other space for those on the 
Left to go.
3. Conclusion
This chapter began by noting the two main types of reformist Left that exist in Latin America -  the 
Third Way and Participatory Left versions -  and asked how they appeared to have collapsed into one 
another after 2000. In addition, we asked what this meant in terms of the nature of social democracy 
in each country.
In both countries there was a military regime and a transition to democracy. In Chile the regime 
was arguably more repressive than in Brazil and the transition from military rile to democratic rule 
coincided with an immediate change in the political elite. By contrast the pace of change in Brazil was 
protracted, with liberalisation occurring under the military from the late 1970s and the regime’s allies 
remaining in power after democracy’s return in 1985. Similarly, the nature of the Right faced by the 
governments in each country varied: in Chile it remained strong, both ideologically and organisationally 
even after the transition; in Brazil the Right was less clearly definable as a particular party or 
organisation and primarily concerned with maintaining power. This was apparent in the compromises 
made after 1985 to remain in government, first by accepting democracy and then through coalition with 
the PSDB.
The difference in the transitions and the type of Right in each country, combined with the 
relative autonomy and organisation of social movements in Brazil, meant that the demands of 
government ensured a more immediate top-down approach in Chile. Given the strength of political 
parties in Chilean society, they soon assumed leadership of the opposition to the military regime, 
weakening social movements’ influence. In Brazil the PSDB had a relatively weak association with 
social movements, contributing towards a more elitist approach. Meanwhile the PT has reflected the 
various changes in the transition as an opposition party prior to the 1990s and the pressures wrought 
through growing electoral success, and the resulting responsibility to run municipal and state 
governments. This has influenced its internal composition and its relationship with power. The most 
participatory model of the three governing cases studied, various factors ensured that the PT’s 
leadership gained greater control of the internal party mechanisms prior to taking national power.
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The contrasting experiences of Brazil and Chile point towards different types of social 
democracy within each. Despite the intensity of the military regime and its New Right project, 
Sandbrook et al (2007:178) suggest that Chile had the basis for social democracy, through well- 
organised working class interests and programmatic parties. Indeed, it could be argued that the 
Chilean Left remained more closely tied to Marxist ideals than the Brazilian Left before the 1980s, 
thereby making its shift towards social democracy the more impressive. The re-emergence of parties 
in the 1980s and their class basis reinforces the tensions at work within that country’s Left. Meanwhile 
in Brazil the veneer of social democracy was weaker. Class-based politics was less the rule and 
substantial inequality has -  and still -  remains the norm. This contributes towards a social democratic 
‘politics’ by the Cardoso and Lula governments as opposed to a social democratic ‘regime’ (Sandbrook 
et al: 238).
This distinction means that the Third Way approaches pursued by the Concertacion and 
Cardoso governments were distinct: the PSDB’s attachment to social democracy was arguably slighter 
than the Concertacion’s more ‘rooted’ version. Meanwhile, the road travelled by the PT since the 
1980s has meant that in government its commitment to the Participatory Left was notably less 
‘participatory’ than it might otherwise appear. These variations are presented in the following chapter 
regarding the educational policymaking cores within each government.
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3. Engineering elites: Accounting for the nature of governmental 
policymaking in education in Brazil and Chile
Social democracy in Latin America appears to fall between two main types: the Third Way and 
Participatory Left. The former lacks ties with wider social movements and class-based interests, the 
latter retains them. This distinction should similarly hold for the way that each approaches decision­
making: while the latter would adopt a more ‘participatory’ style, including various individuals and 
groups from within and outside the party, the Third Way approach will tend to be ‘technocratic’, in 
which an elite dominates policymaking.
However, the difference between these two models is not so clear and is less apparent in 
practice than it seems, especially as a political party moves from opposition into government. The 
cases of Brazil and Chile show that while the PSDB presented the clearest example of the Third Way, 
the nature of the Concertacion prior to taking office suggested it shared some of the characteristics of 
the Participatory Left. Similarly, the PT in government has proved to be less ‘participatory’ than its 
Participatory Left ideal.
Much of this can be attributed to the inevitability of elites. ‘Democracy is inconceivable without 
organization... [and] Organization implies the tendency to oligarchy’, leading to a small minority of 
leaders became dominant (Michels 2001:19, 26). For the Left such elites were negatively perceived, 
since oligarchy tended towards conservatism and bureaucracy, whilst downgrading the role of party 
non-elites (Barker 2001: 32). The nature of the reformist, or more social democratic, approach is 
further complicated by the distinction between politicians who are economically independent and thus 
able to work towards change and those whose motives are constrained by their material dependence 
on the system (Beetham 1985: 229). Today, arguably, most politicians-especially elected ones-find 
themselves in the latter position, being part of a professional political class. Yet even if they rely on the 
political system for financial support, political leaders may not be as limited by structural constraints as 
they appear; Jones (1989) observes that leaders have a certain degree of agency, being able to act 
both where certain rules and conditions are in place or by reacting creatively in more ambiguous 
settings.
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The degree of agency is arguably greater among left-wing Latin American politicians (whether 
they be socialist or social democratic) than elsewhere, even as the pro-liberalisation and deregulation 
influence of international organisations in the education sector have grown since the 1990s (Leuze et 
al 2007). Compared to other regions, Latin American bureaucracy tends to be less institutionalised, 
providing politicians with greater space to shape the direction of the administrative apparatus. 
Furthermore, given that left-wing politicians tend to be more distrustful of bureaucrats, they are 
therefore more inclined to adopt counterstaffs to break bureaucratic control of policy (Guy Peters 2001: 
247-8, 250). This may be reflected in the policymaking core of political appointees and advisors that a 
minister builds around him or herself in the ministry, which may be perceived as a coherent, united and 
self-conscious group of individuals (Parry 1969). In Latin America, this elite role is especially 
important, given the largely top-down engineering of social sector reforms during the 1990s (Hall 2003: 
275).
Despite the presence of policy elites, it would be incorrect to assume that their emergence is 
exclusive. Barker at al (2001) note that more inclusive, democratic leadership does exist, where elites 
seek understanding and acceptance from their supporters. In such circumstances the elite engages in 
defining the parameters of action that it and its supporters can agree with. However, this is a not a 
view that one would expect to find in the Participatory Left, which, owing to its ideological origins and 
roots in social movements, would be more likely to conform to socialists’ distrust of bureaucracy. In 
addition, given the diverse interests that a broader base of social support would demand, one would 
assume the Participatory Left to be less cohesive in its approach to policy. Meanwhile, a Third Way 
government, with its narrower base of external support would arguably be more susceptible to being 
absorbed into the administrative system, while at the same time being far more cohesive.
The Brazilian and Chilean cases that follow illustrate that the Third Way Concertacion and 
PSDB governments largely conform to type. The education policy cores in both governments 
demonstrate few links with other actors within their parties or social movements more generally. 
Furthermore, given their reformist nature they tended to be less sceptical of bureaucracy than more 
radical sections of the Left and had a clearer policy agenda from the outset. But contrary to 
assumptions related to Participatory Left governments, the first Lula term suggests that it too 
conformed to a similar, elite-oriented form of policymaking as well. The journey the PT had to travel to
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reach this point was far less direct than that faced by the Third Way cases. Initially the relative 
strength of the social base underpinning the party had to be overcome. This occurred in tandem with 
the PT’s growing electoral success during the 1990s and the breaking down of party suspicion towards 
the state as increasing numbers of activists worked within it at municipal and state level. Once in 
national government, through the policy core failed to be sufficiently cohesive, reflecting internal 
divisions within the leadership between President Lula and his first education minister. This failure of 
cohesion was evident in the lack of focus in education policy, which was only resolved when changes 
were made to the education team thus ensuring it presidential support.
1. Chile
Educational policymaking in Chilean governments has always been dominated by a small core 
concentrated within the Ministry of Education (Mineduc). The Concertacion that took power after 1990 
was characterised as elitist and technocratic. This was similarly the case in education, where the 
same handful of individuals dominated policymaking until the mid-2000s. Policymaking in this period 
may be divided into two parts: before 1994 when policymakers focused on ‘saving’ the system, 
following years of neglect by the military regime; and after 1994 when the focus was on improving the 
management of the system. During this period the cohesiveness of the policymaking core remained 
strong, ensuring a clear focus in educational priorities and policies.
Since 2000 there have been changes in personnel that appeared to be opening up the 
policymaking process, to include new individuals and groups within the executive branch. In 2006 
protests and demonstrations that initially began with secondary school students and subsequently 
escalated to include parents, university students and wider society in general, seemed to indicate a 
more expansive approach to policymaking was on the cards. However, this was shut down a year 
later by the Concertacion’s traditional way of working.
1.1 Education policy within the Concertacion prior to 1990
The present Concertacion’s approach to policymaking in education has links in its predecessor parties 
prior to the military period. Both the PDC and UP governments that managed the education system 
between 1964 and 1973 were strongly associated with reform (Bitar, interview, 2007). Both 
governments sought to increase coverage throughout the educational system and invested in
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infrastructure to achieve this. However, the PDC was seen as technocratic and clientelist in its 
approach while the UP was seen as more inclusive and committed to decentralised policymaking, 
engaging and involving various educational actors at the local, regional and national levels (Fischer 
1979; Farrell 1986; Yocelevzky 1987; Corvalan 2003; Zemelman and Jara 2004).
During the military period policy makers throughout the government, including Mineduc, were 
primarily motivated by economic concerns. The most prominent actors included the finance, economic 
and planning ministries which influenced policymaking. In the first part of the military period Mineduc’s 
ministers were drawn from admirals and after 1978 from civilians (Dittborn, interview, 2007). It was 
during the early 1980s the key policies that would shape the Chilean educational system were 
implemented, including the deregulation and decentralisation of the school system.
The most visible members of the Concertacion that would form its educational policy core after 
1990 were individuals such as Cristian Cox, Jose Joaquin Brunner, Ivan Nunez, Carlos Eugenio Baker 
and Juan Eduardo Garcia-Huidobro. All shared a common historical experience, having been militants 
in the late 1960s and having supported the Allende government in the early 1970s. The secretary 
general of the opposition movement to Pinochet’s 1988 plebiscite poll, the No Campaign, Genaro 
Arriegada, commenting on the wider Concertacion generation of which these educationalists were a 
part, claimed that they were the last to have been involved in full political participation prior to 1973. 
Not only did the military regime prevent them from entering politics, the universities, the media and 
public administration, its actions also prompted them to re-evaluate their thoughts regarding political 
action, including tolerance and respect for the views of others. The result was a shift towards political 
moderation (Seminario de Campana del No 1988). Furthermore, many of these individuals that would 
be associated with the Concertacion, went into exile in the period after 1973: Cox and Brunner ended 
up pursuing graduate studies in Britain while Garcia-Huibodro completed his doctorate in France. As 
well as excluding them from Chile, exile arguably opened doors to these future policymakers, exposing 
them to wider international trends in both politics and education and providing them with experiences 
and perspectives that went beyond those promoted by the IFIs in Chile during the 1970s and 1980s.
The exiles’ return to Chile occurred while the Pinochet regime remained in place. Still denied 
from participating within the existing political and educational system, these education-oriented 
concertacionistas either established new independent academic research centres or clustered around
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existing ones, including the Latin American Social Sciences Faculty (FLACSO), the Interdisciplinary 
Programme of Educational Research (PIIE) and the Centre of Investigation and Development of 
Education (CIDE). In these institutions they collaborated on analysing the military educational reforms. 
At the time the scope for independent research within Chilean universities was limited. This 
environment ensured that they gained close personal and professional knowledge of each other that 
arguably transcended any ideological differences that existed between them (Cox, Brunner, Elacqua, 
Munoz, Weinstein, interviews, 2007).
In the 1980s the group lacked consensus over the education changes in Chile. A 1984 series 
of academic discussions between Concertacion-associated scholars showed little agreement on a 
wide range of issues, from the role of primary and post-secondary education, municipalisation and 
teacher training (Cox 1985; Cox, interview, 2007). Nonetheless, there was a determination to find 
some agreement, which was evident by the time of the democratic transition. These concertacionista 
academics stressed the need for continuity in educational policy (PIIE 1989). This was evident in the 
Concertacion’s 1989 educational commission proposals which proposed to improve educational quality 
through targeted measures. They included greater financial assistance to poorer students, schools 
and teachers, building infrastructure, curricular changes to primary and secondary education, 
extensions in the school day and revision of various forms of teaching and evaluation (Concertacion 
1989; Diaz, interview, 2007).
1.2. Education policy makers within the Concertacion after 1990
The first Concertacion education minister was Ricardo Lagos, who many had expected would be a 
senator until he lost the election in 1989. Lagos’s prominence in the Concertacion meant that despite 
the assumption that education reform remains largely overlooked by Latin American governments 
owing to the relatively weak position of education ministries (Angell and Graham 1995), in Chile by 
contrast the prospects seemed promising. Cox (interview, 2007) suggested that the presence of 
Lagos, Jose Pablo Arellano, Sergio Bitar and Mariana Aylwin as education ministers ensured a degree 
of continuity during the period. In addition ministers remained committed to the governing coalition 
and consequently sought to effect changes within agreed parameters. This was most evident following
59
the 1994 Brunner commission which provided the strategy and terms of reference for the coalition’s 
approach to educational policy until 2006 (Cox, interview, 2007)
Policy continuity was buttressed by the various academics and scholars that were appointed by 
Concertacion ministers to lead Mineduc after 1990. They came mainly from the two centre-left parties, 
the Socialists and the PPD, and remained in post for more than a decade. Given the role that social 
movements had played alongside the political parties in the struggle for democracy during the 1980s, it 
was perhaps surprising that after 1990 the Concertacion approach to policy became increasingly party- 
centric. Yet this could be understood in two main ways: first, owing to the overlapping role of these 
policymakers as both political party and social group activists; second, the acceptance of the wider 
memberships of social organisations and political parties to defer to this elite. This deference could be 
attributed both to the recognition that a more democratic government was in place and because both 
organisations and political parties had struggled against the military regime. In other words, support 
for the Concertacion could be perceived as support for democracy (Angell 2007:174) -  hence the lack 
of overt civil society opposition or challenges to the governments during the first half of the 1990s.
Within the new Concertacion’s education team there was a feeling that the government’s 
approach needed to change. While the early 1990s had involved debate about the role of the state 
and the use of the market and municipalities in educational provision, from the mid-1990s government 
thinking emphasised greater spending and incentives. At the turn of the century ministers and officials 
began to pay greater attention to the ‘second generation’ of reforms, namely the more problematic 
issues of curricular, pedagogic and evaluative changes (Cox 2006).
Initially, the Concertacion did not subject much of its educational policies to the legislative 
route, the exceptions being the 1992 and 1996 curricular reforms. Between 1990 and 1995 education 
ministers generally sought to reform education by executive discretion (Scope 1997). Politically, this 
was due in part to the relative strength of the Right in Congress, the lack of a Concertacion majority 
and the high threshold required to pass a constitutional law. Attempts to pass bills faced stiff 
opposition, as shown by the failure to reform the Constitutional Organic Teaching Law(LOCE) in 1992 
and the compromise to accept co-financing of subsidised schools in the 1993 tax reform (Nunez, 
interview 1, 2007; Elacqua, Brunner, interviews, 2007; Cortes 1996).
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While the Concertacion had introduced changes in the education sector during the first Aylwin 
government, it was only in 1994 that it more thoroughly analysed the system and the direction for 
future policy reform. A commission, chaired by a political appointee at Mineduc, Jose Joaquin 
Brunner, was set up. First, the Brunner commission highlighted the emphasis that the Concertacion 
had placed on the need for consensus in educational policy; this was expounded on in Frei’s 
presidential message in May 1996 which laid out education reform as the main task of his government 
(Weinstein, interview, 2007). Frei’s first education minister, Schiefelbein (1994) stressed the need to 
find policies and solutions that met the demands of different social sectors, although Rivero (1999) 
observed that it did not offer an alternative approach to education. Increasingly attention was being 
paid to what was occurring within schools, with more research directed to this end (Bosch, interview,
2007). These perceptions were soon reinforced by the cross-party agreement signed by the 
Concertacion and right-wing parties in early 1995. In particular this emphasised an acceptance in 
favour of the existing school system over that of a centralised one. Both Brunner himself and Carlos 
Pena stressed that the main points of discussion in his commission had been over how to manage and 
finance decentralisation (interviews, 2007). The agreement also ensured that a consensus was 
achieved over other aspects of the educational system, including municipal autonomy over schools, 
flexibility in the labour regime and a commitment to increase educational spending from 5% to 7% of 
GDP, with contributions from families, tax incentives and business (Acuerdo Marco 1995). Second, 
the 1994 commission marked the end of the governing coalition’s early phase when it had primarily 
been concerned with passing emergency measures. In its place came a less urgent period in which 
the Concertacion broadly accepted the model as they had inherited it, and sought its reform rather 
than replacement (Diaz, Soto, Garcia-Huidobro, interviews, 2007).
The second phase of Concertacion policymaking, from the mid-1990s on, ended any 
discussion that the pre-1990 decentralisation, choice and market reforms would be reversed. Instead, 
from 1994 until the 2000s the emphasis was on accommodating these trends while increasing 
spending (Cox 2006). This coincided with the arrival of a new president, Eduardo Frei, who sought to 
prioritise education through new improvement programmes. These included the continued use of the 
targeted funding programmes to poorer schools (P900 and MECE), curricular reform, the professional
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development of teachers and the introduction of the Whole School Day Programme (JEC), which 
sought to extend the school day and provide school meals (Mineduc 1998).
The approach adopted by the Concertacion during the 1990s was maintained into the 2000s. 
Notwithstanding the rhetoric about participation and citizenship during Bachelet’s 2005 presidential 
campaign, her manifesto did not challenge the coalition’s prevailing educational orthodoxy (Cox, 
interview, 2007). Despite some references to the importance of improving pre-primary schooling, the 
educational section of the Concertacion programme offered no fundamental change other than to 
propose a differentiated subsidy scheme and more money for social programmes and improvements in 
general (Cox 2007). This was greeted with opposition from the Right and the private sector, who 
argued that this would limit resources and should be replaced with a more general increase in funding 
(Caceres 2007; Bosch, interview, 2007).
Since the early 2000s the policy-making group has undergone both internal and external 
pressures in relation to government. Internally, there has been a shift away from policymaking being 
restricted solely to Mineduc to other branches of government. The change began under the Lagos 
presidency and has continued under Bachelet. In part this is a generational effect, with younger 
scholars and researchers taking up posts within Mineduc, and a broader range of actors, from both the 
technocratic and political sides in government. This has made for a less cohesive policymaking core 
than previously. Unlike the previous generation, which could cite a shared historical experience, the 
lines of attachment are more ‘blurry’. Whereas the initial concertacionistas could place themselves 
clearly on the side of democracy and in opposition to the Pinochet regime, current political appointees 
both in the government and Mineduc distinguish themselves from the Right by being less comfortable 
with the present political and educational situation (Elacqua, interview, 2007). These changes exist 
alongside a social cleavage that persists in Chilean society between those that supported or opposed 
the Pinochet regime (Angell 2007). Alongside this there would appear to be less fear of the Right as 
existed in the period immediately after 1990, although it continues to be consulted on any legislation 
being drafted (Elacqua, interview, 2007). In addition, there are a wider range of political and technical 
individuals involved in the Concertacion’s educational policy-making. Under Lagos this was reflected 
in the involvement of senior politicians such as Sergio Bitar as minister. More recently, under Bachelet 
educational policy-making is influenced by actors beyond Mineduc, to include the Finance and
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Regional Development ministries as well as the presidency, through her advisors and the involvement 
of the educational advisory commission (Munoz, interview, 2007). Yet the view is that policy-making in 
education remains a largely technocratic model (Pena, interview, 2007).
Externally, the Concertacion’s educational policymaking was challenged most notably during 
the 2006 demonstrations. Initiated by secondary students unhappy at rising costs for exams and 
transport, the protests gained the support of university students, school teachers and parents as well 
as the media. Pressure on the government prompted Bachelet to set up an advisory presidential 
commission to examine the problems within the system and make recommendations. Unlike the 
previous 1994 commission the membership was broader (Aguilera 2007). The prospect of a wider 
policymaking process did not ultimately emerge: in November 2007 the Concertacion eventually 
reached an agreement with the Right in Congress on the way forward. Among the proposals was a 
suggestion for a National Education Council to be established that would set the policy agenda and be 
insulated from politics and the presidential electoral cycle (Puryear 2007a). Rather than offering a new 
approach, this appeared to reinforce the present, technocratic form of policymaking within the 
Concertacion -  although in a more formal setting than through the current team of ministerial advisors 
within Mineduc.
2. Brazil
The policymaking teams that emerged in the Cardoso and Lula governments were more similar than 
the distinction between the Third Way and Participatory Lefts would otherwise suggest -  although the 
paths each party took was substantially different. In both administrations policymaking was 
concentrated in the education minister and his team within the Ministry of Education (MEC). Like the 
Concertacion in Chile, those associated with education in the Cardoso and Lula governments (at least 
for the first year in the PT’s case) came from an educational background, especially from those 
involved in higher education. In the Cardoso government this policy elite arrived at the ministry 
already formed, following collaboration by the leading figures prior to Cardoso’s election in 1994. In 
the case of the PT government the policy core was from a more politically-oriented background, with 
their own electoral support bases, including the first two ministers (Cristovam Buarque and Tarso 
Genro) and their senior appointees (e.g. the former teachers’ union leader, Francisco Chagas). More
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recently, figures which are more politically dependent on Lula have come to dominate MEC, such as 
the current education minister, Fernando Haddad and the president of the National Institute of 
Educational Studies and Research (INEP), Reynaldo Fernandes.
One main difference between the two governments was that where Souza and his team had a 
clear policy agenda and presidential support during the Cardoso government, the same could not 
ironically be said of the PT. The relatively clear focus for the PSDB meant it had no trouble adapting to 
a more elitist, top-down approach. The PT by contrast had to cope with a shift away from a 
participatory form of policymaking, an absence of any clear educational project and a relatively weak 
position for MEC in relation to other government departments.
2.1. The education policymaking team in the Cardoso government
The team that took over MEC in 1995 marked a break both in the educational debate and policy 
making. By the mid-1990s the situation seemed open for change: following a decade of economic 
stagnation and emphasis on constitutional matters, there was growing concern about the state of 
education (Hall 2003: 274). There was increasing recognition within political circles about the need for 
change: in 1990 a UN-sponsored global education conference had prompted the creation of a Ten 
Year Education for All Plan in 1993 by the Franco government. This plan aimed to stimulate and 
mobilise government, the education sector and NGOs to become more engaged. The Plan noted that 
government at all levels allocated 5% of GDP to education, which put it in a similar position to other 
developed countries. The Brazilian experience suggested that it was not effectively distributed and 
was subject to either misplacement or embezzlement (Castro 2000). Part of these problems stemmed 
from the nature of policy making within MEC prior to 1995. Education was subject to clientelist 
pressures, whereby resources were allocated on the basis of political support rather than educational 
need (Goldemberg, interview, 2008). Constitutionally, financially and administratively, Brazil’s 
education system needed a response.
Reflecting these trends, Cardoso decided to make education one of his campaign priorities in 
the 1994 election. Paulo Renato Souza, a former chancellor of Unicamp university and education 
secretary for Montoro’s state administration of Sao Paulo during the 1980s, was appointed as the 
coordinator for the manifesto. Five months before the elections discussions were held among 1000
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PSDB activists and technical advisors at state level across the country to formulate a plan for 
education. In contrast to past efforts at developing educational policy at a party level, the process 
included strong involvement by both Cardoso and his election communication team (Souza 2005). 
The result was the close association of Cardoso, the candidate, and education. Despite the efforts to 
broaden the process nationally, including different study groups and the involvement of school 
teachers and union leaders, the bulk came from the higher education community, and from Sao Paulo 
in particular (Souza, interview, 2007; Cardoso 2006).
The resulting manifesto, Maos a Obra, sought to balance the market and the state in poverty 
alleviation (Cardoso, interview, 2008). More specifically, in education it stated the need for more 
resources and institutional reform by MEC to ensure guaranteed places for all 7-14 year olds at the 
primary level. The central state -  or federal government -  would take on less direct responsibility and 
focus on the coordination of the education system (Cardoso 1994).
Following Cardoso’s 1994 election victory Souza subsequently took on the task of coordinating 
the transition from one president to the next. Cardoso was determined to keep the areas he had 
prioritised within the control of his associates rather than of his electoral and government coalition 
partners in the centre-right PFL (Souza, interview, 2007; Gouvea, interview, 2008) -  a decision which 
Cardoso claimed met little resistance from the Right (interview, 2008). Initially Souza appeared to be 
headed for the Ministry of Planning, where he would have maintained the strategic approach he had 
brought to the manifesto and the transition. This was altered when a close Cardoso ally, Jose Serra, 
was placed there; Souza was then invited to take up the post at MEC.
Souza would eventually put together a core of advisors in the various departmental secretariats 
that consisted of the group involved in the PSDB’s election manifesto -  and that related to education in 
particular. Drawn mainly from the party’s support in Sao Paulo and amongst the academic community, 
this new education team included Gilda Portugal Gouvea, Eunice Durham, lara Prado and Maria 
Helena Guimaraes de Castro. Gouvea and Prado had both previously worked with Souza at Unicamp; 
Durham had already spent several years in MEC’s secretariats while Maria Helena was then the 
municipal education secretary in the Sao Paulo city of Campinas. Like Cardoso, Serra and Souza, all 
had backgrounds in higher education and constituted the strongest voices within the PSDB on 
educational matters (Gouvea, interview, 2008). Furthermore, like the Concertacion’s education team
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in Chile, the core of this education team lasted through both Cardoso terms, thereby providing policy 
continuity and consistency at the centre (Costa, interview, 2008). This marked a shift from previous 
education ministers, who had not built such close teams around themselves (Goldemberg, interview, 
2008) and appears to have outlasted the Cardoso presidency, being partially reformed at the state 
level in Sao Paulo since 2007, following Serra’s election as governor.
The direction of the new team soon focused on institutional matters, buttressed by publicity and 
marketing (Souza 2005; Motter, unpublished2). The government identified the main problems with the 
education system as being its poor quality owing to the low level of primary school completions, limited 
or absent materials and teachers’ precarious financial positions (Brasil 1995). This assessment was 
completed during the first part of 1995 and involved a decision to restructure and coordinate more 
effectively the education system.
The restructuring required the introduction of new institutional parameters, which included 
constitutional amendments to the administrative responsibility for education provision (LDB) and its 
finance (FUNDEF). In addition, new mechanisms were introduced (e.g. an external university 
evaluation system, the Provao) or adapted (e.g. the primary school testing regime known as SAEB) to 
assess the performance of the system as a whole (Souza 2005). These developments, the bulk of 
which occurred during the first Cardoso term, were largely generated within MEC by the educational 
core. FUNDEF, for example, was the result of a working group involving Gouvea, Prado, Durham and 
an advisor and economist, Barjas Negri (Durham, interview, 2008). For the new LDB the government 
removed the existing legislation that had been before Congress for several years, working on a 
replacement with the sponsorship of Senator Darcy Ribeiro (himself a former education minister and 
noted academic). The evaluation mechanisms, meanwhile, were designed and implemented by the 
National Institute of Educational Studies and Research (INEP), an agency of MEC that had previously 
been influential in the 1950s and 1960s (Souza 2005).
Alongside these institutional changes the government ran marketing campaigns to encourage 
families to ensure their children were in primary school, including the Wake Up Brazil! (Acorda Brasil!), 
Now is the Time for School (Esta na Hora da Escola) and Every Child in School (Toda Crianga na 
Escola) publicity programmes (Motter, unpublished2). The president took an active part in the early
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stage of this process, travelling to the Northeast to teach a primary school class to make the point 
(Cardoso, interview, 2008).
2.2. The education policymaking teams in the first Lula government
The education team that emerged in the Lula presidency differed from previous PT administrations at 
the local and state levels. Historically, PT policymaking has tended to be participatory, drawing in a 
wide range of social movements associated with producer and grassroots interests. In education this 
would mean teachers and students as well as trade unions, progressive Catholics and various minority 
groups. However, since 2003 this has changed, with policymaking increasingly restricted to PT 
individuals and associated groups within the state apparatus. Furthermore, the PT has become 
substantially less ‘political’ in the individuals steering policy and more ‘technocratic’ -  or at least sees 
the education sector in less political terms.
In the past the PT’s approach to education had been drawn through participation within the 
party itself and the social movements to which it was aligned. During this period these actors’ 
ideological orientation was strongly socialist, which meant they were considerably wary of the state 
structures they found. In response petistas pushed for the creation of more participatory mechanisms 
to include wider social groups in policymaking when they gained executive power, including in Porto 
Alegre, Sao Paulo, Belo Horizonte and Rio Grande do Sul. Examples of socialists’ efforts to weaken 
conservatism and bureaucracy in the education sector were demonstrated in Rio Grande do Sul where 
the PT’s education secretary was a former president of the state teachers’ union, CPERS, while in Sao 
Paulo the PT had brought the educator and critical pedagogue, Paulo Freire, into the municipal 
secretariat (Burton, forthcoming; Arelaro, interview, 2008).
There was also considerable overlap between social movements and the party throughout the 
1980s. This began in July 1980 when a PT-associated group of teachers participated at the National 
Congress of Education Workers. Echoing the strength of the party in Sao Paulo, the bulk of the 
teachers came from that state’s teachers’ union, the APEOSP. During the 1980s this influential group 
played an increasing role in various educational seminars across the country while pressuring for more 
space within the PT. When the party established a National Secretariat of Popular Movements
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(Secretaria Nacional de Movimentos Populares) in 1989 this provided a forum for a national debate on 
education to take place later that year (Gadotti and Pereira 1989).
Alongside the growing presence of social movements within PT educational policy in the 
1980s, there was further institutional space for discussion. The Education Issues Commission (CAED) 
enabled party activists to debate policy in the sector on a more regular basis than at the level of a 
national conference. The goal of the CAED was to search for and identify types of educational policies 
that best reflected the party’s concerns (in particular a ‘modo petista de governar’ or ‘PT way of 
governing’) while providing a platform on which party activists, social movement activists and PT 
officials in state and municipal administrations could share their views (Arelaro, interview, 2008).
However, by the late 1990s this strong institutional space and intra-party dialogue in 
educational policy was weakening. Buarque (interview, 2008) noted that by the time the PT took office 
in 2003 the CAED had effectively ‘died’ as a forum for discussion. Furthermore, what remained cast a 
broadly critical view over both his policies and that of the government more generally.
Why had this happened and how? Internal and external pressures brought about its demise, 
resulting in a different type of educational policy making that owed more to formally constituted 
institutions than informal participation between diverse social movements and party activists. 
Internally, the party had undergone a broad change in the period prior to the 2002 presidential election 
victory. During the 1990s the party’s composition had changed; activists and members were 
increasingly drawn from the middle and professional classes while the party was becoming more 
bureaucratically structured. This was attributable to various reasons: first, public sector trade unions 
were growing while those in the manufacturing or industrial sectors were declining; activists in social 
movements were becoming more professional in order to engage the government more effectively; 
second, electoral success was both catapulting PT leaders into executive posts while influencing party 
members to adopt a more moderate strategy that coincided with the leadership’s outlook (Samuels
2004). The party’s growing involvement in the management of cities and states (and their education 
systems) meant that PT mayors and governors were appointing party members and supporters to 
official positions. Not only did this have the effect of weakening the party’s radical anti-system stance, 
it also blurred the lines between acting to change the system and those who were dependent on it.
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In the 1990s these various changes meant the party was faced with a dilemma: whether to 
maintain its social representation that it had done since the early 1980s, or focus on a more electoral- 
oriented platform (Leal 2004). As the party won more votes and gained more executive positions in 
the decade, the party leadership which favoured the latter strategy, became increasingly influential. 
These changes had the knock-on effect of making the internal institutional mechanisms less important: 
with a growing number of rank-and-file members in broad agreement with the leadership, the capacity 
of more socialist-inclined dissenters to influence the direction of the party became weaker. Contrary to 
the image of a party leadership that was cut off from its membership and supporters, this suggested a 
relationship that was more inclusive and democratic between the elite and non-elite.
For the dissenters, the tendency towards elitism was further exacerbated once the PT won the 
presidency, since the leadership now had considerable access to state resources and patronage and 
therefore demanded loyalty from its members. To a large extent this was achieved. The few that 
refused were either disciplined or forced to leave the party during the government’s first year (Petras 
2005a). This was most evident in the run-up to the new government’s legislative proposals on social 
security in 2003, prompting the departure of several PT senators and congressmen, including Heloise 
Helena, to establish a new party, PSOL.
External explanations for the weakening of the PT’s internally participatory policymaking 
approach centre on the nature of the commitments faced by the party prior to and in office. In 
particular this involved pre-existing commitments and agreements with various international agencies 
and state governments (Brooke, interview, 2008). Indeed, the most visible manifestation was Lula’s 
commitment to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan that was worked out by his predecessor 
during the 2002 election campaign. There was consequently less room for manoeuvre on the 
economic policy front than might otherwise have been the case. In addition there was a growing 
separation between the demands and expectations of the new government and its allies in the social 
movements. Education researchers expected a general change of direction by the new government 
while social movements associated with teachers and students were focused on resolving their 
material concerns (Costa, interview, 2008). There was a growing disconnection between institutions 
such as the CAED and the government (Chagas, interview, 2008). With the PT leadership now 
entrenched in the federal state apparatus, the party faced a resource imbalance as the leaders could
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rely on access to the state to develop and implement policy. By contrast the party’s dissenting rank- 
and-file had only the internal institutional mechanisms (which as noted above was in a parlous state) 
and moral suasion to influence the leadership.
The PT’s educational core after 2003 consequently drew less upon its origins in the social 
movements in favour of its insertion into the state. The shift towards a more elite-driven approach to 
policymaking had already emerged prior to winning power, and was seemingly endorsed by the bulk of 
the party. At MEC this meant the use of its internal secretariats and formally configured forms of 
policymaking, such as national consultations, which necessarily included all educational actors rather 
than just those associated with the party. This approach has been dominant since 2003, despite 
ministerial changes under Cristovam Buarque (2003-04) and subsequently under Tarso Genro and 
Fernando Haddad (after 2004). The difference between the pre-2004 and post-2004 periods has been 
one more of emphasis than policymaking and may be divided into two periods.
Buarque, the first PT education minister, was a former chancellor of Brasilia University, and 
senator and governor of the Federal District (1999-2002). Buarque was strongly associated with 
education, much of it stemming from the ideas generated within Brasilia University which he promoted 
and publicised in various publications. During his time as governor he had put his ideas about 
education into practice with the introduction of the ‘bolsa escola', a cash conditional transfer paid to the 
head of a household (usually the mother) to send her school-age children to school rather than having 
them work. The programme’s success and popularity was such that not only was it subsequently 
implemented at the federal level towards the end of the Cardoso government, but received 
international support; including from the World Bank after Buarque ended his governorship (Haddad 
2003; Buarque, interview, 2008; Hall 2006).
Although Buarque was highly identified with education within the PT, policymaking appeared 
constrained during his time in office. Compared to the previous government, there appeared to be less 
focus about what he sought to achieve as minister. While there was a concern with basic (i.e. pre­
school, primary and secondary) rather than primary education (as had been the case under Souza), 
this largely involved discussion than any tangible outcomes (Fernandes, Chagas, Soares, interviews, 
2008). During his year as minister, Buarque concerned himself with pronouncements on adult literacy 
campaigns and vocational training (Costa, interview, 2008; Schwartzmann, interview, 2007), much of
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which elicited few immediate results. Gouvea (interview, 2008) suggests that this undermined 
effective management of MEC and its policies. The one exception to this was the decision to press 
ahead with FUNDEB, the funding mechanism for basic education that would replace FUNDEF, the 
Cardoso government’s financial system for primary education, when it expired at the end of 2006. Part 
of the reason for this was the PT’s clear position on FUNDEB, a policy that had been worked on in 
opposition with its partners in the social movements and which formed part of the 2002 election 
manifesto.
Accompanying Buarque’s lack of policy focus during the first year is a more critical view that 
suggests the minister was more concerned with marketing and publicising himself rather than that of 
the party as a whole. In particular this assumed that Buarque’s agenda was not administrative but a 
personal, political one (Costa, Arelaro, interviews, 2008). The evidence for this lies in his subsequent 
departure from the PT and presidential candidacy in 2006 for the Democratic Workers’ Party (PDT). 
Furthermore, those who criticise Buarque’s educational policy tend to lie amongst those associated 
with the ‘historic’ section of the PT (i.e. those who had been supportive and actively involved in the 
CAED). Their criticism may be attributed to two main reasons: first, despite the changes made in the 
leading positions within MEC, the bulk of secretariats were assigned to Buarque’s supporters; if the 
‘historic’ section was offered appointments it was to secondary positions. Second, although a political 
figure, Buarque was not seen as a team player or actively involved in the institutional life of the party 
(Arelaro, interview, 2008). He was therefore viewed as apathetic to the fate and role of forums such as 
CAED.
Against the notion of a lack of clear policy, Buarque’s own explanation of his time in office 
highlights difficulties in the relationship between minister and president. In particular he claimed that 
although he had a wide range of policies he wanted to pursue, he failed to receive sufficient support 
from Lula. Not only was Lula disinclined to support a national teaching salary, he was unwilling to 
expand the role of the federal government to take direct responsibility in educational provision at all 
levels. Buarque was subsequently dismissed by Lula in February 2004, although the reasons for this 
remain unclear; Buarque claims to have had no warning and assumed that it was due to open up 
space in the cabinet for a coalition partner (interview, 2008).
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For the remainder of the first Lula term there has been a closer relationship between MEC and 
the presidency, which may be due to its diminishing politicisation and more technocratic approach. 
This began first under the stewardship of Tarso Genro, an academic and former mayor of Porto Alegre 
and his successor, Fernando Fladdad. While Genro had a strong base of support within the party, his 
successor did not. Furthermore, compared to Buarque, Genro was less of a political threat to Lula, 
while Haddad barely registered. According to the critical view of the ‘historic’ PT, this suited Lula, 
since he was personally unenthused about education and more inclined to support an individual who 
was less problematic (Arelaro, interview, 2008).
Genro’s status as a team player was reflected in his appeal to the teaching community during 
his time at MEC. As well as introducing a higher education reform bill, he downgraded Buarque’s 
proposals to certify school teachers. Although not involved in the mid-2005 mensalao scandal, which 
highlighted the extent to which the PT had grown reliant on the use of state resources to buy political 
support in Congress -  the resulting cabinet resignations obliged Lula to shore up his support, moving 
Genro to the Ministry of Justice and leaving a vacancy at MEC. Genro’s replacement was his 
politically appointed executive secretary, Fernando Haddad.
Whereas both Buarque and Genro were political figures in their own right, Haddad was not 
(Schwartzmann, interview, 2007). Although a member of the Sao Paulo PT, he did not have a support 
base of his own (Costa, Arelaro, interviews, 2008). He was a former Sao Paulo University (USP) 
professor who had been appointed to an official position in the finance secretariat during Marta 
Suplicy’s mayoralty of Sao Paulo (2001-04) and owed his position under Genro at MEC to a similar 
process. As education minister he consolidated and implemented the various legislative proposals 
initiated under Buarque and Genro, including the FUNDEB constitutional amendment and higher 
education bill (Chagas, interview, 2008). Despite the differences between Genro and Haddad in terms 
of their political base, their positions reflected a closer -  or at least lukewarm -  relationship between 
minister and president. This was evident in the president’s eventual involvement in setting the federal 
contribution for FUNDEB and Lula’s decision to maintain Haddad in post, following lobbying from the 
private sector-led All for Education (Todos pela Educagao) pressure group following the 2006 election 
(Chagas, Soares, interviews, 2008).
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The presence of Haddad has also meant that MEC may be seen less as a ‘political’ and more 
as a ‘technical’ ministry in the Lula government. While Genro replaced a number of key individuals 
heading MEC’s internal secretariats, Haddad retained most of them. The notable exception was the 
INEP president. He appointed an associate, Reynaldo Fernandes, to that position. Fernandes claims 
to be a technocrat rather than a party activist (interview, 2008), and was influential in overseeing and 
coordinating the work carried out by MEC to launch the Education Development Plan (PDE) at the 
start of the second Lula term, in April 2007. Although the PDE included a range of measures that 
could gain the support of the PT’s supporters among social movements (including a national salary 
and training opportunities for teachers and increased credit and finance for students), it was generated 
within government; input from PT-supporting allies came afterwards in the consultation process (Vieira, 
interview, 2007).
The reaction to this shift in the development of educational policy within and outside the PT has 
varied. On the one hand there is acceptance of the policies and approach presented. Until 2004 the 
role of CAED had declined as there was a separation between the forum’s participants and the 
government over the government’s educational agenda. Since 2004 this has begun to change, as the 
CAED increasingly engages with the proposals being presented by the government, rather than 
presenting their own demands (Chagas, interview, 2008). Chagas’s view represents that of the policy 
elite, whereas among the more socialist-oriented dissenters within and outside the party, CAED’s role 
suggests its capture by what is increasingly a conservative and bureaucratic leadership.
The dissenters’ view is arguably a minority one: the wider PT rank-and-file does not appear to 
oppose the educational agenda presented by the government. Where criticism does exist it tends to 
be concentrated in the educational sector and especially the academic community (Brooke, interview,
2008). Indeed, the association between the PT and social movements may be weaker than 
previously, but it has still managed to transcend the party’s move from opposition to government. 
Despite the departure of disaffected left-wing petistas since the 1990s and the creation of alternative 
political parties, the PT remains largely hegemonic on the Left. Furthermore, the leadership continues 
to see itself as more participatory than its predecessor, notwithstanding its approach to policymaking.
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3. Conclusion
This chapter examined the formation and development of the policymaking cores in each 
government’s education sector. Despite the distinction between the Third Way and Participatory Lefts, 
in the three cases studied the presence of an elite concentrated in the state apparatus that largely 
determines the overall shape of the governments’ educational policies seems apparent. However, of 
the three cases, while the Third Way’s development of a policy elite was relatively straightforward, that 
presented by the Participatory Left was far more circuitous.
Until the mid- to late-1990s the Participatory Left PT had been subject to a wider range of 
different interests and practices, which owed much to its own administration of municipal educational 
systems. This experience of subnational government arguably helped erode some of the suspicion felt 
by party members relating to the administrative apparatus -  increasingly PT activists found they were 
economically dependent on politics, which blunted their radicalism. At the same time, management of 
municipal education prompted the development of internal party institutions to enable discussion about 
policy and their dissemination. However, as the party came closer to winning national power the same 
pressures that had affected the party as a whole began to have an impact on its educational sector. 
The matter was exacerbated after 2003 by the party leadership’s insertion into the state apparatus, 
ensuring a structural imbalance between the governmental education team and what remained of an 
activist base amongst the party’s educational sector. But the effect was not immediate; unlike the 
more Third Way case of the Cardoso government, the PT’s new education minister did not have the 
full support of the president, ensuring not only a weak degree of cohesion and unity, but also eroding 
the position of MEC against other ministries.
More recently, the shift from MEC as a ‘political’ to a ‘technical’ ministry (where the minister 
does not have an independent political position) suggests no pressure within the executive to return to 
a more participatory approach. Such a situation for the PT is ironic, given the assumption that left- 
wing politicians and parties tend to be distrustful of bureaucracy. For the leadership though, this may 
represent a trade-off between access to the state and its resources against the relative lack of policy 
control within the party.
While both the Third Way Concertacion and Cardoso policymaking teams show cases of 
educational professionals (or rather academics) in key positions, the extent to which they were linked
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to wider society has varied. Other than Cardoso’s minister, Souza, the educational team had no 
independent political status and was therefore heavily reliant on his patronage. In contrast, the 
Concertacion’s educational team was prominent in the opposition movement during the 1970s and 
1980s. Yet in both cases the policymaking core was narrow and socially homogenous: the majority 
being based in academic institutions and research organisations and being personally associated with 
each other. Indeed, the extent of personal relations is of profound importance and apparently 
overlooked by the emphasis on participatory or technocratic forms of policymaking. This is especially 
apparent in the way an educational team gains presidential support for its policies (such as contrast 
between the Cardoso and Lula governments) or ensures policy continuity despite ministerial changes 
(the Concertacion).
The chapter has therefore stressed the importance of three key issues. First, the relationship 
between political elites and non-elites is relevant. The understanding between the Concertacion’s 
social base after 1990 and the support of the PT’s rank-and-file and supporters in social movements 
helped both governments develop more technocratic policy elites. Second, while politicians and their 
advisors do find themselves constrained by structural considerations, they do have some degree of 
capacity to act. On the one hand, this may involve developing policies that operate within the 
parameters laid out by the overarching structure; on the other hand, where those lines are less clearly 
defined they may be creative in advancing new proposals. Examples of this include the 
Concertacion’s decision to maintain the educational system while employing commissions to influence 
future policy directions and the PSDB’s introduction of new educational mechanisms, such as the LDB 
and FUNDEF.
Third, the type of policy choices will vary even within the same policymaking approach as a 
result of the relative position of key individuals and groups within the elite. In practical terms this 
meant that the Concertacion (until 2006) and the Cardoso education teams were relatively well 
insulated and able to carry out a clear policy agenda. Meanwhile, the PT’s educational agenda 
demonstrated initial uncertainty and subsequent policy continuity with its predecessor, as ministerial 
changes and executive level support took their toll. In part this may be the relationship between 
governments and their wider support. In sum then, while in all three cases this has tended towards a 
largely elitist approach regardless of a government’s origins, the extent to which this was achieved
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varied. The Concertacion and the PSDB had perhaps the weakest link -  and hence accountability with 
their base -  thereby enabling them to pursue their policy directions more forcefully than the PT, which 
claims to be more participatory, was able to do. These differences are explored in the second part of 
this dissertation, with reference to the nature of the policies pursued in relation to the role of the state, 
curricular reform, public spending and participation with other, organised stakeholders (i.e. the private 
sector, teachers and students).
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4. Finding the right balance: the role of the state and social democratic 
governments
The emphasis on the state as a single political unit overlooks the extent to which it is internally 
organised. This ranges from the most centralised or unitary states to the more decentralised, where 
power is dispersed to a wider range of subnational actors. These differences are presented in Chile 
and Brazil respectively, the Chilean state being among the most centralised in the region and Brazil a 
visible example of federalism. Yet despite these fundamental institutional differences, both types of 
state find themselves subject to a range of similar social, economic and political pressures at both the 
local and global levels. Despite these local and global developments, this has not meant a 
convergence in state structure: both unitary and federal states retain a certain resilience and ability to 
adapt. Nevertheless, the pressures have prompted governing elites to consider how the state and the 
features associated with it (including the education system) might best respond to these demands.
For social democrats, the role of the state has involved the development and improvement of 
institutions to achieve their ends (Hutton 1996). The social democratic state -  at least as it is currently 
understood -  is neither a minimal nor a maximising one. Rather it is an ‘active’ or ‘enabling’ one, with 
licensing, regulating and monitoring capacities along with the provision of state resources (Giddens 
1998, 2003; Jary 2002).
However, understanding the social democratic state and its implications for education is 
complicated by several factors. First, there is the problem of normative comparisons in which a 
previous ‘Golden Age’ for education is idealised. Certain educational actors (especially those who 
defend comprehensive state education) claim that in this period, the highpoint of which was between 
the 1940s and 1970s, the state dominated educational provision. This overlooks the involvement of 
private interests within the system, attributing a negative connotation to the recent past.
Second, the relationship between social democrats and the state has tended to be ambiguous. 
Unlike neo-liberals who see the state’s reduction as a virtue, or the socialists’ expansion of the state, 
social democrats have a vaguer notion of the right size for the state; this is apparent in Bresser 
Pereira’s (2001) use of the term ‘complementary state’ to distinguish the ‘new’ Left from the ‘central 
state’ of the ‘old’ Left. The result has been that social democrats have been subject to criticism from
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both sides of the political spectrum, who view such governments as not having gone far enough in 
their own chosen direction.
Third, attitudes have shifted over the past 20 years regarding the role of the state. This is best 
shown through the development or ‘expansion’ of the Washington Consensus in this period. Generally 
associated with the New Right internationally, the Washington Consensus may be distinguished 
between its ‘first generation’ reforms in the 1980s and early 1990s. In the earlier period its supporters 
within international financial institutions (IFIs) endorsed structural readjustment to reduce the size, 
spending and intervention played by states. During the later, ‘second generation’, supporters 
proposed reforms that would strengthen state capacity and institutions (Zurbriggen 2007; Panizza
2005).
Given these issues, suggesting the social democratic state is ‘active’ and ‘enabling’ is 
insufficient. This chapter therefore presents an approach that seeks to distinguish between Third Way 
and Participatory Left versions of the state. The Third Way state is conceived as a much more limited 
form compared to that presented by the Participatory Left. This may be due to the Third Way elites in 
the Concertacion and PSDB governments having a more comfortable association with the market and 
non-state providers than the Participatory Left administration by the PT. It may also be attributable to 
the Third Way governments in the 1990s coinciding with the state-reducing ‘first generation’ reforms 
promoted by the Washington Consensus and, since the early 2000s, a shift in favour of state-building 
‘second generation’ reforms associated with the Participatory Left (Bourne 2008: 220).
However, although the chapter provides a contrast between Third Way and Participatory Left 
understanding of the state, the distinction is complicated by the context surrounding ideological 
preference. Although the Concertacion pursued a more Third Way vision of the state in the 1990s, it 
has adopted a more interventionist strategy in the past half decade, reflecting the growing support for 
the ‘second generation’ reforms. Meanwhile in Brazil the PT’s association with the more state-oriented 
Participatory Left model was not necessarily determined; indeed, during its first decade in the 1980s its 
position was more ambiguous. Although it was opposed to private education, its stance on public 
education was also buttressed with a strong commitment to non-state education. This was largely 
attributable to the social composition of the party, which drew heavily on social movements, which the 
PT saw as having a role to play alongside that of the state. Only as the party began to pursue a more
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electoral strategy and gained executive posts such as mayoralties, governorships and ultimately the 
presidency, was there a shift towards a more state-oriented perspective.
1. Chile
Chile’s education system underwent a dramatic rationalisation and reduction in the role of the state 
under the military regime. The measures undertaken by the military showed a clear preference in 
favour of both neo-liberal and conservative interests, by enabling private interests to enter the system 
while reducing the role of the state in some cases (e.g. the administration of schools) and maintaining 
it in others (e.g. the funding system for state-subsidised private schools).
The New Right measures were ‘flat’ in the sense that they were applied comprehensively 
across the system. The Concertacion government that took office in 1990 was deeply affected by the 
historical experience of the military period and the measures that had been undertaken during the 
1970s and 1980s. Owing to its wariness regarding the military and the relative strength of the political 
Right in the immediate post-1990 period, the Concertacion opted to maintain the inherited education 
system. But even if the model was kept, the Concertacion did present a slightly more activist approach 
to the state, to pursue a more ‘staggered’ approach that involved democratising the system through 
local elections and more targeted anti-poverty policies.
While the Concertacion approach largely conformed to the limited, Third Way model of the 
state in the 1990s, in its second decade it has pursued a rather more interventionist approach. In part 
this reflects growing social demands for educational reform, resulting in a package of measures in late 
2007 that include a number of new institutions to oversee the system as well as additional targeted 
funds.
1.1. The Chilean state in education before 1990
Chile’s educational system in the 1960s-70s was known as the Estado Docente -  the so-called 
‘Golden Age’ (Diaz, interview, 2007). It is assumed the state dominated the provision and funding of 
education in this period, although this overlooked the role of private actors, especially the Church. In 
the early 1970s this mixed system was reviewed by the Allende government. It was in this period that 
discussion about a national education system emerged. Though national, it would not be state-
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dominated. Instead the state would coordinate the system at the regional level while decentralising 
administration to schools themselves (Superintendencia de Education Publica 1971).
The 1973 coup brought in a regime that viewed its predecessor as overly statist and 
centralised. Later, the regime claimed that this had not only contributed to funding distortions, but also 
meant insufficient space for other, private and community-based groups to participate in the system 
(Republica de Chile 1976; ODEPLAN 1988; Dittborn, interview, 2007). By the late 1970s the influence 
of the free market, neoliberal Chicago Boys was making waves throughout Chile’s economic and 
social policy spheres. In 1979 Pinochet made a speech that set the stage for the economic and social 
reforms of the 1980s. In the minds of Pinochet and his closest advisors, the state was seen as a 
burden which constrained individuals’ ability to act. What was needed was a change in the nature of 
the state. The ideal form was one that was decentralised as far as possible (Pinochet 1979). That 
these objectives were implemented in the 1980s was not due to the repressive nature of the regime, 
but rather the legacy of pre-1973 factors such as a tradition of relatively honest administration, a 
strongly independent auditing system and a legalistic culture (Angell and Graham 1995:205). Indeed, 
these features persisted in Chilean politics and bureaucracy after 1990, which the Concertacion would 
similarly draw on in their own reforms.
For education Pinochet’s 1979 proposals meant the introduction of reforms between 1981 and 
1986 that resulted in both the administrative decentralisation of schools and the opening of the system 
to other, private interests (Araujo 2006a). This process was instigated through a series of decrees 
which were effectively ‘locked’ in constitutionally through the Constitutional Statutory Law of Education 
(LOCE) in March 1990, days before the Concertacion government took office. A similar set of actions 
occurred in the higher education sector during this period, whereby the regime made it easier for 
private interests to establish their own relatively autonomous universities.
Although perceived as ‘flat’ the decentralisation and deregulation processes opened up by the 
military in the 1980s were both unequal in effect and biased against the public sector. Public schools’ 
administration was transferred to municipalities, with the aim to bring them closer to the local 
community they served (Dittborn, interview, 2007). But instead of being subject to parents’ control, the 
schools tended to be subject to the regime-appointed municipal authorities. Schools therefore had 
little decision-making power. Furthermore, both schools themselves and the municipalities had little
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influence over their finances. The result was less one of decentralised power than deconcentration of 
responsibility from the centre, without the means to act (Mardones 2006).
Meanwhile, private schools thrived, as a result of not only being left to their own devices 
(including the right to selection denied to public schools) but also by being able to access the new 
voucher system, which provided them with state funds based on the number of enrolled students they 
enrolled (ODEPLAN 1988). Despite these advantages, there were still limits to what was possible 
within the military-structured education system. Private school managers claimed that the system still 
remained too restrictive and centralised, owing to a standard public funding system that had little 
regard for local need (Bosch, interview, 2007).
1.2. The Chilean state in education since 1990
The new Concertacion government faced a choice between continuing or changing the education 
system it inherited in March 1990. The system was formally enshrined in both the 1980 constitution, 
which guaranteed the ‘freedom of education’ (libertad de ensehanza) and with it the right of selection, 
and the new LOCE. Given the LOCE’s constitutional nature it became quickly apparent that its 
revocation would prove difficult, not least because a constitutional amendment required a high 
threshold, or four-sevenths of Congress -  a figure that the Concertacion did not have. This was shown 
by education minister Ricardo Lagos’s failed attempt to reform LOCE in 1992 (Nunez, interview 1, 
2007).
The effort was also half-hearted, mainly because those in the Concertacion education team 
had undergone a change of opinion during the 16 years of military rule. Whereas the UP government 
had proposed a national education system, the long years of opposition had left their mark. On one 
hand although the military had left office they remained latently powerful. The new government 
therefore thought it prudent to act cautiously. One the other hand within the Concertacion coalition 
there were now mixed views over the effects of the military-era reforms. While some held fast to the 
idea of turning the clock back to a nationally controlled and run school system, others suggested the 
military-era reforms could be used to improve the situation faced by schools and municipalities. The 
attitude was not simply a domestic reaction to the reforms; they also reflected a wider, international
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trend in favour of decentralisation that was part of the ‘first generation’ reforms associated with the 
Washington Consensus (Cox, Velasco, interviews, 2007).
Concertacionistas, however, distinguished between their approach to decentralisation and that 
of the military regime. Whereas the latter had seen it primarily in terms of economic rationalism and 
reducing the burden on the state, the new government saw it as a means of extending democracy to 
the local level (Nunez, interview 1, 2007). In 1990 the government introduced legislation that would 
subject municipalities to elections from 1992. This would add a more democratic and representative 
veneer to local administration. However, at the same time the government did not propose any 
change in municipalities’ attributes or organisation (Pozo 1990). This suited the government: the 
assumption (which proved correct) was that the Concertacion would be the chief beneficiary of the 
democratic dividend in 1992, thereby ensuring that control of municipalities (and the education system) 
would remain in their hands.
The adoption of this decentralised education model -  albeit with a democratic coating -  
showed that the Concertacion had opted for a marginal approach to state reform. It meant that it 
would not directly challenge the legal basis of the system (Diaz, interview, 2007) but also ensure the 
persistence of certain inequalities and distortions within the system. Discrepancies between different 
municipalities existed, which affected their capacity to administer the local education systems 
effectively and financially (Garcia-Huidobro, interview, 2007). Indeed, it has been estimated that by 
2006 less than 65 of Chile’s 345 municipalities had sufficient expertise to tackle the challenges 
presented by educational matters (Bloque Social 2006; Bitar, interview, 2007).
Similarly, decentralisation meant differences between the individual providers, most notably the 
municipal and state-subsidised private schools. Indeed, the model maintains the market in education 
between these different types of schools, with implications for social stratification and inequality as a 
result (Bloque Social 2006). Generally, municipal schools faced greater financial pressures than the 
private schools; this was exacerbated by the unintended consequence of a change in the tax code in 
1993 during its passage through Congress which enabled state-subsidised private schools both to 
charge parents and guardians a levy and receive tax-free donations.
However, this did not mean the Concertacion had bought completely into the military regime’s 
vision of the state. The Pinochet government had pursued two largely contradictory paths, which
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reflected the tension at work within the New Right -  and which was in stark contrast to the social 
democratic orientation of the Concertacion. The neo-liberals within the Pinochet government had 
sought to reduce the burden of state management and administration, by either contracting it out to the 
private sector or deconcentrating it to the municipalities. At the same time the conservative instinct in 
the military regime was still strong: it could not give up full control of funding, resulting in the state 
allocating funds to public and publicly-funded private schools rather than giving them directly to 
parents (Dittborn, interview, 2007). Beyond this, the military regime adopted a largely ‘hands-off’ 
approach.
By contrast, the Concertacion differed from its military predecessor in the scope of state 
engagement. Accepting the decentralised model, it pursued a more ‘hands on’, or Third Way ‘activist’, 
approach including the introduction of new measures from the centre. Unlike the military, the 
government not only acknowledged the administrative and financial inequalities between different 
municipalities, but acted on them. The government introduced targeted funds to alleviate inequalities 
in the system, through the use of additional payments to poorer schools in its P900 and MECE 
programmes (Raczynski 1999). Another approach taken by the government was to introduce the 
Teachers Statute in 1991, to provide a national form of oversight, through labour stability and pay 
equality for teachers in both municipal and state-subsidised private schools (Nunez, interview 1,2007; 
Cox, interview, 2007). Meanwhile, in higher education, the government initially introduced a national 
accreditation body, to bring some order to the expanding number of (mainly private) institutions 
(Consejo Superior de Educacion: Republica de Chile 1998).
The model of the state adopted by the Concertacion therefore sought neither to assume full 
responsibility for educational provision nor accept the distortions that resulted. This demonstrated the 
ambiguous position adopted by the government and the criticisms made by its rivals on the Left and 
Right. For the Right, the Concertacion projects an overbearing state that disregards families and the 
private sector (Santa Cruz 1996; Camhi et al 1999; Caceres and Santa Cruz 1996; Santa Cruz 1991). 
The Teachers Statute, the demand for obligatory accreditation of higher education courses and the 
efforts of some concertacionistas against selection in private schools (including state-subsidised ones) 
all point to a burdensome and bureaucratic state (Weinstein, Garcia-Huidobro, interviews, 2007). By 
contrast, for the Left the Concertacion is not seen as state-oriented enough. The government is
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accused of conducting a ‘blurry’ role for the state while being largely disconnected from the system as 
other, private interests have taken its place (Colegio de Profesores 2003). The Bloque Social, 
meanwhile, criticises the Concertacion as being unwilling to take responsibility for the population’s 
educational needs, by limiting itself to the system’s financing (Bloque Social 2006).
These criticisms reinforce the Concertacion’s own position that it has opted for a midway 
stance between the two, which seeks a balance between private participation and management whilst 
retaining state scrutiny and supervision (Diaz, Brunner, Elacqua, interviews, 2007). However, the 
signs are that since 2006 the government has shown a greater willingness to intervene (Pena, 
interview, 2007). This suggests a shift in the Concertacion approach away from the limited Third Way 
approach towards the so-called ‘second generation’ reforms in education. Admittedly, this overlooks 
the extent to which the education system was already subject to official and public scrutiny and the 
various proposals laid out during the previous Lagos government (2000-06), including differentiated 
funding for schools according to the socio-economic condition of their enrolments. Part of the reason 
for the change may be attributed to the mass protests staged against the educational system in 2006 
and the resulting presidential advisory commission. At the same time as facing social demands, the 
Concertacion has undergone a generational shift within government: many of the ministerial 
appointees and advisors in the policymaking team who lived through the years of opposition to the 
military regime are being replaced by a younger, less cohesive group of individuals who came of 
political age during the Concertacion government in the 1990s.
By 2007 various education-related recommendations were apparent. The resulting agreement 
negotiated between the Concertacion and its right-wing opponents in Congress included the following: 
one, a preferential subsidy bill that would create an additional fund for the most vulnerable students; 
two, constitutional reform to provide ‘quality’ education; three, a General Law of Education that would 
impose standards, require private schools to be run as not-for-profit entities and limit their ability to 
select, and establish a National Education Council that would define the rights and responsibilities of 
various actors in the system; four, a school inspectorate (Superintendencia) that would contribute to 
scrutiny and standards in schools, providing support if necessary and applying sanctions (such as the 
closure of municipal schools or withholding vouchers from public-funded private schools); and five, a
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change in the voucher system that would increase in value for schools where the most vulnerable 
students were enrolled (Cox 2007; Puryear 2007a).
2. Brazil
The Brazilian education system is formally federal in structure. However, the model masks centralising 
and decentralising pressures that have characterised it since the 1960s. Under the military regime the 
system was relatively centralised, although arguably not as much as in other policy areas. From the 
later 1970s the influence of political liberalisation and grassroots pressures meant there was a 
decentralisation in educational policies, with both formal state bodies (state and municipalities) and 
non-state actors engaged in the process.
The swing back towards a more centralised approach occurred after 1995 with the new 
Cardoso government. This pointed towards a more ‘activist’ state in the mould of the Third Way. 
However, the process was more ambiguous than it initially appeared: the centralisation that developed 
was relative compared to the previous decade and a half. Furthermore, this centralisation happened 
only in the administrative and financial areas of the public school system -  where it involved both 
greater coordination and organisation -  and not in school administration, which was municipalised. 
Meanwhile at the higher education level a parallel process of deregulation and greater state scrutiny 
developed, reflecting the extent to which the PSDB government was comfortable with the market.
In contrast, since 2003 the impression given is that the state has played a greater role; 
centralisation has therefore continued. However, this remains subject to interpretation, owing to the 
different perspectives brought to the government both by its rivals and supporters. Furthermore, it 
overlooks the extent that the PT has shifted on its views regarding the state since its foundation in the 
1980s, when its position on the state was counterbalanced by support for alternative, non-private 
forms of education.
2.1. The federal government in education before 1995
During the military period the regime began a process of political centralisation which had an impact on 
education, although this was relatively less than in other social policy areas. The regime issued 
various national plans for education throughout the 1960s and 1970s while educational administration 
was largely decentralised to the states (Arretche and Rodriguez 1999: 89). Nevertheless, funds
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always proved insufficient and dependent on additional discretionary resources from the centre. This 
was exacerbated by the constitutional separation of responsibilities, whereby states and municipalities 
were mainly concerned with basic education and the federal government with higher education. This 
resulted in a chronic shortage of funds which affected educational infrastructure (including buildings 
and teachers) by the later period of the regime.
The military regime’s later phase was also notable for a growing decentralisation in education 
activity. Much of this was not directed by the governments, but rather reflected the growing political 
liberalisation from the late 1970s on. Across the educational system there were developments, both 
within the formal structure of the state at federal, state and municipal levels as well as by social 
movements and NGOs. Among the most visible examples within the state were measures including 
the creation of integrated school and community centres under Lionel Brizola’s state government in 
Rio de Janeiro (CIEPs), to the deliberative and participatory school experiments led by Paulo Freire in 
Sao Paulo city, and the schools run by the landless movement in the countryside (Goldemberg 1993; 
Valente 2007; Branford and Rocha 2002). A further legacy of the military and post-1985 years was a 
substantial private sector, which had contributed towards educational expansion, although mainly at 
university level (Araujo 2006a). This was due in large part to the growing demand for higher education 
during the 1960s and 1970s and the inability of the state to provide a sufficient supply. However, this 
had occurred with little overall direction or scrutiny.
The presence of a prominent private sector had pre-dated the military period. Its strength was 
evident in the balance laid out between public and private education in the 1961 national education 
guidelines (LDB). The return to democracy did not adversely affect this situation, with the new 1988 
constitution outlining a similar balance between the two positions. However, the constitution failed to 
resolve the problems within Brazil’s education system, not least because the reaffirmation of 
educational responsibilities between the three levels of government involved, an absence over where 
to allocate financial responsibility. Also, the lack of consensus over the public-private debate limited 
the prospect for reform (Plank 1990: 550, 557-8).
By the early 1990s the lack of reform resulted in an education system at both school and 
university levels without any outward sign of control or coordination. The 1988 constitution had 
encouraged an increase in enrolment numbers, but both the federal and state governments proved
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unable to financially support them. This was especially the case in the Northeast where municipalities 
dominated public education provision, whereas state governments did so in the more prosperous 
Southeast. The result was uncoordinated growth (Arretche and Rodriguez 1999:107) and increased 
financial aggravation as a result of limited discretionary funds made available by the federal 
government (Goldemberg, interview, 2008; 1993).
Meanwhile the federal government showed few signs of rectifying the problem, or introducing a 
rationalisation similar to that undertaken by the Chilean military. Despite the election of a neo-liberal 
president, Fernando Collor, in 1989, this educational variation was never subjected to the logic of state 
reduction, as happened in science and technology (Goldemberg, interview, 2008). Instead, the federal 
government’s approach was to outline general goals for the education sector while pursing projects 
that promoted the president at local levels. Indeed, during the Collor presidency the main educational 
innovation was the construction of integrated schools and community centres (ClACs), which like the 
CIEPs in Rio de Janeiro, were designed to be integrated schools and community centres. The 
frustration and dissatisfaction of the educational community regarding the sizeable proportion of the 
budget expended on such projects prompted a rethink by Collor’s successor, Itamar Franco (Brasil: 
Presidente da Republica 1994). By the end of the New Republic’s first decade, there was growing 
acceptance that Brazil’s education system was inadequate (Motter, unpublished2; Castro 2000; 
Durham, interview, 2008). It appeared that perhaps the long-awaited consensus was on the horizon.
2.2. The Cardoso government and the role of the state in education
The emergence of a consensus for reform -  across the political class if not in the educational 
community -  appeared to have arrived. Until 1995 different actions at different levels of government 
were taking place throughout the education system, but there was recognition that on their own it was 
insufficient. Something more had to be done. The result involved addressing the structure of power 
and resources within the system, which from the perspective of the early 1990s had not been 
addressed by the Constituent Assembly in 1986-88 (Plank 1990: 550).
The new government’s approach was largely managerial in scope. It saw the problems facing 
the educational system as primarily that of a lack of efficiency, competition and choice. It was not a 
lack of resources that was seen as prompting financial difficulties, but rather its allocation and
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distribution: the existing funding mechanisms paid little attention to the number of students in schools 
(Motter, unpublished3; Durham, interview, 2008).
The government’s response was therefore to adopt two different approaches to the education 
system. On one hand in pre-university education it rationalised the public sector through a process of 
decentralisation while creating new mechanisms and institutions at the federal level to oversee the 
process. On the other hand, at the higher education level it maintained -  and indeed enhanced -  the 
deregulated system, opening up space for non-state actors other than business to participate. 
Underpinning these contrary approaches though was a common policy in both sectors: the introduction 
of evaluative mechanisms and procedures to provide oversight, backed up with more general scrutiny 
by the public.
First, the Cardoso government inherited an uncoordinated and uncontrolled pre-university 
public education system. Like the Concertacion government in Chile, the educational policymaking 
team in MEC appeared divided between those who favoured a more state-oriented approach (e.g. 
more state-provided schools), such as Eunice Durham and lara Prado, and others who preferred a 
more state-directed approach (i.e. less direct state involvement and more non-state solutions), 
including Simon Schwartzmann (Gouvea, interview, 2008). This difference of opinion meant that a 
balance had to be found between the two sides. The way through was eventually found, with both 
sides agreeing that the one position on which they could agree was the need for a constitutional 
separation of responsibility for the education system (Souza, interview, 2007).
The effect of this consensus was to pursue a policy that meant the federal government would 
opt for indirect rather than direct control of the school system, by adopting a coordinating role for itself. 
The implementation of this objective meant that the federal government effectively recentralised 
education policy (Durham, interview, 2008; Brasil: Presidente da Republica 1999). The way this was 
done was through the creation of a new set of educational guidelines (LDB) in 1995 and the creation of 
a funding mechanism, FUNDEF, which hypothecated tax revenues to primary education. While the 
LDB delineated responsibility for education, placing primary schools in the hands of municipalities, 
secondary schools to states and higher education and general overall coordination to the federal level, 
FUNDEF set out an amount of funding per student alongside a federal supplement. The effect of 
FUNDEF was also to contribute towards greater primary school municipalisation, given that the federal
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supplement would be paid directly (Pinto 2007). Both of these measures were achieved through the 
passage of constitutional amendments. This not only demonstrated the policy elite’s commitment to 
legal measures to achieve political ends, but also legitimised them as a consequence of the high levels 
of congressional support required to pass them.
Publicly, Cardoso’s education team stressed that the measures put in place demonstrated their 
commitment to the constitutional separation of powers and subnational autonomy, which accounted for 
the government’s decision to leave the setting of teachers’ salaries to states and to decentralise 
resources (Souza 2005). However, unlike neoliberal advocates, the policy core believed that their 
approach to the municipalisation of primary schools was substantially different from that presented by 
the neoliberal model. Unlike neoliberals, Cardoso and his associates did not have faith that the market 
knew best in all circumstances; rather they believed that while the market had a role to play, it could 
not cover all eventualities (Cardoso, interview, 2008). Consequently, the state needed to be involved 
and therefore played a prominent role in the reforms that happened after 1995.
To achieve this, the education minister, Paulo Renato Souza, and his team reconstituted the 
national evaluation agency, INEP, which would provide comprehensive data and analysis of the 
system as a whole (Motter, unpublished3). The agency and its work would complement the 
centralising policies offered by the LDB and FUNDEF. In contrast, the neoliberal version could be 
characterised by a willingness to decentralise, but without effective control of resources or resort to the 
market. Indeed, the government’s emphasis on publicity and campaigns to get wider society involved 
in sending their children to school, highlighted the extent to which the Cardoso government did not see 
either the state or the market as the only actors involved in education (Motter, unpublished2).
Even if the Cardoso government’s stance was not as stark as the neoliberal position on the role 
of the state, the lack of agreement regarding the correct size of the state within the policymaking team 
meant that its ‘activist’ approach was constrained. This was evident in the non-state sector, in 
particular the private school system. Rather than seek to impose itself and regulate private school 
tuition fees, as previous governments had done, the team at MEC opted towards their deregulation, 
leaving it to the market to decide. Gouvea (interview, 2008) explained that this was due to the 
Cardoso government being subject to criticism for its apparent willingness to intervene in education
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during its time in office; this was felt keenly by the team associated with educational reform, prompting 
them to back away from the sector.
Second, at the university level the government sought a similar clarification and codification of 
policies. This was a particular challenge since this was a part of the education system that had been 
more directly affected by previous unorganised growth by the private sector; by 1995 around two-thirds 
of students were in private higher education institutions (HEIs) (IBGE 1996). However, the 
government did not propose to change the existing model: demand was growing for places and the 
public system had insufficient space to provide an alternative. Furthermore, the education core at 
MEC was sceptical about the public system: it neither had a wide enough range of courses, nor were 
they sufficiently vocational or regionally based in scope (Gouvea, interview, 2008). In contrast to the 
school system where the policymaking core was divided between those who favoured state or market 
solutions, in higher education the only option appeared to be the latter. Consequently, the government 
pursued a pragmatic approach, by opening up the sector to the market while tackling the obstacles in 
its way.
Unlike previous market-led growth in the higher education sector, the government sought to 
introduce a new role for the state to go alongside deregulation. This included an accreditation process 
and a state evaluation system, the Provao-which received opposition from supporters of both public 
and private HEIs alike. The accreditation process required that a minimum of two-thirds of an 
institution’s teachers have a masters or doctoral degree and gave power to MEC to decertify courses 
or intervene where an HEI was deemed to be failing (Niskier 2007: 28). Meanwhile the Provao would 
provide a form of regulation, by publishing the results of poorly performing courses and institutions. 
This would encourage improvement since it would provide parents and students with sufficient 
information about HEIs to make better choices over where to apply and study (Durham, Soares, 
interviews, 2008; Folha de Sao Paulo 2005a).
2.3. The Lula government and the role of the state in education
In contrast to the Cardoso government, where state reorganisation of educational responsibility and 
additional state involvement (e.g. FUNDEF and the various measures of oversight) were introduced 
alongside more space for non-state actors (i.e. the market and parents and students), the first Lula
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term was more state-oriented. This was evident in the government’s first educational announcements, 
in particular its decision to universalise basic education from pre- to secondary school level (Brasil: 
Presidente da Republica 2003).
Universalised education for the new PT government meant federal intervention in areas which 
the previous administration had shied away from on constitutional grounds. This meant that the 
government would play an active role in the development of both primary and secondary education, 
implying a weakening of the role of the municipalities and the 27 states in this respect. The creation of 
a new funding mechanism, FUNDEB, which allocated resources per student from pre-school to 
secondary level, replaced the previous FUNDEF version, which was limited to primary schools. The 
2007 Education Development Plan (PDE), outlined various methods that the federal government would 
use, including standards and evaluative mechanisms, to improve the quality of Brazil’s primary and 
secondary schools (Souza, interview, 2007; Costa, interview, 2008).
Alongside these changes the government’s willingness to intervene more directly was 
highlighted by developments in both further and higher education. In further education the 
administration was engaged in both the construction and integration of new technical and agricultural 
schools into the federal network. In higher education, it was committed to building ten new public 
universities and expanding 49 other campuses (Brasil: Presidente da Republica 2007). In addition the 
government also introduced federally-imposed quotas for public school students and minority groups 
(Brasil: Presidente da Republica 2005). Finally, the government endorsed a greater role for the state 
in the regulation of the higher education system, since it believed that the public interest could only be 
met if private universities were subject to greater scrutiny (Folha de Sao Paulo 2005a).
The greater role of the (federal) state in education emphasised the tendency of PT 
administrations in this direction prior to 2003. While it illustrated the more state-oriented nature of the 
Participatory Left in the 2000s, historically the party had a more ambiguous relationship with the state 
in education. During its first decade in the 1980s, although the PT supported the principle of free 
public education, it also believed that education had to be popular too. In particular this meant that 
social movements had an equally important role to play, including in the education of the masses 
(Gadotti and Pereira 1989). This perspective was arguably reinforced by the first experiences of the 
PT in elected positions of power, where it found administering cities and states insufficiently
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representative or responsive. One way this was resolved was by distributing public funds to social 
organisations and movements (Costa, interview, 2008). Another was to construct new state- 
sanctioned institutions; perhaps the most well-known being the participatory budget (PB). Its 
educational dimension was to be found in the way that it engaged participants to learn about and 
subsequently influence the budget-making process. More specific education-related measures had 
also been tried, including the creation of local popular councils throughout Sao Paulo city during the 
early 1990s (Arelaro, interview, 2008). This was followed later in the decade by the school grant 
programme (bolsa escola), whereby the state provided financial assistance to households whose 
school-age children were in regular attendance.
Despite petistas' views of the state’s many limitations, the transition from a party of opposition 
to that of national government presented new opportunities regarding the state and its education 
system. In executive positions at the subnational level, the PT had previously only had a marginal 
impact on the educational system; at the federal level it could now directly mould and shape education 
in the way it wanted. This more ‘hands-on’ approach was reflected in a less wary attitude towards the 
state and the abandonment of previous policies that it had rejected; among the most notable was its 
acceptance of FUNDEF, which it had voted against in Congress, and its replacement by the FUNDEB 
programme when it finally expired.
More recently, the policies laid out in its Education Development Plan (PDE) in April 2007 mean 
that compared to its predecessor the Lula government can be seen as more state-oriented and less 
inclined to rely on the market (Brooke, interview, 2008); indeed, the government argued that whereas 
education had previously been fragmented between different jurisdictions and levels, the measures 
laid out in its plan would contribute towards a much more integrated system (MEC 2007b: 7). 
However, such pronouncements overlooked the fact that the government’s plans for higher education 
initially rested on support by the private sector. In particular this involved the creation of public 
subsidies for the sector, through the ProUni programme. Since 2004 this measure has meant the 
government pays private HEIs varying amounts of poorer students’ tuition fees, ranging from half to 
the full amount.
In addition, the extent to which the PT government has brought education under direct federal 
control remains subject to interpretation. Souza claims that since 2003 there has indeed been an
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increase in the role of the (federal) state. According to him, this is apparent in the government’s failure 
to respect the constitutional lines of educational responsibility (interview, 2007). In FUNDEB for 
example, the federal government proposes to expand spending in areas that are not directly under its 
jurisdiction. Furthermore, while FUNDEF never defined a set contribution by the federal level, the 
FUNDEB constitutional amendment includes them. Against this view though, is that of Lula’s first 
education minister, Cristovam Buarque, who suggests that the government has not substantially 
increased the role of the state. Rather than ‘federalise’ -  or nationalise -  education as Buarque 
proposed, Lula has preferred to maintain the existing municipal system of schools. The reasons for 
this appear to have been both economic and pragmatic, the president seeking to avoid the growth in 
demands that would result from scaling up control of educational policy (Buarque, interview, 2008).
3. Conclusion
The chapter began by noting the difficulty in defining the state’s role today and has sought both to 
define the contemporary social democratic (educational) state and to distinguish between the (more 
limited) Third Way and (more expansive) Participatory Left variants within it. But defining the social 
democratic state is made especially challenging by the vagueness of the terms used to explain its role. 
While words such as ‘complementary’, ‘enabling’ and ‘active’ emphasise a form of state distinct from 
the minimal neo-liberal ideal, it does not always make clear what this means in practice.
The situation is made more complicated in that the different types of social democratic state 
have coincided with changes of opinion regarding the role of the state, as well as regional differences 
between the cases studied. First, over the past 20 years there has been a shift from a ‘first’ to a 
‘second’ generation of reforms associated with the Washington Consensus. This must be factored into 
an understanding of a state at a given time: the former period until the late 1990s emphasising the 
reduction of the size of a state, the latter since the early 2000s with enhancing its capacity. Second, 
the Chilean and Brazilian cases show (and regardless of whether the state has been unitary or federal) 
that governments have pursued centralising and decentralising policies at the same time. However, 
these contrary paths become clearer when one observes that this involves forms of state support, 
oversight and scrutiny policies at the centre while the decentralisation has concentrated on the 
management or administration of the system.
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The Concertacion has done this both in the creation of new institutions and forms of support at 
the centre to oversee the system as a whole, while maintaining -  and democratising -  the 
municipalities. In Brazil the Cardoso government sought to rationalise the system by encouraging the 
municipalisation of primary schools through a centrally introduced funding mechanism (FUNDEF), 
while also deregulating its university sector. Indeed, this arguably went further than intended, following 
obstruction of its accreditation system and reliance on the market to shape demand. Of the three, the 
Lula administration appears the most state-oriented, with expanded federal involvement and spending 
across all pre-university education (FUNDEB). Yet even here the results have been more ambiguous 
than they suggest: state funding of the private sector and maintenance of the municipal school system 
point away from centralisation.
What do these governments’ experiences say about their respective vision of the role of a state 
and what does it say about the nature of the political elites at the heart of these decisions? Of the 
three cases, the Third Way example of the Concertacion shows the closest attachment to a neo-liberal 
version of the state, because it largely accepted the military regime’s model in which the state’s role 
was dramatically reduced. However, against this were the preferences of its policymaking core, who 
had not only to recognise the relative strength of the political Right, but also the extent to which the 
military-era reforms had become ‘fixed’ by 1990. Consequently, the Concertacion inherited a limited 
educational state and subsequently sought to modify it at the margins through targeted programmes, 
funding and oversight mechanisms.
In Brazil, the Third Way government of Cardoso oversaw the rationalisation of school 
administration to the municipal level, following a decade in which neo-liberalism barely penetrated 
educational discourse, even if the private sector in higher education had grown prior to this point and 
was allowed to persist -  and even encouraged -  after 1995. In contrast to the Concertacion, the 
PSDB did not find a readily established school system in place and was therefore obliged to pursue its 
own rationalisation programme alongside support for a deregulated higher education sector. However, 
the lack of consensus within the policymaking elite over whether the state or market should take 
precedence, contributed to the emergence of apparently contrary positions in the school and university 
sectors. Yet, like the Concertacion, the Cardoso government operated in a period when the
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Washington Consensus was in ‘first generation’ mode and domestic and international elite opinion was 
predisposed towards the market.
By contrast, the PT has operated in a period when the ‘second generation’ had emerged. Like 
the Concertacion it also inherited a rationalised system which it has largely maintained, despite claims 
that it had made in opposition prior to 2003 that the Cardoso government had been ‘neo-liberal’ in its 
educational policies; FUNDEB, for instance, is largely an expansion of the previous FUNDEF model. 
Furthermore, despite Buarque’s claim that Lula did not want to ‘federalise’ (i.e. nationalise or bring the 
central government into closer co-operation with the state and municipal levels) public education 
(interview, 2008), this seems to be part of the aim of FUNDEB. Such measures point to a more 
expansive role of the state, one which is associated with the Participatory Left. Yet despite the PT’s 
association with this model, during its first decade in the 1980s it favoured a more balanced 
relationship between the state and civil society.
Even if there are differences between the Third Way and Participatory Left visions of the state 
and its role, what seems apparent is that where the state dominates a particular sector it may well be 
easier for it to introduce policies that enhance its role than in a sector where it is weaker. This will 
therefore affect the extent to which a social democratic government can shape the state. For example, 
the opportunities for greater (federal level) state development in Brazil’s school system was possible 
under Cardoso, since the public sector was dominant. In contrast, in higher education, where the 
private sector was especially strong, this meant the scope of state involvement was more constrained. 
Similarly, the growth of state-funded private schools in Chile during the 1980s meant that the 
Concertacion was limited in the approaches it could take. Finally, Lula’s decision to keep the public 
school system at arm’s length by ensuring that it remains primarily a municipal- and state-level 
responsibility means that the government is arguably less susceptible to potential pressures and 
demands from teachers, students and parents.
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5. The purpose of education: social democratic objectives and 
curricular reform
What is the purpose of education and how is it best expressed by governments? This is usually done 
through the establishment of an official national curriculum. Furthermore, its content tends to be 
ideological in tone, enabling the observer to determine the political stance of a given government. For 
the post-Cold War era, Bobbio (1996) refashioned the left-right spectrum to account for the decline of 
socialism, distinguishing between a greater commitment to equality on the Left and difference on the 
Right. This spectrum may be similarly applied in educational ideology: At one end the more radical or 
‘progressive’ educational ideologies (e.g. Marxism) offer a challenge to the status quo by promoting 
critical pedagogy that seeks to empower the marginalised. At the other end of the spectrum, occupied 
by the New Right, neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism tend to reinforce ‘difference’(Sarup 1982; 
Trowler 1998; Loveless 2001). Differences may be seen between the neo-liberals’ preferences for 
vocational curricula that stresses the primacy of human capital development and the neo-conservative 
aim to maintain established social norms and values (and hence existing hierarchies). More recently, 
since the 1990s the Right’s values have been softened via international organisations’ advocacy of 
educational reforms to produce relevant ‘knowledge’ that will assist economic development (Dale and 
Robertson 2007: 225). Hall and Midgley (2004: 153) meanwhile argue that during the 1990s the 
education for human capital development paradigm declined and was replaced by education for social 
development (i.e. poverty alleviation, human rights and empowerment). Within this perspective lies 
social democratic education, which seeks to balance the demands of the Left and Right. In terms of 
curricular content this has meant greater personal development through the use of critical learning 
methods as opposed to learning by rote.
However, social democratic education cannot neatly be associated with one form of 
educational ideology. The political variation that exists within social democracy between the Third 
Way and Participatory Left may be similarly observed in the educational context. Given the Third 
Way’s greater level of market orientation and technocratic approach to policymaking, one would expect 
it to occupy space that is closer to the New Right perspective. By contrast, the Participatory Left, with 
its origins in the social movements that advocated critical pedagogy and its ideological challenge to the
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status quo, should occupy a more radical position. This should mean that the Participatory Left PT 
government’s educational ideology and curricular content should be more closely associated with the 
egalitarian end of the spectrum than the Third Way Concertacion and Cardoso governments.
Contrary to these assumptions though, the cases reveal a much more complex state of affairs. 
Despite the association of the PT with critical pedagogy, it was the Third Way governments in Brazil 
and Chile that presented a deeper set of curricular responses. Not only was the curriculum more 
comprehensive than that set out by the PT, but both Third Way governments showed a greater 
concern for critical thinking than might have been expected from a form of social democracy closer 
ideologically to the Right than the Participatory Left. In the case of Chile this may be explained by the 
extent to which New Right ideology had permeated the curriculum by 1990, prompting the 
Concertacion to seek its reform. By contrast, in Brazil curricular policies had drifted even after the 
return of democracy. The Cardoso government therefore had an opportunity to make changes, the 
bulk of which were accepted by its successor.
In addition to comparing the difference between the Third Way and Participatory Left in terms of 
curricular content, several factors must be taken into account. First, variation between critical 
pedagogy and more traditional approaches tend to be based at the level of instruction, usually within a 
school or another, less formal educational setting. This therefore presents a challenge to assessing 
the three social democratic governments’ curricular policies since their objectives belong at the macro­
level and therefore do not take account of either their implementation within the classroom or their 
attainment by students (Benavot 1992; Montero-Sieburth 1992). In addition, this overlooks the 
institutional difference between Chile as a unitary state and Brazil’s federal structure. Whereas Chile 
was able to develop a national curriculum that was implemented in all schools, Brazil’s federal 
government was only able to set national guidelines and parameters for state and municipal authorities 
to develop their own more detailed curricula.
Second, the comparison of the Chilean and Brazilian cases also highlights an institutional 
distinction which must be considered. Higher education tends to have greater autonomy in the 
development of curricula compared to earlier levels of education. As a result one does not find too 
much direct government intervention into the content of university teaching (the military periods with
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their totalising effect on society being the exceptions to the rule). Consequently, governments have 
tended to concentrate their curricular changes at the primary and secondary school level.
1. Chile
The debates that have occurred within Chilean curricular policies have tended to be over the balance 
between vocational and general education at the secondary school level. In particular this discussion 
since the 1960s has centred over the extent to which one should be given greater emphasis than the 
other, regardless of governments’ political complexion. Indeed much of this discussion was tied up in 
the economic goals of the country’s various governments and their vision of how best to develop the 
country.
Until the 1973 coup the differences between the two were largely held in check, reflecting the 
wider domestic and international consensus on education and development. This changed during the 
military period: first as the regime sought to reduce what it saw as a high level of politicisation within 
the system; second, as part of a wider restructuring of the state and transformation of society. These 
two trends contributed to educational goals that were more conservative and neo-liberal; in the 
vocation-general skills debate the balance was tipped towards the former. However, these changes 
during the 1970s and 1980s did not achieve the desired effect. The Concertacion government after 
1990 therefore began a series of curricular reforms that reflected what it saw as the inadequacy of the 
military changes as well as its response to the challenges and pressures faced by globalisation. Like 
its predecessor though, the Concertacion’s curricular reforms were not completely successful.
1.1. Curricular policies prior to 1990
Debate over curricular content has had a long history within Chile. Prior to the military coup the 
country experienced substantial growth in school coverage. However, the emphasis on expansion 
appeared to take priority over what was being taught in Chilean schools: the government-appointed 
educational commissions in both 1961 and 1963 failed to make a decision on the relative merits of 
technical (or vocational) education over the more academic, generalist route (Gill 1966).
This emphasis on vocational-generalist education reflected the general consensus on 
development at the time: both the Christian Democrat and UP governments were preoccupied with 
economic development and saw education as the means by which this might be achieved. Whereas
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the Christian Democrats saw education as a means for preparing individuals for work, the UP 
government believed that the education system had to be integrated into national planning; moreover, 
workers’ control of the means of production would also mean that of the school system (Fischer 1979; 
Superintendencia de Educacion 1969; Oficina de Planificacion Nacional 1971). Internationally, this 
was also the heyday of the state-led development process consensus, which was highlighted by the 
US-sponsored Alliance for Progress.
Under the military this balance was ended as the regime opted for a more vocationally-oriented 
approach. Like its predecessors it saw a close link between education and participation in the labour 
market. It felt that previous reforms had been insufficient and that vocational education was neither 
adequate nor viewed as sufficiently prestigious (Oficina de Planificacion Nacional 1977). Pinochet 
himself stressed the need for practical skills such as reading and writing (Pinochet 1993), while his 
government expressed concern at the apparent disconnection that existed between the educational 
system and the labour market. The response was for a more professionally-oriented approach to 
education (Government/Republic of Chile 1981; CPFUCH 1975).
These two perspectives -  an emphasis on basic skills and professional education -  highlighted 
the conservative and neo-liberal currents at the heart of the military’s thinking about education. The 
regime’s initial preoccupation had been the political polarisation and destabilisation in Chile prior to 
1973. In an effort to overcome this it stressed the need for national unity and a closer connection to 
family. However, as the 1970s progressed and the regime came under the influence of monetarist 
thinking, the same was applied to social policies. Education soon gained a neo-liberal dimension, in 
which individual choice was encouraged (Pozo 1982; Prieto 1980; Pinochet 1993; Castro 1977; Chile, 
Junta Militar de Gobierno 1977).
This New Right ideology could work in different directions. The conservative strain was clearly 
apparent in the military’s attitude to universities. It discouraged free thinking and treated subjects such 
as political science, sociology, journalism, psychology and Russian studies with suspicion (Martinez 
and Valladares 1988; Newsome 1993; CPFUCH 1975; Chile, Junta Militar de Gobierno 1977). This 
occurred despite the relative absence of Marxist influences; notwithstanding an invitation to the 
Brazilian educationalist and advocate of critical pedagogy, Paulo Freire, to introduce his methods in 
Chile under the Christian Democrat government during the 1960s, the results were not lasting (Nunez,
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interview 2, 2007). Nonetheless, the regime reacted as it did since it saw the universities as having 
been part of the pre-1973 crisis.
Meanwhile the neo-liberal dimension became increasingly evident in the vocational direction 
pursued by the government, especially after 1980. Education became subordinated to overriding 
economic concerns, which entailed a restructuring of the state (Cariola et al 2003). In the late 1970s 
the regime had identified bureaucracy as being both too centralised and prone to distorting opportunity 
(Oficina de Planificacion Nacional 1977). As part of the solution, reforms were instigated after 1980 
that deregulated education, making it easier for private interests to enter the system and operate their 
own schools and universities. The deregulation after 1980 provided the impetus for a surge in new 
providers and opportunities for many students from poorer families to go to university. This was 
paradoxically seen as a ‘democratisation’ of education, including among those later associated with 
the more market-oriented sections of the Concertacion (Brunner, Pena, interviews, 2007). At the same 
time the regime encouraged schools to create their own study plans. This heralded a change from the 
approach adopted during the 1970s, when autonomy had been contained in an effort to overcome 
ideology.
The liberalisation of school teaching plans meant that both the outlines of national objectives as 
well as the content supplied by Mineduc became increasingly limited (Dittborn, interview, 2007). The 
situation was exacerbated by the fact that not all schools had sufficient capacity (in terms of teachers’ 
ability or resources) to be able to respond effectively; Cariola et al (2003) note that generally private 
schools were better prepared for this development than municipal schools, thereby reinforcing social 
segregation and differences in learning opportunities between schools.
1.2. Curricular policies under the Concertacion
In 1990 the Concertacion’s view was that the educational system and the national curriculum were 
both inadequate. Not only were there differences in the ability of different types of schools to provide a 
minimum level of education for their students, but the efforts at introducing a more vocational form at 
the secondary school level did not seem particularly effective. Despite the military regime’s 
preoccupation with preparing the labour force for work, it was not seen as sufficiently linked to the 
productive sectors. Meanwhile the more general schooling offered was seen as too academic and
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focused on preparing for higher education. Consequently, the measures taken since the 1960s 
appeared to have yielded few benefits by 1990.
By adopting a Third Way approach to curricular reform the Concertacion’s approach reinforced 
the link that governments make between economic development and education, effectively 
subordinating social concerns to economic ones (Petras et al 1994). According to a former education 
minister, Sergio Bitar (2005), this was evident in the need for economic growth (alongside democratic 
stability and social programmes) as a means of achieving educational coherency and success. A 
similar point was made by Cox (2006), who suggested that since the 1990s Chile’s political and 
economic elites found a common agreement on education as a strategy for economic growth and 
social justice.
The link between education and economic growth by the Concertacion contributed to a two- 
stage process of educational reform. The first, between 1990 and 1993, concentrated on increasing 
resources rather than pressing ahead with curricular reform at the secondary level or tackling the issue 
of vocational-general education. Although the new government wished to do so eventually, it was felt 
that the time was not yet right (Nunez, interview 2, 2007). The exception to this was the changes 
made at to the primary school curriculum, which although begun in 1992, did not reach final agreement 
until 1996.
The second, which occurred from the late 1990s, emphasised the development of new 
curricula, changes to the school day and improvements in the teaching profession (Cariola et al 2003). 
The new secondary school curriculum that was developed in this period demonstrated the 
Concertacion’s preoccupation with wider economic challenges presented by globalisation.
However, contrary to the initial period when the government’s concern had been with 
maintaining market objectives and increasing resources, in this second phase the Concertacion 
appeared to adopt a more critical pedagogical perspective. In particular, its designers advocated an 
educational model that should be less linear, less focused on set subjects and on memorising topics. 
Instead it should be more flexibly organised and tailored to the needs and demands of modern society. 
This meant placing a premium on general knowledge and information and the means to communicate 
and innovate (Programa MECE 1997; Cox 1994; Bitar 2005; Nunez, interview 2, 2007). In effect then, 
the change heralded a shift away from the military’s support for vocational education in favour of one
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that was more balanced. In the 1990s general skills rather than specialisation was now seen as the 
way to reduce inequality (Carnoy and Castro 1997: 64). This echoed the persistently low value which 
is attached to vocational qualifications more generally (Wolff 2002: 93).
Curricular reform occurred at both the primary and secondary levels. At the primary level this 
was completed by 1996. The aims included the inculcation of individual values and rights along with 
interaction in the design of their teaching between both the state and educational establishments 
(Mineduc 2002). Although the emphasis on the individual and decentralised study plans was arguably 
similar to the military approach in the 1980s, there were notable differences. These included the 
development of children’s capacity to resolve problems, self-learn, select relevant information and to 
work as part of a team. As part of this general and comprehensive education, issues of personal 
development and moral values were central (Mineduc 1996). At the secondary level the process was 
finished in 1998 (Doyle 2004). Like the primary model, it included particular moral values that had not 
been included before, such as the teaching of ethics (Mineduc 2005a). Other key changes included 
the decentralisation of study plans to the school level, the reorientation of its objectives and content 
and changes in the structure to include two years of general education followed by specialisation in the 
last two years (Riveros 2004).
Despite the curricular reforms, they still remained relatively limited in scope -  and hence were 
not as radical as critical pedagogy would suggest. First, there was difficulty in satisfying the various 
social demands that were generated through the consultation; not all interests could be represented, 
resulting in frustration and dissatisfaction by certain groups (Nunez, interview 2, 2007). Against this 
was the fact that debate had been generally slight anyway. The details within the curricular reforms 
had generated less discussion than the main objections presented by the Right, including the 
constraints that a national curriculum would have on school autonomy and ‘freedom to teach’ (Pena, 
interview, 2007).
Second, despite having new curricular criteria, teachers were ill-prepared to carry through the 
pedagogic changes (Doyle 2004; Cortes 1992). While teacher focus groups expressed interest in the 
opportunity for more flexible study plans, they were concerned at the increase in the amount of 
material they were required to teach while having the same amount of time to prepare and teach 
(Colegio de Profesores 1997a; Soto, interview, 2007).
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Third, there was also an apparent lack of connection between the new curricular criteria and 
what was being taught to prospective teachers (Doyle 2004). This was a source of frustration for the 
government, which had limited means to influence this. The situation was further exacerbated by the 
government’s dependence on university-trained teachers, since there were few other avenues into 
teaching. Only those with a pedagogy degree were entitled to teach, which excluded other groups of 
people who were deterred from a course lasting several years. Bitar (interview, 2007), for example, 
would have liked to have liberalised the requirements for teaching qualifications, to open the pool up to 
a wider base, including those not initially trained as teachers.
Fourth, the growth of the curriculum exacerbated problems differences between public and 
private schools, namely that of schools’ capacity to deliver these study plans. As was the case during 
the military period, private schools remained in a stronger position to do so than many municipal ones 
(Doyle 2004; Consulta Pablo Moreno 1997). The hope is that following the educational package 
agreed between the Concertacion and the Right in Congress in November 2007, more schools might 
be able to cover the requirements laid out in the national curriculum; they would be required to teach 
the national curriculum for only 70% of teaching time, although this would mean they still had to reach 
standards set by the government (Puryear 2007a).
Fifth, the curricular changes were pushed through with relatively limited participation by the 
teaching profession. This was mainly the case at the primary rather than the secondary level (Cox, 
interview, 2007; Nunez, interview 2, 2007), but might arguably be due to the relative lack of consensus 
within the teaching profession on the proposals too (Colegio de Profesores 1997b).
2. Brazil
Curricular design in Brazil has followed a similar path to that in Chile, albeit in a manner that has 
accommodated the federal structure of the educational system. Under the military a conservative 
approach was largely adopted that stressed discipline and preparation for the labour market. Like the 
Chilean military, it promoted vocational over general education, but as happened in Chile, by 1985 the 
departing government had shown itself unable to effectively integrate education into its economic 
development planning. The situation continued to drift during the first decade of the New Republic, 
partly as a result of the immobilism caused by re-democratisation.
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Curricular reform, and the government’s ideological positions underpinning it, effectively 
occurred after 1995 -  although it was a Third Way government that undertook it. Global pressures and 
demands encouraged the development of new curricular guidelines and parameters, which were 
drafted in such a way to accommodate the institutional nature of the Brazilian education system. 
Notwithstanding the more radical stance that the Participatory Left PT would adopt a curricular reform, 
its entry into government in 2003 did not herald substantial change. Indeed, many of the various 
curricular changes and priorities selected suggested a form of education similar to that introduced 
during the previous Cardoso presidency.
2.1. Curricular policies prior to 1995
Before 1995 two broad trends could be seen in thinking about the role of education. The first, which 
occurred prior to the military coup and was sustained until the 1980s, emphasised the importance of 
planned educational policy within the wider context of state-planned economic development. This 
planning introduced a degree of authoritarian control into the education system, along with other 
measures designed to impose the regime’s goals. The second phase began in the later stages of the 
military regime. Authoritarianism was acknowledged as generally inefficient and coincided with a 
democratisation of Brazilian politics and society, which was reflected in its educational approach. 
Ironically though, the political opening up of the system contributed to curricular paralysis, as the New 
Republic governments largely failed to produce any substantial details about the role of education and 
its content.
The military governments after 1964 was preoccupied with linking the education system to 
wider economic needs. This was the period of state-led forms of development, when national planning 
was a common theme globally. In Brazil the regime viewed the education system’s role as meeting 
national needs rather than import models from abroad (Banas 1972).
In 1971 a restructuring of primary and secondary education resulted in compulsory professional 
or vocational training. The aim was both to ensure the development of qualified labour and relieve 
pressure caused by growing demand for university places (Fernandes e Silva n.d.; Soares, n.d.; Moura 
Castro 1989). These changes occurred at the height of the regime’s anti-subversive activity. This 
period had educational implications too, in particular the introduction of ‘moral and civic’ education
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from school to post-graduate level (Skidmore 1988; Cury 1996). The areas covered by the course 
reflected many of the regime’s preoccupations, including national security doctrine, religious education, 
and the importance of science and technology for national development (Leme Lopes et al 1971).
The political liberalisation in the late 1970s and early 1980s provided space for a discussion 
about the regime’s educational objectives. It was becoming increasingly evident that compulsory 
vocational education had proved inadequate for several reasons. Economic pressures, regional 
variations in development and unemployment all undermined the military’s efforts to achieve effective 
planning and management. Despite its compulsory status, not all schools were in a position to provide 
adequate vocational training, resulting in its repeal in 1981 (Moura Castro 1989; Brooke 1985). This 
was followed soon after by the termination of moral and civic education when democracy returned in 
1985.
The post-1985 period resulted in an effective stalemate for educational development in Brazil. 
On one hand democracy had opened up the system and weakened the previous regime’s authoritarian 
measures. At the same time re-democratisation arguably made it more difficult to achieve a coherent 
approach to educational -  and curricular -  reform. In contrast to the previous period, including in the 
populist era before 1964 when the public-private schools debate had been central, there was a surge 
of new interests clamouring for attention. Both the 1988 constitution and the more detailed educational 
guidelines (LDB) that was still being debated in Congress by 1994, included references to minority 
groups, social rights and decentralisation (Cury 1996).
By 1995 the New Republic had experienced almost a decade of inertia in the area of curricular 
development. Increasingly subnational actors, whether they were individual states and municipalities 
or civil society organisations, were carrying out their own educational programmes and practices. As 
Plank (1990: 599) has observed, this gave rise to more personalistic and clientelist forms of policy, but 
with little overall structure or co-ordination.
The situation was complicated by the competing economic visions at the elite level. The state- 
led model of education had not yet been defeated by the early 1990s. Although its support had been 
weakened by the economic pressures and hyperinflation of the 1980s and was challenged by 
President Collor’s (1990-92) neo-liberal vision, it was by no means certain which economic model 
would eventually prevail. This had repercussions for the education sector: given the close association
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between economic development and education made by all governing elites, the lack of consensus on 
the economic model meant that it was uncertain what the education system’s role should be too.
2.2. Curricular policies under the Cardoso government
The Cardoso government appeared to have a clear agenda for education. In contrast to the half­
hearted attitude of previous governments to economic liberalisation, the new administration appeared 
to embrace the trend. Indeed, the Real Plan that contributed to the PSDB election victory in 1994 
relied on opening up the economy to foreign markets (Ferrari-Filho and Fernando de Paula 2003; 
Vasconcellos 2005). The new government saw a similar role for education. While the new education 
minister, Paulo Renato Souza, did not offer anything substantially different to government thinking 
when he said the role of education was to ensure preparation for the labour force, he did acknowledge 
the context. Not only were markets globalised, but technological advances had occurred, prompting 
the need for education systems that accommodated this looser, more flexible situation (Souza 1999). 
Like the Concertacion in Chile, this did not require a specialised form of education like that under the 
military, but rather a more general set of skills and knowledge. This position has persisted within the 
PSDB, most recently in its 2007 education policy document. This commits the PSDB to flexible, 
lifelong learning with access available to all and at any level, including distance learning and vocational 
training to complement general education (PSDB 2007: 16).
While the Cardoso government endorsed a wide range of educational opportunities, it saw their 
implementation in formal terms, using schools and other educational institutions rather than through 
non-school spaces (Arroyo, interview, 2008). However, the government faced a difficulty in delivering 
these aims in the form of curricula at school level. The federal structure of Brazilian education meant 
that the federal government did not have direct responsibility in the running and management of 
schools. Moreover, the government was seeking to refine responsibilities for the federal, state and 
municipal levels, and create greater coordination within the system (Souza, interview, 2007).
The government’s response was to attempt influence in an indirect manner, through the 
introduction of a new set of educational guidelines (LDB) (Durham, interview, 2008). These would be 
expanded upon by the states and municipalities. Until 1994 a previous version had been subject to a 
wide range of amendments in Congress and did not appear close to passing. The new government
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viewed the existing version as compromised by ‘corporatist’ and ideological demands (Souza 2005). 
The former education minister and then senator, Darcy Ribeiro, was approached to sponsor a new 
LDB, eventually being passed in 1996 (Hall 2003).
The LDB included details for all levels of education, from primary through to higher. It proposed 
the development of national curricular parameters rather than a detailed national curriculum, whereby 
states would set their own curricula and which municipalities could develop. This would enable the 
subnational level to reflect more the various regional diversities (Souza 2005; Gomes 2000).
Like the content in the 1988 constitution, the outline of the government’s curricular proposals 
reflected wider social changes as well as more established concerns. In a sense it was a follower of 
fashion rather than an instigator. At the primary and secondary level it stressed the need for 
Portuguese, mathematics and the natural sciences -  all seen as essential for the economic 
development of a country. Art was to be made compulsory, religious teaching was to be accessible 
(although not at public expense), while history was to include reference to all aspects of Brazilian 
development, including indigenous and African involvement. In addition, the guidelines acknowledged 
regional differences, by including rural areas where schooling had to be organised around the 
agricultural cycle (Brasil 1996; Niskier2007: 28). The content of this at the primary level was achieved 
relatively quickly, in 1995 following discussion between MEC and the state education secretaries 
(Brasil: Presidente da Republica 1996).
At the university level, where the federal government had greater direct responsibility, course 
and curricular details were left to the individual institutions to produce (article 53, LDB 1996). This 
overlooked the reality that many professional associations (e.g. doctors, lawyers) remained especially 
influential in determining the content of courses related to their area of interest, thereby controlling the 
market (Schwartzmann, interview, 2007). The government’s concession to these private interests in 
the higher education sector arguably reflected its attitude to economic policy by favouring deregulation. 
This latter point meant the elimination of the vestibular exam as the only means of entering university, 
to include school notes and the exams taken at secondary school level (Niskier 2007: 28).
The LDB did not meet with complete support. Among its most visible critics were those 
‘corporatist’ sections of the educational community, including the teachers who would have to 
implement the guidelines. In particular they felt there had been insufficient consultation and
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participation with wider social actors and that it undermined public education. They placed particular 
emphasis on those aspects of the LDB that opened up the education system (especially the tertiary 
sector) to private interests and the pressures that would result from increased teaching hours and 
insufficient support to teachers {CNTE Noticias 1995a; Abicalil 1998; CNTE 1997; Neubauerand Silva 
and Cruz 1996). At the university level the government was criticised for its emphasis on technical 
efficiency and economic productivity over the development of the individual. This was apparent in the 
absence of any change to internal university structures from the military regime’s 1968 reform. That 
reform had prompted a departmentalisation of universities that had effectively restricted students’ 
ability to pursue different courses and interests across the university (Arelaro, interview, 2008).
Meanwhile at the secondary school level more detailed curricular guidelines (PCN) were 
introduced in 1998. Although the Cardoso government’s main priority had been primary education, by 
the late 1990s pressures were growing for reform of secondary education. These included the growing 
demand for places as more completed primary school, the new economic context which required the 
training of new skills and the challenge of making the curriculum more relevant to contemporary youth 
(Zibas 2005). The aim of this curricular reform was to reduce rigidity in the curriculum. It set aside a 
quarter of teaching time at the upper end of secondary schools to be defined by states and schools 
themselves. It weakened the link between vocational and general education, while also providing 
differentiated forms of vocational training, from the basic to the more specific (Brasil: Presidente da 
Republica 1999).
The process undertaken by the government to develop this reform reflected the administration’s 
emphasis on the use of state institutions and representative participation. Rather than a wide, national 
debate it opted for a more limited approach. According to Souza (2005) the parameters were drawn 
up within MEC using support primarily from Sao Paulo-based teachers in both public and private 
schools. Using both the case study of Spain, where curricular development had been implemented in 
a decentralised system, and the main curricular proposals that had been presented in Brazil over thei
past ten years, the group’s recommendations were passed onto the state-level forum, the National 
Council of Education (CNE). Participation in the development of these parameters were therefore 
decided between formally constituted, organised actors, such as state and municipal education 
secretaries and teaching groups and unions (rather than the favoured deliberative and broader
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participatory approach favoured by the government’s opponents in the educational community). The 
government considered the changes a success, given the finding later that year that suggested half of 
12,000 teachers surveyed were using the guidelines.
Despite these changes and their supposed success, like the Concertacion in Chile, the 
government faced similar problems in the actual implementation of these curricular guidelines. The 
government faced difficulties with the teachers’ movement, which had placed itself against the 
government politically and ideologically. This meant that efforts by the government to reform the 
technical colleges and encourage them to award their own qualifications as an alternative to entering 
higher education was obstructed by teachers (Schwartzmann, interview, 2007). Meanwhile, many 
schools admitted that they lacked sufficient conditions to implement fully the guidelines’ criteria (Zibas 
2005). Once again, the goals of officials were constrained by facts on the ground.
2.3. Curricular policies under the first Lula government
The introduction of the Participatory Left form of social democracy through the PT government after 
2003 did not herald any substantial change in direction regarding the purpose of education. In contrast 
to the Cardoso years, no new LDB was introduced. Instead changes were made at the margins. It 
was not until the start of the second term that the government displayed its role for education, in its 
Education Development Plan (PDE), in April 2007. The plan maintained the link between educational 
reform and economic development, which demonstrated the emphasis that governments continue to 
play in this regard. Indeed, even former policymakers associated with Souza’s team at MEC found 
little difference in the general educational goals undertaken after 2003 (Gouvea, interview, 2008).
That the PT government was pursuing an economic-oriented educational project highlighted 
the transition undertaken by the party since the 1980s. In its earlier years it had a substantially 
different, more socially-oriented project for education. This was shown not only in the party’s wider 
political project and development, but also in the shifting influence of particular groups and individuals 
in educational policymaking. In education it meant a shift from ‘socialist’ aims of transformation in the 
1980s which required the state to play a key role (Arelaro, interview, 2008). This was reflected in the 
themes associated with PT educational policy in the period, which drew strongly on Freire’s ideas of 
education as a means of liberation and as a right. This was reflected in its divergence from PSDB
109
thinking, which stressed the role of formal education, such as schools, as opposed to a more open- 
ended process (Arroyo, interview, 2008).
The 1989 election campaign defined this ‘socialist’ approach. It stressed the importance of 
conducting the project at all levels, from pre-school to higher. Furthermore, the PT placed itself 
against the dominant class, which sought to maintain the masses in ignorance -  and thereby 
perpetrate the status quo. Instead, the PT believed that its purpose was to assist the masses in 
making them aware of their situation. The party should therefore be the educator of the masses. At 
the same time it recognised its role was as much responsive as educative; preparation of the masses 
would mean a more questioning and demanding society (Gadotti and Pereira 1989). This view was 
generally held throughout the PT; the future education minister, Cristovam Buarque, wrote in 1991 that 
in the past education had generally been seen as a privilege and luxury. Education therefore needed 
to be ‘educated’, which meant that the elite had to accept inclusion of Brazilian society at all levels. 
This meant the prioritisation of educational over economic concerns, the redirection of resources, the 
elimination of illiteracy and completion of secondary school (1991:53-66). This last point was made a 
few years before the more modest proposals of the Cardoso education team to prioritise primary 
education.
The aims of the 1989 campaign were never implemented nationally. Lula was defeated in the 
presidential election by Collor. However, the party did have a base both in municipal government and 
the social sector. Municipally, the most prominent manifestation of the PT’s educational practices in 
this period was in the Erundina administration in Sao Paulo, where Paulo Freire had been appointed 
the city’s education secretary (1989-92). Emphasising a collaborative approach between educators 
and educated, Freire promoted a city-wide dialogue on the purpose of education and the creation of 
tailored curricula for the city’s schools that reflected the demands of local needs. This took the form of 
‘popular councils’ consisting of the municipal bureaucracy, educators and social groups locally. 
(Valente, Zanetic 2007, Arelaro, 2007). According to Macaulay (1996) the impact of the Erundina 
administration on education resulted in municipal school enrolments rising by 20% while truancy and 
failure rates dropped. Teachers benefited from a more structured system, including only teaching in 
one school (rather than several), having clearer job descriptions, improved salaries and materials. 
However, following a wide range of problems, including internal divisions within the Sao Paulo PT,
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opposition from both business and part of the social sector and institutional inertia, the PT was 
punished in the 1992 elections, being voted out of the mayoralty.
Despite the limited oppostunity afforded the PT, some of the educational practices associated 
with the Sao Paulo experience soon spread to other PT-run municipalities. In Belo Horizonte Miguel 
Arroyo instigated the Plural School, which involved the integration of informal educational processes 
occurring in the city into the established school network. The content of school materials was 
reviewed to include subjects not previously covered, either in the city or elsewhere in the country at the 
time, including Afro-Brazilian history. In addition, learning cycles were introduced, which involved 
students’ automatic promotion from one grade to the next, rather than holding them back and distorting 
the relationship between a student’s age and a teacher’s level of teaching (Arroyo, interview, 2008). 
This approach ensured that time periods were reflected and avoided adolescents being taught in 
primary school classes. Indeed, the popularity of this last approach was such that it was taken by 
other cities during the 1990s, including in Porto Alegre, Blumenau and Brasilia. However, against this, 
automatic grade promotion has been criticised for providing superficial improvements in education 
indicators (Hall 2003: 282).
The PT’s more participatory approach was echoed by its supporters in civil society during its 
early period. The most notable of these was the landless movement (MST), which pursued 
educational objectives in line with Freire’s ‘pedagogy of the oppressed’ within its camps (Branford and 
Rocha 2002). But while the PT lost its radical edge in educational policy during the second decades of 
its existence, that of the MST has persisted. McCowan (2003) notes that the MST has continued to 
challenge the system, by encouraging the landless to demand both their rights as well as changes to 
improve their situation. Since the 1980s, this approach has become increasingly institutionalised 
within the movement; Diniz-Pereira (2005) observes that the MST has introduced pre- and in-service 
teacher training that reinforces the movement’s commitment to socialist and collective ideas within its 
own schools and educational establishments.
The persistence of the MST’s educational ideology therefore provides a contrast to the extent 
that the PT has shifted with regard to ctitical pedagogy. To account for the PT’s growing moderation in 
the curricular sphere, several factors occurred during the late 1990s that may account for the party’s 
transition. These included issues related to the policymaking machine within the party as well as
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broader developments occurring in relation to party membership and organisation. But of perhaps 
greatest impact was the growing strength of the party leadership to its grassroots and social base as 
the party came closer to realising a possible Lula election victory in 2002 (Leal 2004).
Despite the changes within the PT before 2003, there was no clear separation between the 
party’s approach to curricular practices before and after this date. The policymaking core under the 
new education minister, Buarque, initially reflected some of the ‘progressive’ goals associated with the 
party during the early part of the 1990s. Buarque initially appeared to prioritise more informal 
educational practices, such as youth and adult literacy campaigns at the expense of the formal basic 
educational system (Souza, Schwartzmann, interviews, 2007; Soares, interview, 2008). This was in 
keeping with more community-based popular education practices that were occurring globally during 
the 1990s (Hall and Midgley 2004:157). However, in the case of the PT, the attempt to pursue this at 
the national level failed and reflected the broader tension that was at work in the government’s 
approach to social policy during its first year. For Buarque, the failure of his education policies were 
largely due to a perceived lack of presidential support (interview, 2008).
The emphasis on the informal or social was not one that occurred at MEC in isolation. Other 
social policy areas were also subject to this pressure. In particular, this included the debate over the 
form that the government’s Zero Hunger (Fome Zero) programme should take. Goertzel (unpublished) 
summarises this as a choice between adopting an organic, social movement-based approach or the 
use of formal institutional mechanisms. In this instance the latter was eventually opted for, resulting in 
the cash conditional family grant programme (bolsa familia). Similarly, PT educational practice 
eventually shifted in this direction, especially after Buarque left office. This was evident in the 
emphasis given to formal education, including reforms of educational finance (FUNDEB) and higher 
education (Schwartzmann, interview, 2007; Brooke, interview, 2008).
With the emphasis on the formal, the PT’s educational goals demonstrated no substantial 
difference from its predecessor. By pursuing more institutional goals, the party commitment to 
‘progressive’ education arguably diminished. The emphasis was less on transforming the system than 
on managing what it had inherited. This meant expansion of formal education, most especially in the 
pre-university levels (Brooke, interview, 2008). The introduction of FUNDEB meant that guaranteed 
school finance was broadened from the primary level to include pre-school and secondary levels.
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Higher education reform included both a commitment to increase the public university network as well 
as providing state support for poorer students to enter the (private) system, through the Prollni 
programme. Evaluation was widened in both scope and content; at school levels samples were 
ditched in favour of countrywide tests and their publication (Motter, unpublishedl, unpublished, 2, 
unpublished 3; Soares, interview, 2008).
This expansionary approach was reinforced in the government’s curricular practices. Unlike its 
predecessor, it did not issue any new educational guidelines or parameters, but instead made 
adjustments to the existing ones. Primary school education was expanded from eight to nine years 
and the teaching of Afro-Brazilian history and culture became compulsory in both primary and 
secondary schools (Brasil 1996; Niskier 2007).
One difference in the formal education system between the Cardoso and Lula years though 
was the emphasis given to vocational training. Whereas the previous government had weakened the 
link between vocational and general education, the PT government claimed to have substantially 
increased the number of vocational teachers during its first term and proposed to expand the size of 
the sector in its second (MEC 2007b: 32-3). Schwartzmann (interview, 2007) meanwhile noted that 
the PT government sought to make the link between vocational education and other forms closer by 
making it easier for those attending technical colleges to be able to enter university. At the same time 
the period saw a growth in numbers both in terms of students and schools in the sector (Azevedo
2006). The reasons for this growth may have been due not only to the recovering economy after 2002, 
but also the expansion in government-backed employment opportunities; Cardoso (interview, 2008) 
claimed that his successor had fallen back onto past political practices, such as clientelism and the 
construction of public works.
The decision to adopt a more institutionalised approach to education meant that the Lula 
government adopted the logic of the system as left by its predecessor. Government supporters did 
argue that there was a substantial difference separating it from the Cardoso era, not least in the notion 
of the PT having ‘rescued’ education through expanded financial coverage and in linking it to wider 
child and youth concerns through the bolsa familia (Pinto 2007; Arroyo, interview, 2008). However, 
this was a far cry from the revolutionary rhetoric of the late 1980s and the commitment to achieve a 
comprehensive transformation and suggested a more modest set of objectives.
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3. Conclusion
This chapter has compared and contrasted the educational aims of the three governments and the 
extent to which these have been followed through in curricular changes. Attention was initially given to 
how educational objectives may be perceived, distinguishing between the forms of education 
associated with the Left and Right and social democracy. More specifically it sought to distinguish 
between the variations that exist within social democrat thinking about the curriculum, between the 
Third Way and the Participatory Left. Of the two, the Third Way shares some of the traits of the Right, 
most notably in its inclination to reform rather than transform the prevailing educational model, only 
making adjustments where necessary to accommodate economic demands. That economic reality 
reflects a change in fashion from the state-led development approach of the 1970s towards one that is 
both more liberalised and deregulated. This has placed pressure on governments to develop their 
education systems to accommodate the demands of economic globalisation. Against the Third Way 
approach is the Participatory Left version, which is more closely associated with ‘progressive’ 
educational aims of challenging the status quo.
Given these differences, it is ironic that the two governments which appear to have produced 
the most extensive curricular reforms have been the Third Way administrations in Brazil and Chile. By 
contrast the PT, which began life closer to the ‘progressive’ end of the educational spectrum, has 
ended up conforming to the model bequeathed it. Rather than seeking an overhaul of the system, the 
government since 2003 has largely echoed the educational goals and curricular content of the 
Cardoso years. The reason for this can be laid at the shift away from a more society-oriented form of 
education towards the use of existing institutions. This was due in large part to the difficulties of 
achieving educational change through social means.
Although it modified them, by emphasising greater coverage, this had the unintended 
consequence of tying the government to the goals and content of the Cardoso-era curricular reforms. 
The act of adopting its policy approach arguably determined this result. Furthermore, given various 
changes within the party and the leadership’s acceptance of the same broad vision, this did not appear 
to create any substantial problems in terms of education content.
The two Third Way governments were therefore the most comprehensive reforming their 
curricular policies. This reflected the fact that both came to power just as state-led development had
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been discredited and economic globalisation required a response (in which case the Lula government 
may be seen as the beneficiary of those decisions taken a decade ago). As a result, the reforms while 
comprehensive, they were paradoxically limited as well. They did not challenge the wider economic 
context, opting for models that reflected what other governments and international agencies were 
recommending at the time: general education and knowledge of skills to support more flexible labour 
forces. These curricular policies also highlighted the governments’ conformity regarding the link 
between education and economic development. Perhaps the unwillingness to challenge this -  and 
adopt a more ‘progressive’ approach -  was due to their predecessors’ difficulties: the first decade of 
the New Republic in Brazil displayed a persistence in trying to resurrect the state model of 
development to little effect; in Chile the military’s New Right policies failed to achieve their aims.
However, at the same time regardless of the governments’ responses, their capacity to 
influence the outcome of their decisions has remained marginal at best. The Brazilian federal system 
provided much space for other, subnational actors to influence the curricular debate. In both countries 
government aims depended on educators to put them into practice, whether it be within the classroom 
or a community centre. No government could have that kind of direct control over the process and so 
were therefore dependent on wider forces if their objectives to be realised.
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6. Spending more?: Public expenditure on education and social 
democratic governments
If the role of the state for social democrats has been rather vague, its involvement in public 
expenditure has been more apparent. In contrast to the New Right, which seeks to reduce public 
spending, social democracy -  in both its past and current incarnations -  has tended to favour its 
increase (Bresser Pereira 2001). However, in contrast to the past these increases do not mean the 
contemporary social democrats support across-the-board rises in public spending; it may well be the 
case that it is held steady or reduced in certain areas while it is expanded in others (Glyn and Wood
2001). This reflects the changes that have occurred since the 1970s, due both to the need to ensure 
stable public finances generally, and evidence of weak correlations between welfare spending and 
outcome. Indeed, more sophisticated analyses of the relationship between these last two suggest that 
issues such as market failure, spending composition, corruption and effective service delivery may be 
more relevant (Funk 1999; Goldstein 2008).
Although social democracy is relatively clear about its preference towards greater public 
spending, it is complicated by the more recent global ideological convergence in its favour. During the 
1980s the institutions associated with the Washington Consensus stressed the need for structural 
readjustment, including a reduction of the state and its spending and its replacement by privately 
funded provision. Since the 1990s however, this rhetoric has changed towards stressing greater state 
capacity and institutional strength (Zurbriggen 2007). This seems apparent both in the World Bank’s 
recommendation to use targeted spending for particular groups to encourage school enrolment and 
attendance (World Bank 2007) rather than increasing general spending for education overall (figure 2). 
Such data, selected from a set of Latin American and non-Latin American middle income countries, 
suggests that since the early 1990s public spending on education as a proportion of GDP has 
remained within the same band, between around 3% and just over 6% of GDP (the exception being 
the Cuban government, which saw the amount it allocated to education fall dramatically owing to the 
economic difficulties it faced in the period) -  although in both the countries studied, Brazil and Chile, 
the proportion of GDP spent on education by the public sector has tended to be lower than other 
comparable cases.
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rigure 2
Public expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP in m iddle-incom e countries, 1990-2005
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The shift towards a global consensus that first emphasised state reform (whether it be its 
reduction or more recently capacity-building) over that of greater public spending (in education) has 
arguably complicated the conventional distinctions between social democratic theory and practice 
regarding public spending. With the exceptions of Cuba, Estonia and Poland, most other countries 
(including within Latin America) increased their proportion of public expenditure on education during 
the 1990s and 2000s (figure 2). Meanwhile, in both Brazil and Chile there were overall falls in public 
spending in the first decade before a stabilisation in the former at 4% of GDP and an increase of 1 % to 
3.4% between 2000 and 2005 in the latter. The relatively lower Chilean amount in public expenditure 
has been compensated by a greater reliance on private funding than in Brazil, enabling it to spend 
nearly the same amount as the OECD average of 5.8% of GDP (from both public and private sources) 
in 2005 (and 1% more than the OECD mean in 2000) (OECD 2008).
That this occurred arguably reflects the origins and ideological direction of the Third Way which 
dominated in both countries during the period, when a more modest expansionary approach to 
education spending might occur against a Participatory Left that would be more inclined to a
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substantial increase in expenditure. Yet the reasons for the policymaking elites adopting thse lower 
levels of spending compared to other countries may be attributed primarily to domestic concerns. For 
the Third Way this consists of its much closer association and comfort with the free-market and 
structural reform, making it more favourably disposed to spending less than the Participatory Left. As 
for the Participatory Left, because it draws its support from those social movements and organisations 
largely opposed to the structural readjustments of the 1980s, it would be expected that they would 
demand substantial spending increases to overcome public sector weakness.
Yet despite the supposed differences between the Third Way and the Participatory Left and the 
shifts in the total amount allocated by the public sector to education during the 1990s and 2000s 
(figure 2), in practice all three cases show that certain education sectors within each country 
experienced a real increase. However, the extent to which the governments were directly responsible 
varied. Of the three, the Cardoso government contributed the smallest direct increase. This was 
paradoxical since one of its main achievements was the introduction of a funding mechanism -  that 
drew mainly on subnational expenditures-to increase spending substantially. Furthermore, in terms 
of targeting, the Third Way Concertacion and the Participatory Left PT appeared to adopt the use of 
targeted funds most actively.
The reasons for the difference were due to Concertacion and PT leaders’ belief that the 
educational sector required substantial direct investment. Each came to this from different starting 
points: the Concertacion had broadly accepted the educational model that it inherited in 1990, meaning 
that its scope for action was more constrained; the PT could draw both on social support and previous 
experience of successful targeted programmes (such as the school grant or bolsa escola) as 
influences. In contrast, the Cardoso government’s decision was guided by the educational 
policymaking core’s belief that the main spending concern was to achieve a more rational and efficient 
use of resources -  hence the development of a new funding system rather than a substantial overall 
increase.
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1. Chile
1.1. Macro-economic policy prior to 1990
The Concertacion’s spending on education has been shaped by the broader economic policies 
pursued under the previous military regime. In particular, this involved a wholesale structural reform of 
the state, including spending cuts and greater use of the market. The focus was consequently more 
on the state’s economic capacity rather than resolving social questions. What resources remained 
became increasingly targeted. This approach contributed to a perspective that not only recognised the 
limited funds available, but also emphasised efficiency in spending rather than its expansion (Puryear 
and Olivios 1995).
In addition to the dictatorship’s economic transformation, it intended to change Chilean society 
and notions of citizenship as well (Taylor 2006; Sandbrook et al 2007; Taylor 1998). The process 
occurred in two stages. The first, between 1973 and the early 1980s, saw the regime stabilise the 
economy and reduce the role of the state. The rise of the monetarist-inclined Chicago Boys in 
economic policy-making from 1975 meant the introduction of policies that reduced the number of state- 
owned companies from over 400 to 45 (Boeninger 1988). The second, which occurred after the 
economic crisis of 1982-83, saw the regime adopt a less dogmatic and more pragmatic approach to 
the economy (Sandbrook et al 2007). By the end of the 1980s the country had largely recovered from 
the economic crisis. Chile was experiencing rising economic growth, based largely on primary 
commodity exports. But alongside this, spending in education -  as in other social policy areas -  had 
fallen (figure 3): in 1990 spending per student had fallen to 23% compared to 1982 (Marcel and 
Tokman 2005: 10-11). Education, like other social policy areas, was subject to the influence of the 
economic ministries, such as finance and planning (Dittborn, interview, 2007).
It was during the 1980s that the government began to make use of targeted resources. The 
most notable of these was the introduction of the ‘voucher’ system for schools. Within Mineduc 
discussions were held on whether the voucher should be paid directly to schools based on the number 
of students they had or handed over to parents to redeem at the school of their choice. The first option 
was eventually chosen (Dittborn, interview, 2007). This model of funding meant that the ‘voucher’
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system as practiced in Chile after 1980, while maintaining elements of the market, was never complete 
since it maintained a role for the state.
Another approach was to promote the greater use of private funds, reflecting earlier 
encouragement by the regime’s education ministers during the 1970s; one of the last military ministers, 
Rear-Admiral Luis Niemann, suggested that those who could afford it should spend what they could 
(Zalaquett 1977). In higher education, this included encouragement towards self-financing, greater 
use of the market in meeting demand and discussions about a graduate tax (CPFUCH 1975). By 1980 
a new three-part funding model was introduced into higher education: smaller direct state contributions 
to the eight pre-1980 institutions; new indirect contributions which were available to new, private 
institutions set up after 1980 and which were dependent on student performance; and direct student 
credits (Pinochet 1993; Larrain 1997). The aim of these measures was to expand the role of the 
market in the sector. Indeed, after 1980 the bulk of university funding certainly did come increasingly 
from private sources. By the 1990s higher education was the education sector that was most exposed 
to the market (Marcel and Tokman 2005).
The Concertacion’s 1989 programme maintained the general thrust of economic policy of the 
previous two decades. Yet it did not offer a complete acceptance of the military approach. The 
Concertacion saw itself as different from the military in being concerned with assigning greater 
spending to social issues. This was reflected not just in the Concertacion’s commitment to a more 
progressive tax system (as opposed to the Pinochet regime’s acceptance of a constant level of 
spending, albeit it redirected to the poorer sectors), but also to identify the root causes of social 
problems and assign a greater role to social groups. This included increasing the minimum wage and 
improving the bargaining position of the unions (Petras et al 1994; Raczynski 1999; Angell 2007).
Despite the greater social focus, the Concertacion approach meant that economic concerns 
would invariably override those of education. This was reflected in the relative importance of the 
Finance Ministry in educational policy, including its acceptance of the voucher system and its 
prioritisation of issues such as unemployment, which constrained spending (Garcia-Huidobro, 
interview, 2007; Aylwin 2002). The effect of this was to limit the possibility of substantial structural 
change, according to Garcia-Huibodro (interview, 2007). This was echoed by more leftist actors such 
as the Colegio de Profesores, who believed that the educational reform of 1996 was financially
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motivated and maintained the process of deregulation and privatisation begun in the 1980s (Moreno 
1998).
1.2. Public expenditure on education under Concertacion governments
It was a market-oriented educational model that the Concertacion confronted when it took office in 
1990. As a first measure, the decline in education spending as a proportion of the budget, was 
reversed, along with that of health (figure 3). In real terms, education spending, which had seen an 
8.4% fall in the 1980s, more than doubled between the 1980s and late 1990s. By the mid-2000s it had 
increased three-fold (Araujo 2006a; Raczynski 1999; Cox 2006). As a proportion of GNP, this meant 
an increase in public spending from 2.7% in 1990 to a high of 4.4% by 2002 (CEPAL 2007: 65). 
Notwithstanding the increases in education spending during the 1990s under the Concertacion, by 
2006 the proportion allocated in the budget had begun to decline, from 4.4% to 4.1% of GNP (CEPAL 
2007: 65). However, this decline masked the fact that the amount allocated was still higher than that 
spent under the military during the 1970s, and compared to social security, its decline had not been as 
steep.
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Alongside the general increase in education spending, the Concertacion’s commitment to the earlier 
phases of teaching was reflected in the doubling of spending per student at both primary and 
secondary levels during its first 15 years in office (figure 4). Against this though was variation in the 
amount the public sector spent per student type: 73%, 62% and 51% of pre-school, primary and 
secondary schooling respectively (Marcel and Tokman 2005). By contrast, the proportion allocated to 
higher education continued to decline under both military and Concertacion governments (figure 5).
For left-wing critics though, the Concertacion’s increases in educational spending remained 
insufficient. During the national debate on education in 2006 the Bloque Social advocated further 
reductions in the military budget and the allocation of 10% of copper revenues to expand the resources 
available for education and other social policies (Bloque Social 2006). However, the government 
arguably had relatively less direct control over the use of these resources as a result of the 1980s 
changes when they were transferred directly to primary and secondary schools: by the time the 
Concertacion took office in 1990 more than half of Mineduc’s resources were being allocated directly 
to schools (figure 5).
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Figure 5__________________________________________________________
Chilean State Spending on Education, 1970-2007
Source: Adapted from Ministerio de Hacienda (various years)
 Primary Directorate
 Education Directorate
Secondary Directorate 
—  Professional Directorate 
 Higher
 Transfers to Schools
^  A^ V A^ A ^ A^ A*k A^ A^ txV ofb nfe CyS o fr gS^  q*. qTV q[b q?0 rSb (A  Q& qR> r f i (A  P\V jtb  gV ffo  gfo (A
^  ^  ^  ^  ^  & &  &  •& &  &  &  &  &  &  •& &  &  s #  &  &  &  &  &  n? o? n? ^  n? n?
Year
If the Concertacion’s priority was primary and secondary education during its first years of office, by 
the late 1990s and 2000s it was refocusing attention towards pre-school (Marcel and Tokman 2005). 
This reflected a growing global concern that children better educated at pre-school level did 
proportionately better later on than those who were not (Eyaguirre and Le Foulon 2001). During 
Lagos’s first year as president, the budget for pre-school programmes doubled from Ch$632.m to 
Ch$1.2bn in 2002, before nearly doubling again to Ch$2.1 bn in 2007 (Ministerio de Hacienda, various 
years). This increase in spending not only offered mothers the opportunity to seek employment, but 
also presented the possibility of a break with the cycle of poverty (Marcel and Tokman 2005).
1.3. Targeted public spending programmes under the Concertacion
The Concertacion was especially concerned by inequalities in educational opportunities and made use 
of existing mechanisms to address this. The new government had broadly accepted the tripartite 
school system and made similar use of the previous regime’s use of targeted resources. But whereas 
the military had used it to promote economic rationalisation, the Concertacion used it as a form of
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positive discrimination. Targeting was the way that the Concertacion could focus on resolving 
inequalities between schools, rather than on attempting to reform the system as a whole -  an issue 
made all the more problematic owing to the government’s lack of a majority in Congress. Targeting 
was therefore a way of pursuing priorities that did not require legislation (Munoz, Elacqua, interviews, 
2007; Nunez, interview 1, 2007).
Of the Concertacion’s targeting measures, there were several which addressed education from 
pre-school to higher levels, including the use of specific credits and grants (Aylwin 1994b; Mineduc 
1993; Cox 1994; Garcia-Huidobro interview; Concertacion 1994). Their use meant increased spending 
on school improvements and the marginalised sectors of Chilean society. Among the most important 
was the Educational Quality and Equity Improvement Programme (MECE) at pre-school, primary and 
secondary levels. Launched in 1992, it initially allocated US$243 million over five years to its various 
component parts, of which US$170 million came from the World Bank (Ministerio de Planificacion y 
Cooperacion 1996: 118). Within the fund was the P900 programme. Allocated to those schools 
deemed in greatest need, between 1994 and 2002 the P900 programme saw its budget rise from 
Ch$812m to Ch$3.74bn, while those related to educational improvements grew from Ch$1.1bn to 
Ch$3.2bn in the five years to 1997 (Ministerio de Hacienda, various years). Against this were 
criticisms from parts of the left-wing educational community that these measures were devised and 
implemented with the limited involvement and participation by them (Caceres, Rodriguez, interviews, 
2007). This was explained by the government’s apparent sense of distrust and lack of confidence in 
schools to manage themselves effectively (Bosch, interview, 2007).
The Concertacion also sought alternative sources of funding for its social policies. In education 
this was explicitly stated by the 1994 Brunner Commission which recommended greater spending, 
from both private as well as public sources. This was to be achieved through resources from families 
and business, the use of tax exemptions and the development of funds for innovative projects. The 
result was a three-fold increase in education spending since 1990 (Comite Tecnico Asesor del Dialogo 
Nacional sobre la Modernizacion de la Educacion Chilena 1994; Concertacion 1994; Cox 2006). The 
World Bank was approached for loans to fund the MECE programme (Rivero 1999; Cortes 1994). 
This initially proved controversial for parts of the Concertacion, who were concerned that the Bank
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would impose conditions on the government’s education policy. This was averted by the Ministry’s use 
of negotiations and demand for independence from the Bank (Nunez, interview 1, 2007).
2. Brazil
2.1. Macroeconomic policy and public spending on education before 1995
In contrast to the Chilean case, the neo-liberal impetus was never as strong in Brazil. The military 
regime pursued a broadly state-led development model, a direction that was largely maintained for 
most of the first decade of the New Republic. The one exception to this trend was that of the Collor 
presidency (1990-92), which was stridently neo-liberal in tone and included some of the first privatising 
and deregulating measures, but resulted only in temporary economic stabilisation and left the 
education sector largely unaffected (Goldemberg, interview, 2008; Coes 1995; Longo 1993).
The reasons for the persistence of the state-led model into the 1990s was due to the general 
success of the model from a long-term perspective that included the ‘economic miracle’ of the early 
1970s, and an inability to resolve the economic crisis after 1982, in particular hyperinflation and rising 
public debt (Font 2004; Spanakos 2004; Moura 1993). Indeed, during the military period education 
reforms failed to improve the system or provide sufficient resources, owing to spending distortions 
(especially at the federal level) in favour of higher education (Hall 2003: 270).
At the same time the New Republic was increasingly susceptible to wider political demands, 
especially at the subnational level where elected politicians agitated for greater public funds. Public 
spending on education rose from 0.7% of GDP in 1980 to 3.7% by 1990, eventually settling at 4.5% in 
1993-95 (CEPAL 2001: 49). Much of this spending came at the subnational level, which during the 
1980s became more decentralised and less coordinated. In 1983 the Calmon amendment was 
introduced, a constitutional mechanism that required 13% of federal and 25% of state and municipal 
tax revenues to be allocated to education (Gadotti 1992). However, it was made largely irrelevant by 
the growing independence of states, municipalities and social movements after 1985 and the 
increasing politicisation of education spending (Medici and Maciel 1996; Neubauer da Silva and Cruz 
1996; NEPP 1988; Castro 1996; Hall 2003). At the local level there was variation though: differences 
in states’ GDP allowed states in the Southeast to draw on more resources than those in the Northeast, 
which affected the level of enrolment (Plank 1990: 543; Arretche and Rodriguez 1999).
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The rise in public spending on education was not sustained at the federal level (as opposed to 
the states and municipalities) (Plank 1990). As a proportion of the budget education spending 
declined along with most other social services after 1985 (figure 6), as the government began to 
shoulder the growing burden of public debt (included in administration and planning prior to 1994).
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Given the decentralised nature of education, the federal government had two main ways of influencing 
expenditure: through distribution of the federal quota of the salario-educagao and resources from 
international institutions (Arretche and Rodriguez 1999: 90). The salario-educagao was a levy 
established under the military, targeting employers’ payrolls to fund schooling at federal, state and 
municipal level, and was divided on a quota basis between each authority. However, as a form of 
funding, it was undermined by the lack of adequately controlled municipal finance for education to go 
alongside its growing management responsibilities (Neves 1992). More generally, the discretionary 
nature of much education spending became problematic, with politicians at the subnational level 
redirecting funds elsewhere (Goldemberg, interview, 2008). Especially notable in this period were the 
highly visible construction of integrated schools and community centres, such as the CIEPs during
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Leonel Brizola’s governorship of Rio de Janeiro state and Collor’s ClACs, whose funding remained 
uncertain and insecure (Goldemberg, Cardoso, interviews, 2008). Indeed, in the absence of any 
effective central control, these factors, coupled with various short-term government responses to tackle 
growing inflation, only served to create a less financially secure environment for the wider public sector 
and education itself.
2.2. Public expenditure on education under the Cardoso government
Brazil’s macroeconomic situation -  and that for education -  changed after 1994 with the Real Plan. 
Introduced by Cardoso while at the Finance Ministry, the Real Plan was different to previous 
stabilisation attempts, helping deliver and retain the presidency for Cardoso in 1994 and 1998 
(Cardoso, interview, 2008). The Plan resulted in a sharp and lasting fall in inflation, rising incomes 
throughout the 1990s (especially amongst the poorest sectors) and attracted greater foreign 
investment. Its downside though was that it made the economy more susceptible to external financial 
pressures (Ferrari-Filho and Fernando de Paula 2003; Vasconcellos 2005). This risk became a reality 
when the East Asian and Russian financial crises affected Latin American markets and the Cardoso 
government was obliged to devalue the real in early 1999, contributing to an economic slump (Rocha
2002).
With a stable financial environment the new Cardoso government set about determining its 
spending priorities for education. In 1994 the view held by the educational policymaking team was that 
the system had relatively little coordination, control, equality or efficiency in the use of resources. 
Unlike the Concertacion in Chile, the Cardoso team did not see the problem facing educational finance 
as a lack of resources, but rather their efficient use. Having chosen to prioritise primary education, the 
government therefore set about making changes to the educational system’s financial mechanism and 
the use of targeted resources to ensure both sufficient funds and keep children in school. This 
involved the development of three main policies: the creation of a new financial compact in the form of 
FUNDEF, targeted incentive programmes to households through the bolsa escola to keep children in 
school, and direct payments to schools to assist material improvements.
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2.2.1. FUNDEF
The search for a means to secure educational funding had been introduced through the Calmon 
constitutional amendment in 1983. A similar effort was made in the 1988 constitution, which required 
that 18% of federal and 25% of state and municipal tax revenues be spent on education (Levacic and 
Downes 2004). However, as with the Calmon amendment, this measure was poorly implemented. 
State and municipal governments did not earmark the necessary funds, contributing to wide variations 
in spending allocations across the country. To address this, Paulo Renato Souza, Cardoso’s 
education minister, set up a working group within MEC made up of his senior ministerial advisors in 
early 1995. Drawing on comparative consultancy work she had done for the Sao Paulo state 
education secretariat where she had observed differences in the finances and performance of 
municipal and non-municipal schools, Eunice Durham proposed a mechanism that would equalise 
those differences (interview, 2008). The result was a new funding system, FUNDEF, which would 
require that over a period of ten years 15% of state and municipal tax revenues -  or 60% of the 
revenues hypothecated for education -  would be allocated to primary education (Levacic and Downes 
2004).
In addition, FUNDEF was to provide greater equality in primary education funding by allocating 
a set amount to municipalities on the basis of the number of students enrolled as well as a minimum 
amount of R$300 per student each month (Souza 2005). Where spending by states and municipalities 
failed to reach the minimum amount, the federal government would step in to provide a supplement. 
For the government, the process was deemed to be more efficient than before, since it would work 
alongside the constitutional jurisdictions laid out in the 1996 national education guidelines (LDB). The 
new LDB determined that while municipalities would bear the main responsibility for primary education, 
the federal government would provide overall coordination and assistance where necessary. FUNDEF 
was credited with adding two million new students into the primary school system, although only 
600,000 of those were assumed to be new entrants, the bulk being those who had dropped out of 
school previously. Consequently, a substantial number of the students who benefited from the 
FUNDEF programme were older than the primary school age range (7-14 years) (Araujo e Oliveira 
2004).
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The educational team was helped by Cardoso’s immediate support for FUNDEF, which helped 
overcome reservations by the Finance Ministry and enabled the government to build sufficient 
congressional support to achieve the necessary constitutional amendment to make FUNDEF law 
(Souza 2005; Cardoso, interview, 2008). After coming into force in 1998, the result was a near tripling 
of the amount allocated to primary education by the end of the first Lula term (2006). This meant that 
primary education spending had increased from R$13.2bn to R$35.9bn -  even as the federal 
contribution declined from R$435m to R$250m (Ministerio da Fazenda 1998-2006). As intended, the 
fund provided resources for greater primary school attendance, redirected money to the relatively 
poorer North and Northeast and ensured rises in both teachers’ salaries and spending per student 
(Draibe 2004). At the same time, however, while the fund did centralise control of educational funds 
and protect the federal level from subnational pressures, it did not deliver the same level of oversight 
and scrutiny of spending at the municipal level, where mayors had considerable discretionary power in 
its allocation (Sands 2008).
Despite FUNDEF’s achievements, the initial response to the proposal from the wider (left-wing) 
educational community was muted. The teachers’ union response to the FUNDEF proposal noted the 
absence of any reference to a key demand, that of a national teaching salary. In its place the 
government specified that at least 60% of the funds raised by FUNDEF should be spent on teachers’ 
salaries (Souza 2005). In addition, criticisms included: the extent to which all municipalities were 
capable of managing FUNDEF resources and whether there were sufficient incentives to encourage 
this; whether it really meant an expansion of resources or was just a reallocation of existing funds; its 
emphasis on primary education at the expense of pre-schooling and secondary education; whether it 
provided sufficient funding per student; and the reduction in the federal contribution overtime (Arelaro, 
interview, 2008; Nascimento, interview, 2006; Neves 1999; Hall 2003; Araujo e Oliveira 2004; Pinto
2007). The teachers received support for their views from the PT, to which they were closely aligned. 
Given its status as an opposition party in 1996, the PT voted against the constitutional amendment 
(Buarque, Soares, interviews, 2008).
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2.2.2. Targeted programmes under the Cardoso government
If the federal government did not directly contribute to the expansion of public spending in education 
under Cardoso, where there was a more noticeable change was in the area of targeted funds. This 
included the introduction of the bolsa escola, money paid directly to schools, and targeted international 
assistance. In part this reflected the tendency of political leaders prior to the Cardoso government to 
fund projects (e.g. CIEPs and ClACs) that were readily identifiable with their administrations. 
However, where the process was arguably different was in these programmes’ shift away from being 
associated with a specific politician in favour of a more technical set of criteria to determine allocation.
First, unlike FUNDEF, the bolsa escola did not have a single intellectual origin, but stemmed 
from several different forums and practices from the late 1980s on. The bolsa escola is a cash 
conditional transfer (CCT) that is paid to the head of a household to encourage them to send their 
children to school rather than work. Cristovam Buarque, the first education minister in the PT 
government, claims intellectual credit for the idea, arguing that it originated in the Brazilian Studies 
Centre at the University of Brasilia in 1987, where he was chancellor at the time. Buarque also noted 
the PT’s initial opposition to the idea (interview, 2008). Eunice Durham, an advisor to Souza, similarly 
distinguishes between Buarque and the PT (interview, 2008), while it is notable that the bolsa escola 
was one of the notable features of Buarque’s administration of the Federal District between 1995 and 
1998 (Macaulay and Burton 2003).
Souza (2005) suggests that debates surrounding the use of CCTs had been around since the 
early 1990s and were put into practice at the local level in Campinas by the PSDB mayor in 1994 -  
which, according to Buarque, involved his participation (interview, 2008). The bolsa escola was 
subsequently taken up in discussions between Souza and the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IADB) president, Enrique Iglesias, over the possibility of a bank-funded CCT project in the Northeast 
the following year. However, it was not deemed sufficiently mature enough by the Bank to be rolled 
out at that time (Souza 2005:102). Nevertheless, the notion of CCTs was gaining broader social and 
political appeal in the latter half of the 1990s, including endorsement from the PT through senator 
Eduardo Suplicy and his commitment to a basic income (Souza 2005).
Following a federal evaluation in 1997-98 of existing programmes and the introduction of 
central funds from 1999, the bolsa escola remained a largely subnational policy. In 2000 the
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government took the decision to reduce mayoral association with the programme and introduced a 
federal level bolsa escola. The decision also included the use of magnetic cards by beneficiaries to 
reduce the level of bureaucracy and potential corruption by municipalities (Souza 2005). The resulting 
package from 2001 initially reached 5.8m families and cost around R$2bn a year (Aguiar and Araujo 
2003; Caixeta 2002; Cardoso 2006). Despite the national bolsa escola’s introduction, there remain 
questions regarding the causality between income and schooling levels. Vasconcellos (2005) has 
suggested that compulsory school attendance would have a greater impact on income than any 
contribution. This position was subsequently accepted by Souza, who noted that while its value was 
real, it was also limited; economic growth, sufficient education and a well-paid job are also necessary 
preconditions (Souza 2002).
Second, the other main targeted programme involved funds paid directly to schools for 
infrastructure improvements and materials. Drawing on the salario-educagao, this discretionary fund 
was proposed within MEC by lara Prado, one of the ministerial advisors, and sought to bypass the 
municipalities through direct-school payments. Although the sums paid to the schools were small, they 
did not require any form of ‘earned autonomy’, whereby the school was required to reach certain 
standards or deliver particular results. The policy’s success is measured by the claim that it has been 
maintained under the subsequent Lula government (Durham, interview, 2008).
Third, the administration followed previous governments in seeking out international funding 
where necessary. Although the bolsa escola was not deemed sufficiently mature to receive support 
from the IADB, the government did accept funds worth US$1.3 billion from the World Bank to assist 
states and municipalities in training teachers and delivering school materials in the Northeast (Brasil: 
Presidente da Republica 1996,1998). In contrast to previous international assistance -  most notably 
that by USAID in the late 1960s (Poerner 2004) -  the programme was subject to little visible 
opposition. This suggested a decline in nationalist discourse between the two periods and highlighted 
international financial credibility in the government. Indeed, the lack of opposition may have been due 
to the government’s decision to focus international financial assistance in the Northeast (Hall 2003: 
278), which has historically been the poorest and most disadvantaged region of Brazil.
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2.3. Public expenditure on education under the first Lula government
The PT in government and its behaviour in power surprised many observers, who had anticipated a 
change of economic direction, since the new administration maintained its predecessor’s focus on low 
inflation and openness to foreign investment. The flipside was a continuing dependency on the 
international markets and limits to public expenditure. The path was not a complete shock: the PT had 
laid out its intentions in its Letter to the Brazilian People (Carta ao Povo Brasileiro) during the 2002 
election campaign, which had been put together by a small group around Lula and the leadership 
(Palocci 2007). The group was determined to gain both domestic and international credibility, which 
meant avoiding policies such as capital controls or rejection of the 2002 IMF loan which might 
aggravate the financial situation. Nonetheless, the PT leadership’s adoption of this approach came at 
a fortunate moment: following the economic downturn during Cardoso’s second term, Brazil soon 
began to recover, ensuring growing revenues for social policies (Cardim de Carvalho and Ferrari Filho 
2006; Mollo and Saad-Filho 2006; Cardoso, interview, 2008).
In public spending on education, the new PT government maintained the funding system it had 
inherited. This included the use of FUNDEF for primary education funding and the steady increase in 
both the minimum amount per student and the total sums allocated, even as the federal government’s 
share continued to decline. By 2006 the amount allocated per student had risen from R$300 in 1998 
to between R$683 and $R730 depending on a student’s grade and geographic location (MEC: 
Secretaria de Educagao Basica 1997-2006).
Where the Lula government differed from its predecessor was in the ‘deepening’ and 
politicisation of the Cardoso-era reforms. Rather than start again, the first Lula term saw expansion of 
the constitutional funding mechanism and targeted programmes as the way forward. In the first 
instance this involved the expansion of the financial system that underpinned primary education 
funding through FUNDEF to include all basic (i.e. pre-school, primary and secondary) education 
through a new fund, FUNDEB. Alongside this the government introduced changes to the salario- 
educagao in 2003, which directed two-thirds of its funds to public education as opposed to the state 
governments which invariably spent it on subsidising private schools (Cunha 2007). Meanwhile 
targeted policies included changing the bolsa escola into a more general form of financial assistance 
via the bolsa familia, as well as a new grant for poorer students to attend university known as ProUni.
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The government’s pursuit of these goals emphasised the extent to which concerns about quantity 
seemed to trump those relating to quality within education (Schwartzmann 2006).
2.3.1. FUNDEB
By the late 1990s the previous opposition by the PT and its allies in the educational community to 
FUNDEF had largely evaporated. The (predominantly subnational) fund had not only increased the 
amount allocated to primary education, but had arguably contributed towards greater enrolments and 
retention of children in school. The main criticism levelled against it was derived from its success: 
having achieved so much in primary education, pre-school and secondary education were seen to 
have lost out. This was especially the case with the latter, which now faced greater demand following 
the increase of primary school completions (Cardoso, interview, 2008). In association with social 
movements, the PT had originally presented a constitutional amendment bill in Congress in 1999. 
Later, during the 2002 election, the proposal formed part of its education manifesto (Davies 2006; 
Nascimento, interview, 2006; Chagas, interview, 2008). The matter became more pressing once the 
PT took office, as FUNDEF had been passed with a ten year limit (Aparecida da Silva, interview, 
2006); any government after 2003 consequently had to act, whether it was to maintain the FUNDEF 
model or pursue the PT’s alternative.
With a mandate to act, the new education minister, Cristovam Buarque, set up a working group 
within MEC to outline the details of a new financial model to begin when FUNDEF ran out, in 2007. 
This was followed by consultations including state and municipal educational secretariats and 
representatives as well as wider social movements (Chagas, interview, 2008). The proposals elicited 
little opposition, with the exception of the former education minister, Paulo Renato Souza. He rejected 
the idea of one funding mechanism covering all basic education, as this would blur the formal 
responsibilities laid out for states and municipalities. While not rejecting the need to cover all three 
modalities in basic education, he favoured a separate package for each -  a recommendation that 
found limited support amongst the states and municipalities (Souza, interview, 2007; Chagas, 
interview, 2008).
Like FUNDEF, the new FUNDEB mechanism would hypothecate tax revenues at state and 
municipal level, raising them from 15% to 20% in a constitutional amendment in 2006. In terms of
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federal spending though, this would not mean any substantial new funds, since the vast majority would 
come from the states and municipalities. In FUNDEB’s first year the federal contribution was 
anticipated to be at less than 5% (or R$2bn). Furthermore, the government proposed to use some of 
the federal component of the salario-educagao to fund its contribution -  which, given that the salario- 
educagao is already a hypothecated education resource, did not suggest the use of new money 
(Davies 2006: 765).
These claims were disputed by the fund’s supporters, who argued that it was different to the 
previous model through expanding both the amount of resources to be allocated and the modalities to 
be covered. The number of students covered by the fund would rise from around 35 million of primary 
school-aged children (7-14 years) to 60 million of children aged from 3 to 17 years. Not only would 
each student receive a greater average amount than before, but it would also involve a constitutionally 
fixed federal commitment. Under FUNDEF the federal government’s contribution had not been 
specified, other than it would be a supplement to state and municipal spending; under FUNDEB it 
would rise to 10% of the value of state and municipal contributions from 2010 and remain in place until 
its expiry in 2020 (MEC 2006). Furthermore, all teachers would benefit from the salary payments 
stemming from the new system, rather than just primary school teachers under FUNDEF (Chagas, 
interview, 2008; Mercadante 2006; Brasil: Presidente da Republica 2007; Pinto 2007).
Despite such arguments, the passage of FUNDEB was not as simple as that which created 
FUNDEF. While FUNDEF received almost immediate support from the president and received 
relatively quick attention in Congress, FUNDEB’s passage was slower. First, despite the general 
agreement that Buarque’s working group achieved, it was only passed in 2005, towards the end of the 
government’s first term. Indeed, Davies (2006: 760) suggests that FUNDEB was not seen by the 
government as a priority. Had it done so, FUNDEB might have been introduced earlier, in 2003, when 
public support was high, rather then during the middle of the mensalao scandal which threatened to 
engulf the party. Consequently, FUNDEB could be seen as a means of improving the government’s 
public image. Second, although there was consensus between MEC and the Finance Ministry over 
the fund’s structure, there were differences over their respective views of the federal government’s 
financial contribution: while MEC wanted to introduce it into the constitutional amendment, the Finance 
Ministry wished to address the issue of financial amounts later. The issue was eventually resolved
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when Lula stepped into the debate, to specify a set amount during the fund’s first four years (Folha de 
Sao Paulo 2005b; Fernandes, Chagas, interviews, 2008). Lula’s late entry reflected the frustration felt 
by the first PT education minister, Buarque, that education was not seen as high a priority by the 
government compared to the economy (interview, 2008).
Just as FUNDEF had elicited opposition from the PT a decade earlier, FUNDEB was criticised 
by the PSDB education policy elite. Their complaints were twofold: first, the increase in the population 
would prove too great for the amount of resources presently set aside for it; second, the inclusion of 
pre-school, primary and secondary education in the same funding mechanism would weaken the 
constitutional separation of educational responsibility between municipalities and states (Souza, 
interview, 2007; Durham, interview, 2008).
2.3.2. Bolsa familia
The PT government’s change in public spending on education was not restricted to expanding the 
financial mechanism from FUNDEF to FUNDEB. A similar approach was also at work with its targeted 
programmes. We have noted the introduction of CCTs in education through the bolsa escola, first at 
the subnational and subsequently at the federal level during the 1990s. This was achieved across 
political lines, by different actors including PSDB mayors and the PT in the Federal District. Under the 
Lula government the process became increasingly politicised and associated with the figure of the 
president.
The identification of Lula with targeted programmes initially began with a Zero Hunger (Fome 
Zero) campaign in 2003, before it succumbed to administrative difficulties (Goertzel, unpublished). 
This was due to the lack of coordination and coherence in the different parts of the programme (Hall 
2006). It was subsequently replaced by an amalgamation of existing and new social cash transfers for 
food, energy and health as well as the bolsa escola, into the bolsa familia (family grant) in October 
2003. Of the government’s social policies, this was the most visible and widely publicised, and was 
credited with contributing to Lula’s re-election in 2006, owing to his support among bolsa familia 
claimants from the North and Northeast (Hunter and Power 2007).
Despite its amalgamation of various programmes, as a targeted programme its cost remains 
relatively small, taking up only 0.72% of GDP, but has grown in coverage from 3.6 million to 11.2
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million families during the first Lula term. Amongst those receiving the bolsa familia, the proportion of 
families who received the bolsa escola and who sent their children to school rose from 19% to 77.5% 
between 2003 and mid-2005 (Patu 2006; Mercadante 2006).
Notwithstanding (poorer) voters’ enthusiasm for the bolsa familia, it has been subject to 
criticism, including by the advocate of the bolsa escola within the PT, Cristovam Buarque. In 
particular, Buarque (interview 2008) saw the immersion of a school grant into a more general, family 
one as reducing the emphasis on education, and increasingly, of it being seen as an assistance 
programme rather than as a CCT. Rather than being a payment conditional on mothers sending 
children to school, it could be seen as a payment made because the mother (and family) is poor. In 
addition, Schwartzmann (interview, 2007) claims that the bolsa escola component of the bolsa familia 
remains insufficient as a means of keeping children in school, especially if a school continues to be 
poor and there is no subsequent work for graduates. Indeed, Hall (2006) questions its value given that 
it covers children aged 7-13 years since they are likely to attend school anyway. The problem is that it 
does not cover 14-17 year old students, where a CCT would have most impact -  and is the age at 
which children start dropping out of school.
2.3.3. ProUni
While FUNDEB and the bolsa familia were extensions of existing programmes begun under the 
previous government, in 2004 the PT administration introduced a new funding system that had no 
previous equivalent (Brooke, interview, 2008). Whereas FUNDEB and the school component of the 
bolsa familia dealt with basic education, the introduction of ProUni not only brought targeted public 
spending into the higher education, it also blurred the lines between the public and private sectors.
Just as FUNDEB sought to address the rising demand for basic (as opposed to only primary) 
education, ProUni was seen as a way of dealing with the pressure for more higher education. An inter­
departmental working group had carried out a study in 2003 that recommended: increases in places 
and teaching staff, greater university autonomy to access additional resources, and including non-state 
resources at under-resourced federal universities. The government responded with ProUni (Otranto 
2006). The programme targeted ethnic minorities, poorer students and students from public schools, 
with either partial or full grant assistance (Mercadante 2006). The difference was that rather than
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placing these students in public universities, they would attend private higher education institutions 
(HEIs), which already accounted for a majority of the student population.
The programme anticipated 120,000 new places being achieved each year from 2005 
(Mercadante 2006; Aparecida da Silva, interview, 2006). By 2006, 203,000 grants had been offered, 
with 400,000 applying in 2005 (Araujo 2006b; Saad Lucchesi 2007). Despite these numbers, critics 
questioned why the money had not been spent on increasing public university places rather than 
subsidising private places, especially as the government’s own evaluation suggested that the quality of 
public university courses was better (Leher 2005; Arelaro, interview, 2008; Mendes Catani et al 2007; 
Saad Luchessi 2007). Indeed, ProUni has been characterised as little more than ‘inclusion at the 
fringes’: it meets the demand of poorer people for a university education while directing state 
resources to lower cost private education rather than spending it on the more expensive public 
universities (Motter, unpublished2). The corollary of the government’s financial assistance to private 
HEIs, however, has been its commitment at the beginning of the second Lula term (2007-10) to 
expand the public university system, by increasing both resources and the number of physical 
campuses (REUNI) (MEC 2007b).
2.4. Structure of public spending on education in Brazil, 1995-2006
If the targeted programmes, such as the bolsa escola, bolsa familia and ProUni were relatively small, 
the impact of FUNDEF and the financial changes brought by the Cardoso and first Lula governments 
did substantially affect the structure of public spending on education in Brazil by the mid-2000s. 
Overall government spending on education -  at all levels -  did grow and budget cuts were avoided, 
although the emphasis was more on redirection of expenditure coupled with a drive for greater 
efficiency (Cardoso 2006; Castro 2005, 2007).
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Figure 7
Spending in Education in Brazil by Level of Governm ent, 1995-2006
■  1995
■  1999 
□  2006
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Level of Governm ent
Sources: IBGE 1997: Table 2.117; IPEA n.d., 2003
Between 1999 and 2006 the real amount spent on education (in Brazilian reais) by the federal 
government did increase, although given the limited availability of figures, it is unclear whether this 
occurred under the Cardoso or the Lula government. Certainly, the tendency during the Cardoso 
years was to reduce the proportion spent by the federal government: during its first term (1995-98) 
when the educational team was at its most active in terms of the policies developed and implemented, 
both the amount and the proportion spent by the federal government fell. Nowhere was this more 
evident than in higher education, which following the 1996 LDB had been designated for direct federal 
jurisdiction. In primary and secondary education, which were assigned to municipal and state 
governments respectively, the proportion of federal assistance similarly declined (figures 7 and 8).
The bulk of the spending increase in education came from the state and municipal levels, which 
following the 1996 constitutional amendment obliged them to allocate directly a proportion of their tax 
revenues. The most substantial rise was found in municipalities, which under FUNDEF was directed 
towards primary education. The shift towards hypothecated spending for basic (i.e. primary and 
secondary) education in FUNDEB in 2006 should mean that state and municipal spending will continue 
to grow, although it remains uncertain whether this will be the case for the federal government (Souza,
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interview, 2007; Chagas, interview, 2008). However, the figures suggest that at the end of the Lula 
government’s first term the federal government was expanding its share of revenues in education, 
although this was most apparent in for higher education (figure 8). This may be attributed to the 
government’s decision to expand the sector, including expansion of the existing system and 
construction of new institutions (MEC 2007b). The problem with higher education spending in Brazil 
though, is the extent to which it undermines redistribution. Hall (2003: 281) notes that higher 
education funding primarily benefits the middle classes: only 2.6% of Brazil’s poorest 40% of the 
population have access to university compared to 21% of the country’s richest 10%.
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3. Conclusion
The general trend across all three governments has been for greater public expenditure in education, 
regardless of the assumed differences between the Third Way and the Participatory Left. Similarly, all 
three cases have shown not only a reliance on the wider economic context to help shape their 
education spending, but also demonstrate a marked willingness to make use of targeted resources -
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whether it was through the MECE and P900 programmes in Chile or the bolsa escola (later bolsa 
familia) and ProUni policies in Brazil.
There were differences though. Whereas the Cardoso government had emphasised the need 
to restructure public spending in favour of primary education with funds coming from sources other 
than the federal level, the Lula government stressed the need to increase spending across the board. 
This included the expansion of the FUNDEF mechanism to FUNDEB; this meant a shift from 
addressing only primary school funds to include all pre-university education, and a guaranteed federal 
contribution that had not existed before. This across-the-board increase was similarly pursued in 
Chile, where more resources were allocated both to schools and per student generally, and in targeted 
assistance. The effect of the Concertacion and Lula cases showed that public spending increases 
happened regardless of the structure of the educational system (i.e. whether it was federal or unitary) 
or of the nature of the government (i.e. whether it was a Third Way or Participatory Left type).
After a decade and a half of these various spending policies and reforms meant that the 
amount being spent per capita by the public sector on primary and secondary students was around the 
same as other middle-income countries within the region and slightly less than those outside (with the 
exception of Turkey) (figure 9). The fact that the experience of social democracy in Brazil and Chile 
remained low in comparison to these non-Latin American states demonstrated the extent to which the 
Third Way model dominated during the period. The acceptance of the growing global consensus on 
state reform -  and the development of effective state capacity in particular-illustrated the spending 
priorities within the Cardoso and Concertacion governments. As has been noted previously, the 
Cardoso government sought to redistribute existing finances for education through FUNDEF while the 
Concertacion accommodated this comparatively low amount of expenditure by making use of private 
funds alongside targeting of public expenditure.
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Public expenditure per student in m iddle incom e countries (US$ PPP), 2006
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The implications of these findings suggest that Third Way and Participatory Left approaches to 
public spending may be due less to their ideological or social origins than their immediate political and 
economic concerns. Politically, both the Concertacion and the Cardoso governments were tied to 
institutional approaches to education spending (the former through its acceptance of the military 
regime’s model and the later through its aim to set a constitutional minimum for primary education 
spending). Meanwhile, the PT supported the development of FUNDEB through pressure from its 
supporters in the educational community (i.e. teachers), but arguably preferred the use of targeted 
programmes such as the bolsa familia, which enabled it to distinguish itself from its predecessors.
Economically, the differences between the three cases -  the focus on redistribution by the 
Cardoso government and the decline in federal funds during his first term (1995-98), against the 
increased spending under Lula and the Concertacion -  could be attributed to the broader economic 
context. Both the Concertacion and Lula governments were the beneficiaries of economic changes 
that had occurred prior to them entering office. Following the economic crisis of the early 1980s, by 
1990 the Chilean economy had undergone restructuring and was growing. In Brazil the Lula
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government adopted the macro-economic policies of its predecessor which had begun to improve after 
a slight economic downturn in the late 1990s. Meanwhile, although Cardoso owed his presidential 
victories to the anti-inflationary Real Plan, a concern with economic factors arguably shaped his 
government’s approach to social policy and education in particular. This was most apparent in the 
emphasis on restructuring public spending across the three levels (federal, state and municipal).
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7. Making us all managers?: The use of assessment and evaluation by 
social democratic governments
Echoing the changes wrought by the New Right, social democrats have largely accepted the need for 
assessment and evaluation of public services. In particular they see such measures as a means of not 
only setting standards, but also as a means of testing the quality (as opposed to quantity) of public 
services (Bottery 2000). However, in education the use of evaluation has been more multi­
dimensional than it is sometime portrayed in the literature. Although the purpose of evaluation is to 
improve the system, how that is to be achieved is open to contestation, given the different and 
changing views of what constitutes improvement, both between and within affected groups (Behn 
2003; Broadbent and Laughlin 2004). At the extreme end is its extensive use in Britain, which despite 
initially driving up results appears to have presently stalled (Bevan and Hood 2006).
The difficulty of using evaluation to achieve improvement is highlighted by the uncertainty of 
what affects public service delivery. At a global level there is growing concern for greater 
accountability and deeper understanding of how poverty and inequality manifests itself. This has 
prompted pressure for more effective targeting in public services, which requires more refined impact 
evaluations and policy-relevant research (Goldstein 2008). Yet this ‘accountability’ has increasingly 
been displaced by a greater emphasis on making institutions ‘auditable’, whereby the objective is less 
about accounting for various practices than measuring performance (Espeland and Sauder 2007: 2).
Making evaluation effective is further complicated by the individuals and groups involved within 
the process and their diverse interests and demands. Indeed, the more inclusive a process is, 
arguably the less rigorous and useful it will probably be (Pollit 1999). This is compounded by the fact 
that no one assessment process will work for all the different purposes pursued by evaluation; 
consequently designers must decide what their main concern is. For example, policy makers may 
seek to use data generated from evaluations to make administrative decisions and monitor progress, 
while researchers may be concerned with identifying the determinants of ‘quality’ (Amin and 
Chaudhury 2008).
In education, the issue of relevant evaluation is especially pertinent. The expansion of school 
coverage globally raises questions about the effectiveness of that service provision, especially in
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developing countries, where until recently, the focus was on quantity as opposed to ‘quality’. It 
therefore encourages more attention to be placed on standard forms of evaluation, to be able to 
ascertain the extent to which a system is performing. In the context of education, this has meant a 
shift away from focusing on educational access towards what schools teach and hence the use of 
standardised tests to assess this (Amin and Chaudhury 2008; PREAL 2008; Dale and Robertson 
2007; Vegas and Petrow, 2008).
At both ideological and sectoral levels the purposes of evaluation may diverge. Ideologically, 
the choice between a progressive or an economically-oriented education model may affect both the 
types of skills and learning assessed, as well as the purpose of that evaluation (Apple 1997; Adamson 
and Morris 2007). Neo-liberal advocates stress the need to create markets in education; the use of 
assessment can provide a market indicator to assist in them. Conservative education, meanwhile, 
would make use of assessments to ensure that students are absorbing the desired social values and 
order. By contrast, a more ‘progressive’ educational approach, which emphasises the central role of 
the child, would favour evaluation that stresses the development of students’ critical faculties.
Sectorally, different groups will also have different ideas about the purpose of evaluation. Just 
as education bureaucrats (or managers) are primarily concerned with effectively managing a 
reasonably centralised and uniform test system, teachers see themselves as more professional and 
experienced in this regard, emphasising issues of ‘quality’ and impressionistic evaluations (Ball 1990). 
Indeed, these viewpoints may well come into conflict, as bureaucrats see teachers failing to impose 
consistency across the system, while teachers may feel threatened by the bureaucrats’ attempts to 
manage them.
Even when both sides (along with other education stakeholders such as parents) agree on the 
need for student assessment, differences will persist over what should be assessed. While this may 
be partially attributable to the ideological stances of each actor, it may also be due to the level at which 
assessment is to take place. Are tests designed to evaluate a student, or test aptitude, or assess the 
education system as a whole? (Carnoy and Castro 1997: 37) Whichever approach is used, the issue 
is further complicated by external factors outside the classroom for which there appear to be no means 
of control, such as household income or community background (Amin and Chaudhury 2008). 
Furthermore, even if such matters could be controlled, there is a further problem: to what extent does a
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test -  especially as it becomes more uniform -  assess anything more than what is being assessed? In 
other words, contrary to the expectations of its designers, a test and its results may not adequately 
reflect students’ general abilities and skills, but rather their capacity to pass that particular test (Dohn 
2007; Herman 1997). This is especially complicated in international testing, where the areas of 
evaluation and comparison are pared down to the minimum, thereby lacking sufficient context of a 
country’s educational model or socio-economic development. Yet at the other extreme, the more 
expansive the test model, arguably the less rigorous and comparable it presumably becomes.
Notwithstanding the various views presented by particular stakeholders, this chapter is primarily 
concerned with how the social democratic governments in Brazil and Chile have used educational 
assessment. The differentiation between the Third Way and Participatory Left approaches suggests 
that one might expect to see differences between the three cases and challenges the more stark 
contrast assumed between each at the start of this dissertation: namely that the Third Way would 
support evaluation and the Participatory Left reject it. Evaluation and assessment, judging by the 
various stances that can be adopted, suggests that its status is much more nuanced. Consequently, 
given the closer association with the New Right, the Third Way offers an educational vision in which 
economic concerns take precedence; consequently, one would expect to see assessment used to 
accommodate this, both as the development of a market indicator and as a means of ensuring that 
students are assimilating key societal values. The Participatory Left approach, by contrast, offers 
more scope for other stakeholders to become engaged in the evaluative process. One might therefore 
expect less externally-imposed and collaborative forms of assessment in favour of a more 
‘progressive’ approach that would be associated with imbuing students with a more critical perspective.
However, as the cases show, the distinction between Third Way and Participatory Left 
approaches to evaluation is less apparent than would be expected. In both countries the growth of 
assessment has been accompanied with an expansion in stakeholder concerns and involvement, 
thereby diminishing any clear ideological undercurrent in favour of one form of social democracy or the 
other. Indeed, despite governments’ attempts to manage and control the system, evaluation and 
assessment gains a momentum of its own, which increasingly absorbs stakeholders’ views and 
perspectives into the process.
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1. Evaluation in Chile prior to the Concertacion
The Chilean education model is amongst the most market-oriented globally. After 1980 the school 
system was formalised into a tripartite model in which public and private schools were joined by the 
state-subsidised private schools, which is the fastest growing section. For many, the underlying 
ideology inherent in this system suggested a neo-liberal direction: a reduced role for the state in favour 
of the private sector. To such observers though, the market logic remains relatively weak in the 
absence of an effective means of providing information and therefore choice regarding the different 
types of schools and their consumers (i.e. parents and students). The need for market indicators that 
can identify the ‘best’ and ‘worst’ performing schools is therefore necessary. Such an interpretation 
has been placed on the use of both student and teacher evaluation. Amongst school students, the 
national SIMCE tests for fourth and eight grades and second year secondary school students were 
implemented by the military regime in the late 1980s.
However, despite this neo-liberal critique of assessment, the use of SIMCE and teacher 
evaluation has been rather more multi-faceted and complex than ideology would suggest. Indeed, 
while sections of the Chilean Right do endorse the notion of SIMCE as a market indicator, a closer 
study of the aims and uses to which SIMCE have been put by both the military regime and the 
Concertacion suggest a more ambiguous role.
The current method of student assessment in school is done through the national SIMCE tests. 
Between 1968 and 1971 only eighth grade tests existed, after which there were no nation-wide exams 
until the 1980s. In 1982 and 1984 some attempt at national evaluation was made through the PER 
assessment mechanism, but this was limited. Indeed, the regime’s critics claimed that Mineduc failed 
to make use of the assessments to influence policies that would deliver improvements in the system 
(Cox 1985).
In 1987 SIMCE was developed, using the methodology adopted by educators at the Catholic 
University. Designed to test students’ aptitude in mathematics, Spanish, social and natural sciences, it 
was carried out in 1988 amongst fourth graders before including eighth graders a year later (Carnoy 
and Castro 1997: 40). However, contrary to neo-liberal interpretations of its use, Mineduc 
accompanied the publication of the results with an explanation of the test’s purpose. While it noted 
that it was not a ‘global evaluation’ (i.e. it did not seek to assess all aspects of a child’s education), it
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aimed to contribute to educational ‘quality’ and to analyse, with a view to developing further 
governmental action in schools and curricula. Furthermore, in this first test it also included the results 
of student, parental and teacher perceptions of the education system and its performance; it was 
therefore as much concerned with eliciting information for internal usage within Mineduc as it was in 
providing it to the system’s users (Mineduc 1989).
Consequently, if the purpose of SIMCE was merely to provide consumers with sufficient 
information to help choose where to send their children to school, then the mechanism had failed. The 
outgoing military regime was not only using the results to determine where (limited) state resources 
should be allocated, it also provided insufficient information for parents to choose between ‘good’- and 
‘bad’-performing schools. Furthermore, compared to the methods of evaluation that would come into 
use later in the 1990s, the Chilean system was relatively modest in scope: during the 1980s there was 
no international testing regime that distinguished between the performance of different countries’ 
students at the same age (Dittborn, interview, 2007). This restricted the extent to which any 
meaningful comparisons and analysis could be carried out.
2. Evaluation under the Concertacion: SIMCE, international comparisons and teacher 
assessment
The entry of the Concertacion into government, and its management of the education system, did not 
undermine the notion of evaluation as a means of enacting neo-liberal educational policy. If anything, 
the critique intensified, especially as test scores demonstrated differences between public and private 
schools.. Furthermore, Chile’s involvement in international tests and efforts to introduce teacher 
evaluation were also cited as examples of the government’s increasing interest in the economic use of 
assessment. Yet the Concertacion presented more complex and ambiguous responses about the use 
of evaluation than the neo-liberal claim afforded.
First, since the 1990s the SIMCE results have been broken down to the micro-level, to include 
both school and municipal level. However, this does not extend to individual students (Matear 2007). 
Generally, the findings are that students in municipal schools have the lowest average scores 
compared to state-subsidised and independent private schools (Aedo 1998). Indeed, between 1998 
and 2003 a widening split was observed between public and private school results, even though the
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change was not as great in state-subsidised private schools. Given the greater amount of state 
resources for such schools, the results suggest that state-subsidised private schools failed to address 
the influence of children’s socio-economic backgrounds and the impact on their education (Matear 
2007). This has not stopped the private sector arguing in favour of a private education over that 
provided by the state (Bosch, interview, 2007).
The government claims to make use of the results to determine the use and level of targeted 
state assistance and resources. During the 1990s this was done with the P900 and MECE 
programmes, which were based in part on the weakest performing schools (Aedo 1998). To achieve 
this, the government considered other factors alongside SIMCE results, including the socio-economic 
context of schools. Since 2000 the government has made this data more widely available by providing 
it by school. This indicates a further use of the results as not just a means of providing information to 
parents, teachers and students, but also to policy-makers and researchers as well (PREAL 2006:13- 
4). Against this is the fact that the circulation of useful or meaningful information remains largely 
circumscribed. Not only are the tests conducted independently from schools’ own student 
assessments, but parents are not supplied with their children’s individual scores. This last point is 
especially pertinent, since it limits parents’ ability to choose schools effectively -  even though evidence 
suggests that Chilean parents tend to use other factors than test scores to choose schools, such as 
social demographics and location (Matear 2007).
Second, since the late 1990s Chile has made increasing use of international testing and 
comparisons, including the IALS, PISA and TIMSS assessments. Such tests are perceived from the 
educational progressives to reflect the Concertacion’s adherence to the New Right. In particular this 
includes pressure for the neo-liberal acquisition of skills -  primarily communication, language and 
scientific knowledge -  necessary for the labour market and neo-conservative concern with centralised 
order and discipline. Indeed, globalisation arguably demands labour forces with a more flexible skills 
base; poor performance in international education evaluations could therefore be used to undermine a 
country’s relative position and affect prospects for foreign investment and economic opportunities. Yet 
given these concerns, the results of international tests and comparisons have not been favourable to 
Chile: the PISA findings showed that nearly half of Chilean 15 year olds were in the lowest level of 
reading proficiency in 2000 compared to the OECD average of 18% of the same age group (PREAL
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2006: 31). When coupled to national test results, around 40% of children in fourth, eighth and tenth 
grades were found to be functionally illiterate (Eyzaguirre and Le Foulan 2001). This was despite 
Chile’s performance in international tests placing it above other Latin American countries (Matear 
2007).
Although these findings did initially shake confidence in Chile’s educational system, the 
outcome was not as negative as portrayed above. There was acknowledgement on both the Left and 
the Right that the education system was failing to deliver (Dittborn, Bitar, interviews, 2007). At the 
same time it opened up a national debate on the state of education in Chile, which was reflected in the 
2006 protests (Weinstein, Brunner, interviews, 2007). The subsequent presidential advisory 
commission offered an opportunity for those concerns to be aired and solutions to be proposed. This 
led to a subsequent agreement in November 2007 between the Concertacion and the Right, which 
included the establishment of minimum, measurable national standards and a Quality Assurance 
Agency to assess students’ progress and classify and publicise school performance (Puryear 2007a). 
Cox (interview, 2007), meanwhile, suggested that the international test score findings had helped 
erode old ideological certainties concerning the education system. The use of international 
comparisons was encouraging a more open approach to policy-making: rather than restricting itself to 
regional comparisons, Mineduc was increasingly interested in learning how education policy was 
conducted elsewhere, including North America, Scandinavia and East Asia (Bitar, Brunner, interviews, 
2007).
Third, the Concertacion has pushed through teacher evaluations in municipal schools. This 
may be presented as evidence of the government subjecting the teaching profession to the same 
manageralist impulse as that faced by the education system as a whole through the international 
testing regime. The pressure for such evaluation may be deduced from private school supporters’ 
claims that their teachers are more ‘efficient’ than public school ones, owing to the higher SIMCE 
results they deliver and the cost they deliver it at (Bosch, interview, 2007). Yet such claims are made 
without reference to students’ socio-economic contexts and private schools’ ability to select. 
Furthermore, the recent election of the Communist Party member Jaime Gajardo as president of the 
Colegio de Profesores in October 2007 prompted calls by its leadership for teacher evaluation to be 
ended (Nunez, interview 2, 2007).
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The current distinction between the private sector and the teachers’ union on the issue of 
teacher evaluation would suggest a clear ideological separation and places the Concertacion in the 
former camp. Yet this distinction is not as clear as it would seem. The evaluation of municipal 
teachers became law towards the end of the Lagos presidency (2000-06) and included the 
involvement of the previous leadership of the Colegio de Profesores under Jorge Pavez (Assael, 
interview, 2007). An accord was signed between the two, which according to Nunez (interview 2,
2007) reflected the shift in the teachers’ union from a corporatist, materialist body to an increasingly 
professional community (Chagas, interview, 2008). Furthermore, the Concertacion’s measure was 
limited only to public school teachers and did not include private school teachers, a measure that the 
former education minister, Sergio Bitar, wanted to see corrected in the future (interview, 2007).
3. Evaluation in Brazil prior to 1995
In the 20-30 years prior to 1995 the use of centrally administered exams had been largely abandoned, 
with only the vestibular as an exam to enter higher education remaining (Carnoy and Castro 1997:39). 
However, this did not mean an absence of discussion or concern surrounding the need for evaluation. 
In the early 1990s there had been various state-level and regional forms of testing, while at the 
national level the SAEB tests had already been carried out once, in 1993 (Souza, interview, 2007). 
The main distinction between the period before and after 1995 was in the nature of the Brazilian 
debate on evaluation: prior to 1995 it had been a largely national discussion involving a wide range of 
educational actors such as academics and researchers; after 1995 discussions included a more 
international dimension, while the development and implementation of assessment mechanisms was 
increasingly centralised and concentrated in MEC’s National Institute of Studies and Research (INEP) 
( Teixeira de Freitas 2004).
4. The development of assessment and evaluation during the Cardoso presidency
The purpose of evaluation under the Cardoso government was tied to its vision of the state. The 1996 
LDB had defined the roles and responsibilities of federal, state and municipal levels on educational 
matters: the federal government’s was predominantly in the higher education sector and providing 
complementary assistance and coordination to the system as a whole. Given the federal 
government’s lack of direct involvement in primary education -  an issue that it had made among its
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priorities -  it needed to find a way for improvement to be achieved. Evaluation became the means by 
which the federal government exerted indirect control (Durham, interview, 2008).
The first stage involved an internal reorganisation within MEC. Before 1995 both INEP’s status 
and role had been in decline, while little national-level evaluation had taken place (Souza, interview,
2007). This was reversed with the appointment of Maria Helena Guimaraes de Castro as its president 
with a brief to take responsibility for the government’s assessment and evaluation of the education 
system (Souza, interview, 2007; Soares, interview, 2008 Souza 2005: 83-84). Between 1995 and 
2002 the effect of this change was to take Brazil from one of the least assessed to the most centrally 
evaluated of federal educational systems. Two new national evaluation mechanisms were created at 
secondary and tertiary levels, while at primary level the existing model was given a new lease of life, 
alongside school censuses to provide more accurate data on the system and assessments of teaching 
materials (Brasil: Presidente da Republica 1998). Towards the end of the Cardoso government the 
first international tests and comparisons also took place, in the PISA assessments.
The new government inherited SAEB, which had been held once previously for fourth and 
eighth grade primary school children in Portuguese and mathematics (Soares 2004). It was 
remodelled, extended to include eleventh graders and conducted every other year. The government 
contracted out to private institutions and foundations, including the Carlos Chagas Foundation, to 
design the methodology eventually used (Souza, interview, 2007). SAEB provided information at a 
given place and time, which enabled comparison between places and at the national level overtime 
(INEP 2001). Furthermore, while the test would include both public and private schools, it would not 
be nationwide. Rather it would be done by sample, with the results being publicised by state rather 
than municipality or school. This limited the test as a means by which parents might be able to 
exercise choice -  and challenged the notion of it as a neo-liberal measure.
Instead, the purpose of SAEB appeared directed towards assisting the funding and control of 
various government programmes, including curricular guidelines and teaching materials (Brasil: 
Presidente da Republica 1997). Despite these aims, the findings throughout the 1990s did not 
suggest any notable improvement in learning outcomes amongst those taking the test. MEC explained 
this as reflecting other policies which contributed towards growing numbers of individuals entering the 
education system, including those from backgrounds not previously associated with high educational
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attainment. This underpinned the notion that any expansion of an educational system will have an 
adverse impact on its performance, as quality is substituted for quantity (Motter, unpublished2).
In 1998 the government introduced a secondary school exam, ENEM, which similarly sought to 
monitor performance. Conducted annually, its arrival did not face any public opposition, which the 
educational team had anticipated following their experience with the university evaluation system 
(Souza, interview, 2007). Societal acceptance of ENEM was evident in the growing number of 
participants taking the test each year, from 120,000 in the first year to 1.3 million by 2002 (INEP, 
various years). Similarly, ENEM’s growth may have been attributable to the government ensuring that 
ENEM was kept free for students from public schools (Souza, interview, 2007). Nonetheless, like 
SAEB, there was no discernable improvement in students’ scores, a situation which could have been 
explained in a similar manner to that related to the primary school test.
From 2000 Brazil began to participate in international evaluations. Like Chile, the results were 
not good; indeed, in PISA’s findings Brazil came out in last place. In 2000 56% of Brazilian 15 year 
olds tested were found to be at the lowest level of reading proficiency; in the mathematic assessment 
in 2003, the figure was worse, with 75% failing to meet the first level. In both tests OECD countries 
found that a fifth of their 15 year olds were in the same position (PREAL 2006: 31-2). On average, 
Brazilian 15 year olds were categorised as amongst the weakest in terms of maths and problem 
solving, although in language comprehension the results were slightly better (OECD 2004a, 2004b). 
Indeed, when analysed more closely, the top 10% of Brazilian 15 year olds had a higher average score 
in language comprehension than the OECD average, although this had more to do with the smaller 
pool of 15 year olds in secondary education and the greater propensity of such students to be in elite, 
private institutions (Carnoy 2004: 62). However, this did not worry the government in the same way 
that it concerned Chile’s policymaking core. When challenged on Brazilian students’ low performance, 
Paulo Renato Souza, Cardoso’s education minister, claimed that the comparisons were by country and 
excluded the wide range of differences that exist within the Brazilian education system, including 
whether students are the correct grade age or have repeated a year (Souza 2005).
If SAEB and ENEM were generally approved of, the same could not be said for the 
government’s evaluation for higher education, the Provao. Although Souza (interview, 2007) claimed 
that wider society was in favour of it, the majority of the organised university community, including
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chancellors, teachers and students, were wary of any external assessment. Furthermore, the minister 
had to cope with considerable pockets of resistance within MEC as well, including among his own 
allies (Souza 2005). The Provao was criticised as neo-liberal, and of the various evaluation systems 
introduced by the Cardoso government in education, it was perhaps the closest to achieving that 
status. Although it constituted part of the same package of reforms designed to introduce coordination 
and indirect control of the education system, the Provao was notably different in one key regard: its 
assessment of university courses, teaching and final year student exams would be used to accredit 
existing higher education institutions (HEIs), thereby providing a form of market regulation to the 
sector. Unsurprisingly, each of the various actors in the university community feared the impact of a 
bad result (Cunha 2004). Students were especially worried that a poor final result would affect their 
future career prospects, although the government argued that it was not aiming to stigmatise them but 
rather that higher education in general would benefit from such scrutiny (Souza 2005).
5. Assessment and evaluation measures during the first Lula term
If evaluation during the Cardoso period was designed to bring about greater indirect control, ensure 
coordination from the centre, and thereby increasing the role of the state, the changes made by the PT 
in MEC after 2003 ironically shifted the direction towards the market. With the exception of higher 
education evaluation, the main changes to the primary and secondary evaluation systems were much 
closer to the notion of assessment as a form of market indication. Indeed, the PT began to reconsider 
its position on the need and nature of evaluation in the transition from opposition to government 
(Soares, interview, 2008; Abicalil 2002). This contrasts with the position in the late 1990s when it 
rejected many of the evaluation systems used by the Cardoso government; among the most visible of 
these protests was Rio Grande do Sul state, where the PT administration elected not to publish the 
SAEB results (Burton, forthcoming). This was due in part to the composition of the party’s 
membership, which was dominated by former trade unionists (Buarque, interview, 2008). The 
relationship between the national teachers’ union and its sympathisers in MEC similarly challenged 
Buarque’s proposals for teacher evaluations during his time as minister.
Since 2003 the PT government’s stance on evaluation has become more ambiguous. Arguably 
the PT’s path is no different to that faced by other parties in government: the need for more and
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detailed information has become a necessity, especially as ‘quality’ in education becomes increasingly 
synonymous with what individuals learn (Brooke, interview, 2008). Within the government this is 
emphasised, especially by self-identified technocrats, such as the INEP president since 2005, 
Reynaldo Fernandes. In particular he sees the role of evaluation as providing ‘accountability’ to the 
system; but, rather than engaging in an ideological definition of what accountability stands for, he 
stresses the practical. This requires a national assessment system to ensure that the educational 
structure is working effectively since the federal government cannot directly intervene in the running of 
schools (Fernandes, interview, 2008). The government’s commitment to this approach was echoed in 
its support for state-level evaluations to go alongside the national one they administer (Brasil: 
Presidente da Republica 2004).
Notwithstanding the technical nature of its justification for evaluation, the first reforms 
conducted by the new PT government were very political. It scrapped the Provao and replaced it with 
a new system, Sinaes. This gained the new administration considerable support from within the public 
and private university community, who had actively opposed the Provao when it was first introduced in 
1996. Where Sinaes differed from the Provao was that, despite retaining external assessment, 
internal self-assessment was also introduced, alongside student exams in the first and last years 
(Brasil: Presidente da Republica 2005, 2007). Nevertheless, doubts were expressed by this more 
participatory process, most notably regarding the extent to which any effective or indeed negative 
assessment could be made (Barreyro and Barreyro 2006; Durham, interview, 2008).
In contrast to the more participatory Sinaes evaluation in higher education, the PT 
government’s approach to assessing primary and secondary education not only maintained the models 
introduced before 2003, but deepened them. In primary education the government shifted emphasis 
from the sample-based SAEB assessment to a more universal model via the Prova Brasil from 2005. 
This evaluation of every public school in the country had widespread support both within and outside 
the government (Fernandes, interview, 2008). In part, the reason for the relative absence of 
opposition could be found in the detail: the government claimed that the additional information would 
be passed back to school teachers and administrators at the local level, to help them in the 
development of policies and solutions (Brasil: Presidente da Republica 2007). However, the aim of 
influencing teaching behaviour is constrained by the fact that since the results are only made available
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at the end of each academic year, it would not provide any immediate benefit (Brooke, interview,
2008).
In secondary education, the ENEM continued to be the main form of assessment and its 
popularity grew as greater numbers of students took it each year. Its credibility as an instrument was 
enhanced through the government’s decision to publish the average results by schools each year. Its 
use both as means of gaining a Prollni grant and as either an alternative or complementary 
qualification was generally welcomed (Brasil: Presidente da Republica 2007; Motter, unpublished 1). 
Against this, there were concerns that the publication of the average results -  while increasing 
transparency -  also opened the door to school rankings (Motter, unpublishedl).
Alongside these developments, two further proposals highlight the ambiguity regarding of the 
PT’s objectives concerning evaluation. In 2003 Cristovam Buarque introduced proposals for teacher 
evaluations at the primary and secondary levels. This prompted considerable opposition from the 
teaching profession, who campaigned against them. The teachers feared that evaluation would create 
differences amongst teachers, rewarding those deemed ‘good’ against the ‘bad’ ones, and would also 
fail to take into account the contrasting situations faced by teachers in different parts of the country 
(Vieira, interview, 2007; Chagas, interview, 2008). The lobbying was sufficient in that the proposals 
were quietly dropped following Buarque’s departure in 2004.
By 2007 the PT’s concern with context was manifest in the proposals creating the Basic 
Education Development Index, or IDEB. Developed within MEC -  as opposed to being contracted out 
as SAEB’s methodology had been under Souza -  the IDEB would deepen school assessment by 
bringing it down to the local level and including wider socio-economic data concerning a school’s 
situation. In addition, the aim of IDEB was to help influence teaching behaviour in a way that SAEB 
had not, by providing data for teachers and managers to use (Fernandes, Brooke, interviews, 2008). 
However, there was uncertainty about how it would actually be applied. First, how might the 
government make such data and intentions intelligible to individual teachers and school administrators 
(Brooke, interview, 2008)7 Second, there was an issue of equity absent in the index: if a school’s 
position on the development scale was dependent on the use of ‘average’ results, then simply 
improving the performance of the most able at the expense of any involvement with the least able 
would improve a school’s overall position (Soares, interview, 2008).
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The various approaches taken by the PT government to evaluation since 2003 reflect its 
increasingly ambiguous relationship with it, compared to that before 2002. Buarque (interview, 2008) 
observed that this change was partly attributable to the organisational structure of the educational 
community. Responsibility for higher education was held mainly at the federal level, which placed it in 
the direct line of campaigners who sought the Provao’s replacement. By contrast, primary and 
secondary education was managed at a subnational level, thereby insulated pressure from the federal 
government. The exception to this was when the government proposed to evaluate teachers during its 
first year, prompting a lobbying campaign both by the CNTE and its supporters within government 
(Vieira, interview, 2007; Chagas, interview, 2008). Yet the pressure against teacher evaluation 
showed that the federal government could be challenged on its policy. By contrast, the PT 
government pressed on with introducing or expanding evaluation mechanisms because they were 
either supported by other educational actors (such as teachers or students) or not directly rejected. 
This might account for the IDEB in the 2007 Education Development Plan (PDE), where context would 
be considered alongside results. The proposal of such measures arguably offset other aspects of 
assessment, such as the growing use of test scores as a means of ‘ranking’ schools and students by 
journalists -  an issue over which the government claimed to have no control (Chagas, interview,
2008).
6. Conclusion
The experience of the three governments and their relationship to evaluation suggest that 
distinguishing between a supportive Third Way and an anti-evaluation Participatory Left is not so 
simple. Each case presents a combination of the different objectives and goals associated with 
assessment, as well as considerable stakeholder involvement which has contributed to this blurred 
situation. The aims and direction to which evaluation has been put by the three governments reflects a 
more ambiguous position than ideology might otherwise suggest.
Although evaluation is used to achieve improvements, what that means can vary ideologically 
and across different groups. For neo-liberals, evaluation is generally seen as providing a market 
indicator to enable choice and competition. Amongst neo-conservatives the goal is discipline and 
order. For more ‘progressive’ educationalists on the Left -  where teachers’ organisations usually place
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themselves -  the objective is to create a form of evaluation that assesses a student’s critical capacities 
and self-empowerment.
Yet the use of assessment is never as singular as this. While governments may have their own 
objectives, they have to also accommodate the aims and demands of others within the educational 
community. This is especially apparent on Mineduc’s SIMCE website, which includes details of how 
the test and its results may be used by different groups, including teachers, parents, students and 
researchers (Mineduc n.d.). Consequently, the aims and objectives to which assessment is put by 
government are more multidimensional and hence more complex than simple ideology will allow.
Despite the difficulty of making this distinction, some similar and diverging trends between the 
three case studies appear evident. The use of limited (and decontextualised) international 
comparisons on specific learning outcomes (e.g. language and maths) appears in line with the Third 
Way’s narrower focus on economic development. However, against this perspective, both the 
Cardoso and Concertacion governments appear to demonstrate a more progressive concern by 
encouraging the use of test results by school teachers and managers. From the late 1980s this was 
one of the stated objectives of SIMCE (thereby undermining the supposed New Right goals of the 
military regime which had begun the process of testing); policymakers at Mineduc also used the results 
after the return to democracy to target resources through the P900 and MECE programmes. 
Furthermore, from 2000 the Concertacion added more context to the published results, including 
background details on a school’s level of socio-economic development. Meanwhile the SAEB model 
used by the Cardoso government was always limited as a market indicator since it operated on a 
sample basis, and details of ENEM results remained confined to MEC, schools and students and were 
not publicly available.
In addition, the institutional differences between the two countries had an impact on the 
motivations for assessment. The centralised nature of the Chilean education and political system 
contributed to an early system of evaluation prior to democracy’s return. The Concertacion which 
inherited the model did not therefore have to make any substantial changes, being able to adapt its 
use according to the various demands made on it by different constituencies.
By contrast, the decentralised nature of Brazil’s education system, and the relative chaos that 
the new Cardoso government encountered after 1995, made the creation of a new evaluation system
157
necessary, especially if the government sought how best to coordinate and provide complementary 
assistance to subnational actors. In other words, the introduction of a national testing regime had 
more to do with establishing a more effective state, prompting the creation of new testing methods, 
including at secondary and higher education levels in ENEM and the Provao. This last one was 
certainly the most controversial, arguably because it was closest to the market model questioned by 
parts of the education community. The intention behind Provao was not only to assess the ‘quality’ of 
the courses and the students’ results, but to inject some competition and regulation into the higher 
education system through the publication of results. Contrary to the ideological logic, this did not find 
favour with the most market-oriented sectors of the education community, private HEI managers. 
Rather, there was a common consensus against the Provao by both private and public education 
advocates, which meant the government’s assessment of the sector was met with obstruction.
Provao’s replacement by Sinaes in the first year of the Lula government included self- 
assessment by HEIs. This made for a less market-oriented evaluation model and highlighted a more 
participatory approach. Elsewhere though, the form and content of the reforms to the evaluation 
processes undertaken since 2003 reflect the growing ambiguity regarding assessment and its role in 
education in the Lula government. On the one hand, the PT government’s deepening of the reforms, 
through the publication of ENEM and the universalisation of SAEB into the Prova Brasil, offered space 
for a more neo-liberal interpretation, including making school rankings possible. On the other, these 
changes were accompanied with a progressive concern for greater details about background context, 
which made the introduction of IDEB an important tool in this regard.
Finally, alongside the introduction and expansion of these domestic evaluation systems, both 
countries have played a visible role in the international testing regime that has been emerging since 
the mid- to late-1990s. Along with other Latin American participant countries, Brazil and Chile have 
been regularly ranked in the bottom third of the PISA evaluations and have done worse than similar 
middle-income countries such as Poland and Estonia (Puryear 2007b). Notwithstanding the extent to 
which these tests offer truly comparable data (Dohn 2007), the findings have enabled attention to be 
focused on Latin American education, most especially in the differences between the (relatively) 
successful Cuban model and poorer-performing regional cases. This has prompted a realisation that 
issues of quality (as opposed to quantity) need addressing: the lack of a sufficiently challenging
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curriculum, inadequate preparation by teachers, poor training, low expectations and insufficient 
mastery of the material by both teachers and students (Carnoy 2004: 68-70).
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8. No participation without representation: social democratic 
governments and participation in the education sector
Today’s social democracy is notable in its accommodation of non-corporatist, non-class based 
interests. This suggests a looser understanding of the types of social groups that governments might 
engage with to develop their public services and the education sector in particular. Analysing 
governments’ attitudes to participation offers a broader perspective of their involvement with the 
educational sector, as opposed to the material concerns that dominate government interaction with 
specific groups (e.g. teachers and students). Attention to the key groups that have effectively 
‘captured’ the public education debate (Puryear 2008) therefore means that other less organised or 
visible groups are overlooked in the process -  in the case of education this would include parents 
compared to the organising capacity of teachers (Angell and Graham 1995: 198).
A government’s approach to ‘participation’ is complicated by the widespread ideological 
consensus in its favour. However, demand for greater forms of participation in public services has 
grown over the past twenty years; it has not always been clear what is meant by the term. This is due 
to the fact that ‘participation’ can appeal to different audiences, each with a distinct vision of what it 
represents. Anderson (1999) has observed that participation can be distinguished between three main 
types. Representative democracy emphasises the role of organised constituencies in school decision­
making. Deliberative democracy is a more open-ended process between groups that search for 
dialogue and seek consensus. Finally, rational choice or self-interest sees participation as mainly 
being market-based; in the educational context this stresses the role of vouchers and parental choices. 
With regard to the first two forms, representative and deliberative participation, while groups may well 
be organised in the former, in the latter the need for such coherence is arguably less rigid.
Bobbio (1996) suggested that despite socialism’s decline after 1989 the Left-Right distinction 
persists. This is due to the underlying values associated with each ideological pole, namely more 
egalitarianism related to the former and acceptance of difference for the latter. Such values arguably 
underpin the relative differences between the three approaches associated with participation as well. 
The deliberative or participatory approach occupies the end closest to the egalitarian pole, with few 
distinctions drawn between groups and their capacity to organise, making it arguably the most open-
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ended process of the three. At the opposite end, the market model of participation is most closely 
associated with the notion of difference. By stressing individual (or parental) choice, it breaks down 
any idea of a shared or public form of engagement. This means that the representative approach lies 
somewhere in between the two poles, since it provides space for a wider range of actors than under 
the market version, but not to the same degree as the deliberative approach. This model will find it 
easier to accommodate those interests that are relatively well-organised.
Given the distinction between the Third Way and Participatory Left, one would expect the 
participatory version to conform closer to the deliberative end of the spectrum and the Third Way to 
adopt a more differentiated approach, hovering around the representative market-oriented 
approaches. This would suggest that of the three cases, one would expect the PT government to be 
the most deliberative and inclusive in its approach to participation, while the Concertacion and 
Cardoso governments would be more exclusive, restricting involvement to more organised groups. 
However, as the evidence shows, this is not the case. The presence of policymaking elites at the 
heart of each government has arguably contributed to all three adopting a more representative 
approach, in particular through the use of institutional, state-related channels. For both the 
Concertacion and the Cardoso government, this arguably reflected a way of ‘controlling’ participation. 
Meanwhile, the PT government has opted for the same approach, partly because it has to 
accommodate demands wider than that of its own social base, but also because the Brazilian state’s 
division of educational responsibility disaggregates participation along federal, state and municipal 
lines.
1. Chile
Participation in Chile’s education system has swung like a pendulum across the different perspectives 
on what participation means. In part this reflects the ideological difference between Left and Right: 
whereas the Left has tended towards a more egalitarian outlook, the Right is generally more 
hierarchical in its approach -  and therefore tolerant of differentiated outcomes (Bobbio 1996). In Chile 
this meant that prior to 1973 government attitudes to involvement in the educational community not 
only reflected the high degree of mobilisation within society, but also the extent to which they identified 
with the Left, by being more inclusive. Following Anderson’s (1999) typology, this was closest to the
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deliberative form of democracy or participation. This was reversed by the military regime. The Right, 
which dominated in this period, was more selective in its choice of interlocutors and restricted 
participation of the bulk of educational actors in favour of more narrow, economically-oriented ones. 
This was the heyday of the rational choice or self-interest approach, when private interests were given 
institutional space, in particular through the formalised status of publicly funded private schools and 
selection. Since 1990 the shift back to the Left has been evident in the Concertacion’s modification of 
this approach. Participation is more inclusive than before, involving groups otherwise overlooked 
during the 1970s and 1980s such as teachers and students. But rather than returning to the more 
deliberative model period associated with the Popular Unity (UP) government before 1973, the 
Concertacion has opted for a more representative approach. This was challenged briefly in 2006 
following widespread protests regarding the education system, and a subsequent presidential advisory 
commission, before soon reverting to type.
1.1. Participation prior to 1990
In the decade prior to 1973 Chile can be characterised as a hyper-mobilised society (Sandbrook et al 
2007: 198). Different social groups were both highly visible and assertive in their demands. At the 
same time Chilean society and politics was becoming increasingly polarised. Both the Frei (1964-70) 
and Allende (1970-73) governments were seen as determined to respond to rising social demands, 
especially those for the poorer and less privileged sectors. This was apparent in the expansion of 
rights and benefits to the working classes during the 1960s and early 1970s, which appeared to 
conform to European notions of development. Notwithstanding this trend, the Christian Democrat 
government was seen as technocratic and clientelist by its rivals, including those on the Left, such as 
the teachers’ unions. By contrast, the UP government was seen as more inclusive and decentralised 
in policy-making, with the involvement of various educational actors in policy making at national, 
regional and local levels (Fischer 1979; Farrell 1986; Yocelevzky 1987; Corvalan 2003; Zemelman and 
Jara 2004). At the same time though, the UP also managed to antagonise its rivals. In the education 
sector this meant divisions between the government's supporters and its political opponents over its 
proposed National Unified School (ENU) proposal between its discussion in 1971 and eventual 
proposal in 1973. The ENU was seen as a means of democratising and restructuring the education
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system, along with eventual curricular reform that would conform to the government’s ‘Chilean road to 
socialism’ (Nunez 2003: 35).
Seen as a response to the historic demand circulating in ‘progressive’ sections of the Chilean 
education community, ENU presented an opportunity to integrate and unite the socially and 
institutionally segmented educational system. A highly political project, it would bring together the 
different types of education, such as general and technical, manual and intellectual (Nunez, interview 
1, 2007). However, the proposal suffered from both a lack of consensus within the UP, and the highly 
polarised environment and social divisions of the early 1970s (Farrell 1986; Garcia-Huidobro, 
interview, 2007). Allende’s education minister, Anibal Palma, subsequently felt that the ENU proposal 
was ill-timed and presented in too controversial a light (Hite 2000). Yet even with the defeat of the UP, 
ENU continued to occupy a prominent position. The military the coup prevented its introduction while 
for sections of the Left it was seen as a future education policy goal (Nunez, interview 1, 2007).
Alongside the ENU, the UP government introduced a broad participatory mechanism, the 
National Conference on Education. This brought together a wide range of actors within the education 
community and involved both national and local level engagement in December 1971 (Fischer 1979). 
The aim was to encourage a nationwide debate and dialogue about education, including what role it 
should have, and the structure it should take to develop and transform Chile. Both the ENU proposal 
and the need for greater inclusion contributed towards proposed legislation, aimed to create a common 
school structure and its administrative decentralisation in subsequent years (Fischer 1979; Nunez, 
interview 1, 2007).
The military regime that took power in 1973 rejected the previous forms of participation. For 
Chile’s new rulers, participation was conceived in more narrow terms. During the 1970s this meant an 
emphasis on national unity and the role of the family; after 1980 it involved a greater role for economic 
interests, in particular the role of private actors in school and university provision. Alongside this, the 
wider educational community was to be largely ignored.
In the immediate period after 1973, the military regime sought to do away with political 
pluralism. It had taken power fearing that political polarisation had made the country susceptible to 
communist subversion. Repressive measures were carried out, initially during the 1970s and 
maintained intermittently until 1989. In education, the government’s exclusionary attitude was
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reflected in its Declaration of Principles made a year after the coup (Briones et al 1984). In practice 
this meant military intervention in educational institutions, including the replacement and appointment 
of university chancellors, and the expulsion of teachers associated with the UP (Castro 1977). Unlike 
the previous model, participation was restricted to those it could trust, thus excluding wider society. 
During the curricular development and reforms of the 1970s for example, only education professionals 
and policy-making within the ministry and higher education sector were consulted (Prieto 1980).
After 1980 the tone of the military regime’s approach to participation in education changed. 
The late 1970s had seen the rise in ascendancy of economic liberals (Boeninger 1998). Monetarism 
was increasingly seen as the means to transform not just the Chilean economy but society as well. 
Although Chile’s education system had always included a large number of private schools, the decrees 
in the early 1980s formalised the situation -  especially state subsidisation of particular private schools. 
Similar developments were happening within higher education that also contributed to the creation of 
new private higher education institutions (Newsome 1993).
1.2. Participation according to the Concertacion
By the time the Concertacion took power, the military education reforms were well established, making 
them difficult to replace. Indeed, in many respects the military’s approach had been successful in its 
own terms, although with unintended consequences. It had sought to transform Chile’s economy and 
society by encouraging private interests. For a number of observers and scholars, this contributed 
towards greater individualism and consumerism in Chilean society by the 1990s (Colegio de 
Profesores 2003; Tironi and Ariztia 2003). Against this, the more conservative elements of the regime 
would have been disappointed at the other, unintended effects: these included the Church’s declining 
role, a rise in unmarried cohabitation and children being born outside of marriage. These changes 
were subsequently confirmed through legislation, such as the divorce bill (Garreton 1998; Funk 2006; 
Salcedo 2005).
With the proliferation of groups and demands, the Concertacion opted for a ‘middle way’ 
between the extremes of the pre-1973 and military regimes with respect to participation in the 
educational sector. In particular, this meant maintaining those groups who had benefited before 1990, 
while also providing space to those who had been overlooked. The result was a more representative
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than deliberative form of participation, which also meant that the government would have to play a 
more adjudicative role than previously. Furthermore, it meant that participation would not be open- 
ended, but ordered and structured, making use of existing or new institutions. This would provide the 
framework of participation under the Concertacion until the 2006 protests, when sections of the 
educational community associated with the Left declared that the Concertacion was behaving in an 
elitist manner which privileged private interests over social ones (Bloque Social 2006). Yet 
notwithstanding the government’s more deliberative response in the presidential advisory commission 
that followed, this now appears to have been an exception to the rule of representation.
Before examining the Concertacion’s approach to participation, it is worth noting that despite 
new forms of social activism and organisation, Chilean democracy is characterised as one where 
technocratic decision-making is especially prominent (Moulian 2002; Salcedo 2005; Aguila 2005). 
Both of the two main Chilean political party coalitions, the Concertacion and the Alianza, have been 
dominated by the same elites since the early 1990s (Hidalgo 2005; Salcedo 2005). This is suggested 
by evidence which suggests that despite the general liberalisation within Chilean society, individuals 
remain politically conservative (Palacios and Martinez 2006). This is reflected by the growing vote 
share of the Right since the 1990s, as society has become more concerned with issues such as 
delinquency and crime rates over those of political freedom or equality (Lehmann and Hinzpeter 2001). 
Indeed, Cleuren (2007) notes that Chilean civil society appears broadly supportive of the government’s 
approach, showing little interest either in more participatory politics or those on the Left who advocate 
it. Consequently, there would appear to be a lack of pressure or incentive for political parties to 
change. Such a situation has its own advantages for Concertacion politicians and the Right. Recalling 
the turbulence and polarisation of the pre-1973 period, they favour a more technocratic form of 
government. The civil service assists this attitude by operating in a manner is both centralised and 
suspicious of wider involvement, either by NGOs or the wider public (Cleuren 2007).
Despite this sclerotic image of Chilean politics and its criticisms by the Left, the Concertacion 
has arguably been more accommodating of participation than is supposed -  even if its willingness to 
include previously excluded groups means that it does so through state institutional channels rather 
than more deliberative, grassroots-based methods. Nationally, the Concertacion was characterised as 
pursuing a top-down form of policymaking from the centre, through the minister and advisors at
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Mineduc. This was shown by its educational reforms concerning curricular content and objectives, and 
the various recommended methodologies for teaching and learning (Thomas and Hernandez 2001). In 
the early 1990s this involved a National Conversation on Secondary Education between 1992 and 
1993, which the government claimed involved 30,000 students, teachers and business people in 2000 
groups (Programa MECE 199?). For a number of left-wing associated NGOs and teachers’ 
organisations though, this did not represent any meaningful consultation, since it was shaped from the 
centre rather than emerging from wider civil society. Meanwhile, the Right opposed the process and 
sought to slow its progress towards implementation (Doyle 2004).
Despite the government’s commitment to the National Conversation, it began to redirect its 
energies towards the Brunner Commission during 1994, which established the parameters for 
educational activity under the Concertacion (Scope 1997). Furthermore, seen from the perspective of 
the 2006 presidential advisory commission, the Brunner Commission appeared substantially narrower 
in social representation, with a strong emphasis on technical experts. Indeed, notwithstanding the shift 
from Christian Democrat (PDC) to Socialist control of the Concertacion by the end of the 1990s, this 
approach to policy-making remained strong, with substantial use of technocrats and NGOs to design 
and plan educational policy (Rivero 1999; Weinstein, interview, 2007). This was due to the 
policymaking core continuing to be dominated by educationalists, who sought consensus as a matter 
of course rather than by independently influential political figures from the parties that constituted the 
Concertacion (Bitar, Garcia-Huidobro, interviews, 2007).
Locally, the Concertacion sought to channel participation through particular institutions, by 
decentralising the basis for participation to the level of the school. There, participation would occur 
through the teacher in the classroom or on school councils, where students, teachers and parents 
would have the space to engage in educational issues (Mineduc 1993; Concertacion 1994; Rivero 
1999; Racynzski 1999). The government was aided by municipalities, whose response to Mineduc’s 
policies was more collaborative and less confrontational than that presented by other actors, such as 
the Colegio de Profesores (Weinstein, interview, 2007).
Aylwin’s government had sought to decentralise pedagogy, with teaching responsibilities 
shifted away from Mineduc to the schools (Cox 1994). This process was maintained under his 
successor, Eduardo Frei, whose approach to participation in the educational sector was seen as
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offering a more flexible, decentralised model that offered greater responsibilities and opportunities at 
the school level (Concertacion 1994). For example, the outcome of the National Consultation on 
Secondary School Curriculum provided a basis for understanding how this would occur: while the 
changes were deemed to be obligatory, with uniform study programmes across all schools, it would be 
up to schools and teachers themselves to determine and interpret how they would be taught (Mineduc 
2005a; Cox, interview, 2007). Meanwhile, legislation existed to provide for consultative school 
councils on which students and families would be able to participate in school management 
(Castiglioni 2006).
The emphasis of the Concertacion on representative participation meant that it was susceptible 
to overlooking particular groups, especially where interest groups had either not existed or were 
organisationally weak. Among the most visible were non-teaching staff and parents, both of whom 
were obliged to organise in order to engage with the government and its policies. In the first instance, 
this was apparent in 1996 when the government passed legislation relating to the roles, responsibilities 
and remuneration of non-teaching staff in educational establishments (Law 19.464). The absence of 
any representative body for these workers prompted the formation of CONFEMUCH the following year 
with 16,000 members in 92 municipalities, as of 2007 (Rodriguez, Caceres, interviews, 2007). In the 
second instance, despite the Concertacion’s rhetoric about the role of parents within the education 
system, the latter have tended to be weakly organised and consequently neglected by the government. 
In both cases this has been due mainly to the relative lack of information available to parents 
concerning the finance, management and performance of their schools (Velasco, Catalan, interviews, 
2007). More recently this sense of weakness prompted the creation of a Metropolitan Association of 
Parents and Guardians in Santiago in 2000, which not only sought to organise these actors at the 
school level, but has also taken a stance alongside the Bloque Social in the 2006 education debate 
(Catalan, interview, 2007).
1.3. The 2006 ‘penguin revolution’: representative to deliberative participation and back 
again
By 2006 the Concertacion’s approach to participation had apparently run its course. The early years 
after democracy’s return and the relative absence of social pressure and demands had accommodated
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the Concertacion’s style of policymaking. In 2006 this no longer seemed sustainable. Mass protests, 
demonstrations and school occupations occurred, initially led by secondary school students (who were 
known as penguins for their uniforms), and soon included university students, teachers, parents and 
other social groups and organisations. Their complaint was about the quality of the Chilean education 
system, which was perceived as failing.
In addition, for the protestors, representative democracy was increasingly seen as constrained 
and insufficient to accommodate wider social demands, with observers claiming that democracy 
increased in relation to growing social mobilisation (Observatorio 2007). This perspective was not lost 
on concertacionistas. Cox (interview, 2007), cited Toqueville’s Democracy in America as a 
comparison for what was happening in Chile in 2006: that is, expanded education coverage and mass 
knowledge prompted more social and political demands. At the same time, there was a shift in 
Concertacion discourse: the newly-elected president, Michelle Bachelet, represented a distinctly 
different discourse to previous Concertacion leaders, with a greater emphasis on societal engagement 
(Garcia-Huidobro, interview, 2007).
The main difference in terms of educational demands before and after 2006 was to do with the 
structure of the educational system. Until 2006 most interest groups had been primarily concerned 
with material issues (e.g. teachers’ pay, student finance, sufficient resources for the voucher system). 
In 2006 the educational model and the right of private schools both to select and gain profit was being 
questioned. The demonstrations also surprised the Concertacion by their intensity (Brunner, Elacqua, 
interviews, 2007). Finally, the main difference in the pre- and post-2006 period was the origin of 
demands: before it had been technical experts; but now it was coming from social groups and 
movements.
• The Concertacion’s response was the creation of a presidential advisory commission to 
examine the state of Chilean education and make recommendations. According to its chairman, Juan 
Eduardo Garcia-Huidobro, this represented a break with previous presidents and working groups, 
since it sought to listen to societal concerns. In other words, the process marked a change from the 
Concertacion’s usual form of participation through representative and institutional channels in favour of 
one that was more deliberative. The result was a greater number of representatives from social
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groups and organisations than there had been in the previous educational commission, under Jose 
Joaquin Brunner, in 1994 (Garcia-Huidobro, Weinstein, interviews, 2007).
The work of the commission coalesced around four main positions with the key differences 
being on the role of profit and the level at which schools should be controlled (table 1): the right-wing 
opposition maintained its support of for-profit schools and the existing model of municipalisation, while 
the left-wing opposition -  the Bloque Social -  opposed for-profit schools and sought greater control of 
the school system from the centre. The Concertacion, meanwhile, consisted of elements that ranged 
between these two particular poles, although the more politically powerful sectors tended to be less 
concerned with profit and municipalisation (or Bloque Social) (Garcia-Huidobro, Cox, interviews, 2007). 
The Right was obliged to shift its position owing to the groundswell of public criticism of the educational 
model (Cox, interview, 2007).
Table 1: Key educational positions within the Garcia-Huidobro commission, 2006
Bloque Social
(extra-parliamentary Left)
Concertacion
(centre and centre-left)
Alianza
(Right)
Oppose for-profit schools, 
school fees and co-financing
Differing internal positions on 
for-profit schools
Defend for-profit schools
Reform LOCE Differing internal positions on 
LOCE reform
Reform LOCE
Stronger state role/less Stronger state role/maintain Weaker state
municipalized system municipalized system role/municipalized system and 
greater school autonomy
Internally divided on selection Regulate selection (in 
municipal and subsidised 
private schools)
Defend selection
Source: Author’s own analysis; Garcia-Huidobro 2007
The Bloque Social arguably represents the most visible -  albeit politically limited -  coalition of social 
organisations challenging the Concertacion from the Left in Chile today. As well as criticising the 
technical approach to policymaking since the 1990s, it sees municipalisation as disconnecting the 
state from its obligation to provide adequate education, and encouraging segregation within the 
system. Furthermore, parental choice is seen as unviable, owing to the ability of schools to select and 
the variability of families’ economic situations (Bloque Social 2006). Organisationally, the Bloque
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Social comprises key educational actors, such as the Colegio de Profesores and the main student 
unions, along with teaching assistants, non-teaching staff and parents’ groups (Bloque Social 2006).
The Bloque Social today presents several further challenges to the Concertacion. First, it 
represents a previously silent body of public opinion, by being larger than its constituent parts (Cox, 
interview, 2007). This is despite the fact that differences of opinion exist as to whether it is strong or 
weak (Brunner, Elacqua, interviews, 2007). Second, it presents political obstacles to the Concertacion 
through its association with an alternative vision of the Left, and its association with social movements, 
a relationship that the Concertacion increasingly lacks (Grau, interview, 2007). Forming the 
educational component of the Fuerza Social, the network includes former Communist Party members 
among its leadership. Consequently, it is perceived as more leftist than the Concertacion, thereby 
weakening the Concertacion’s hegemony in that political space, and pressuring the government to 
respond in two ways: on the one hand, by making concessions such as the reform of LOCE (Velasco, 
Elacqua, interviews, 2007), and on the other by seeking an accommodation with the Right through a 
national agreement in November 2007.
Despite the visibility of this non-Concertacion Left during 2006, its political impact has been 
marginal due to institutional, ideological and organisational factors. Institutionally, unlike the 
Concertacion and the Alianza, the Fuerza Social lacks parliamentary representation. This makes it 
difficult for its views to be articulated through the Concertacion’s preferred way of participation, 
primarily through Congress (Cox, interview, 2007). Furthermore, the absence of parliamentary 
representation means that its ability to challenge the consensus is made that much harder, both 
rhetorically and practically; this presumably contributed to its marginalisation in the negotiations that 
took place in the commission and its separation from the consensus sought by the government (Kubal 
2007). Ideologically, the agreement between the Concertacion and the Alianza not only demonstrates 
the persistent strength of the mainstream Left and Right, but also the fact that these two groups’ 
political positions are not as stark as they were before 1973. This suggests that the main differences 
between the Left and Right are over the details of policy rather than the nature of the policies 
themselves (Angell 2007: 179) -  thereby leaving the Fuerza Social, with its strident anti-systemic 
rhetoric on the outside. Organisationally, the Fuerza Social and the social sectors it represents remain 
relatively weak. In the 2005 elections, the presidential candidate behind which most of the non-
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Concertacion Left could converge, Tomas Hirsch, achieved only 5.4% of the vote (Gobiemo de Chile: 
Ministerio del Interior 2006). More recently, despite its visibility during the 2006 protests and 
subsequent involvement in the Garcia-Huibodro commission, its strength has been diminished through 
internal divisions and splits, the most notable of which occurred in one of its strongest constituent 
member groups, the teachers’ union, in late 2008 (Coordinador Nacional: Fuerza Social y Democratica 
del Magisterio 2008).
The Concertacion’s eventual agreement with the Right in Congress in November 2007 
suggests that the present round of deliberative participation has come to an end. Not only was the 
Bloque Social largely been frozen out of the Concertacion-Alianza negotiations that followed the 
commission, but of the three advisory commissions enacted by Bachelet in 2006 the one on education 
was the most participatory. The others (social security and health) functioned largely as expert-led 
organisations (Aguilera 2007). Nevertheless, sections of the Concertacion felt that the approach 
undermined representative political institutions such as Congress, by introducing a new space in which 
policies would be debated and negotiated (Elacqua, interview, 2007).
2. Brazil
Participation as understood for Brazilian governments has not followed a stark back-and-forth 
approach as that in Chile. From the military period to the present, all governments have broadly 
adopted the representative form of participation, which has surprisingly included the supposedly more 
participatory PT since 2003. In part this may be due to a less ideological polarisation between Left and 
Right, although variations between governments before 1995 and after are evident. Indeed, in the first 
decade of the New Republic, the Right was largely in government and this was reflected in the greater 
role played by private interests -  although in contrast to Chile, this had less to do with economic 
interests than with self-interest, or ‘corporatist’, material concerns.
2.1. Educational participation, pre-1994
Whereas the military government in Chile was closely associated with the market model of 
participation, in Brazil this was less so. Yet to suggest it was representative is also erroneous. The 
regime was inclined to a state-led form of development and this was reflected in the types of groups it 
favoured. These included those of a similar inclination in the private sector and within the state
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apparatus, in particular technocrats. Furthermore, throughout the regime, there was an emphasis on 
state planning (MEC 1965, 1967, 1973, 1976). The centralisation of the system made it easier to 
disseminate control and direct demands down the chain, especially as the regime ensured that 
administration was decentralised (McGinn and Pereira 1992). Towards the end this approach came 
increasingly under threat as the liberalisation process of the late 1970s (the ‘abertura’) spilled over into 
the education sector, prompting grassroots social movements to campaign for both educational and 
wider political reform.
Compared to the military regime that preceded it, the New Republic showed itself more open to 
participation by other social and political actors. This included those that the governments did not 
politically identify with, such as teachers’ unions. In some respects it was a continuation of the period 
prior to 1985, when the military had begun a process of political liberalisation where social actors were 
increasingly gaining space. At the same time, the relative openness of the first New Republic 
governments in education was attributable to other factors, including awareness of the persistent 
‘social debt’ or inequality in Brazil (Plank 1990). Meanwhile, even if the governments had wanted to 
control social demands they would have faced difficulties in doing so since these were increasingly 
autonomous. This was evident in two main arenas in this period: during the Sarney government’s 
dialogue with the educational community in its D-Day initiative, and subsequently in the debates 
surrounding educational responsibilities in the 1988 constituent assembly. In both areas the 
government faced criticism from the teachers’ unions and their allies that the dialogue was not 
deliberative enough and too limited by its representative format (Neubauer da Silva and Cruz 1996; 
CPB Noticias 1987b). The role of representative participation was not restricted solely to those groups 
that failed to identify politically with these governments. Other groups were forming throughout the 
1980s, including the state and municipal education secretaries, into CONSED and UNDIME 
respectively, as well as the owners of private HEIs (Plank 1990: 556).
This criticism highlighted the extent to which the first New Republic governments were further 
away from the more participatory vision that the Left espoused. Given their greater inclination towards 
representative over deliberative participation, they more closely identified with the political Right. 
Furthermore, the sentiments of policy elites in this period highlighted their affinity to that end of the 
spectrum: Collor’s second education minister, Jose Goldemberg, observed that while he did not
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identify with neo-liberalism, he did share a more general, conservative commitment to elitism. This 
was most evident in his opposition to directly elected university chancellors, over which he clashed 
with the more left-leaning teachers’ unions (interview, 2008).
Meanwhile private interests of a sort did predominate. Such interests were less economically- 
oriented and instead more particular, and were personalist. Increasingly, governments were subject to 
the pressures and demands of subnational administrations and their policies, thereby limiting the 
capacity of the federal level to coordinate the education system as a whole. This included a wide 
range of policies and actions, from the popular participatory educational policies enacted under Paulo 
Freire in Sao Paulo city to the creation of prefabricated new schools and community centres by Lionel 
Brizola in Rio de Janeiro state, and -  eventually at the federal level -  by President Collor himself 
(Mignot 2001; Velloso 2004). Indeed, the latter faced considerable criticism from teachers, who 
claimed that he was failing to involve civil society and Congress in his policies and was offering too few 
incentives for public schools (CNTE Noticias 1991, 1992). Yet this self-interest was not one-way. It 
was also reflected in the way that government perceived the educational community. Although 
ideologically aligned with the Left, the general view was that teachers and students remained largely 
‘corporatist’ actors, concerned mainly with material maximisation, including salaries, grants and credit 
(Goldemberg, interview, 2008).
2.2. Participation under the Cardoso government
The Cardoso government adopted a broadly representative approach to participation that was 
characterised by the use of institutions -  and in particular those associated with the state. As a result 
social movements that did not have sufficient organisation or involvement in the state apparatus 
received less attention, at least according to those movements themselves (e.g. the teachers and 
student movements).
The Cardoso government’s main focus after 1994 was the creation or reform of institutions 
through the laying out of new directives and state bodies. This included the creation of a new LDB 
defined the structure and responsibilities of the educational system, and the changes to the state 
structures for proposing and developing policy. It also brought an end to what had become an
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increasing phenomenon under the Franco government (1992-94), of bilateral pacts signed between 
government and social actors (Arelaro, interview, 2008).
Despite the government’s approach, in early 1995 it appeared that the new administration was 
going to pursue a direction that was more deliberative (Arelaro, interview, 2008). Cardoso’s election 
manifesto had emphasised the role of the ‘community’ in educational policy and made reference to 
participation through various campaigns involving various groups (Cardoso 1994). For the Left in the 
educational community, this soon proved not to be the case, as the drafting of the FUNDEF proposals 
and the constitutional amendment setting out the parameters of federal, state and municipal 
responsibility for educational provision soon demonstrated (Arelaro, interview, 2008). The government 
had a distinct view of what participation, or ‘community’, entailed: rather than all education actors, it 
mainly meant parents and wider civil society (Cunha 1995; Naspolini 2001). Furthermore, ‘civil society’ 
in this context included private interests, which would potentially reduce the degree of influence that 
such left-leaning organisations such as teachers’ and students’ unions would have in educational 
policy. The new government adopted this stance partly because it saw the existence of ‘corporatist’ or 
particular interests as detrimental to achieving change. Cardoso (2006) acknowledged as much in his 
political memoirs, noting that the MEC bureaucracy was highly susceptible to corporate and political 
influences, making reform in the higher education sector, and in the decentralisation process, 
substantially difficult to achieve.
Indeed, concern with corporatist interests prompted the administration to introduce changes to 
the state structures to minimise these influences (Souza 2005:148). At the national level official rules 
and bodies were recognised. The Federal Education Council (CFE) was replaced by the National 
Education Council (CNE), which involved new membership procedures and competences. They 
appeared to give greater weight to MEC, by not only giving it the right to choose with whom it 
consulted, but also in drawing up the final recommended membership list (MEC 2007). Cury (1996) 
observed that the new system was consequently too skewed towards the executive and its agenda 
and did not adequately capture the concerns of the wider educational actors, such as students and 
academics, who complained of being overlooked (Neves 1999). This latter criticism was politically 
motivated, given these groups’ opposition towards the Cardoso government after 1995. Executive 
power was also reflected in the changes made to the election of university chancellors: while teachers
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would constitute 70% of voters, they would be required to put forward three candidates, one of whom 
would then be selected by the education minister (Brasil: Presidente da Republica 1996). In contrast 
students and teachers had favoured direct elections. Locally, the government sought to transfer 
powers and resources directly to schools (Cardoso 2006). This occurred in several ways, including the 
use of small federal sums and efforts to devolve the management of primary schools to the 
municipalities in the 1996 LDB.
The use of official rules reflected the government’s priority of participating with state actors as 
opposed to civil society. The passage of the LDB was one such example. Another was the 
involvement of the state education secretaries in the development of national curricular guidelines 
(Brasil: Presidente da Republica 1996). Despite the government’s rhetoric on the need for more 
community participation in schools, research during the period suggested relatively little had changed 
at the local level. This was especially the case regarding parental involvement (Maia et al 2001; World 
Bank 2003). Indeed, school councils were the forum by which parents were best placed to influence 
educational issues. These were set up at by the state governments from the 1980s on. However, 
even in Ceara state, where Cardoso’s PSDB allies oversaw the establishment of such councils, 
parents’ awareness of their function on such bodies was poor and dependent on the teaching staff and 
head teacher (Maia et al 2001). Furthermore, even among the most aware parents, the federal 
delineation of educational responsibility, and the bulk of primary and secondary education fell to state 
and municipal governments, which meant there was presumably less pressure on them to organise 
nationally as opposed to subnationally.
To combat what it saw as ‘corporatism’, the government was also inclined to use the media as 
a means of going around those it considered to be obstructive, thereby and appealing to wider society. 
This occurred on several occasions, including a defence of the new Provao higher education 
assessment exercise after teachers and students threatened to boycott it, and inviting the press to sit 
in during pay negotiations between the university teachers and the government (Souza 2005). 
Similarly, the use of media promotion was prominent in the administration’s publicising its prioritisation 
of primary education, through the use of the Wake Up Brazil! (Acorda Brasil!) and All Children in 
School (Todos na Escola) campaigns during the Cardoso presidency (Cardoso, interview, 2008). The 
use of the media by the government was not new: it had been a key part of the 1994 election
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campaign in which the manifesto and the communications teams were designed to work closely 
together (Souza 2005). However, using the media constitutes a relatively limited form of participation. 
By its nature it was a one-way process, designed to promote and defend the government’s agenda 
rather than engage in a wider dialogue on educational policy.
The extent to which the Cardoso government had sought to reduce the threat of corporatist 
influences and make use of representative participation culminated in its National Education Plan in 
2001. Produced within MEC rather than through a deliberative process (such as that which occurred 
in Chile in 2006), the wider educational community criticised it for failing to promote sufficient funding. 
The teachers’ union, the CNTE, noted that it was never fully consulted on the plan and that neither did 
the government appear wiling to accept amendments from civil society organisations (Vieira, interview, 
2007). Concerns were raised at the lack of credit for poorer university students, pensions for retired 
teachers and salary plans for non-teaching staff. These were developed into a series of amendments 
that supporters in the wider educational community, including the PT, sponsored when the plan came 
before Congress. In 2001 Cardoso vetoed nine of these demands, citing constitutional, financial and 
planning grounds for doing so (Presidencia da Republica: Casa Civil 2001; CNTE 2002; Peixoto 2001).
2.3. Participation during the first Lula term
The representative approach to participation was largely maintained under Cardoso’s successor, Lula. 
But whereas the Cardoso period was seen as constraining participation (certainly by those social 
movements that felt excluded from the process), under Lula it was perceived as more accommodating. 
This did not mean that the process was made more deliberative; the new government maintained the 
institutions introduced by Cardoso while being more attuned to the demands of previously excluded 
groups, such as teachers and students.
The use of the state to recognise who was included in the policy process heralded a shift in 
thinking by the PT. Until the mid-1990s there had always been a tension at the heart of participation 
within the party. While all broadly agreed on the need to have as wide participation as possible, this 
had different interpretations. At one extreme were those activists and social movements who believed 
the party should act in the interests of those it represented: essentially the otherwise excluded and 
overlooked. At the other end were those activists (usually in elected state positions as mayors or
176
governors) who argued that they had to act in the interests of the wider community, including social 
groups that the PT did not usually align with. This was a tension that has been at the heart of PT 
administrations since the early 1980s (see Keck 1992, Baiocchi 2003b; Macaulay and Burton 2003).
The PT has recognised these difficulties and argues that the solution is for more democracy 
rather than bureaucracy (Pontual and Almeida Silva 1999). Yet how this is to be achieved seems 
vague and open to interpretation. Furthermore, the very ambiguity of the rhetoric made its practical 
application not only difficult to achieve but may well have contributed towards reinforcing the very 
criticisms made by the ‘inclusive’ group within the PT. Pontual and Ameida’s ‘radicalised democracy’ 
and increased citizen activity was associated with the participatory budget, arguably the most notable 
and readily identifiable policy associated with the PT in the 1990s. However, since then this 
participatory approach has been undermined as a tool for achieving radical change. This is evident 
through the increasing involvement of organisations as opposed to direct democracy, and the degree 
to which the system has been used to co-opt groups (Cabannes 2004).
In education, the PT’s arrival at MEC similarly showed up the difficulty of pursuing policies that 
focused on the party faithful. Regardless of the PT’s sympathies, the government faced demands and 
expectations from other actors such as the private sector (Nascimento interview, 2006). The new 
administration therefore had to accommodate wider, more diverse interests that could potentially come 
into conflict with its own constituent base. In this context, the resort to use of the existing state 
apparatus was therefore advantageous since it shifted debate from within the party to the level of the 
state. As a result the PT’s approach to participation and dialogue did not differ dramatically from that 
undertaken during the Cardoso years (Costa, interview, 2008).
The reliance on the state as the arbiter for participation was reflected in the main policies 
undertaken during the first Lula term and into the second. At the broadest level, the government failed 
to engage social movements and organisations in anything like the same format that it did during the 
1990s, and the participatory budget. Both the Council for Social and Economic Development (CDES) 
and the Multiyear Plan (PPA) ended up more consultative and dominated by the executive than being 
collaborative (Baiocchi and Checa 2008). In education the same state-dominated perspective was 
similarly evident: the development of FUNDEB, the higher education review and reform bill along with 
the drafting of the Education Development Plan (PDE) were all undertaken within MEC. Much of this
177
arguably had to do with the PT leadership’s greater access to resources and information within the 
ministry compared to outside.
The rules of the game suited a wider educational community that has been broadly established 
since the 1980s: organisations represent a cross-section of categories, from managers of private HEIs 
to teachers’ unions in both the public and private sector, and from students to state actors (i.e. state 
and municipal level education secretaries). However, the PT’s entry into national level government 
presented particular obstacles, especially for those movements that have historically associated 
themselves with it. Indeed, they were a relatively weak voice during an MEC-sponsored basic 
education conference in the early part of the first Lula term (Chagas, interview, 2008). One reason for 
this may be due to these organisations’ willingness to allow the government to take the lead in 
policymaking, on the assumption that the new leadership reflected their own objectives.
Another reason for the social movements’ relative weakness may be due to the nature of 
lobbying in a federal system. Buarque (interview, 2008) noted that given the decentralised 
management of basic education, the national level organisations were consequently relatively weak. 
Since states and municipalities are directly responsible for basic (primary and secondary) education, 
which consisted of the bulk of Brazil’s education system, movements lobbying for change at this level 
had to direct their pressure to the subnational education secretariats. By contrast federal government 
had direct constitutional responsibility for higher education only -  which meant that only those 
movements associated with the sector had much influence with the federal government.
This greater pressure at the higher education level was perhaps best reflected in the policies 
pursued by the PT government during 2003-06. But even here there was arguably some shift in 
emphasis between the Cardoso and Lula governments. Whereas Paulo Renato Souza and his team 
had sought to challenge ‘corporatism’, the Lula government sought a compromise between the 
different interests. For its supporters in the academic and student communities, MEC replaced the 
Provao with Sinaes and ProUni. The ProUni benefited both poorer students as well as the private HEI 
managers, who had been seeking state support (Barreyro 2007). Similarly quotas in federal 
universities were made available to minorities and those who had attended public schools (Arroyo, 
interview, 2008; Brasil: Presidente da Republica 2005).
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3. Conclusion
Contrary to expectations, the distinction between the Third Way and Participatory Left is not easily 
perceivable in the manner in which these governments approach participation in the education sector 
generally. While both the Concertacion and Cardoso governments demonstrate a relatively close 
affinity between the Third Way, and more representative approaches to participation, this also 
appeared to be the case for the PT government during the first Lula term. Indeed, just as the more 
deliberative form of policymaking declined prior to the PT entering government, so too did its own 
approach to participation. Whereas the Cardoso government’s approach sought deliberately to 
weaken the power of ‘corporatist’ interests, such as the well-organised teacher and student 
movements, the Lula government found its commitment to representative forms of participation owed 
much to context. By 2003, the party faced the combination of its formerly more deliberative approach 
to policymaking being substantially weakened, and the petistas who now occupied positions within the 
state (MEC) having relatively greater influence and access to resources. This encouraged them to 
make use of the formal state bodies and institutions already in existence, prompting education 
stakeholders to engage the PT within the state.
Consequently, in all three cases the main form of participation was conducted through 
institutional channels, either already established or set up at the state level by each government. In 
Chile, the Concertacion opted for the representative path since it ensured that its own position -  
including the politicians leading the coalition and the bureaucrats employed to implement policy -  
remained paramount, especially after the relative decline of civil society as a mobilising force. This 
was evident in the government’s use of school boards as the means of encouraging local participation. 
While nationally it sought to constrain participation through convening educational commissions in 
1994 and 2006. In both cases not only was membership based on organisational size and presence, 
but the parameters for debate were largely defined by the government. Indeed, the later commission 
was the result of the government seeking to institutionalise the growing social demands and 
dissatisfaction around the educational system. Social groups seemed attuned to this perspective: new 
legislation and institutions introduced during the 1990s prompted previously unorganised groups to 
mobilised, for example as parents and non-teaching staff, in order to gain both official recognition and 
to be able to participate.
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In Brazil the Cardoso government created new state institutions, such as the CNE, through 
which the influence of social movements was minimised by the presence of official groups at the state 
and municipal levels. Similarly, the development of policies was kept within MEC, limiting participation 
to a form of consultation, in which teachers and students would be but one voice. While the Cardoso 
government’s approach therefore helped constrain those actors that it considered ‘corporatist’, its 
association with civil society organisations was weak. Unlike the PT, the PSDB did not have any 
strong links with educational organisations, other than the academics that constituted its policymaking 
core. Meanwhile, under Lula, the institutional approach has persisted, reflecting the extent to which 
the insertion of the party into the state apparatus contributes towards a more representative approach. 
Various factors, including the separation of educational responsibility between the federal, state and 
municipal levels, arguably weakened the influence that many of the social movements associated with 
the government might have -  especially in the largest education sector: that related to basic education. 
In addition, the PT government also experienced a ‘honeymoon’ period during its first term, during 
which social movements either waited for the administration to propose policy or were uncertain what 
stance to adopt.
Perhaps the options for social democratic governments -  whether Third Way or Participatory 
Left -  are more limited than the participation models suggest. Certainly, all three cases tended toward 
the representative rather than the deliberative approach. Efforts to create a more participatory form of 
engagement cannot be conducted without the establishment of certain parameters; both the ENU and 
National Conference on Education under the UP government in Chile in the early 1970s involved some 
degree of organisation and representation. In the 1990s the PT also introduced participatory 
mechanisms at the municipal level; like the Chilean case, this also required frameworks to be 
developed from the centre. In both instances the measures suffered from political polarisation 
surrounding and within them. Even in less polarised or politically charged settings, such as the most 
participatory effort by any of the three governments to date -  the Garcia-Huidobro commission in 2006 
-  the prospects for deliberation seems constrained. Participation required education stakeholders to 
be organised as interest groups, and also set out a timetable by which to report back its findings and 
recommendations. This possibly suggests that deliberation, especially in its most organic and least 
rule-driven version, is no more than an ideal rather than being achievable in practical terms.
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The lesson regarding social democrats and participation, then, is that to engage the 
government a social group must take on forms of organisation that will provide it with official 
recognition. Yet this does not mean that all groups will consequently be treated equally. As the 
following chapters and the focus on government relations with key educational actors will show -  
teachers, students and private interests -  much of that engagement is influenced by political ideology 
and the affinity, or not, between government and social movements.
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9. A compromised position: Private interests and social democratic 
governments
For the Left, the presence of private interests challenges the notion of education as a public good, 
prompting it to be treated with suspicion. Crouch (2003), for example, suggests that the introduction of 
private interests into public services affects the nature of the public system and distorts citizenship, by 
weakening the link that individuals have with the state. If public services are provided by private 
organisations, then citizens are unable to influence the system through the vote. The private sector, 
for its part sees its role in a different light. Since the 1980s its discourse has stressed its relatively 
cheaper cost and greater productivity compared to the centralised inefficiency of public systems, 
(Puryear and Olivios 1995; World Bank 2007; Albornoz 1993). The rhetoric appears to have captured 
some degree of support, as the World Bank (2007) reports a rising proportion of families accessing 
private primary and secondary schools, including in developing countries.
The question for social democratic governments then is how best to manage the relationship 
with a prominent actor in education. The private education sector has shown a considerable capacity 
to organise itself, especially in comparison to other social actors. This is the case even though the 
private education sector is not homogenous: it includes entrepreneurs who own and manage for-profit 
institutions and other non-profit, religious and community-based schools and universities. 
Notwithstanding the variation, the private sector has managed to organise itself effectively, thereby 
enabling it to influence public policy. Given social democrats’ disposition towards representative 
participation through state institutions, this has meant that such governments in Brazil and Chile have 
largely opted to either accommodate existing institutions or to change the rules of the game around 
private interests. Where governments have sought to impose conditions on private interests -  or 
where the sector itself feared an adverse impact -  the government has faced obstruction and, on 
occasion, has had to abandon its objectives. This has been the case regardless of whether the 
government has been from the Third Way or Participatory Left.
Yet even though the direction of the social democratic government-private education sector 
relationship has been largely one-way, the composition and ideological differences between Third Way 
and Participatory Left social democracy should mean that nuances do exist. For example, the Third
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Way’s greater accommodation, both of the market and the use of representative participation (i.e. 
through organised groups), should mean that it is more willing to cede space to the private sector in 
terms of policy direction and outcomes, more so than the social movement-oriented Participatory Left.
That this difference between the two forms of social democracy did not occur may be attributed 
to the willingness of all three governments to treat the private sector as a partner rather than as one 
interest group among many. In Chile this was due not only to the Concertacion’s determination to 
strike a balance between different educational actors, but also its inheritance. Unlike the federal 
Brazilian model, where the government was only responsible for higher education, Chile’s unitary 
nature meant it was responsible at all levels. This made government policy more complicated, since it 
inherited a school system in 1990 where nearly half of all students were in private schools. 
Furthermore, the system had been formalised to include state subsidies for a rising number of private 
schools after 1980.
Meanwhile, in Brazil both the Cardoso and the first-term Lula governments faced a relatively 
uncoordinated and unplanned private university sector. With limited resources available for higher 
education expansion, the two governments treated the private sector as a partner which could provide 
the growing demand for university places.
1. Chile
Among Latin America’s education systems, Chile has a more market-oriented model than most. This 
trend was encouraged after 1980, following the various military decrees that opened up the education 
sector to private interests. The Concertacion therefore faced a substantial and relatively well 
organised private sector when it took office in 1990. This was especially the case in the school 
system, where a tripartite system operated, with municipal (public) schools, state-subsidised private 
and private schools. This led to a policy approach that has not substantially altered the system, partly 
because of the growing dependence that successive governments have had on the sector to ensure 
sufficient educational provision.
1.1. The Private Sector in Education prior to 1990
At the school level Chile had a notable private sector even before the military coup (Bosch, interview, 
2007). Allende’s Popular Unity (UP) government had sought to integrate private schools into a
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national and publicly controlled education system through the National Unified School (ENU) proposal 
(Superintendencia de Educacion Publica 1971; Nunez, interview 1, 2007). ENU raised fears among 
the middle class of socialist indoctrination in schools and threaten the role of the Church and family in 
education. This contributed towards the general climate of fear and suspicion that precipitated the 
military coup in 1973 (Farrell 1986). The military response was to emphasise the role of the family and 
the principle of subsidiarity, or decision-making, at the lowest possible level, in government. This 
would be achieved by reducing the role of the state, providing space and private competition in the 
education sector (Riesco 1981).
Following evaluations undertaken by the ODEPLAN and Mineduc between 1977 and 1981 and 
Pinochet’s March 1979 presidential directive, several decrees followed in 1980 and 1981. School 
administration was municipalised (Schiefelbein 1982; Bosch, interview, 2007) and management 
deregulated, leading to a substantial increase in the number of private schools. These schools were 
entitled to select their students, and were funded by the state through a ‘voucher’ system. The 
voucher system not only introduced a degree of choice into the system, it also rationalised resources 
by only paying schools for their number of students. However, the system never provided full 
competition and choice, as some in the government favoured (Dittborn, interview, 2007): rather than 
being directly paid to parents to spend at their preferred school, it was allocated by Mineduc on the 
parents’ behalf.
Despite the incompleteness of the voucher system, the impact of the changes was swift. 
Between 1981 and 1990 the number of students in municipal schools fell by over a fifth, while the 
number matriculated in subsidised private schools more than doubled. The trend persisted after the 
return to democracy in 1990: during the first 15 years of Concertacion government the number of 
municipal school students remained broadly steady, but the drive towards subsidised private schools 
continued, with the number enrolled rising by more than half again (figure 10).
184
zigure 10
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Source: Mineduc 2005: Table 2.7
While the military’s efforts to deregulate the education system had proved successful, sections of the 
private sector felt underrepresented. The private sector had begun to organise itself during the 1980s, 
the two main bodies being the Chilean Private Colleges (CONACEP) and the Federation of Private 
Education Institutions (FIDE). As of 2007, they represented around 1400 schools between them, with 
CONACEP members responsible for over half a million students. Despite the relatively privileged 
status of the private sector, it felt that it was not able to participate fully; this was due in large part to 
the non-democratic nature of the regime. In addition, the organisations felt that the state still retained 
too much control and supplied too little funding both in education generally and in the voucher system 
(Bosch, interview, 2007).
At the university level, a similar deregulation and competition took place after 1980. Prior to the 
military coup there were eight universities and around 71,000 students. These universities included 
both state and state-funded private institutions, which accounted for 70% of government higher 
education spending. The sector began to suffer as student numbers more than doubled between 1966 
and 1975, while coordination between universities and the use of resources remained poor and 
inefficient (Oficina de Planificacion Nacional 1971, 1977).
1 8 5
The higher education reforms of the early 1980s occurred alongside the changes to the school 
system. The measures at tertiary level were similarly designed to develop a market in the sector, by 
curtailing public universities’ autonomy and established funding streams, while also making it easier for 
new, privately-run institutions to be established. The impact of the reforms initially encouraged 
selection and reduced the proportion of the budget spent on higher education (Newsome 1993). By 
the early 2000s, the objectives of the military regime -  to reduce the burden of higher education on the 
state -  appeared to have been realised. The proportion of public to private spending in higher 
education was reversed, from 70% public to around 70% private (Marcel and Tokman 2005). The 
ease of entry into higher education was combined with relative freedom of private HEIs to organise 
their courses and collaborate with external actors, such as business. Regulation was effectively left to 
the market while there was a general absence of accountability mechanisms (Brunner and Uribe 2007: 
195-7).
As well as introducing new types of institutions and courses, and stimulating greater research, 
the changes paradoxically led to a less elitist culture in higher education (Brunner 1989). Expanded 
coverage meant that higher education was no longer limited to richer sections of society, but was now 
accessible to all social classes. The flipside to this, of course, was an ability to pay for that education 
since the shortfall in resources resulting from the military reforms meant that students and their 
families had to contribute towards their own tuition.
1.2. The Private Sector and the Concertacion
Since 1990 the Concertacion government has sought to balance the needs and demands of the 
various social groups such as teachers, students and private interests within the education system. 
This is largely due to its inheritance of the strongly market-oriented philosophy bequeathed it by the 
outgoing military. As a result its main way of dealing with the private sector was to accommodate the 
school structure while aiming to improve it at the margins. This has included the use of targeted 
resources to schools and more recently proposals for a differentiated voucher system that would help 
poorer-performing schools in lower socio-economic areas (Cox 2007).
Another reason why the Concertacion chose to work with the private sector was the residually 
strong Right in Congress which provided allies to private interests in education. In addition, within the
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Concertacion there was no consensus about the private sector, ranging from support to opposition. 
This meant there was no agreement over the extent of private sector involvement in education. By 
contrast, the Right had a clear and simple argument: that private schools provide a ‘better’ education, 
since although state-funded private schools have the same level of resources as municipal ones, they 
tend to outperform them in exam scores (Larrain 1997; Caceres 2007). This is despite the fact that 
public and private schools do not compete equally (Garcia-Huidobro, interview, 2007; Marcel and 
Tokman 2005). Private schools (both those funded by the state and those which are not) are able to 
select their students, whereas municipal schools cannot.
Part of the reason for the Concertacion’s failure in taking a clear stand on the private sector is 
that much of its support is also drawn from these same private interests. On the one hand the rise in 
the number of school students attending state-subsidised private schools means a growing number of 
their parents -  potential Concertacion voters -  are part of the system. On the other hand, according to 
the CONACEP president, many of the organisation’s members are middle class supporters of the main 
political parties in both the Concertacion and opposition sides (Bosch, interview, 2007). The breadth of 
political opinion ensures that they coalesce around common interests, including schools’ autonomy, 
the right to profit and pupil selection (Velasco, Bosch, interviews, 2007). Such circumstances make it 
difficult for the Concertacion to repudiate the private sector completely.
The role of the private sector has also benefited the Concertacion in other ways, in particular by 
supplying resources that would otherwise be lacking. Indeed, by 2003 the private sector accounted for 
46% of spending in primary education, 49% in secondary and 72% in higher education (Marcel and 
Tokman 2005). At the school level the 1993 tax code which included co-financing, also contributed 
towards greater private resources.
The impact of co-financing helped increase the number of students in subsidised private 
schools after 1990. This was in keeping with the government’s drive to increase family and private 
sector involvement and contribution in education during its first years in office (Concertacion 1994). At 
the same time, the Chilean school system is extremely socially segregated (table 2), so subsidised 
schools were at an advantage by having children from the middle and upper middle sections whose 
parents could afford such contributions. Meanwhile, enrolment figures in state funded private schools 
remained largely static. The change in the tax code enabled exemptions to be made on school
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donations, as well as any co-finance made by parents (Raczynski 1999; Aedo 1998; Carnoy and 
McEwan 2001). The introduction of co-finance caused tensions within the Concertacion during the tax 
reform bill’s passage through Congress. However, any concerns had to be put to one side, as the 
political arithmetic in Congress meant that the bill required the support of the Right -  which demanded 
the exemption remain -  in order to be passed (Garcia-Huidobro, Elacqua, interviews, 2007). The 
exemption is therefore seen as an unintended policy by the government, even if it did plug the gap in 
public expenditure.
Table 2: Significant social class segregation by school type in Chile (2003
Quintile % Municipal 
school 
enrolment
% Subsidised 
school 
enrolment
% Private 
school 
enrolment
% as a total
A (Low) 79.4 20.6 0 10
B (Lower Middle) 81.9 18.1 0 32
C (Middle) 47.8 52.3 0 37
D (Upper Middle) 13.0 81.6 5.4 14
E (Upper) 0 6.1 93.9 7
Source: Mineduc 2006
Furthermore, co-finance is a measure that still prompts division to this day. Bitar (interview, 2007) 
accepted the need for it in the 1990s when schools needed more resources, but today feels that it 
does not take into account parents’ different income levels and ability to pay. Elacqua (interview, 
2007), meanwhile, feels that eliminating it without also providing sufficient regulation, greater 
accountability and an end to selection, will make little difference. The private sector meanwhile claims 
that not all state-subsidised schools have benefited; CONACEP claims that while co-payment has 
contributed more funds in wealthier areas, this has not been the case for those schools with students 
from poorer families and areas. Furthermore, the average amount contributed remains relatively low, 
at Ch$40,000 per student each month (Bosch, interview, 2007).
Given concerns regarding the level of funding in Chilean schools (both state and state-funded 
private), by the mid-2000s both the Concertacion and the wider political spectrum was united in seeing 
the need for the use of more targeted resources, and the introduction of a preferential subsidy to 
schools taking in more vulnerable students. During the 2005 presidential campaign, the right-wing 
candidate, Joaquin Lavin expressed no great opposition to a differentiated voucher scheme when it 
was proposed by Lagos (Elacqua, Velasco, interviews, 2007). The Left, in the guise of the Bloque
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Social, meanwhile maintains that state-funded private schools should not be able to select or for-profit 
(Bloque Social 2006). Indeed, following the Concertacion-Right agreement on education in November 
2007, it was proposed that private schools would not be allowed to select before the seventh grade 
and should no longer be allowed to select on the basis of family income. Instead, it could only be done 
on academic achievement and association with the school’s objectives (e.g. religious identification) 
(Puryear 2007a).
The division between these two positions is based on the way that each side views the 
‘voucher’ paid to state-funded private schools, regardless of empirical evidence that provides no 
conclusive proof either way whether such schools are better than municipal ones (Sapelli 2002). To 
the Left, these are public funds, whereas the Right views them as originating from the individual, even 
if they are collected as a tax (Velasco, interview, 2007). Furthermore, the Right places emphasis on 
the right of the individual (in this case the parent and student) to be able to choose, and of providers to 
offer the widest range of options possible. Diversity, then, is a virtue. Given the various positions held 
within the Concertacion, the difference between the two political positions has been largely 
sidestepped by the Concertacion centre which has tried to shift the focus away from a debate over 
public and private in favour of one that concentrates on standards, accountability and performance 
(Elacqua, interview, 2007).
At the university level the role of the private sector is similarly prominent. More than 90% of 
Chilean higher education institutions are private, with nearly 70% of students enrolled within them 
(Informe del Consejo Asesor Presidencial 2008: 7); 72% of funding in the sector is concentrated in 
private hands (Marcel and Tokman 2005). Indeed, compared to OECD countries, Chile’s higher 
education sector is among the most privately oriented globally; only South Korea, Japan, Kazakhstan, 
Indonesia and Colombia come relatively close (Brunner and Uribe 2007: 185). Despite its presence 
though, Chile’s private higher education sector has arguably received less scholarly attention 
compared to its school system. Nevertheless, the same arguments tend to be advanced in this sector 
as in the school system, in particular the right to autonomy and selection.
The incoming Concertacion government had the same concerns about HEIs as the previous 
regime. In particular this included the relative lack of coordination between the state, institutions and 
productive sectors such as business or industry (Aylwin 1994a). In addition the new government felt
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that the proliferation of new HEIs had not been sufficiently overseen. An early response was the 
creation of a Higher Education Council (Consejo Superior de Educacion), with a duty to supervise the 
system and ensure the accreditation of private institutions (Ministerio de Planificacion y Cooperacion 
2006; Consejo Superior de Educacion 1998). However, this accreditation process remained largely 
voluntary among all universities, with reliance on exam results and the market as the means by which 
the higher education system was regulated (Brunner and Uribe 2007: 195-7). Indeed, by 2005 a 
government review concluded that the system remained largely deregulated and uncoordinated 
(Informe del Consejo Asesor Presidencial 2008: 9).
Meanwhile, the government cut back on direct state funding to private HEIs. Whereas this 
remained available to public universities, state resources entered private higher education in a more 
indirect fashion after 1990. Such institutions were allowed to participate peripherally in some 
government finance programmes and their students were able to access credit for their studies 
(Brunner and Uribe 2007: 197). This was reinforced by Lagos’s decision to allow students to gain 
additional funds if an institution was accredited (Castiglioni 2006). This reflected the aim of the 
Concertacion to introduce more state-related regulation -  as opposed to direct intervention -  through 
accreditation, into the system (Concertacion 1994) and highlighted the extent to which the government 
accommodated private interests as opposed to challenging them.
2. Brazil
Compared to Chile, Brazil is less dependent on private interests at the school level. However, in 
higher education much of the growing demand of the 1960s and 1970s was met through private 
provision. To achieve this, the military regime deregulated the system without providing sufficient 
means of quality control. Given the Cardoso government’s concern with organising and more 
effectively monitoring the (higher) educational sector, various measures in the 1990s were introduced. 
Those that were perceived to be in the interests of the private sector flourished (e.g. enabling new 
institutions to be set up), while those that were seen as detrimental were opposed (e.g. regulatory 
mechanisms such as the Provao and the accreditation system). The same occurred in the first Lula 
term, with the ProUni programme (where the state provided financial support to private institutions) 
being accepted and the university reform bill being opposed.
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2.1. The Private Sector in Brazil in Education prior to 1995
Like Chile, the private sector has always been present in the education system. Prior to the military 
coup the debate surrounding the 1961 national guidelines (LDB) was dominated by the opposing 
positions of supporters for public and private education, resulting in a balance between the two 
positions (Plank 1996; Morales-Gomez and Torres 1992). This changed after 1964, as the new 
regime provided greater space for the private sector to participate.
As in Chile, the military governments saw the private sector as a partner and the means for 
greater education provision, especially as a means of satisfying demand that it was either unable or 
unwilling to meet through the public sector. However, unlike Chile, the size of the private school 
system was never as substantial. Indeed, between the end of the military regime and 2000 the 
numbers attending private schools remained largely constant and formed a diminishing part of the 
total, as the public system nearly doubled between 1982 and 2000 (figure 11). By contrast, the 
situation was different at the university level, where the private sector consistently accounted for 
around two-thirds of students during the same period (IBGE 1983: 284; 1990:198; 1996:2-183; 2000: 
2-201).
Even if private interests in Brazil’s school system have tended to be more modest than in Chile, 
they are still influential. It was generally the higher income groups that made use of them where there 
was no good public school to be found. For lower income groups that lacked public schools -  let alone 
good ones -  this proved more costly effect as they were obliged to pay disproportionately more for 
(private) education compared to richer income groups (Birdsall et al 1996).
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Prim ary and Secondary School Students in Brazil, 1988-2000 
(m atriculated at start of academ ic year)
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Sources: IBGE 1983: 264, 274; 1990: 182, 186; 1996: 2-172, 2-175; 2000: 2-188, 2-194
In Brazil the growth of private education has faced a number of problems. These have ranged from 
being insufficiently coordinated and managed, while also being vulnerable to economic shocks. During 
the late 1970s, national industry observed persisting distortions and income inequalities owing to a 
failure in planning between the education system and the labour market (CNI 1979). The expansion 
of institutions (especially HEIs) was seen as directionless and had occurred with little supervision and 
evaluation or use of quality controls (Banas 1974; Souza 2005; Schwartzmann, interview, 2007). 
Meanwhile, the debt crisis of the early 1980s highlighted the risk of relying on the private sector to 
deliver a public good as the number of basic and higher education institutions fell.
The New Republic oversaw this deterioration in both the public and private sectors during its 
first decade. There was little prospect of change, not least because the size of the private sector 
across the school and university system was strong enough to ensure that it was not directly 
challenged by government. Indeed, the reliance on private education at the expense of the public 
system meant that government from national to municipal levels was transferring large sums to the 
sector (Plank 1990: 551). By the early 1990s the number of private HEIs was already beginning to
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increase (Durham, interview, 2008), pre-dating the expansion that is generally attributed to the laissez- 
faire attitude of the Cardoso years.
When comparing the Cardoso and Lula governments and their relationship to the private 
sector, two factors must be considered: first, changes related to administrative responsibility of 
education which made higher education the main arena for government-private sector relations after 
1995; second, the main policies associated with higher education were the same under both 
presidents. This included efforts to introduce regulation and autonomy into the system.
2.2. The Private Sector and the Cardoso government
Given the federal government’s responsibility for higher education, the new Cardoso government’s 
main involvement with the private sector was at this level. The government saw the private sector as a 
partner in its educational policies and, unlike its critics in the PT and social movements, it was more 
inclined to accommodate private interests, be they business, national and international NGOs or 
international sources. The government felt confident in its position, since it believed it could maintain 
overall public control (Souza 2005). Indeed, the Cardoso government showed its willingness to work 
with private interests at the school level by creating a partnership with industrialists soon after coming 
to office. The result was the Wake Up Brazil! (Acorda Brasil!) campaign which was designed to 
promote greater uptake of primary education (Cardoso, interview, 2008).
However, the private sector was not as unified as it seemed. Two main groups constituted it: 
industrialists and big business on the one hand, and managers of private HEIs on the other (Rodrigues 
2007). Although both groups advocated freedom of choice and diversity in educational provision, 
industry saw its main concern as national development, while private HEI managers were primarily 
concerned with raising public and private funds. They questioned the right of the government to 
interfere in what they saw as their private interests, especially when an external assessment system 
was introduced. Indeed, they query whether the state is capable of being objective in this respect, 
owing to its dual role as both provider of public education (at the university level) and evaluator of 
quality. Meanwhile, the industrialists, including the National Confederation of Industry (CNI) and the 
finance community-associated Herbert Levy Institute, stressed the importance of national solutions,
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such as a minimum amount of government spending per primary school student and the adoption of 
national and permanent systems of quality assessment (de Oliveira 2003).
During the Cardoso years HEI managers were the most visible of private actors. The 
government’s approach to addressing private interest concerns in higher education was therefore to 
lay out the rules of the game. We have observed that the growth of private educational institutions 
throughout the system prior to 1995 had been largely un-orchestrated. The new administration 
therefore sought to create some institutional parameters, which it delivered through the new LDB. 
These guidelines delineated responsibility for education, including in the university sector, and thus 
differentiating between the various kinds of private institutions, such as confessional, community- 
based and philanthropic endeavours. The guidelines were designed to make it easier for the creation 
of new HEIs by other actors while limiting the state’s role to that of supervision and scrutiny (Souza 
2005). Indeed, Souza claimed that he had wanted to make the higher education system more flexible 
and break what he considered to be an effective cartel between the established public and existing 
private HEIs (interview, 2007).
Deregulation led to a surge in private HEIs. Between 1994 and 2003 the proportion of 
universities that were public fell from a quarter to 11% (Franga 2005). By the late 1990s, 75% of 
university students were in private HEIs (Trindade 2000). Given the now-recognised heterogeneity of 
the private sector, it was perhaps unsurprising that a wide range of associations emerged to represent 
the various private HEI owners and managers. The largest was the Brazilian Association of Higher 
Education Managers (ABMES), founded in 1983, which has a growing membership totalling several 
hundred (Franga 2005).
Alongside the relaxation in rules, the government introduced several other institutional 
changes. A decision-making body, the National Education Council (CNE), replaced a previous body 
that the education team at MEC felt was too beholden to corporate interests. Generally the criticism of 
‘corporatism’ was levelled by the government at its critics in the teaching and student professions. But 
corporatism could also include private interests as well, including those associated with ABMES, some 
of whose members also sat on the CNE. Furthermore, whereas certain groups, such as teachers and 
students, set themselves against all government policies, ABMES adopted a more differentiated 
approach, only campaigning on issues that it considered vital to its members (Sampaio 2000).
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As part of the government’s hands-off approach to supervision, its proposals included 
additional institutional mechanisms through evaluation and accreditation systems. The evaluation 
system, the Provao, elicited considerable opposition from all quarters, including the public universities. 
Teachers and students were concerned at the consequences of poor results and the impact this would 
have on their future employment prospects. University managers -  both public and private -  worried 
what impact poor results would have on applications (Cunha 2004). By contrast Souza (interview, 
2007) viewed the Provao as a means of injecting regulation by the market into the system, since it 
would encourage improvements, with the better-performing institutions attracting more students. 
Moreover, Souza claimed that the measure was a success, since its coverage grew each year until it 
was replaced by the new government after 2003 (Souza 2005).
Meanwhile, the accreditation system did not achieve the same degree of implementation as the 
Provao. This had been laid out in the LDB and proposed that all HEIs either seek accreditation or re­
accreditation. This reflected the relative absence of scrutiny that had occurred during the expansion of 
the private sector since the 1970s. However, the government could not overcome opposition by the 
private sector, with ABMES and others resorting to legal means to obstruct the passage of legislation. 
The argument made -  and accepted -  was that the government had interfered unduly in private 
initiative (Cunha 2007).
The legal challenges to accreditation and the private sector’s ability to opt out of the Provao 
meant that private HEI managers had a relatively influential position during the Cardoso years. The 
situation was further compounded by the government’s apparent unwillingness or inability to 
adequately resource public higher education as an alternative. Not only did this mean a reliance on 
the private sector to accommodate the demand, but also the relatively lower quality of education that is 
generally perceived among private HEIs (Kempner and Jurema 2002). This is due in part to the 
traditionally higher status associated with public universities, which attract the best teachers and 
students. The effect of this was worst for poorer students, since they tended to be the ones accessing 
private HEIs, while better-off students dominated the more exclusive public institutions (Castro 2004; 
Caixeta 2002). The extent to which public institutions provided better ‘quality’ to private ones is 
alluded to by the fact that such universities accounted for 90% of scientific and technological research 
(Trindade 2000).
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Finally, private sector obstruction was also arguably detrimental to itself. As well as avoiding 
regulation, the sector’s actions made it difficult for the government to achieve its stated aim of 
coordination within the system. By the 2000s more than a third of places in private HEIs were not 
being filled, causing widespread pressures on institutions’ finances and course availability (Saad 
Lucchesi 2007).
2.3. The Private Sector and the Lula government
In many respects, the experience of the Cardoso government with the private sector was repeated 
during the first Lula government (2003-06): the emphasis was on the creation of rules and parameters 
which would indirectly influence the nature of the private sector. Furthermore, given the differentiated 
responsibilities for basic and higher education that had occurred under the previous government’s 
reorganisation, the bulk of MEC’s dealings were therefore with private HEIs and their associations, as 
opposed to private school providers. Indeed, the government’s attempt at higher education reform 
during the first term was perhaps the main policy where it engaged with the sector; the latter’s 
opposition to its proposals largely prevented any substantial reform in the period.
While the failure of the government to pass its reform legislation suggests that private interests 
remained strong, it also showed the extent to which the Lula government had shifted in its attitude to 
the sector. Indeed, while the government’s traditional supporters within the teaching and student 
communities remained suspicious of the private sector, the Lula government saw it as a partner. The 
government’s accommodation of private interests was consequently seen as a source of frustration by 
its historic support base, who questioned why a sector with few links to the PT should receive such 
attention (Nascimento, interview, 2006). This was despite the government’s announcement of REUNI 
at the start of Lula’s second term, which would increase resources for the development of new and 
existing public universities (MEC 2007b; Lima et al 2008).
Part of the reason for the government’s decision to accommodate the private sector during the 
first term may be attributed to the shift that had occurred prior to the 2002 election victory, when the 
party had begun to reach beyond its regular base. Another reason was the realisation that in 
government the PT was required to balance a wider range of demands, including those not commonly 
associated with the party. In effect it was a repeat of the internal tension faced between those who
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emphasised the party’s social origins over those in responsibility once elected (Keck 1992). However, 
there was another factor in play too: since the 1990s there appeared to be a growing convergence in 
social policy by governments, regardless of ideological complexion (Panizza 2005). This, though, was 
skin-deep and overlooked different motivations that could vary between different actors.
Certainly Rodrigues (2007) has recognised this by noting the different tensions within the 
private sector and its contrasting relationship with government over higher education reform. While the 
industrial class and MEC were broadly united on the need to subject public universities to greater 
competition (and hence efficiency), the industrial class seemed wary of the quality of the product 
offered by private HEIs (Rodrigues 2007: 132). Despite such intra-private sector differences, they 
were glossed over when they shared common interests, most notably in the key higher education 
policy that was implemented by the government before 2006: the introduction of state-subsidised 
places for students in private universities through ProUni.
ProUni was created as a result of the government’s review of higher education. In the first 
year, an inter-departmental working group was set up to examine the state of higher education. 
Among its recommendations were: an increase in the number of places and teaching staff, distance 
learning and the need for university autonomy to enable institutions to access additional resources. 
For under-resourced federal universities it recommended seeking out non-state resources (Otranto
2006), which resulted in legislation for public-private partnerships and generated considerable 
opposition from the Left of the education community (ANPEd 2005).
ProUni was set up in 2004 and designed to cover poor students wanting to access higher 
education by paying either part or all of their tuition at a private HEI. It prioritised ethnic minorities and 
students who had attended public schools (Saad Lucchesi 2007; Arroyo, interview, 2008). It was 
anticipated there would be 120,000 new places each year to a total of 400,000 by its fourth year 
(Mercadante 2006; Araujo 2006b; Aparecida da Silva, interview, 2006). According to MEC’s figures, 
112,000 grants were offered in 2005, followed by 139,000 in 2006 and 164,000 in 2007 (MEC 2007a).
At one level ProUni challenged the private HEI system: private institutions saw their right to 
selection being challenged by the conditions imposed through ProUni. However, at the same time the 
programme offered a public subsidy to the system amounting to around R$2.7 billion a year while 
filling places that would otherwise have remained vacant (Mendes Catani et al 2007; Leher 2005).
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Even the PT’s rivals, the PSDB, viewed ProUni in a positive light: both Souza and Cardoso felt that the 
principle was correct and constituted a logical next step (interviews, 2007, 2008). What concerns 
existed were related to the details of the programme (Souza, Schwartzmann, interviews, 2007).
Amongst the PT’s traditional supporters opinion was divided and those committed to public 
education were critical. Students and (primary and secondary school) teachers both supported the 
programme, claiming that it would provide access for many students who would otherwise not have 
had the chance to go to university (Aparecida da Silva, Stumpf, interview, 2006; UNE 2005; Minoro
2006). Against this, public university defenders asked why the government had not used the funds to 
create more spaces in the public system rather than subsidising the private sector. Moreover, they 
had reservations over the value of such spending, which appeared to ‘accelerate’ the approach 
adopted by the previous government (Schuch, interview, 2006) and which was especially prejudicial. 
Indeed, findings suggest that the relative quality of private HEIs was poorer than those in the public 
system (Saad Lucchesi 2007; Arelaro, interview, 2008). The emphasis appeared to rest more on 
quantity -  or increasing higher education coverage -  than on providing quality for those involved with 
the programme (Schwartzmann, interview, 2006; Mendes Catani 2007). By mid-2006 nearly half the 
courses covered by ProUni were in the worst-performing universities (Folha de Sao Paulo 2006). To 
these concerns the government stressed that ProUni was just one aspect of its higher education 
programme; with REUNI it proposed to increase federal spending on higher education as well as 
expand the public university network, including the building of new campuses across the country.
The success of ProUni and its implementation showed that where government and private 
interests converged, policy was possible. By contrast, the other key policy area during the first Lula 
term, that of higher education reform, largely collapsed as a result of differences -  and both direct and 
indirect pressure by private HEI managers -  in Congress. Although the private sector was divided 
between different interests, including for-profit, community, confessional and philanthropic HEIs, they 
shared a common concern that the state should not interfere in what they saw as their internal activity 
(Franga 2005). They were also astute enough to build common cause on this issue with public 
institutions as well, thereby creating a broad front to defeat the government’s proposals.
The higher education reform bill had been drafted within MEC in 2004 and was submitted to 
various organisations associated with the sector for consultation. This included not just the private
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interest groups, but also those associated with defending public education, such as the teachers and 
student organisations, the National Association of Federal Higher Education Institution Leaders 
(Andifes) and the National Students’ Union (UNE). There was dissatisfaction from both sides 
regarding the bill: public sector defenders wanted to see a greater increase in government spending 
for public universities as well as direct elections for chancellors. In addition these groups felt that the 
bill did not adequately address the diversification taking place in the higher education sector and failed 
to provide a ‘single quality standard’ by which HEIs could be judged (GTPE 2006).
Meanwhile private sector organisations were opposed to the prospect of additional bureaucracy 
that would regulate the system and impose constraints on the opening of new courses or institutions. 
ABMES put together the National Forum for Free Initiative (Forum Nacional de Livre-lniciativa), which 
emphasised the diverse nature of the HEI sector and rejected any singular attempt to regulate it 
(Rodrigues 2007). Before the 2006 election the organisation stressed the importance of respecting 
university autonomy and the need for equality in regulation. By contrast, owing to the state’s role as 
both the owner and manager of the public system as well as the assessor of private HEIs, it 
questioned whether the government was able to carry out both tasks without being biased against the 
private sector (ABMES 2006).
Defenders of both public and private HEIs criticised the government for failing to meet their 
demands and favouring the position of the other side. Increasingly the government seemed less 
inclined to find a way through. By mid-2007 the bill appeared to have lost momentum and observers 
were suggesting that the government’s education priorities had shifted elsewhere (Souza, interview, 
2007). However, the decline of government action in this area does not mean that the issue is dead or 
that a balance between the two sides exists. As the previous experience of the Cardoso government 
showed, the deregulation of higher education has created space for private interests, whose influence 
has grown substantial enough to block efforts at supervision and scrutiny. This can only benefit the 
private over the public sector, but as a result of government inaction rather than action.
3. Conclusion
The cases of the Concertacion, Cardoso and Lula governments all highlight different levels at which 
the relationship between social democrats and private interests may be analysed. In the Chilean case
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the focus of that relationship has been mainly in basic education whereas in Brazil this has been in 
higher education.
The cases presented above show that the differences between the Third Way and Participatory 
Left do not count for much in governments’ relations with private interests. While Third Way 
governments are more inclined to accommodate the market and diversity in educational provision, one 
would expect the Participatory Left government to pursue a less friendly approach to non-state 
interests. That this has not happened reflects the extent to which these governments are dependent 
on the private sector to meet demand in the educational sector. Where governments are either 
unwilling or unable to provide education, they have resorted to private actors to do so. This has 
ensured greater coverage across education systems and made certain kinds of education (such as 
university and the ProUni programme) accessible to those who might otherwise not have had the 
opportunity.
While a case might be made for the Concertacion being constrained by the system it inherited, 
it also provided space for the private sector, by seeking to balance the competing demands of different 
educational actors. In Brazil meanwhile, both the Cardoso and Lula governments were arguably less 
constrained, but still perceived the private sector as a partner. During the Cardoso presidency this 
occurred even as efforts to regulate the private university sector took place. In Lula’s first term, higher 
education expansion was directed through the use of private institutions. That the government 
proposed to direct greater public funds towards the sector through REUNI following Lula’s re-election, 
this may also suggest that it was constrained by its predecessor’s own stance.
For social democrats, the accommodation of private interests has come at a price. 
Liberalisation and deregulation of the education market generated its own expansionary impetus. 
While economic factors may constrain its advance (as happened in both countries during the debt 
crisis of the 1980s), governments’ efforts to oversee the process themselves has been less successful. 
As the actions taken by the private sector against the accreditation scheme during the 1990s or the 
higher education reform bill in 2004-06 in Brazil show, the size, organisation and influence of the 
sector can prevent this from happening. This can compromise public services generally, since the 
dependence on the private sector limits the scope for government action. Furthermore, an acceptance 
of diversity in educational provision means that differences will inevitably result; this can have an
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impact on the extent to which the system is able to provide redistribution -  a key social democrat 
concern.
That the private sector has managed to achieve such influence owes much to its organizational 
capacity. As the higher education reform case in Brazil shows, despite the heterogeneity of the private 
education sector, it is able to act cohesively and in partnership with political allies in Congress to 
achieve its ends. This has arguably placed it in a relatively stronger position in the educational sector 
compared to other actors, such as teachers and students. Governments, regardless of political 
complexion, are therefore obliged to take into account private sector concerns and demands to a 
degree that undermines any attempt for a balanced form of representative participation. 
Consequently, social democratic governments which seek this approach as a means of providing a 
level playing field for engagement with the educational community will invariably fail to achieve it.
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10. Lobbying from the Left: Teachers and social democratic 
governments
The relationship between government and teachers in the education system is usually either 
conciliatory or confrontational, due to the different demands and expectations of each -  although one 
would expect social democratic governments to be more favourably inclined to teachers’ needs than 
the Right. This reflects the extent to which the Left generally is supportive of labour interests. 
However, the relationship between government and teachers is complicated by the ambiguous position 
which the teaching profession occupies. Should teachers be best understood as a traditional trade 
union or a distinct group of professionals? Do they constitute a class of civil servants or are they social 
reformers? (Cooper 1992) What is their position regarding social change? Do they seek to transform 
or maintain the status quo? (Cook 1996)
Part of the answer lies in the different ideological and motivational perspectives placed on 
teachers, both by themselves and others. For social democrats, teachers may be perceived as 
partners in the educational arena, while more Marxist observers may view them as either a hinderer or 
facilitator of social change. On the Right, neo-liberals consider them to be anti-business (and favour 
replacing them with industry and commerce as more attractive partners) and neo-conservatives 
perceive them as permissive (Trowler 1998). These contrasting approaches were neatly summarised 
by Le Grand (2003), whose general view of producers in the state sector distinguished between public- 
spirited and altruistic knights of the past, as opposed to selfish budget-maximising knaves during the 
neo-liberal period.
Despite this distinction between the Left and Right regarding teachers’ motivations, this 
remains insufficient for understanding their relations with government. It is made more complex by the 
ambiguity that exists within social democracy in relation to teachers. While the past social democratic 
notion of teachers’ purposes as presented above seemed clear cut, the changes within social 
democracy and the entry of a more managerial and ‘outcomes’-based perspective suggests a very 
different kind of teacher. Whereas the past vision of the teacher presumes a ‘knight’ model similar to 
that outlined by Le Grand, the contemporary ‘outcomes’ vision presumes a more professional
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managerial role, with an emphasis on standards and evaluation, with strategies derived through 
external directives (Bottery 2000).
The situation is further exacerbated by the context in which teachers find themselves in. Since 
the 1980s teachers have generally felt attacked by what they have perceived to be a New Right 
assault involving centralisation and privatisation. The restructuring of education systems has at one 
level sought to seek greater productivity, efficiency and results while at another it has challenged their 
own notion of professionalism, empowerment and organisational capacity (O’Donoghue and Dimmock 
1998; Cooper 1992). As a result, teachers’ organisations find their scope for engaging governments 
concentrated in the following areas: to seek official recognition as a bargaining agent; to engage in 
collective bargaining; to withdraw services (through strikes); to seek third party mediation or 
intervention; or to gain access to management decision-making (Cooper 2000). These various 
positions and strategies adopted by teachers’ organisations mask two types of demands which may be 
summarised between the material and non-material. Whereas material concerns are related to their 
declining economic situation, non-material issues relate to their role and status in society.
Given the political, social and economic contexts facing teachers, of the two social democratic 
forms one would expect the Participatory Left to be more responsive to their concerns than the Third 
Way. The Participatory Left has roots in the social movements of which teachers are a part. It should 
therefore be in tune ideologically with the organisations that represent teachers, namely the unions, 
and in their desire to reverse their declining economic and social status. This will mean more 
collaboration and conciliation. The Third Way, meanwhile, having fewer links with social movements -  
and hence teachers’ organisations -  would therefore be less susceptible to their demands. Although 
this does not mean they oppose improving their social status, they are arguably less persuaded by 
teaching organisations’ arguments, and therefore more inclined to develop policy related to teachers 
independently. This antagonises teachers’ leaders and consequently would lead to a more 
confrontational relationship.
In the cases of Chile and Brazil this holds closest for the two Brazilian governments. Both the 
Third Way Cardoso and Participatory Left Lula governments offer contrasting relationships with 
teachers. The Lula government has been more closely engaged with the concerns of teachers (most 
notably reversing its position on teacher evaluations when they were opposed). Meanwhile, during the
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Cardoso presidency the government was inclined towards an antagonistic relationship in which it 
imposed education policies regardless of teachers’ opinions. By contrast, in Chile the Third Way 
Concertacion government seemed in tune with the teaching profession initially, especially by 
introducing a Teachers Statute. More recently, however, the relationship has shifted towards one 
more commonly associated with the Third Way. While this may be attributed to changes in the 
leadership of the teachers’ organisations after 1995, it also suggests that Chilean democracy has 
finally consolidated itself.
1. Chile
In Chile the teachers’ unions have historically been associated with the Left. The highpoint was the 
close collaboration between it and the Allende government prior to 1973. During the military period 
teachers faced several challenges, including the disbandment of their organisation and subsequent re­
organisation from above by the regime. During the 1980s the movement democratised itself and 
formed part of the broad opposition movement with the Concertacion parties. In this period its 
leadership was drawn from the Concertacion which meant that relations between it and the 
government after 1990 were cordial. Since 1995 the union leadership has been dominated by 
communists who adopted a more confrontational approach with the Concertacion.
1.1. Teachers and government, pre-1990
Teachers and educational workers prior to the military coup were represented through the Education 
Workers’ Union (SUTE). The union was highly politicised and divided, with conflicts between the 
different parties trying to control it. Allende’s arrival in the presidential palace, La Moneda, initially 
weakened it, with a number of its leaders moving from the union into government (Farrell 1986). 
However, this pre-1973 period is recalled for not only producing a relatively collaborative relationship 
between government and union, but also in the degree to which the profession was mobilised and 
involved in the educational debate. The status and prestige of teachers was high and reflected in 
improved work conditions, considerable freedom in teaching content and methods, and involvement in 
the development of policy (Superintendencia de Educacion Publica 1971; Colegio de Profesores 
2003). In 1971 the National Congress on Education was held which enabled teachers and other 
education-related workers to participate and engage in a broad discussion about the aims and role of
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education. Looking back, teachers recalled the relative freedom they had to conduct their work without 
any external or repressive influence. At the same time, the teaching profession experienced the same 
wider social polarisation occurring in the country, most evidently in the proposed National Unified 
School (ENU) programme. The teaching profession -  like wider society -  was split between those 
who defended it and those who feared it would lead to Marxist indoctrination of children and society 
(Colegio de Profesores 2003).
Teachers neither expected the military coup nor the level of cruelty it introduced. From the 
perspective of 30 years teachers’ impressions of the dictatorship was of lost freedoms. Certain 
teachers were removed from teaching while the regime imposed restrictions on what could be taught. 
As with wider society, teachers grew more distrustful of each other and self-censoring, for fear of being 
accused by colleagues or students (Colegio de Profesores 2003).
The regime’s economic rationalisation from the late 1970s had a pronounced effect on 
teachers, reducing the teaching body in total by 25% through various side effects. These included a 
decline in salaries, which by 1990 were only a quarter of that at the start of the 1970s (CENDA 2000; 
Rojas 1998), and changes to teachers’ career structure in 1978, which meant those without a 
professional qualification would be laid off from 1986. Meanwhile, all of them experienced longer 
teaching hours and less tenure (Soto, interview, 2007; La Opinion 1987; Escobar 1987; Lomnitz and 
Melnick 1991). Faced with these pressures, many teachers chose to leave their post (Colegio de 
Profesores 2003). By 1990, teachers had few safeguards on job security, opportunities for leadership 
or training (Arrellano 1998; Becca et al 2006).
The impact of these changes on teachers was felt disproportionately though. In the early 
1980s, reforms had formalised state subsidies for privately managed schools, creating an incentive for 
resulting growth for that sector. However, unlike the publicly run municipal schools, teachers’ financial 
and social status was dependent on the private managers of such schools, rather than the minimal 
safeguards provided by the state. This meant that they were in a more precarious and insecure 
position, even as their numbers grew (table 3). That this situation developed was in marked contrast 
to the military regime’s claims that the reforms would contribute to improved teachers’ salaries; instead 
it meant the persistence of an authoritarian managerial model, which was perhaps most visible at the
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university level, where generals and colonels were imposed as chancellors (CPFUCH 1975; Riesco 
1981).
Table 3: Primary and Secondary School Teachers in Chile, 1985-2005
Municipal Subsidised
Private
Private Delegated
Municipal
Total
1985 84,762 10,507 24,053 4,819 125,397
1990 78,916 36,462 15,768 3,196 134,342
2000 80,597 41,053 20,348 2,379 144,377
2005 84,085 63,283 20,435 2,458 170,261
Sources: Table 3.15 in Mineduc 2005b; Table 31. 02 in Mineduc 1990; Table 3-2 in Mineduc 1985
(NB. Municipal includes fiscal schools as well)
Although the military regime abolished the SUTE, it found it necessary to introduce some form of 
representation. In the first phase of the dictatorship (1973-80) the approach adopted constituted a 
conservative reaction against the growing influence of the Left by 1973. This involved the creation of 
'gremios', or associations, which sought to depoliticise social groups by breaking their link with political 
parties and limiting the scope of their demands (Dittborn 1993). The regime introduced the Colegio de 
Profesores in 1974 with membership being obligatory for all teachers, and leaders being appointed 
(CTERA et al 2005; Nunez, interview 2, 2007; Lomnitz and Melnick 1991). The result was an 
uncertain position between teachers and their representation with the regime during the 1970s (Castro 
1977). However, during this first phase of the dictatorship, some pockets of limited and locally-based 
autonomy were sustained within the teaching profession. This was done through informal education 
and using non-school spaces provided by social groups such as the Catholic Church (Soto, interview, 
2007).
The end of the regime’s initial phase saw an ideological shift towards neo-liberalism from 1980 
on. In social relations this included the changes to the gremio system by allowing free association and 
from the mid-1980s internal leadership elections (CTERA et al 2005; Nunez, interview 2, 2007; 
Lomnitz and Melnick 1991). The changes had several effects on teachers’ representation. First, an 
independent Association of Chilean Educators (AGECH) was founded, which both demanded an end 
to the privatisation occurring within the education system and the creation of a Teachers’ Statute 
(CTERA et al 2005). While its membership was both smaller and more subject to persecution than the 
Colegio, it remained highly visible and prominent during the 1980s (Assael, interview, 2007). This
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included not only remunerative demands, such as increased salaries and pensions and greater job 
security for teachers, but also critique of the education model being set up by the regime. It 
challenged the lack of democracy and presence of privatisation within the system, the lack of attention 
paid to the linkages between education planning and national development needs and the rigid 
administration structure that existed. It sought the reversal of municipalisation, increased spending on 
schools and more opportunity for public debate on the role of education (AGECH 1984, 1985).
Second, the Colegio underwent internal changes through its first leadership elections. Its first 
elected president, Oswaldo Verdugo, adopted a similar position of opposition to the regime as the 
AGECH’s president, Jorge Pavez. During the 1980s, both organisations and their leaders were 
involved in popular protests against the deaths of students and teachers and demands for the return of 
democracy, resulting in their detention (Colegio de Profesores 1986). The shift towards greater 
opposition to the regime was reflected in the rise of the Left in leadership elections for teachers’ 
representative bodies. In 1972 left-wing candidates won 29% of the internal vote for the SUTE 
executive; in 1985 the Left received 19%, while in 1987 it gained 25% in the Colegio. Against this, the 
centrist groups remained constant in their vote share, gaining almost 50% in all three elections.
Third, the shared consensus amongst both teachers’ organisations and their common political 
direction, coupled with the Colegio’s larger size, prompted the AGECH to recommend its merger with 
the Colegio (AGECH n.d.). This resulted in a unified organisation for the teaching profession which 
was allied to the growing social and political opposition movement to the regime and constituted the 
largest union in the country (CTERA et al 2005; Palamidessi 2003; Gode la Maza 1999). However, 
against this is the fact that the Colegio primarily represents teachers in the municipal school sector, 
which make up only half of the profession (table 3). This meant that despite the Colegio’s links with 
the Concertacion during the 1980s, the extent to which the union represented the teaching profession 
was questioned by concertacionistas, especially after 1990 within Mineduc (Cox, Brunner, interviews, 
2007).
1.2. Teachers and the Concertacion
The context of the changes in teachers’ organisation, its size and political demands, had implications 
for its relations with government when the Concertacion replaced the military regime. In particular
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relations may be studied from several different perspectives: one, from within the Colegio or the 
government; two, from the change in the political composition within the Colegio before and after 1995, 
and those implications on the nature of its demands.
First, both the Colegio and the Concertacion government had different views about the role that 
the teachers’ union should play. For several officials associated with the government, the Colegio was 
seen as primarily concerned with ‘corporatist’ interests, emphasising traditional material concerns such 
as better salaries and working conditions (Brunner, Elacqua, interviews, 2007). Such a position is 
arguably more prominent in the centrist sections of the coalition. By contrast the more leftist sections 
of the Concertacion would presumably concur with those in the Colegio leadership who see its role as 
far broader. This wider involvement in educational policy appears to be the result of a changing view 
within the Colegio about its purpose, a result of internal and external political changes since 1990.
Second, the Colegio’s changing approach to educational policy and its relations with the 
government may be divided into three since 1990: 1990-95, 1995-2000 and 2000-07. Internally, 
changes within the Colegio occurred between 1990 and 1995, when the Colegio directorate was 
dominated by the Concertacion’s allies, and after 1995, when political control shifted to Communist 
Party (PC). This tension was apparent by the Colegio’s more confrontational approach, including over 
the rejection of the voucher system. By contrast, after 2000 the relationship became more 
collaborative (Palamidessi 2003). The change since 2000 may be partly attributed to shifts in the 
political leadership, following the relative distancing of the Colegio leadership from the PC, but also in 
the nature of the demands adopted by the Colegio. In the first phase these focused on restoring the 
membership’s material concerns, while the second saw greater demands for participation in the policy­
making process, with the Colegio investing in research, technical work groups and advisors (Assael, 
interview, 2007; Nunez, interview 2, 2007). Externally, the Colegio’s political composition and shift in 
demands coincided, from the mid-1990s, with Chilean democracy becoming increasingly consolidated, 
and social movements and organisations more assertive in its demands. In the early years following 
democracy’s return, not only was the economic situation relatively precarious, contributing to 
weakened union organisations, but also the Concertacion was driven by the need for political stability 
and governability (Espinosa 2005). This approach was aided by the relative decline of broader social 
mobilisation that had dominated the 1980s.
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1.2.1. Teachers and the Concertacion, 1990-95
The first phase of relations between the Colegio and the Concertacion government was notable for 
several reasons: one, the political configurations within the union and government, which contributed 
to collaboration; two, the relatively limited level of union mobilisation; and three, the limited scope of 
policy-making and outcomes by the government that involved the Colegio -  despite the close 
association between government and union leaderships.
First, both the union leadership and the new government were dominated by members of the 
Concertacion. The Colegio’s president, from the mid-1980s until 1995, when he was defeated by the 
former AGECH president, was Oswaldo Verdugo. By being associated with the Christian Democrats., 
this ensured relatively low levels of conflict between the government and Colegio (Palamidessi 2003).
Second, the teachers’ organisation was relatively weak in 1990. The structural changes to the 
education system in the 1980s, including municipalisation and privatisation, meant that there was 
substantial variation in teachers’ work conditions and salaries. This affected the degree to which the 
teachers’ movement could maintain solidarity (Cariola et al 2003). Furthermore, the capacity of the 
teachers to mobilise was constrained by the Concertacion’s efforts to pursue consensus and stability, 
appealing over the head of the union to wider society if necessary. The Colegio’s 1991 strikes for 
increased pay drew criticism from the education minister, Ricardo Lagos, while prompting President 
Aylwin to ask for understanding. A subsequent education minister, Jorge Arrate, noted that the choice 
open to teachers was either dialogue or confrontation -  but the latter would not lead anywhere (Arrate 
1993b). Indeed, during this period the Colegio appeared to recognise its own weakness, noting that, 
despite its demands for changes to the Teachers Statute, including an increase in salaries and 
resolution of municipal debt accrued from rising education costs, there had been only limited 
achievement (Colegio de Profesores 1994).
The Colegio’s mixed feelings seemed especially evident with regard to teachers’ salaries. 
Although Mizala and Romaguera (2004) noted that between 1990 and 2002 the average value of 
salaries for teachers working 44 hours a week rose from Ch$258,242 to Ch$660,161 (in 2001 pesos), 
the change was more beneficial for those in the state-funded private sector as opposed to municipal 
schools. While teachers in both sectors had a starting salary of Ch$389,442 in 2002, in 1990
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municipal teachers had received Ch$142,591 compared to teachers in state-funded private schools 
who earned Ch$73,337.
Third, despite the close association between the Concertacion and the Colegio, this did not 
extend to policymaking. Once in government, the Concertacion became cut off from the wider social 
mobilisation that had campaigned during the 1988 referendum against Pinochet’s continued rule and 
propelled it into power. This was partially due to the teachers’ precarious financial and labour 
situation, but also the demobilising effect that re-democratisation had on social movements. Angell 
(2007:174) has noted the extent to which support for the Concertacion could be interpreted as support 
for democracy. At the same time, despite the military regime’s departure, it remained latently 
influential (most notably through Pinochet’s continuing presence as head of the armed forces until 
1997), prompting both government and social actors to seek a cautious line.
Within such constraints and opportunities, the new government saw the establishment of a 
Teachers’ Statute as its primary concern in relation to teachers (Aylwin 1994a). This was aided in part 
by the limited resources that the government claimed to have available in 1990, contributing to their 
being focused on teaching salaries (Aylwin 1994a). Notwithstanding its introduction, the Teachers 
Statute was primarily a creation of the Concertacion rather than a collaborative result between it and 
the Colegio (Nunez, interview 2, 2007). The debate on the nature of the legislation occurred primarily 
within the government over the issue of municipalisation (Weinstein, interview, 2007). The finance and 
labour ministries initially opposed the Statute’s introduction and subsequently sought a more 
decentralised version. It would have ensured that teachers’ negotiation occurred at a local level, but 
was rejected by Lagos and his associates who favoured a national model. This version, which was 
eventually achieved, would ensure both an agreed national minimum salary and avoid conflicts 
between teachers’ organisations and municipal administrations at the local level (Nunez, interview 2,
2007).
While the Colegio was consulted on the proposed Statute, it was not directly involved in its 
drafting (Nunez, interview 2, 2007; Soto, interview, 2007). This meant that the Statute neither covered 
state-funded private and private school teachers nor did it provide a teaching career path {'carrera'). 
Furthermore, the minimum salary was seen as insufficient by teachers themselves (Aedo 1998; 
CTERA et al 2005; Ministerio Secretaria General del Gobierno 1993; Cortes 1994; Colegio de
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Profesores 2003). Indeed, the association of the Colegio with the public sector and the growth in the 
private school sector meant that the Colegio arguably represented a smaller proportion of the teaching 
profession (Bosch, interview, 2007). Yet against this, it was arguably a gain for the union movement: 
the Right had been critical of the Statute’s measures, which it saw as introducing specific and unequal 
legislation for different groups, while providing both higher financial costs and few incentives for 
teachers to improve their teaching (Larrain 1997). Furthermore, teachers in subsidised schools could 
not only count on aspects of the Statute, but also the Labour Code, which all private enterprises were 
subject to (Bosch, interview, 2007).
The relative absence of the Colegio in policy-making circles was also apparent in the 
Concertacion’s approach in two other areas: primary school curricular reform and the impact of the 
1994 educational commission. On primary school curricular reform, the Colegio showed no substantial 
disagreement with the government’s proposed changes, which were begun in 1992 and completed by 
1996 (Colegio de Profesores 1992). Although there was broader consultation with the Colegio over 
secondary school curricular reform in 1998, the involvement of the Colegio was perceived by 
concertacionistas\o be relatively limited (Cox, interview, 2007; Nunez, interview 2, 2007). During the 
1994 educational commission, the chair, Jose Joaquin Brunner, recalled that despite not having the 
complete support of the Colegio, it was considered a marginal player at the time (interview, 2007). 
This was echoed in the Colegio’s apparently modest contribution to the commission through its 
response: while it did not think privatisation of schools was necessary, it did not reject the existence of 
different types of schools (Colegio de Profesores, Directorio Nacional 1994).
1.2.2. Teachers and the Concertacion, 1995-2000
The second phase in relations between the Colegio and the Concertacion government occurred after 
1995. In contrast to the prior period, the relationship was marked in three main ways: one, a growing 
political difference between them; two, greater levels of teacher mobilisation and demands to 
participate in policy-making; and three, the persistence of the Colegio’s exclusion from those circles. 
At the same time, the period also saw a shift in the way that the Colegio engaged the government, 
from confrontation to dialogue, which suggests consolidation of Chilean democracy.
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First, the 1995 Colegio leadership elections marked a break in the Concertacion’s control over 
the union. The split had already been developing, presenting a challenge within and outside the 
Colegio. Internally, the Colegio’s leadership was divided between those who supported the 
government and others, around Jorge Pavez, who opposed it. This had been evident prior to Pavez’s 
successful election as Colegio president in 1995, most notably in the criticism directed at the 
leadership’s agreement of a pay deal with the ministry during the early 1990s (Colegio de Profesores, 
Directorio Nacional 1993). The split persisted after 1995, with confrontation between both sides over 
whether to pursue stoppages in demand for higher pay (Colegio de Profesores, 1998a, 1998b). 
According to Angell (2007: 92), this change was due less to the appeal of Marxism than a protest 
against a non-participatory party system and centralised parties. Externally, both Cox and Brunner 
queried whether the preponderance of PC members in the Colegio executive after this date reflected 
the rank-and-file membership (interviews, 2007).
Second, the change in leadership after 1995 heralded a shift in the Colegio’s demands. 
Politically, this had much to do with the difference of opinion that existed between the Colegio and PC 
leadership. The PC leadership saw itself in the leading role within an anti-neoliberal movement that 
would include various opposition social and political groups. This meant that the Colegio should take a 
subordinate role to the party. However, the PC-supporting Colegio president and his followers 
believed that those civil society organisations should remain autonomous (Soto, interview, 2007). The 
split between these activists inside and outside the PC led to the creation of the Fuerza Social, a loose 
association of social movements that sought to coordinate their activities while avoiding any attempts 
at hegemonic political control by a third party. In education, this split led to wider social discussion 
about the way forward, most notably through the National Education Congress convened by the 
Colegio in 1997 (CTERA et al 2005).
Third, despite the Colegio’s new direction in relation to education policy, it did not appear to 
yield any immediate or substantive results. The National Education Congress resolutions were largely 
overlooked by concertacionista policymakers, who perceived the role of the Colegio in more 
instrumental concerns, such as pay and work conditions (Cox, Brunner, interviews, 2007). Indeed, the 
focus of Concertacion governments for much of the 1990s had been on finding ways to develop and 
improve teachers’ performance, through the use of more courses, incentives and performance-related
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pay (Concertacion 1994; Arrate 1993a; Bitar, interview, 2007). This last objective proved difficult to 
implement, as many refused to participate. Meanwhile, education minister Mariana Aylwin (2000-03), 
acknowledged that the government needed to change, from imposing policies from above to 
concentrating on the development of teachers’ capacities (Angell 2007: 132). Furthermore, the 
Colegio leadership’s approach was arguably undermined by its own members as well. In the late 
1990s a poll showed that nearly half (48%) of those surveyed had a ‘very good’ or ‘good’ view of the 
government’s educational reforms, while almost the same number (45%) had a ‘regular’ view and only 
7% felt that they were ‘bad’. Nearly a third of polled teachers thought Mineduc was most worried when 
it came to improving educational quality against a quarter who felt that the Colegio was similarly 
concerned. Among the reforms that had taken place, more than half (55%) claimed to have 
participated in pedagogic decision and 85% had received training in the previous five years, with 53% 
claiming it had been very beneficial (MORI 1998).
1.2.3 Teachers and the Concertacion, 2000-07
After 1995 there seemed a clearer understanding of the different roles played by government and 
union respectively. Initially, this had been confrontational, as the new Colegio leadership engaged the 
Concertacion on both material and pedagogical issues. By 2000 a new dynamic appeared to be 
emerging. Despite the differences that existed between them, the relationship appeared to be one that 
more clearly delineated government from union. In contrast to the 1990-95 period, the government 
now engaged in dialogue and negotiation with the Colegio (Aylwin 2002). The Colegio, for its part, 
qualified its criticisms of the system inherited from the military regime by acknowledging the reforms 
that had occurred under the Concertacion (Colegio de Profesores 2006a). At times these differences 
could become confrontational, with the government claiming the Colegio had an idealised image of the 
pre-1973 regime. This was sustained by teachers’ memories of a greater degree of mobilisation and 
participation among the profession during the Allende period, when compared to the present with a 
less politicised environment and policy being driven by the Ministry (Mineduc 2003; Colegio de 
Profesores 2003). Sometimes government and union could find themselves arguing at cross 
purposes. On the Whole School Day (JEC) programme, for example, the government claimed that the 
teachers had not changed their teaching methods sufficiently while teachers argued that the new
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measures required them to spend more time in class and gave them too little time to prepare (Bitar, 
interview, 2007; Bloque Social 2006). Even the 2006 presidential commission that was appointed in 
the wake of the student protests raised suspicion, since it not only included notable figures who had 
established the educational model under Pinochet, but it was claimed, did not provide sufficient weight 
to social actors (Colegio de Profesores 2006b).
If the Colegio and Concertacion had defined their respective roles by the turn of the century, 
the electoral results in the Colegio leadership in October 2007 potentially heralded a new period in 
government-union relations. For the first time since 1995 the results changed the complexion of the 
executive. The new Colegio president was PC activist Jaime Gajardo, who defeated Pavez’s Fuerza 
Social block. The result was attributed to a low turnout and misinformation during the campaign 
(Assael, interview, 2007). However, the change was by no means certain, since despite his electoral 
victory, Gajardo did not have a majority on the executive (Assael, interview 2007; Nunez, interview 2,
2007). The demands posed by the new leadership included a revision of the current salary 
agreement, rejection of teacher evaluations and the inclusion of a teaching career path within the 
Teachers’ Statute (Assael, Munoz, interviews, 2007; Nunez, interview 2, 2007).
In sum then, the nature of the relationship between the Concertacion and the Colegio has 
passed through three main phases between 1990 and 2007. The first, between 1990 and 1995, 
provided the government with the least level of resistance. In this period, the teachers’ leadership was 
mainly dominated by government supporters, who had participated in the wider movement for 
democracy during the 1980s. This shared experience meant that the new government was perceived 
in a more favourable light than its predecessor. At the same time, it also meant that concertacionistas' 
fears of the relative strength of the Right after 1990 were similarly echoed among the teachers’ 
leadership; the implications of this was such that the Colegio did not overtly challenge the government. 
Yet even if it wished to, it was questionable whether it had the capacity to do so: the teachers’ 
relatively weak position in both economic and organisational terms meant that the government was 
able to dominate the agenda. It acted strategically, rectifying teachers’ situations by introducing a 
Teachers’ Statute -  but with little direct involvement from the Colegio in its drafting.
During the second phase, between 1995 and the early 2000s, the teachers’ leadership became 
more independent. On the one hand, in contrast to the early 1990s, the Colegio’s executive was
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dominated by leaders who did not identify as closely with the government. On the other hand, the 
leadership began to make non-material demands that did not conform to the Concertacion’s perceived 
role of the Colegio, as being primarily being concerned about its members’ material interests. This 
certainly caused confrontation in the latter 1990s, most notably in the form of protests and strikes. 
Since the early 2000s, however, relations have become less combative, even as the positions of each 
are further apart than they were a decade earlier. This third phase arguably reflected a ‘normalisation’ 
of Chilean politics, whereby the role of government and interest groups became both more clearly 
defined and stable compared to 1990.
2. Brazil
In Brazil the relationship between the military regime and teachers was not as arbitrary as it was in 
Chile. Until the mid-1970s the movement was largely co-opted by the regime. During the political 
liberalisation later in that decade the teaching profession adopted an increasingly autonomous position 
vis-a-vis government, while a substantial part provided part of the social base that subsequently 
formed the PT in 1980. The close association between the teaching unions (mainly organised at state 
level) and the PT contributed towards a more confrontational approach with government during the 
Cardoso years and a more conciliatory one once Lula was elected.
2.1. Teachers and government, pre-1995
The relationship between the military regime and the teaching profession in Brazil was initially more 
ambiguous than that in Chile. The government’s relations with the teaching community were largely 
shaped by their economic situation. Initially teachers presented no substantial challenge to the regime 
following the 1964 coup. This was largely due to the relative co-option of their representative 
organisations by the regime. However, at primary, secondary and tertiary levels the introduction of 
various reforms had an impact on the community, which ultimately challenged the nature of the 
relationship.
At primary and secondary level, school teachers had begun to organise themselves in the 
1950s, mainly under the Confederation of Brazilian Primary School Teachers (CPPB). Owing to its co­
opted state with the regime after 1964, the CPPB (later the Confederation of Brazilian Teachers or 
CPB) offered little threat. However, the 1971 primary and secondary education reforms effectively
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broke the compact between teachers and government. The legislation brought about greater 
regulation and evaluation of teachers, including an obligation to undertake short-term courses. 
Furthermore, as the economic miracle came to an end, working conditions and salaries declined, 
placing the previously middle class teacher within the ranks of the proletariat (Tavares 1995).
At the university level, the academic community similarly presented no substantial challenge to 
the regime until the late 1970s. However, following a series of incomplete higher education reforms in 
the late 1960s (Durham 2004), academics found both their organisational and economic situation 
weakened. Organisationally, the reform sought to introduce a US-style departmental system (as 
opposed to the interdisciplinary approach then present) (McGinn and Pereira 1992). Economically, 
like the primary and secondary school teachers, the university level staff began to develop a more 
proletarian outlook that enabled them to identify with the working class (Schuch, interview, 2006).
From the mid-1970s on, teachers at all levels increasingly aligned themselves with other social 
groups in a similar position, including Christian grassroots activists. The association with the working 
class and other excluded groups lent the movement a left-wing hue, which identified with Paulo 
Freire’s ideas on critical pedagogy, on the need to transform both the state and school (Aparecida da 
Silva, Schuch, interviews, 2006). This resulted in national teachers’ conferences during the late 
1970s, culminating in the formation of the primary and secondary school teachers’ National Union of 
Education Workers (UNTE) and the academics’ National Union of Teachers in Higher Education 
Institutions (ANDES) in 1981. The regime-compliant CPB was challenged, prompting it to reverse its 
line and undergo a process of internal democratisation (Ferreira Junior 1998). Meanwhile ANDES 
found itself challenged by an internal tension between its more conservative elements and those who 
saw the need for the organisation to adopt a vanguard role in the demand for rights and democracy 
(Schuch, interview, 2006).
By the early 1980s teachers had become more specific and vocal in their demands. Identified 
with the Left, many had been involved in the formation of the PT as well as the communist parties. 
The relationship between the military regime and teachers shifted from co-option to confrontation. 
Alongside the wider demand for democracy, teachers wanted the right to independent unions, the 
presence of their representatives in federal and state education councils, salary readjustments and an 
end to the regime’s use of economic pressure to undermine their position (Jornal da Educa?ao 1981).
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In the first decade after the return to civilian rule in 1985, the most evident example of teachers’ 
growing organisational capacity and influence was in the explicit statement of teachers’ pension rights 
in the 1988 constitution. This had not existed in the previous 1967 version under the military (Brasil 
1967, 1988) and followed a broad, cross-societal dialogue in the constituent assembly between 
teachers’ organisations and the political class.
However, the teachers’ advances in the 1988 constitution were the highpoint of their demands 
and organisational unity. The first two governments after 1985 were identified both by their supporters 
and their opponents in the union movement as right-wing politically. As such, neither of these two 
governments was seen as particularly sympathetic to workers’ interests or those of teachers. 
Consequently, aside from their constitutional rights, there was little else that the teaching unions could 
point to as an advance in their working conditions. Teachers continued to see their salaries eroded, 
prompting calls from the CPB for a national minimum salary and strikes (CPB Noticias 1986,1987a). 
Indeed, the decline in teachers’ salaries was considered so large by the early 1990s that teachers had 
a lower level of income relative to other workers in the service sectors despite being more highly 
educated (Tavares 1995). Second, the failure of the teaching unions to achieve any substantial 
change in this regard had an impact on their organisation. By the early 1990s the CPB’s successor, 
the National Confederation of Education Workers (CNTE), observed that it was struggling from a lack 
of regional unity, common dialogue and strategy among its affiliates’ associations (CNTE 1990). This 
occurred against a growth in the size of the teaching body at all levels (table 4).
Table 4: Teachers in Brazil, 1985-2000 (‘000s)
Pre-School Primary Secondary Higher
1985 N/A 1,041 206 122
1991 163 1,265 250 133
1994 275 1,335 296 156
2000 228 1,538 430 174*
* refers to 1999
Sources: IBGE 1987/88: 212, 219, 231; 1993: 2-167, 2-179, 2-190, 2-202; 1996: 2-168, 2-171, 2- 
174, 2-181; 2000: 2-180, 2-186, 2-192, 2-200
The removal of Collorfrom office in 1992 did not offer the teaching community any immediate source 
for optimism. According to the CNTE, President Franco was not seen as likely to improve their 
situation (CNTE 1993). Consequently, the teaching unions continued with their demand for a national
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minimum salary. This eventually resulted in a National Accord that committed the government to its 
implementation in September 1994. However, it proved no more than a dead letter since four months 
later, under the new education minister, Paulo Renato Souza, the agreement was overturned.
2.2. Teachers and the Cardoso government
During the Cardoso years the concerns of the teaching movement remained broadly the same as 
those after 1985. In particular teachers’ unions expressed concern at their economic situation and 
their organisational capacity. However, this was also a period where there were substantial protests 
and strikes against the government, which the unions accused of being ‘neo-liberal’ and contributing to 
a tense government-union relationship (Palamidessi 2003). In part this was due to the strong left-wing 
identity of the teachers’ movement, which was politically associated with the opposition PT and other 
parties of the Left. The result was that the educational arena became a battleground. The reaction of 
the administration was to adopt a similar position to that of previous governments, accusing the 
teaching community of being ‘corporatist’ and politically motivated in their actions (Goldemberg, 
Souza, Durham, interviews, 2008).
The Cardoso government’s relationship with the teaching community may be understood at two 
levels: first, among primary and secondary teachers; second, with the higher education community. 
While both were chiefly concerned with material concerns, the extent to which they were able to 
challenge the government varied, as a result of their organisational capacity and the institutional nature 
of educational responsibility within Brazil.
At the primary and secondary level, the CNTE remained the largest national teaching union. 
Although it had expressed concern at its capacity to organise across the country, during the Cardoso 
period it had an estimated 700,000 members, with its leadership being dominated by those either 
associated with, or members of, the PT (Palamidessi 2003). Nonetheless, it suffered from the 
institutional nature of educational responsibility in Brazil which granted substantial influence to states in 
education. As a result, the state-level teaching unions were arguably stronger than that of the national 
CNTE (Vieira, interview, 2007; Buarque, interview, 2008).
From the beginning of the Cardoso presidency the CNTE maintained its support for a national 
minimum teaching salary. It pointed to the agreement signed with Franco at the end of 1994 as the
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basis for discussion. While the bulk of public school teachers received their salaries from states and 
municipalities, the CNTE saw a national minimum as a means of securing a fair and decent salary 
(CNTE 2005a; Palamidessi 2003). However, the incoming education minister, Souza, rejected the 
idea. He claimed that its introduction would challenge subnational autonomy and educational 
responsibility by interfering with states’ and municipalities’ rights to set their own salary levels (Souza 
2005, interview 2007; Durham, interview 2008). As Souza’s position was being formulated, teachers 
carried out a 20,000-strong protest in favour of public schooling, social security and a national 
minimum salary in early 1995. They were the largest teacher demonstrations seen since the end of 
the Collor government (CNTE Noticias 1995b).
The government’s eventual response to the teachers’ economic concerns was FUNDEF. The 
study group at MEC proposed that 60% of the fund be allocated as teachers’ salaries. The fund 
effectively vetoed the prospect of a national teachers’ salary (CNTE Noticias 1995b, 1995c, 1995d, 
1995e; CNTE 1997), which seemed borne out by subsequent findings. Although Souza claimed that 
the fund eventually increased primary school teachers’ salaries by 30% (Souza n.d.), variations in both 
teachers’ own education and regional location contributed towards substantial differences. While the 
average salary for primary school teachers rose from R$717 to R$929 per month between December 
1997 and June 2000, a teacher in the poorer Northeast with only a primary school education saw her 
income rise from R$168 to R$326 while one who had a teaching degree in the richest region, the 
Southeast, experienced an increase of R$1165 to R$1545 in the same period (Souza 2005:96). 
Furthermore, compared to several other Latin American countries, Brazil’s teachers were paid less per 
hour than other professions (Castro and loschpe 2008).
Distrust continued to persist between government and teachers, even as protests dwindled 
after FUNDEF took effect. Initially, the FUNDEF proposal had elicited little support from both the 
teachers and their PT allies. In particular they argued that the fund failed to cover basic education 
sufficiently, being limited only to primary education. Furthermore, there was concern that the proposal 
and its elaboration had received insufficient consultation with educational actors outside of MEC, and 
appeared to lack adequate oversight mechanisms (Chagas, interview, 2008).
At the higher education level, the degree of antipathy between government and teachers 
remained similarly acute. However, unlike primary and secondary school teachers, visible protest
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persisted until the end of the Cardoso presidency. This owed much to the direct responsibility of the 
federal government for much of public higher education (as opposed to those institutions run by the 
states or the private sector) and the relatively stronger level of organisation by university teachers, 
compared to their school colleagues at the federal level (Costa, interview, 2008). Among such (federal 
university) teachers the key concerns including the lack of a career plan, insufficient rises in their 
salaries and a restricted form of democracy within universities. The government’s main concern during 
this time was with the extent of academics’ qualifications, time spent teaching and efforts to create 
incentives to encourage greater productivity.
However, the academic community that confronted the government was split. By the mid- 
1990s it was no longer a single, identifiable community. The growth of the private sector since the 
military period had weakened academics’ ability both to organise and to have a collective sense of 
identity. The expansion of higher education had contributed towards academics’ individualisation and 
isolation, as they competed for better salaries, funding and research opportunities from a diminishing 
pot (Bosi 2006; Vianna 2000; Schuch, interview, 2006). The difference was also generational. While 
younger academics with more advanced research degrees felt relatively more comfortable in this new 
environment, it was the older academics that were more organised and challenged the government’s 
measures (Schwartzmann, interview, 2007). It was this latter group that Souza criticised as corporatist 
and self-interested (Souza 2002).
Despite an increase of academics in federal universities from 44,500 to 45,900 (3.1 %) between 
1994 and 2002 (Paulo Renato Souza Consultores n.d.), the view of the higher education teaching 
organisations was that the Cardoso presidency had neither improved their career plan nor their 
salaries (Schuch, interview, 2006; Schwartzmann, interview, 2007). This was aggravated both by 
Cardoso’s 1994 manifesto commitment that he would introduce teacher career plans (Cardoso 1994) 
and the subsequent claim that exchange rate instability and fiscal pressures limited the scope for 
salary adjustments (Cardoso 2006). The results were two major higher education strikes in 1998 and 
2001. In both cases the protests were led by the academic teaching union, ANDES, whose leadership 
identified with the political opposition to the government. In each case negotiations were achieved, in 
the first instance by internal elections in ANDES and second by the government’s invitation to the 
media to attend (Souza 2005). Nevertheless, a comprehensive reform of higher education was never
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fully achieved during the Cardoso administration, owing to the active and ideological opposition 
brought to bear by the teaching profession, in partnership with the student movement (Cardoso 2006; 
Brooke, interview, 2008).
Finally, the government and higher education teaching profession divided over the degree of 
internal democracy within federal institutions. The academic unions wanted a substantially 
proportional say by the student and administrative bodies in the vote for university chancellors 
(Durham, interview, 2008). This was vetoed by Souza, who challenged the academics when he 
appointed a new chancellor for the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) from outside those 
proposed to him (Schwartzmann, interview, 2007).
2.3. Teachers and the Lula government
Compared to the Cardoso government, the Lula presidency was seen as more receptive to the 
demands of teaching unions (Schwartzmann, interview, 2007). The unions noted that while personal 
relations were seen as good, the aim was to institutionalise the relationship between government and 
teachers (Vieira, interview, 2007). Much of the initial good personal relationship between government 
and teaching unions may be attributed to the close political association formed in the past; a number of 
individuals from the teaching organisations took up positions within MEC after 2003 (Aparecida da 
Silva, interview, 2006).
Notwithstanding the relatively close relationship between government and union, the teachers’ 
movement faced ongoing challenges regarding their capacity both to organise and maintain a 
collective identity. Indeed, the situation has arguably been exacerbated by the acquiescence of key 
government supporters among the social movements (Schuch, interview, 2006). Indeed, during Lula’s 
first term, the level of collective action had weakened and corporatist organisations were becoming 
ever less representative of educators. CNTE findings in 2004 showed that 61% of teachers had no 
involvement with social movements, against 9% that were sympathetic towards them, and 11% who 
counted themselves as active members. Similarly, more than half (56%) of teachers reported not 
being a member of any political party, with 23% being inclined to one and 25% either an activist or an 
armchair member (Vieira 2004). While the decline of collective and political identity among teachers 
neither began with the Lula presidency nor its predecessor, this development contextualises these
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organisations’ situation and their leaderships’ claims that they represent the mainstream of the 
teaching profession.
Despite the close political identification between government and unions, differences did exist 
between the two during the first Lula term. Between 2003 and 2006 the main education issues faced 
by the government and teaching unions were over differences over its approach to participation, 
teacher evaluation and salaries.
First, teachers have been concerned at the limited scope of participation under the PT 
government. Despite the widespread support for FUNDEB from across social movements and prior to 
the PT’s entry into government, many educators neither felt that the proposed amendment met their 
demands nor did they feel it had been debated widely enough. This was partially placated by the PT’s 
decision to include a long-standing CNTE demand, that of a national teaching salary, in the new 
funding system (Brasil: Presidente da Republica 2004). The CNTE proposed that the value of the 
salary be set at R$1000 per month, but felt overlooked because rather than consulting its partners in 
the social movements, the government had concentrated its deliberations with representatives of the 
state and municipal educational secretaries (CNTE 2005b; Nascimento, Aparecida da Silva, 
interviews, 2006). Against this, the government saw FUNDEB as far more equitable than FUNDEF in 
terms of teachers’ salaries: the use of a constitutionally guaranteed minimum of resources to be spent 
on salaries meant that all teachers would benefit under FUNDEB, whereas only primary school 
teachers had done so through FUNDEF (Chagas, interview, 2008). In July 2008 the legislation 
mandating a national teaching salary was passed, setting the amount at R$950 per month from 2010. 
During the interim the education minister, Fernando Haddad, announced that any teachers earning 
less than this would receive a supplement worth two-thirds of the difference between his or her current 
salary and the legal minimum (Ministerio da Educapao 2009).
Second, the CNTE was opposed to the efforts of the first PT education minister, Cristovam 
Buarque, to certify teachers through an evaluation (Buarque, interview, 2008; Vieira, interview, 2007). 
The Teachers’ National Certification Exam would establish a national evaluation system along existing 
state-level assessments. Teachers would not be obliged to take the exam or attend the courses; but 
Buarque offered incentives to do so, including the use of federal grants for further training and salary 
increases, up to 30% in parts of the country (Brasil: Presidente da Republica 2004; Buarque, interview,
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2008). Francisco Chagas, a former CNTE leader and government-appointed MEC official, recalled 
that this was the source of greatest tension between the new government and the union, prompting 
him to seek an early meeting with Buarque to discourage the idea. In Chagas’s mind, the introduction 
of a certification process would be discriminatory, by separating ‘good’ teachers who had gone through 
the process and received increases in income as a result, against ‘bad’ teachers who had not done so 
(interview, 2008). Following Buarque’s departure in February 2004 the new minister, Tarso Genro, 
downgraded the proposal (Genro 2004). Buarque noted that his ideas received support from his 
predecessor, Paulo Renato Souza, who tried to improve on the inclusion of a national teaching salary 
in the FUNDEB proposal by recommending only those who participated in the evaluation process 
should receive the national salary. The measure was rejected on what Buarque called ‘corporatist’ 
grounds (interview, 2008). Despite the measure’s defeat with Buarque’s departure, it has since been 
revived in the National Education Plan since April 2007 (Motter, unpublishedl).
Third, teaching unions have expressed their dissatisfaction with the level or form of salary 
increases under the PT government. The CNTE, for example, claimed that the expanded coverage 
offered by FUNDEB did not yield either the necessary level of payment to teachers nor set a value for 
a minimum teaching salary. While the CNTE had campaigned for 80% of FUNDEB resources to be 
paid towards teachers, the government fixed on 70%. Furthermore, while the government accepted 
the need for a minimum teaching salary, it refused to set a value (Aparecida da Silva, Nascimento, 
interviews 2006; CNTE n.d.). Meanwhile, in higher education ANDES claimed that the Lula 
government had failed to readjust salaries (Schuch, interview, 2006). This was in contrast to 
observers and the government, which claimed that it had indeed increased university and technical 
school teaches’ salaries over inflation, in some cases up to 20% (Azevedo 2006; Schwartzmann, 
interview, 2007).
3. Conclusion
This chapter started with the challenge faced by the ambiguity of teachers’ motivations and the 
ideological impositions that may be placed on the movement by governments of particular political 
hues. What is evident is the relative decline of past social democratic notions of the teaching 
profession: the notion that the teacher is an altruistic ‘knight’ is disregarded by all three governments.
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This is apparent in the rejection of the teacher as the sole professional actor in the education system. 
Under the Concertacion, the teaching body complained at the level of scrutiny which had not 
previously existed under Allende; the Cardoso government’s rejected school teachers’ demand for a 
national salary and university teachers’ demands for a more comprehensive voting system for 
chancellors; and halted the use of teacher evaluations under the Lula administration.
Such tensions blur the distinctions that were initially drawn between Third Way and 
Participatory Left governments and the relations with teachers’ organisations at the start of the 
chapter. Owing to the closer links between Participatory Left and social movements, it was assumed 
that a more collaborative and conciliatory relationship might be expected, against the Third Way’s 
weaker social links and hence more independent policymaking -  which would contribute to 
confrontation. Of the three governments, the Cardoso and PT governments appeared to conform most 
to type. The education team in the Cardoso government appeared weary of teachers and their 
inclination to strike. This influenced their opinion of them, prompting them to ask with scepticism 
whether these organisations accurately represented the movement. The PT’s Participatory Left 
government arguably had a closer and less fractious relationship with teaching unions. Whereas 
teachers were inclined to use their capacity to strike under both the Concertacion and Cardoso 
governments, its use was distinctive in its relative absence in Brazil after 2003. Instead, teachers’ 
organisations engaged in greater levels of debate and discussion, no doubt aided by the relative 
overlap in membership that existed between government and unions. The closer relationship was 
evident in the introduction of a national teaching salary and an expanded constitutional fund for 
education, FUNDEB, which both the CNTE and PT had defended. However, despite this relative 
closeness, the government did not give full reign to the union. The CNTE’s involvement in the design 
of FUNDEB highlighted the limits of government-union engagement over decision-making. Meanwhile, 
the Third Way Concertacion government’s relationship with teachers could be divided into periods: one 
until 1995 when it appeared to share their concerns, most notably through the creation of a Teachers 
Statute and after 1995 when the teachers’ leadership changed. In this later period the notion of 
teachers as selfish, budget-maximising ‘knaves’, became more apparent in Concertacion thinking (as it 
was during the Cardoso presidency).
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The separation of the Concertacion’s relationship with the teaching profession into two periods 
demonstrates the limits of analysis offered by the distinction between Third Way and Participatory Left 
approaches. With regard to the Third Way, both the Teachers Statute in Chile and the Cardoso 
government’s FUNDEF fund placed teachers on a more secure and legal footing. Furthermore, the 
Participatory Left model fails to account for the tension between the PT government and the CNTE 
over teacher evaluation. This may be due to the change in the nature of policymaking by the PT 
before and after 2003: whereas before it was more participatory and therefore in tune with union 
concerns, once in power it ceased to have the same degree of engagement with social movements.
Despite these developments, it remained the case that the Cardoso administration was beset 
by opposition from the teaching unions from the start. By contrast, the Concertacion’s first half decade 
in power was notable for the relative absence of conflict emanating from the teaching unions, due in 
large part to pro-Concertacion sympathies of the union leaderships during these years. The variations 
between the governments and their relationships with teachers may therefore owe much to previous 
associations between governments and the movement. Of the three cases, the PT has had the 
longest such relationship: teachers were among the founders of the party in 1980 and remained close 
political allies during the years of national opposition during the 1980s and 1990s. Indeed, despite the 
changes that had occurred within the party in terms of policymaking, the bulk of the teaching 
profession’s leadership remained closely identified with the PT until its election and provided 
individuals for government positions. The PSDB has had the weakest links with teachers’ unions -  
indeed, compared to the PT, they have arguably been non-existent. Meanwhile in Chile, the 
Concertacion has occupied space between these two extremes. The Concertacion dominated the 
mainstream opposition movement before 1990, in both political parties and social movements 
(including the teachers’ union). Despite the decline in social mobilisation, concertacionistas remained 
in leading positions in the teachers’ union after 1990, thereby providing a collaborative relationship 
until their defeat by a more radical group in 1995.
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11. An unequal relationship: Students and social democratic 
governments
Like teachers, students are an interest group in the education policy process (Harman 1984). 
Furthermore, like teachers, the student movement can be distinguished between those in the school 
system (at secondary level) and in higher education. The extent to which they present both a 
collective entity, students’ capacity to organise and the nature of their demands are contingent on a 
range of factors.
First, students’ relationship to the education system is especially ambiguous. From an 
ideological perspective, the Left views students as either an agent of change (by Marxist, feminist and 
conflict theorists) or as a beneficiary or ‘entitlee’ (past social democracy) while on the Right they are 
perceived to be either raw material for the market (neo-liberal) or as empty vessels to be filled with 
social values and norms (neo-conservative) (Trowler 1998). This distinction sits at odds other images 
of students (or consumers more generally): of 'pawns’ (passive and lacking agency) by the Left cind 
social democrats and ‘queens’ (demanding and active) under the neo-liberal Right respectively (Le 
Grand 2003). Meanwhile, student leaderships tend to make similar demands as teachers’ 
organisations, illustrating their shared ideological commitment. This seems contradictory, since 
teachers’ positions means they can be perceived as a producer group, while the positions ascribed to 
students by both Left and Right suggest anything but this. Notwithstanding this paradox, the role of 
students remains relevant for analysis since of the two so-called ‘consumer’ groups (the other being 
parents) they tend to be the most well-organised nationally.
Second, student concerns range from the narrow to the broad. At its most limited, student 
interests address the educational system and its impact upon themselves. At its broadest, they have 
formed part of society-wide movement in favour of social or political change. In part this may be 
explained by the wider political context in which they find themselves: Liebman et al (1972) suggest 
that under stable, liberal and democratic government students will focus their attention on university 
reform, while under authoritarian or non-responsive regimes, students will concern themselves with
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political issues. The extent to which they are successful in their demands depends on their ability to 
manipulate and provoke the prevailing social and economic forces (Boren 2001).
Third, in Latin America students have been an especially important interest group -  arguably 
more so than in the global North. This owes much to the relatively elitist nature of education in the 
region, where historically a minority passed through higher education, let alone completed secondary 
school. Furthermore, the stratified nature of Latin American society meant that those who reached the 
later stages of education in the past came from families that were in the higher income groups, 
ensuring a relatively cohesive and socially homogenous movement. However, the expansion of 
education coverage across the region since the 1960s, while ensuring that greater numbers now 
complete secondary school and go onto higher education, has also weakened the student movement’s 
self-identification and political activism. This is due in part to the growth in private provision of 
education and the repressive and depoliticising actions of military regimes in this period (Levy 1981). 
Yet it must also be due to the increasingly diverse nature of the student population, politically, 
economically and socially.
As with teachers, governments tend to find that their previous associations with the student 
movement influences the extent to which the relationship is confrontational or conciliatory. This is due 
in large part to the self-conscious association of the bulk of student leaderships with the Left, and 
suggests distinctions between the different social democratic approaches: whereas relations should be 
relatively collaborative between students and Participatory Left, they will be more confrontational with 
Third Way governments that have fewer connections with them. Such an assumption goes against the 
more consumerist vision of students, who would welcome not only more choice but also the 
procedures and information to facilitate it.
As the cases show though, it is the Participatory Left perspective of students that appears to 
hold in both Brazil and Chile. Student leaderships appear motivated more by shared political affiliation 
than by consumerist concerns. However, even though the Participatory Left enjoys a relatively closer 
-  and less confrontational -  relationship with students, they do not appear to be especially influential 
with governments generally, thereby challenging past notions of the relevance of students as an 
interest group in Latin American education policymaking. Indeed, contrary to the notion of students as
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consumers, among both Participatory Left and Third Way governments student organisations have not 
been treated as full and active partners in education, but rather as entitles.
1. Chile
In Chile, student organisations were shut down following the military coup in 1973. This followed 
several years in which the student movement had played a visible role, especially on the Left. In the 
1980s the regime introduced student organisations once again, seeking to control them from above. 
However, they soon lost control, with student leaderships being largely made up of concertacionistas. 
Unlike Brazil, there was no national student organisation, so student activity remained concentrated in 
a few key institutions. Following the Concertacion’s entry into government in 1990, the relationship 
between it and the student movement was largely cordial until changes in organisational leadership in 
the mid- to late-1990s prompted a more confrontational approach. Throughout the Concertacion 
period the government has largely introduced measures directed at students and has not included 
them as an active partner in policymaking. The 2006 demonstrations forced the government to 
respond, although this did not result in any lasting change in students’ status vis-a-vis the government.
1.1. Students and government, pre-1990
The expansion of Chile’s education system occurred in the middle part of the 20th century, with key 
reforms occurring during the Christian Democrat presidency under Frei (1964-70). Although there 
were only 346,000 secondary school students in 1966, between 1957 and 1966 the number of primary 
school students had increased by around 50%, from 997,000 to 1.57m (DESAL 1969). Politically, 
student leaders reflected broader society. They were primarily Christian Democrat activists or at the 
least, left-leaning (Burnett 1970). It was in this period that Christian Democrats took control of the 
largest university student union in Chile, the Federation of University of Chile Students (FECH), 
demanding more autonomy within higher education institutions. This it achieved in 1967, following 
student protests and occupations and despite the presence of Christian Democrats in the presidential 
palace, La Moneda (Hofmeister 1995). Furthermore, in contrast to other Latin American student 
movements, the Chilean student body was noted for being more moderate in its strategy and tactics 
(Burnett 1970).
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During the Allende presidency the level of mobilisation among students was enhanced, 
including in the pre-university sector. Space existed for secondary school students to participate not 
only in school councils, but also in deliberations within the teachers’ union, SUTE, itself (Colegio de 
Profesores 2003). But the presence of the Popular Unity (UP) government coincided with growing 
polarisation in Chilean society; in the educational arena this was most visibly demonstrated by 
divisions over the National Unified School (ENU) proposal. Chilean students were not immune from 
this debate, separating themselves along political lines. Arguably the most conservative student group 
in the country, the leadership of the Catholic University’s student union, FEUC, denounced ENU as a 
means of trying to impose political control and a uniform educational model on society (FEUC 1973).
The military regime, following the 1973 coup, sought a transformation of Chilean society. This 
included efforts to change the nature of the student movement as well. The military leadership saw the 
universities as problematic, on account of the level of politicisation and agitation within them. This 
could not be allowed to continue, prompting the regime to control them directly, by appointing 
chancellors drawn from military ranks (Chile, Junta Militar de Gobierno 197?). During this first phase 
of the regime, enrolments fell by 30% between 1974 and 1980 (Newsome 1993). Meanwhile the 
student movement remained in disarray, being unable to organise or co-ordinate itself in the first years 
after the coup.
By the early 1980s there was some demand from within the student movement to organise 
although the political context did not allow the prospect of any kind of activity other than cultural ones, 
and only at the level of the department rather than university-wide (Martinez and Valladares 1988; 
Toro et al 2005; Gode de Maza 1999). At the same time as the regime began to allow the creation of 
professional labour associations, or gremios, these student organisations were co-opted and controlled 
from above. Notwithstanding the military’s intentions, they became increasingly autonomous from 
1982 on. This was due in part to the absence of any links with political parties, the economic crisis in 
1982 which brought students alongside other protestors, and the construction of a university-wide 
student association at the University of Chile (FECECH) (Martinez and Valladares 1988; Toro et al 
2005).
If higher education was bearing the brunt of military repression in the 1970s, at the secondary 
school level the number of students surged forward. Although this would create more demand for
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university places in the 1980s, it also meant that the student body became less politically and socially 
homogenous. Increasingly, poorer classes were able to access the Chilean university system (Cariola 
et al 2003). These changes, coupled with the educational reforms promoting greater liberalisation and 
use of the market, contributed to a model that was perceived as individualist and consumer-driven 
(Schiefelbein 1982).
In the final phase of the dictatorship, the military faced more vocal opposition from the student 
movement. The 1982 economic crisis gave way to broader protests across the country. Within higher 
education, this was evident in demands for an end to military intervention in universities via the 
appointed chancellors, in favour of greater autonomy for institutions and student bodies. These 
demands transcended political lines, being supported by both opposition and government supporters 
alike in the 1984 Federation of University of Chile Student Centres (FECECH) elections and beyond 
the student movement, to include the teaching profession (Toro et al 2005; AGECH 1986). 
Organisationally, the student movement became increasingly tied to political party activity. This was 
dominated by the left and centre-left parties, the more visible and moderate tied to the Christian 
Democrats and the more clandestine elements centred on the Communist Party (Gode de Maza 1999; 
Toro et al 2005). Despite these links, the repressive nature of the regime ensured that the student 
movement remained fearful and received only limited support from their parents and the media, when 
compared to the secondary student protests on 2006 (Pancani, interview, 2007).
1.2. Students and the Concertacion governments
Notwithstanding the differences between secondary school and university students, relations between 
the Concertacion and the broader student movement may be distinguished by two main concerns: 
material issues since 1990, followed by educational quality and the nature of Chilean democracy in the 
decade after 1995. This latter shift was associated with the change in student leadership in 1995 and 
arguably reached its highpoint in 2006 when student protests gave rise to mass demonstrations and 
social demands for education reform.
Interest group concerns and actions were primarily material in nature, including grants, student 
financing and access to higher education (Nunez, interview 1, 2007). These have dominated 
Concertacion-student relations since 1990, although they were arguably more prominent during the
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first half of the 1990s. In 1992, students took to the streets to protest against a credit system that was 
deemed insufficient (Roco Fossa 2005). In response, the first Concertacion president, Patricio Aylwin, 
while stressing the wide range of priorities his government faced and his prioritisation of primary and 
secondary education, did commit the government to more student credit, from 5000 to 20,000 grants 
between 1991 and 1994 (Aylwin 1994b). The demand for a national fund of credit and support formed 
the basis of the Left’s campaign platform in the FECH elections in 1995 (Roco Fossa 2005). In the 
years following, the level of student mobilisation increased, most notably between 1997 and 2002, 
along with protests in 2002 by secondary school students concerning limited resources (Grau, 
interview, 2007; Garreton 1998). Yet the most prominent of these protests regarding university credit 
occurred in 1999 when police shot protestors in Arica (Roco Fossa 2005). Given the agitation within 
the student movement and the crisis in the university credit system, an accord was eventually signed 
between the Confederation of Chilean Students (CONFECH), the organisation which represented 
students at the traditional universities (Grau, interview, 2007) and Mineduc in September 2005. This 
guaranteed free study in the first year for the poorest students while recalculating poverty levels to 
assess the extent of financial assistance to such students (Roco Fossa 2005). A similar agreement in 
November 2005 was also achieved, between the government and secondary school students. This 
occurred despite the relatively weaker level of organisation by secondary school students compared to 
university students (Nunez, interview 1, 2007).
Concerns about educational quality and the nature of democracy reflected the second 
dimension of Concertacion-student relations. Prior to 1995 these concerns were muted, mainly as a 
result of the strength and legitimacy of the Concertacion and the representative political institutions 
including Congress, when compared to other social actors (Theza and Munoz 2005). Meanwhile the 
representative student bodies, most notably FECH, suffered from a corresponding lack of legitimacy 
(Roco Fossa 2005). This was due to the close link that existed between government and the student 
leadership in FECH. At the same time, a debate was taking place within FECH over whether to accept 
the present educational system or demand an alternative. Finally, the FECH leadership was accused 
of financial impropriety and a lack of participation and transparency. The result was the disbandment 
of FECH between 1993 and 1994 (Gode de Maza 1999). Following its reformation, the Concertacion’s 
allies were defeated in the 1995 elections by a coalition of left-wing non-party and social-movement
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based groups which -  with the exception of 1997 when it was led by the Right -  have dominated the 
organisation ever since (Grau, interview, 2007).
The change in student leadership is characterised as a break from past, internally-focused, 
‘gremialist’ concerns such as student finances, towards one that is more outward-looking and 
structural in its demands, seeking changes to the educational system as a whole (Grau, interview, 
2007). In particular this represents a demand for less use of the market in education, the need for 
stronger student organisation (especially in private universities) and a greater state commitment to 
public funding (Grau 2005). During the 1997 student demonstrations, the role and purpose of the 
university in contemporary society was questioned and new issues emerged, including greater 
regulation, the derogation of the Constitutional Statutory Law of Education (LOCE) and an end to for- 
profit institutions (Garreton 1998; Perez de Arce 1998). These visions were shared by other social 
actors, including the Colegio de Profesores, whose change in leadership after 1995 echoed a similar 
shift in thinking, and the creation of a left-wing cross-social movement grouping known as the Fuerza 
Social in 2001. Like many of those involved in the Fuerza Social, many student leaders either have 
been or are Communist Party (PC) activists. These activists see Chilean society as insufficiently 
politicised and Chile’s representative institutions as inadequate, since they do not allow social 
organisations to participate (Grau 2005).
Chile’s student movement remains organisationally weak, despite its substantial increase in 
numbers (Weinstein, interview, 2007). Student organisation is at its strongest within the traditional 
public and state-funded private universities, the largest of which -  the University of Chile and the 
Catholic University-constitute up to 27,000 and 24,000 students respectively (Grau, interview, 2007). 
Despite attempts to create a more co-ordinated approach through CONFECH, these efforts broke 
down in 1998, leaving it with a limited organisational structure (Roco Fossa 2005). This was apparent 
to the government, which viewed the main representative student bodies as being those associated 
with the University of Chile, the Catholic University, the University of Santiago and some of the 
regional universities (Weinstein, interview, 2007). Furthermore, in the larger sector of private higher 
education -  which makes up around 70% of the student population (Informe del Consejo Asesor 
Presidencial 2008: 7) -  few student organisations exist. In many cases they are not allowed by the 
university authorities. Those that do exist, such as at Diego Portales and Universidad Central, remain
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relatively weak (Grau 2005; Grau, Weinstein, interviews, 2007; Perez de Arce 1998). This would also 
appear to reflect the changes in higher education more generally, with the greater diversity in the 
student population and provision limiting the degree of solidarity (Roco Fossa 2005).
The 2006 secondary-school led demonstrations have also been portrayed representing the 
shift from students’ concerns with material benefits to demands with more structural concerns about 
the education system. This interpretation overlooks three factors, however: the extent to which student 
mobilisation was evident prior to the 2006 protests; the immediate, material catalysts that prompted it; 
and the extent to which education was a mass concern.
First, there is debate over whether the demonstrations were a unique event or the culmination 
of growing frustration of the education system by students and wider society. Guttierrez and Caviedes 
(2006) trace the origins of the estimated 600,000 to one million-sized demonstrations back to student 
activism in the early 2000s and general frustration at an apparently unresponsive government. By 
contrast, Silva (2007) presents the protests as unexpected, given the relatively limited degree of social 
mobilisation in recent Chilean history, and the memory that it brought back of the 1971-72 period, 
obliging the government to respond. This became more urgent after hundreds of students were 
injured by police action (Fuerza Social y Democracia 2006). This perspective also maintains that such 
activism tends to be organic, sporadic and limited in its long term organisation (Weinstein, interview, 
2007).
In between these two positions is the notion that the demonstrations marked a generational 
shift in Chilean politics. The ‘penguin revolution’ (named for the secondary school students which are 
known as ‘penguins’ for their uniforms) was distinct from the Concertacion generation by being 
comprised mainly of individuals who had not directly experienced the dictatorship. As a result there 
was a difference in the expectations between the two generations in terms of educational quality, with 
the younger cohort both more dissatisfied and inclined to protest (Bitar, Cox, Pefia, interviews, 2007; 
Huibodro-Garcia 2007). This was possibly aided by the level of support experienced by the cohort. 
Unlike their 1980s forebears, the 2006 protestors could not only count on support from their parents 
and the media, but operated in a less politically risky and repressive environment (Pancani, interview, 
2007). Indeed, police action against demonstrators prompted Bachelet to fire the chief of the riot 
police as a result (BBC News 2006).
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Second, the demonstrations were seen as presenting a shift from material to structural 
demands concerning education. This includes the limitations of the Whole School Day (JEC) 
programme, and concern at the rising costs of the university examination test (PSU) and public 
transport (Garcia-Huibodro, interview, 2007; Nunez, interview 1, 2007). Against this should be noted 
students’ frustration at the relatively weak financial position of municipal schools compared to 
subsidised ones, insufficient infrastructure, the limited capacity for student participation owing to 
‘authoritarian’ head teachers on school councils and a non-responsive ministry (Estudiantes 
Secundaristas de la Region Metropolitana 2005). Demands were made to reform the LOCE, change 
the financial arrangements for education funding and alter the municipal nature of the school system 
(Colegio de Profesores 2006a).
Third, the demonstrations reflected the extent to which education had shifted from being an 
elite to a mass concern. Since the 1980s the proportion of the population in education had expanded 
across all social and economic groups. During the 1990s not only had primary education been 
effectively universalised in Chile, but an increasing number of poorer students were accessing both 
secondary and higher education; by 2005 at least four-fifths of the relevant age group across all social 
groups were in secondary school (table 5). The effect of this broad education system meant that more 
people were able to access knowledge and develop themselves, and thereby becoming more inclined 
to make political demands (Cox, interview, 2007; Cox 2007).
Table 5: School and College Attendance in Urban Areas by Household Income Level and Age Groups
Poorest quintile Middle quintile Richest quinltile
7 to 12 
years
13 to 
19 
years
20 to 
24 
years
7 to 12 
years
13 to 
19 
years
20 to 
24 
years
7 to 12 
years
13 to 
19 
years
20 to 
24 
years
1994 98.7 76.4 14 99.8 82 24.5 99.8 90.7 52.3
1997 98.7 76.4 14 99.8 82 24.5 99.8 90.7 52.3
2005 99.2 81.4 18.9 99.8 84.1 31.4 99.6 88.7 53.7
Sources: CEPAL 1998: 50; CEPAL 2001: 48; CEPAL 2007: 62
The scale of the demonstrations contributed to the creation of a presidential advisory committee 
presided over by Juan Eduardo Garcia-Huibodro that was broad in the range of social actors 
represented. This was seen by both the Concertacion government and students to have a wide- 
ranging discussion about the nature of the education system and propose changes (Grau, Diaz,
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Garcia-Huibodro, interviews, 2007). The Right, though, questioned the extent to which the ‘structure’ 
of the educational system was discussed. They saw the demands as primarily political or ideological 
in scope and claimed to be uncertain what was sought beyond more investment in infrastructure 
(Dittborn, Velasco, interviews, 2007). However, despite students’ engagement with the committee, 
there was a split between the government and the Right on one side and the Bloque Social consisting 
of social movements, including student organisations on the other. This was evident in the Bloque 
Social’s rejection of both the final report at the end of 2006 and the government’s eventual agreement 
with the parliamentary (Right) opposition in November 2007 on the proposed education legislation.
2. Brazil
Student activity in Brazil has arguably concentrated more on broader political issues than educational 
policy and material matters. During the military period the student movement formed part of the 
growing opposition movement, with significant numbers contributing to the rebuilding of the political 
Left, including the formation of the PT. During the New Republic’s first decade secondary school 
students were a visible part of the movement demanding Collor’s impeachment while after 1995 the 
student movement opted for an opposition stance against the Cardoso government. Following Lula’s 
victory the student movement has adopted a more conciliatory approach with the government, 
although in both cases students have been the recipients of policies rather than participants in their 
formation.
2.1. Students and government, pre-1995
Students were arguably among the most prominent critics of the military regime, both educationally 
and politically. They challenged the regime’s higher education reforms and questioned its political 
legitimacy, which was largely attributable to the movement’s self-conscious association with the Left 
(Mische 1997; Skidmore 1988). It was also in marked contrast to its relationship with government prior 
to 1964, when it had acted as an arm of the corporatist state (Durham 2004).
The regime’s response to the student movement was noticeable in the different approaches it 
adopted. This was largely attributable to the tendency which dominated within the regime at any given 
time: the moderate or the hardline. Following the coup it pursued a moderate course, during which 
student protests were tolerated. This was followed by a more repressive period, during the regime’s
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hardline phase, followed by a resurgence of student activism under the liberalisation process of the 
late 1970s and early 1980s.
The process of liberalisation which began in the later 1970s contributed to a less repressive 
environment in which the student movement was able to emerge. Yet as with the previous moderate 
phase in the mid-1960s, the regime was only prepared to tolerate limited dissent. Initially student 
activism was confined to internal university matters, regarding the dismissal of staff and meetings on 
technical issues and areas related to study. As long as this remained the extent of student action, the 
regime restrained itself (MEC 1975a, 1975b). After 1977 though, the student movement became more 
visible and critical. MEC interpreted this dissatisfaction to reflect student frustration at an insufficient 
supply of university places (MEC 1977b). The regime responded by reminding all university 
chancellors that order and discipline be maintained on campus and the ‘prohibition of any university 
assemblies of a political nature’ ensured. If necessary, the government was prepared to call upon the 
security services and, as a last resort, suspend all academic activity if the disturbances became too 
great (MEC 1977a).
However, the regime increasingly found itself unable to control the student movement. This 
was partly due to the sheer size of the student population that had increased throughout the military 
period. Secondary school student numbers had increased from 510,000 in 1965 to 2.82 million in 
1980 and 3.02 million in 1985. In 1965 160,000 had entered higher education; by 1980 this had 
reached 1.38 million (IBGE 1977,1982,1987/88). The students, emboldened, reconstituted their own 
autonomous organisations within both public and private universities (the latter being a notable 
difference in student organisation compared to Chile); in May 1979 the university students reformed 
the previously banned the National Students’ Union (UNE), whose leadership was strongly leftist 
(Poerner 2004). By the early 1980s UNE had joined a wide coalition of social and political forces 
which were not only demanding changes to the education system, but also for a return to democracy. 
The movement was increasingly active and organised, achieving a national three-day strike by around 
one million university students and teachers in 32 higher education institutions to support its political 
and educational demands (Poerner 2004).
Following the return to civilian rule the student movement lost its previous impetus and 
momentum. With democracy now established, there was no focal political issue around which
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students could gather. This absence was coupled with a less politically or ideologically inclined 
student body, whose primary concerns were individual and work-based, owing in large part to the 
economic difficulties faced by Brazilian society in this period (Costa 1996; Mische 1997; Maia 2004). 
Indeed, it is significant that during this period there were few prominent or widespread demonstrations 
or protests against government higher education policies. This changed in 1992 when the student 
movement once again became visible. However, it had less to do with the education system, being a 
moral-based protest against corruption within the Collor presidency (Boren 2001). The first protest 
involved 10,000 students and occurred after months of media campaign. While the protests eventually 
gained a broad base in society, students were among the earliest and most visible participants 
(Gusmao 2005).
Following Collor’s replacement with Itamar Franco, government-student relations shifted 
towards more material concerns. Secondary school students expressed concern at the relative 
difficulty faced in organising and arbitrary increases in tuition fees in private schools (Brito da Silva 
2005). University students celebrated the return of UNE’s headquarters which had been confiscated 
under the military regime while making demands for the freezing of tuition fees and greater resource in 
public universities (Gusmao 2005).
2.2. Students and the Cardoso government
Despite the organisational challenges faced by the student movement following 1985, the leaderships 
of both the UNE and UBES (the national secondary school student organisation) quickly adopted an 
oppositional stance to the Cardoso presidency. This was due in large part to the political identification 
of the organisations’ leaderships: since 1989 the UNE leadership had been dominated by the PT and 
the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) (Araujo 2007; Gusmao 2005). In sheer numbers, the two 
organisations represented substantial constituencies: the number of secondary school students 
doubled from 4.5 to 9 million between 1995 and 2005 while the number of university students 
increased from 1.76 million to 2.13 million during Cardoso’s first term; with more than three-fifths being 
based in private institutions (Paulo Renato Souza Consultores, n.d.; IBGE, various years; MEC/INEP 
2000). As in Chile, the population accessing education in these years was expanding across all social 
groups and most especially among the poorer sections; by the mid-2000s primary education was
237
effectively universalised while around three-quarters and one-fifth of the relevant age groups were in 
secondary and higher education respectively (table 6). It was in this period that the existence of state- 
level student organisations, especially in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, aided the movement in its 
capacity to mobilise and target its protests (Maia 2004).
Table 6: School and College Attendance in Urban Areas by Household Income Level and Age Groups 
in Brazil, 1994-2005 (%)_____________________________________________________
Poorest quintile Middle quintile Richest quinltile
7 to 12 
years
13 to 
19 
years
20 to 
24 
years
7 to 12 
years
13 to 
19 
years
20 to 
24 
years
7 to 12 
years
13 to 
19 
years
20 to 
24 
years
1994 87.5 61.1 13.3 96.7 67.9 17.6 99.1 85.3 39.4
1997 90.5 64.9 14.5 97.5 71.9 19.2 98.9 87.5 45.2
2005 97.4 73.6 17.4 99.3 75.7 21.3 99.6 89.8 53.9
Sources: CEPAL 1998: 5(3; CEPAL 2001:4 3; CEPAL 2007: 62
The university and secondary school students’ emphasis on the political was evident in the key 
features of the government-student relationship between 1995 and 2002. First, both types of students 
focused their criticism of the government on its ‘neo-liberal’ course (Poerner 2004; Stumpf, interview, 
2006; Maia 2004; Brito da Silva 2005). Secondary school students opposed the government’s 
decision to separate vocational training from general education and were determined to maintain 
concessionary transport fares and spaces in public universities for public school students (Brito da 
Silva 2005). University students (and teachers) challenged the government’s efforts to allow increases 
in tuition fees and the Provao, a university-level evaluation and exam system to be taken by all 
students in federal universities, on the basis that it would introduce individual assessment of students 
(Cunha 2004). This prompted students to boycott the Provao (Maia 2004), despite Cardoso’s 
education minister, Paulo Renato Souza, claim that the assessments were designed to provide 
students, parents and the educational community an opportunity to identify whether a given course 
and institution was adequate (Souza, interview, 2007).
More generally, the students’ opposition to the ‘neo-liberal’ approach was evident in their 
clashes with the federal police over the government’s proposed social security reform in March 1995. 
This was followed in 1999 by general protests against the government’s economic model, in which 
UNE formed part of a broad civil movement with other groups of the Left, including the Landless
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Workers’ Movement (MST), the Central Trade Union (CUT) and the National Conference of Brazilian 
Bishops (CNBB) (Maia 2004).
Second, the movement saw the government as determined to curtail their civil and 
organisational rights (Stumpf, interview, 2006). This was evident in two key ways: one, when 8000 
university and secondary school students demanded that the senate president’s political rights be 
stripped in 2001, resulting in action by the police and 18 injuries and arrests; two, MEC’s decision to 
end UNE’s monopoly on the sale of student cards in August 2001, which had been worth R$1.9m the 
previous year and constituted around 80% of UNE’s income (Poerner 2004; Stumpf, interview, 2006; 
Maia 2004). Indeed, this latter issue became one of the key rallying points for students against the 
government, given the impact that this financial measure had in financially hamstringing the 
movement. In response, Souza’s own justification was that the UNE was using the money it raised 
through this monopoly to provide election finance to the Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB). He 
considered this ‘un-transparent’ since the student movement was a politically plural rather than a party 
political movement (Souza, interview, 2007).
The government criticised the student movement in much the same fashion as it did teachers’ 
organisations. Cardoso claimed that both were ‘corporatist’ and had prevented university reform 
(Cardoso 2006). This view overlooked the extent to which universities themselves -  including those in 
the private sector -  challenged the measures as well. Nevertheless, the government’s frustrations 
were reflected in the students’ approach to its policies. The former UNE president, Felipe Maia, 
conceded that for much of the period its response to Cardoso and Souza was limited to the negative; 
the movement did not work up alternative proposals. This prompted the UNE leadership to draw up 
proposals that included an emergency spending programme for federal universities and teaching 
salaries (which UNE perceived as having fallen throughout the Cardoso period) and a replacement of 
tuition fee increases with legislation regarding paid teaching (Maia 2004).
2.3. Students and the Lula government
With the election of Lula, the relationship between students and government became substantially less 
confrontational. Indeed, from the government’s perspective, there were virtually no notable sources of 
tension between the two (Chagas, interview, 2008). This owed much to the political identification of
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the student organisations’ leaderships, which are dominated by the PT and other parties of the Left 
(Araujo 2007; Brito da Silva 2005). This remained the case despite the declining presence of students 
associated with the PT Articulagao faction (to which Lula and his close allies belonged) on the UNE 
executive after its 2001 congress (Maia 2004).
The strength of the Left was evident in the movement’s approach to the 2002 elections. 
Students generally saw continuity in the presidential candidacy of the PSDB’s Jose Serra. Lula 
appeared to represent change (Brito da Silva 2005). The UNE published its own manifesto during the 
2002 elections and included all the presidential candidates in its distribution. At the time only Lula 
appeared to meet all the demands set out in the manifesto. However, it was not until the second round 
run-off between Lula and an ex-UNE president from the 1960s, Jose Serra, that both university and 
secondary students held a plebiscite among 400,000 student to decide which candidate to support. 
The result indicated a clear preference for Lula and explicit support was given to his campaign (Araujo 
2007; Poerner 2004). In 2006, the UNE, along with other social movements, took a similar approach 
in relation to Lula’s re-election, delaying support until the second round (Baiocchi and Checa 2008: 
125).
The student leadership’s stance in relation to the PT government has been seen as 
advantageous and disadvantageous. On the positive side, the government is seen as more accessible 
and sympathetic to their concerns than its predecessors. The UNE leadership was determined to 
maintain its autonomy but recognised the government as more inclined to engage with them. This 
included discussion between the two in the transition period between the presidential election and Lula 
taking office. The environment also enabled UNE to present its own proposals (Maia 2004, Petta 
2004). This represented a shift from the Cardoso years, when the leadership had maintained a 
confrontational stance throughout. Soon afterwards, both UNE and the Brazilian Union of Secondary 
School Students (UBES) were invited to discuss their concerns with the new education minister, 
Cristovam Buarque, in January 2003, followed by Lula himself later that year.
Among the demands laid out by UNE during the first Lula term included a commitment to a 
more state-led form of economic development, the re-constitution of the Rondon Project (an 
assistance programme using student labour that was originally initiated under the military regime), the 
elimination of the Provao and the reinstatement of UNE’s monopoly on the sale of student cards
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(Poerner 2004). Soon after taking office Cristovam Buarque announced the end of the Provao and 
invited UNE to participate in the development of a new evaluation mechanism in higher education 
(Maia 2004). The Rondon Project was subsequently restarted in 2005 (UNE 2006) while the UNE 
leadership also celebrated the government’s expansionary higher education programme of new public 
universities, quotas and the ProUni assistance programme. This latter scheme involves a grant 
assistance scheme for poorer students to attend private institutions, although it was apparently 
devised with little direct input from the movement.
On the negative side, the government had failed to reinstate the student card monopoly by the 
end of the first Lula term (Monteiro, interview, 2006). This was arguably the central UNE concern, as it 
limited its financial capacity and autonomy. Furthermore, the relationship between government and 
movement remained ambiguous: while the students’ leadership claims organisational autonomy, its 
closeness and ability to influence the government was criticised. This included its unwillingness to 
mobilise or carry out large-scale campaigns during the first Lula term (especially in relation to its higher 
education reform which some leftist students accuse of being ‘neo-liberal’ and ‘privatising’) and its 
decision not to submit its 2006 election manifesto to the PSDB presidential candidate (Monteiro, 
Stumpf, Schuch, interviews, 2006; Araujo 2007). This has prompted the UNE to reconsider its way of 
working, including how it mobilises support in favour of proposals rather than against them. Indeed, at 
the 2003 UNE congress, the first after Lula took office, the main issue concerned whether the 
organisation should actively support or oppose the government or remain independent (Maia 2004, 
Petta 2004).
Notwithstanding the movement’s closer relationship with MEC since 2003, the extent to which it 
is a full participant in policy-making remains ambiguous. Although the presence and engagement of 
government ministers was noted at the 2003 UNE congress (Petta 2004), the organisation’s decision 
to remain autonomous has meant that its concerns are not fully adopted by the government. This was 
most apparent in the government’s higher education reform which began to emerge in 2004. The UNE 
leadership supported measures for more resources for public education and greater democracy in 
university chancellor elections, but criticised the government’s apparent unwillingness to regulate and 
control the private sector (Stumpf, interview, 2006; Petta 2004). The result of the PT government’s 
policies in relation to students has therefore been less of a student movement directly involved in the
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construction of policies than of being a cheerleader on the side. This presents a dramatic shift from 
the traditional image of Latin American students, in which they have a key political role as an important 
pressure group that governments must take account of.
3. Conclusion
At the outset of the chapter, it was suggested that given their ideological association with the radical 
Left and their social attachments, student organisations would be more in tune with Participatory Left 
than Third Way governments. One would expect to see greater collaboration with the former and more 
confrontation with the latter. Certainly the student protests in Chile in 2006 against the education 
system overseen by the Third Way Concertacion were but the most notable and recent example of 
this. At the same time there were also regular protests and opposition by students against the 
Cardoso government in Brazil. By contrast during the first term of the Participatory Left PT 
government, student mobilisation declined substantially.
Despite the difference between the three governments, the extent to which the student 
organisations were seen as active partners was questionable. Despite the PT government’s early 
meeting with the UNE and UBES leaderships, this arguably proved the highpoint for the Brazilian 
student movement. Regardless of whether a Third Way or Participatory Left government was in office, 
students were generally not seen as full partners by policymakers. The reason for this may have been 
the decline in students’ historic moral and political role since the 1970s, but it also was not helped by 
both the educational and political stances taken by the movements (which itself undermined the other 
assumption that student leaderships would focus primarily on education matters in democratic 
periods).
In Brazil, for example, the student organisation arguably took a conscious early decision to 
oppose the new Cardoso government and accuse it of being ‘neo-liberal’. The relative absence of 
dialogue appeared to suit the administration, which accused it of being ‘corporatist’ and politically 
biased. Following the 2003 meeting with the government, PT policymakers’ involvement with students 
began to flag. On key initiatives that affected students -  FUNDEB, ProUni and higher education 
reform -  the student movement was not present either in their design, other than as one stakeholder 
among many. Even in the most notable case of where student action yielded a government response,
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the involvement of students in the presidential advisory commission in Chile, it was constrained by the 
Concertacion’s eventual negotiations with the political opposition on the proposed education 
legislation. It seemed that while the Concertacion was prepared to listen to the grievances of students, 
acting on them was another matter.
Similarly students’ weak involvement in the policymaking process may also be attributable to 
their relative organisational decline -  although this varied between the two countries. While the 
expansion of higher education after the 1970s undoubtedly expanded the student population, the 
impact of economic pressures and the impact of military repression affected their capacity to mobilise. 
The repression by the military in Brazil and Chile contributed to a politically active and cohesive 
student movement which formed part of a broader civil society united in its demand for a return to 
democracy. When this occurred, in Brazil in 1985 and in Chile in 1989, the activism of the student 
movements ebbed. While in Brazil the student movement returned to visible prominence momentarily 
during the anti-Collor corruption scandal in 1992, in Chile the student leadership remained relatively 
acquiescent until its change in 1995. However, unlike the Chilean case, Brazilian students have 
generally remained more strongly organised: both at a national level and within the private sector.
The effect of these various economic and organisational pressures and ideological stance 
meant that in all three cases, social democratic governments adopted positions that treated students 
more as beneficiaries or ‘entitlees’ than as full partners, as shown by the Lula government’s ProUni 
programme to enable poorer students to enter university and the Concertacion’s increase in student 
grants and assistance. This approach also indicated that even if Third Way social democrats were 
more inclined towards the market and the notion of choice than the Participatory Left, their treatment of 
students did not appear to conform to the idea of them as ‘consumers’. The closest version of this 
model was the Cardoso government’s Provao, which did little to assist current students in making an 
informed choice for their education, since its methodology meant that assessment would only be made 
at the end of a student’s course rather than during it.
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12. Conclusion
This dissertation set out to answer two main questions: what is social democracy in Latin America and 
what impact does it its have on public policy? To examine this, three case studies of education policy 
were used, including the Concertacion in Chile and the Cardoso and Lula governments in Brazil. The 
case studies were chosen due to their association with social democracy, whether by themselves or by 
others (Castaneda 1994, 2008; Kirby 2003; Navia 2008; Sandbrook et al 2007).
As social democratic governments, the three cases are distinct from other, arguably more 
publicised, forms of the Left in Latin America today. They are clearly different from the nationalist, 
populist version more commonly associated with Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia, 
and possibly Rafael Correa in Ecuador and Nestor Kirchner in Argentina, in two main ways. First, 
while social democrats arguably remain more committed to the use of institutions to drive through their 
agenda, populists are more inclined towards charismatic and personal leadership allied to mass 
mobilisation. Second, social democrats appear more cosmopolitan and comfortable with globalisation, 
while populists tend towards more nationalistic and state-led rhetoric.
The distinction between ‘two Lefts’ in the region overlooks the extent to which differences also 
exist within the social democratic Left, and the impact this may have in policy terms, specifically in the 
field of education. I have distinguished this between what I term a Participatory Left and the Third 
Way. Castaneda (1994) was perhaps the first to develop this contrast, suggesting both a more 
reformist and radical strain in the post-Cold War period, including the Concertacion and Cardoso’s 
PSDB in the former and the PT in the latter. That division was stark, not least because of the social 
origins of each, with the Third Way owing more to a narrowly selected political class and the 
Participatory Left drawing its support from a range of social movements.
Yet despite the scholarly separation of Latin American social democracy into the Participatory 
Left and the Third Way, the evidence presented in preceding chapters suggests that these contrasts 
are not as stark as they might otherwise seem (table 7). For example, certainly the PT and PSDB 
disagreed on policy prescriptions during the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s and were composed 
of particularly distinct bases of support, but once in government they have developed surprisingly 
similar approaches to policy, with the PT building on PSDB meaures in the areas of evaluation, public
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spending, the curriculum and participation. In other words, when not in power they appeared to 
represent substantially different objectives and constituencies, while conforming to a broadly similar 
path once in government.
Table 7: Social democratic governments and education policy in Latin America
Concertacion (Third  
W ay)
Cardoso (PSDB) 
governm ent (Third W ay)
Lula (PT) governm ent 
(Partic ipatory Left)
Part One: G overnm ent em ergence and nature
Origins Political party-social 
movement opposition to 
military regime, pre-1990
Political parties dominate 
social movements, post- 
1990
Political party opposition 
to military regime, pre- 
1985
Parliamentary opposition 
(1985-92), government 
member (1992-94)
Political party-social 
movement opposition to 
military regime, pre-1985
Parliamentary opposition 
(1985-2002)
Education policymaking 
core
Opposition: political 
party-social movement 
links
Government: 
concentrated in ministry
Opposition: concentrated 
in political party
Government: 
concentrated in ministry
Opposition: political party- 
social movement links (pre- 
2000s)
Government: concentrated 
in ministry (post-2003)
Part Two: Im pact on education
Role of state Limited, supervisory 
(1990s)
Expansive (2000s)
Limited, coordinative Expansive
Purpose of education 
(curriculum)
Economic 
competitiveness: 
curricular reform; primary 
and secondary education 
(formal)
Economic 
competitiveness: 
curricular reform; primary 
education (formal)
Uncertain, changing goals 
(formal and informal); 
subsequently primary and 
secondary education 
(formal)
Public expenditure on 
education
More public spending, 
targeted programmes
Redistributed public 
spending (FUNDEF), 
targeted programmes
More public spending, 
redistributed spending, 
targeted programmes
Assessment/Evaluation Method: universal 
(SIMCE), external 
(international testing)
Method: samples (SAEB), 
external (Provao), 
international testing
Method: universal (Prova 
Brasil), participative 
(Sindaes)
Attitude to participation Representative (1990- 
2006)
Deliberative (2006)
Representative (post- 
2006)
Representative Deliberative (pre-2000s) 
Representative (post-2003)
Relations with private sector Consensual Consensual Consensual
Relations with teachers Consensual (1990-95) 
Conflict (post-1995)
Conflict Consensual
Relations with students Consensual (1990-95) 
Conflict (post-1995)
Conflict Consensual
Source: Author’s own analysis
What accounted for this? I maintain that, rather than the ideological and sociological nature of social 
democratic parties that influence the course of education policy, it was the construction of 
policymaking elites within the parties that largely determined their approach to education. The 
emergence of elites emphasises the observation made by Michels (2001) that in all organisations there
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is a tendency towards oligarchy, or elite formation. That this finding should prove central to the study 
of Latin American social democracy should not have proved so surprising, since the emergence of 
elites is presumably inevitable, that sections of the Left -  including within the PT (see Keck 1992; 
Baiocchi 2003b) -  have not only shown themselves to be elite-aware, but also sought to counter them. 
Perhaps the most notable of such efforts has been the participatory budget (PB). Yet there is arguably 
something within the nature of national (as opposed to subnational) government which exacerbates 
the dynamic between elites and non-elites and directs social democracy in practice along broadly the 
same policy lines. Consequently, I suggest we take a closer look not only at the formation of social 
democratic parties themselves, but of the policy elites within social democratic parties once they take 
power as well. This is addressed in the following section, which considers the evidence of the 
preceding chapters in relation to the hypotheses presented at the start of this dissertation.
1. Evaluating the Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: The Left and Right in Latin America may be distinguished between a more 
equality-inclined Left that is supported by the subordinate class and uses the state to 
challenge the status quo and a Right that accepts social differences (and hence inequality), 
less state intervention and favours dominant class concerns and the status quo.
Hypothesis 2: Social democracy in Latin America may be distinguished between a more 
egalitarian Participatory Left and a more elite-driven Third Way, which should have an 
impact on public policy outcomes.
Qualification of hypotheses 1 and 2: Hypothesis 1 distinguished between the Left and Right in both 
ideological and sociological terms. As a basis this is a useful delineation, although the acceptance of 
the left-right dichotomy as proposed by Bobbio (1996) is relative rather than absolute. Such an 
approach has both strengths and weaknesses. On the one hand it offers a timeless point of 
comparison between the two poles and their associated values. This proves especially useful in the 
context of a post-Cold War environment where differences are less binary (e.g. socialist-capitalist). In
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all three cases the social democratic governments demonstrated their determination to pursue 
objectives that were different from their predecessors. In Chile, the Concertacion governments did 
appear motivated by subordinate class concerns and enhancing opportunities for more marginal 
groups through the use of targeted programmes such as MECE and P900. In Brazil the Cardoso 
government was preoccupied with universalising primary school coverage and creating a more 
equitable funding system through FUNDEF, while Lula’s first term involved broadening out that 
financial mechanism to include pre- and secondary school education.
On the other hand, differences between the two can only be expressed in relation to each other 
-  and the values and objectives associated with each in theory may not be apparent in practice. For 
example, although the Left tends to challenge the status quo, the nature of social democracy is to 
pursue a more modest objective: that of reform. That this occurs reflects its more politically ‘centrist’ 
approach (relative to the more radical Left), which is further complicated by the different ‘reform’ 
projects happening in that space. This may mean a less robust adherence to the state than is 
otherwise assumed. Certainly in the context of the 1990s this may well have been the case given the 
New Right’s own claim to reject the status quo also and seek structural readjustment, albeit through 
neo-liberalism. The situation is exacerbated for the Third Way (over the Participatory Left) by the fact 
that it shares some of the features associated with the New Right, including tolerance of the market 
and less attachment to class concerns. In other words, rather than pursuit of subordinate class 
concerns, social democrats sought policies that were cross-class, which meant appealing to dominant 
class concerns. This was especially the case in terms of the Concertacion and Cardoso governments, 
which did not directly challenge the influence of private interests, including in the tripartite school 
system in Chile and the expansion of private higher education in Brazil.
Certainly, in comparison to the Participatory Left, the Third Way looks less ‘leftist’, being less 
egalitarian and more elite-driven -  like the New Right (hypothesis 2). Yet although they are different, 
the division between the two is not always so apparent. The nature of government encourages elite 
formation, which tends to share broadly similar traits between the Third Way and Participatory Left. In 
particular they include the separation of social democrat leaderships from their supporters in 
policymaking, and a growing imbalance in the relative power and influence in favour of the former at
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the expense of the latter. This unequal relationship suggests a shift away from the supposedly more 
egalitarian Participatory Left in favour of the more ‘differentiated’, elitist Third Way.
The emergence of policymaking elites highlights the difference between social democracy as 
theory and practice, or between ‘ends’ and ‘means’ respectively. The distinction between Third Way 
and Participatory Left is typological, drawing on ideological and sociological differences. However, 
typologies are only models, therefore providing incomplete representations. They help encapsulate 
the contrasts between the two, but remain incomplete because they are not contextualised. By 
providing such material it becomes readily apparent that in terms of means, or practice, the two types 
share more than is otherwise assumed. In Chile, this included social democrats’ re-evaluation of the 
political polarisation prior to 1973, wariness of the Right’s continuing political strength after 
democracy’s return in 1990 and the lack of consensus among education policymakers regarding the 
structure of the education system. In Brazil, although PSDB leaders saw themselves as relatively 
more committed to equality and social justice compared to other actors within the political system, 
government was a balancing act, as they required coalition support from the centre-right. And in the 
PT, the party leadership faced a choice between pursuing electoral success or representation of its 
constituent base. The party’s growing success at the ballot box and pursuit of executive posts at the 
subnational level not only shifted its leaders to adopt stances it would previously have rejected, but it 
was also supported by sections of its rank-and-file that encouraged it to do so.
This last point, that the rank-and-file had a role to play in the development of policy elites, is a 
key element. It highlights the fact that power is relational and that the interaction between elite and 
non-elite can affect the type of leadership that emerges. Rather than being imposed, the nature of that 
elite may be more inclusive and democratic than is otherwise perceived (Barker 2001). While the PT’s 
policymaking became less participatory in terms of utilising the party’s internal institutional 
mechanisms, the replacement of Buarque with Genro and later Haddad not only reflected greater 
policy coherence, but more consensus within the party -  since the latter two enjoyed the president’s 
ear, who himself was broadly supported within the party.
The effect of similar policymaking elites in both types of social democratic governments has 
implications for policy outcomes. Through the greater access they enjoy to state resources, both Third 
Way and Participatory policy elites become detached from their bases of support within and outside
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their parties. In the case of the Participatory Left, this situation is more extreme, owing to its closer 
links with its members and supporters, compared to the less member-bound Third Way. The fact that 
both social democratic forms share an elite form of policymaking means that they tend to pursue 
broadly similar policies.
Hypothesis 3: Social democratic governments are inclined towards greater state 
involvement and intervention in policymaking, although the Third Way version is less state- 
oriented than that of the Participatory Left.
Qualification of hypothesis 3: As with hypothesis 1 and 2, the empirical evidence both supports and 
challenges hypothesis 3. On the one hand it remains valid owing to the different values and principles 
associated with each version of social democracy in government and the policies associated with 
them. On the other hand, the extent to which a social democratic government intervenes or not in the 
state appears to depend on context, rather than a rigid commitment to the state -  as proposed in 
hypothesis 1.
The Third Way’s greater acceptance of the market means that it is inclined to adopt a more 
limited role than that proposed by the Participatory Left. This is evident in the fact that the 
Concertacion opted for a more supervisory role and the Cardoso government for a more coordinative 
role in the 1990s. Meanwhile, the PT adopted a (relatively) more expansive role for the state, part of 
which may be explained by the party’s early rhetoric associated with public education, and its support 
by public sector workers generally and teachers in particular.
However, the difference between a more limited and a more expansive role for the state may 
also owe as much to context. In Chile for example, the Concertacion’s decision to maintain the 
market-influenced reforms highlighted the extent to which they could benefit the poor: Brunner 
(interview, 2007) observed that the market reforms in Chile had paradoxically contributed to greater 
access at all levels of education. In higher education especially, the growth in supply and means- 
tested tuition meant that students from previously overlooked social classes found it easier to attend 
university. In Brazil, meanwhile, the PT’s more expansive state role could be attributed to other, global 
factors. It came to power at a time when there had been a shift by organisations associated with the
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Washington Consensus. During the 1980s and 1990s, the Washington Consensus espoused a ‘first 
generation’ of reforms, stressing a reduction in the size of the state and its interventions. Since the 
turn of the century ‘second generation’ reforms have gained currency, including the building up of 
states’ capacities (Zurbriggen 2007; Panizza 2005). This ideational change can similarly be seen 
within the Concertacion government thinking on the state between the 1990s and 2000s. During its 
early years in power it adopted a more hands-off approach to education policy, most notably by 
maintaining the military era school structure, and overseeing an increase in the number of state 
subsidised private schooling. More recently it has adopted a more interventionist role since 2006, 
following growing social protests and demands. Among the measures that it now favours are 
differentiated state funding for schools and greater supervision of the system.
Hypothesis 4: Social democratic governments have increasingly adopted human capital 
development theories associated with the New Right (i.e. markets, entrepreneurship and social 
order); but Participatory Left governments are more inclined to pursue policies that maintain 
aspects of ‘progressive’ critical pedagogy than Third Way ones.
Qualification of hypothesis 4: While the left-right dichotomy has proved useful in comparing and 
contrasting educational perspectives, in practice the differences have proved less apparent. To some 
extent this was reflected in a shift from education for human capital development towards social 
development over the past 20 years (Hall and Midgley 2004: 153). Despite the distinction drawn in 
hypothesis 4 -  that the Participatory Left is more committed to critical pedagogy than the Third Way -  
the evidence suggests both types of social democracy have viewed the role of education and the 
content of curricular reform in broadly similar ways. Where an alternative educational approach was 
initially attempted, during the PT government’s first year, the importance of formal structures (e.g. the 
state and the existing school system) and context proved more decisive. The new education minister, 
Cristovam Buarque, sought an approach to educational policy that would make greater use of social 
movements than the institutional apparatus of the state. However, this reliance on other actors, 
coupled with an uncertain set of policy priorities (between a literacy campaign reliant on social 
movement involvement and reforms of the state institutions regarding basic education funding and
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higher education) and an absence of strong presidential support, meant the education agenda 
arguably suffered during the PT government’s first year. Subsequent education ministers were more 
inclined to maintain the inherited system, with the result that the PT government became tied to the 
prevailing education agenda, limiting its scope for reform. The reformist stance essentially meant 
conformity to the Third Way model, which was reflected by maintaining the bulk of the Cardoso 
government’s curricular guidelines (the exceptions being proposals to extend the number of years 
children spend in primary school and the compulsory inclusion of Afro-Brazilian history and culture in 
schools).
Yet even if Third Way governments have appeared most comfortable from the outset with 
policies that emphasised the development of human capital in a structured, formal environment 
(school) to aid economic growth and competitiveness, it would be a mistake to assume they were 
accepting the New Right agenda unquestioningly. Those associated with the Third Way emphasised 
the impact that such policies would achieve for social justice and opportunity (Giddens 2000) and 
recognised the need to reform existing curricula to achieve them. This was distinct from the arguably 
more limited, economic focus of the New Right’s curricular goals.
Hypothesis 5: Social democratic governments support increased social spending in education;
but Participatory Left governments will spend proportionately more than Third Way ones.
Qualification of hypothesis 5: Although social democratic governments do tend to favour greater levels 
of public spending generally (and in education specifically), the distinction drawn between Third Way 
and Participatory Left versions is too simplistic. It fails to take into account the way each achieves it. 
In particular, the main distinction is between the uses'of general or targeted spending. Indeed, both 
the Concertacion and the PT governments pursued increased general and targeted funds, while the 
Cardoso government opted largely for the general approach. These differences illustrate the relative 
unimportance of the Participatory Left or Third Way labels in this regard.
The reason for targeted spending over general increases owes much to context. In Chile, the 
Concertacion pursued targeting because its maintenance of the military-era school system meant that 
targeting was the most effective way to direct financial assistance from government; the alternative
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would have been to place it in the hands of private providers, who constituted a growing proportion of 
the school system. For the PT government the use of targeted funds helped provide it with a 
distinctive image, which contributed towards popular support and Lula’s re-election in 2006. 
Meanwhile, although the Cardoso government made use of some targeted programmes, its primary 
concern was on creating a more effective financial regime. Consequently, it focused attention on 
restructuring the system, which resulted in greater resources for education at the subnational level, 
relative to the direct amount provided by the federal government.
Hypothesis 6: Social democratic governments can either accept or reject evaluation and 
assessment regimes; Third Way governments accept them, Participatory Left governments 
reject them.
Qualification of hypothesis 6: The trend towards education systems that produce ‘knowledge’ for 
economic growth and the development of human capital in education has coincided with a rise in 
evaluation and assessment. This reflects a wider concern with the need for greater public sector 
accountability and performance, led domestically and internationally by the New Right since the 1980s. 
Social democratic governments in power have therefore had to accommodate these considerations. 
The distinction between Third Way governments accepting them as they are, and the Participatory Left 
rejecting them outright, is too simplistic. Furthermore, a more nuanced, modified version of the 
hypothesis, in which the Third Way pursues mechanisms that have a greater economic focus, and the 
Participatory Left which accommodates those stakeholders associated with it (i.e. teachers and 
students), was similarly found to be insufficient.
The evidence presented by the three cases suggests that the distinctions between Third Way 
and Participatory Left regarding evaluation and assessment are less apparent than it otherwise 
appears. Social democrats, regardless of type, appear inclined towards mechanisms that may be 
used by a wider range of stakeholders, including administrators, teachers, students and parents. In so 
doing they demonstrate a different set of objectives to the New Right, being less inclined to use 
assessment as a form of market indicator. In addition, the use of evaluation and assessment can gain 
its own momentum owing to the involvement of stakeholders (e.g. the use of test score for ‘rankings’,
252
despite governments’ objections). This means that the process can become subject to political 
pressure, which can affect social democrat elites and policymaking. In Brazil, for example, the PT and 
its supporters in the teacher and student movements challenged the Cardoso government’s evaluation 
and assessment mechanisms and promoted their reform.
Hypothesis 7: Social democratic governments tend to recognise and pay attention to interest 
groups that are more organised and cohesive; but Participatory Left governments tend to have 
closer relations with teachers and students; Third Way governments tend to have closer 
relations with private interests.
Qualification of hypothesis 7; Social democratic governments do appear to engage more with 
organised interest groups over non-organised ones, and pursue more representative forms of 
participation, regardless of type. In addition, the evidence certainly points to teachers and students 
being more closely related to Participatory Left governments than Third Way ones. However, the 
notion that Third Way governments cannot have conciliatory relations with teachers and students is 
erroneous. The evidence also suggests that private interests will tend to trump those of other 
stakeholders, such as teachers and students.
First, the three cases presented in Brazil and Chile suggest that interest groups such as 
business associations, private school managers, teachers and students tend to be both more 
recognisable and likely to participate in the policymaking process than those that are not. Indeed, the 
cases of non-teaching staff in Chile and parents in both countries would seem to demonstrate the 
extent to which the hypothesis holds. The absence of a non-teaching staff organisation at a time when 
the Concertacion was passing legislation on such workers meant that they lacked a voice. There was 
no one able to engage the government regarding their concerns. Following the creation of 
CONFEMUCH, non-teaching staff now have the capacity to lobby and influence government actions. 
Meanwhile parents in both countries continue to lack a strong national organisation. This has meant 
that all three governments have largely overlooked them as an interest group in the policymaking 
process.
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Second, social democratic governments approach policymaking with other actors in a more 
representative way (i.e. formally structured decision making with clearly defined organisations) as 
opposed to a deliberative (i.e. open-ended process with organised and unorganised groups) path. 
This occurs regardless of the social and political origins of such governments. Much of this may be 
attributed to the fact that such governments have a more elite-based form of policymaking. The 
education policy elites in all three governments were committed to working through state institutions; in 
such circumstances, those groups that were organised fared a better chance of gaining government 
attention. Of course, the reasons for pursuing this common approach to policymaking varied between 
governments: the Concertacion adopted it after 1990 as a means of balancing the contrasting needs of 
different groups, such as teachers and the private sector. In Brazil the Cardoso government identified 
institutional channels as the way to defuse ‘corporatist’ groups that it felt compromised its objectives. 
Meanwhile, the PT shifted towards using state institutions following failed efforts to pursue socially 
mobilised education projects during Buarque’s administration (2003-04).
Even when social democratic governments have pursued a more deliberative approach to 
policymaking, the process has never been especially open-ended and inclusive. The PT, before it 
assumed power at the national level, pursued the most participatory of policy approaches, including 
through the party itself. However, the pressure for timely decisions by PT-elected executives at the 
subnational level would always trump more deliberative policymaking. Meanwhile, the Concertacion, 
in response to the 2006 protests against the education system, established a time-limited advisory 
commission to examine the problems and propose solutions. This meant that a structure had to be 
imposed on the process and the government had to determine which groups were to participate -  
thereby leading back to the point that those most organised and cohesive had a better chance of being 
engaged. Consequently, social democratic governments’ ability to offer a more deliberative 
policymaking arena remains constrained, enabling this to only occur in a time-limited and partial 
fashion.
Third, despite social democratic governments’ use of representation and attention to organised 
groups, private interests gained greater attention and engagement with government than other 
stakeholders such as teachers and students. This happens regardless of whether governments are 
Third Way or Participatory Left, and the historic connections that each has with certain interest groups.
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The reason for the private sector’s relative influence is due to social democratic governments’ reliance 
on them regarding the structure and finance of social policy generally, and education in particular. In 
such circumstances teachers and students find themselves constrained by their relative weakness, 
notwithstanding their past association with particular social democratic parties. In addition, teachers 
and students can have conciliatory relations with Third Way governments as much as Participatory 
Left ones: in contrast to the clearer distinction between the relationships that teachers and students 
had with the Cardoso and Lula governments, in Chile the Concertacion shared much with these 
groups during the first half of the 1990s. This was due to the government being perceived as far more 
preferable than its military predecessor, and included an overlap between the Concertacion leadership 
and teacher and student movements.
2. Final remarks
In sum, then, social democracy in Latin America appears to comprise two main tendencies: a more 
ideologically egalitarian Participatory Left version and a more elite-driven Third Way model. Although 
social democratic parties will tend to conform to one type over the other, the business of government 
ensures the emergence of elites irrespective of the politics of those in power. These elites’ inclination 
towards the use of institutions -  and the opportunities afforded by the state -  ensures that not only do 
their policy agendas are broadly similar regardless of type, but also distance them from their 
supporters, within and outside the party. By acknowledging such factors, it becomes easier to account 
for the supposed variation between current and recent governing experiences by the centre-left since 
the 1990s.
By focusing on the nature of social democracy and its impact on policymaking, this dissertation 
has not directly addressed itself to the important and interesting question of whether the quality of 
education in either country has improved as a result. In part this has been addressed indirectly, 
through reference to other, pre-existing research, much of which does not necessarily distinguish 
between policymakers’ political principles and ideologies. Certainly it is the case that more research 
and work could be done on the matter of educational ‘quality’ (a subject whose definition is contested 
at the best of times), including with reference to spending and curricular reforms.
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The focus on elite formation and its impact on policy also emphasises that the influence of 
social democracy is to be found less as a social or political movement or party, than its actual 
application in power. Social democratic parties have been perceived as facing a dilemma: do they 
focus on representing their core constituencies -  the poor, the dispossessed and the disadvantaged-  
or do they strive for greater electoral success by adopting ideological moderation and greater affinity 
with other social groups? The evidence suggests that, in government, the choice appears largely pre­
determined, in favour of the latter.
Should the choice be as stark as this? There are sections on the Left that maintain this need 
not be the case, that it is possible to represent the poor and excluded and still win votes. Since the 
turn of the century, there have been efforts to create a more egalitarian and participatory version of the 
Left, most notably through the anti-globalisation movement and initiatives like the World Social Forum. 
Certainly the space presented through such mechanisms challenges the more elite-oriented approach 
taken by social democrats in government. Yet the glaring weakness of the anti-globalisation 
movement is its emphasis on opposition to existing forms of power and the role of the state and its 
institutions. This means that despite the idealistic rhetoric of the egalitarian and participatory Left (as 
opposed to political parties of the Participatory Left), anti-globalisation groups have tended to offer no 
more than social mobilisation, foregoing efforts to control the state directly. Where the Left seeks -  
and takes -  power, the inevitability of elite formation and policymaking, with the relative advantages 
that the state offers, will invariably occur. According to Michels (2001: 6), nearly a century ago:
‘Democracy has encountered obstacles, not merely imposed from without, but 
spontaneously surgent from within. Only to a certain degree, perhaps, can these obstacles 
be surpassed and removed.’
So, it can be said, is the case of social democracy in Latin America.
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Appendix 1: Political events in Chile, 1964-2006
Pre-1973
1964 Eduardo Frei Montalva (Christian Democrat) wins presidential election with
56.1% of the vote
1970 Salvador Allende (Socialist) wins presidential election with 36.6% of the vote
Military period
1973 Military coup (General Augusto Pinochet eventually achieves dominance of 
ruling junta); congress is shut down and political parties banned
1980 New constitution promulgated; Pinochet wins plebiscite with 68.52% to 
remain in power for eight more years
1982-83 Debt crisis and growing social protests against regime
1985 National Accord for Democracy (signatories include Christian Democrats 
and other opposition political parties)
1987 Repeal of law banning political party organisation
1988 Pinochet loses plebiscite to remain in power; the opposition coalition 
including the Christian Democrats and Socialists (Concertacion para el No), 
receives 55.99% of the vote
1989 Presidential election, first round: Patricio Aylwin (Christian Democrat and 
candidate for the Concertacion) wins with 55.17% of vote 
Legislative elections: Concertacion wins 51.49% of vote for lower house 
compared to 34.18% for the right-wing coalition (including RN and UDI)
Concertacion governments
1990 Aylwin becomes president; Pinochet remains commander-in-chief of the
armed forces (until 1997)
1993 Presidential election, first round: Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (Christian
Democrat) wins presidential election with 57.98% of vote 
Legislative elections: Concertacion wins 55.4% of vote for lower house 
compared to 36.68% for the right-wing coalition
1997 Pinochet steps down as commander-in-chief of armed forces and becomes
senator-for-life
Legislative elections: Concertacion wins 50.51% of vote for lower house 
compared to the right-wing coalition’s 36.26%
1998 Pinochet arrested in London
1999 Presidential election, first round: Ricardo Lagos (Socialist) receives 47.96%
of vote to Joaquin Lavin’s (UDI) 47.51%
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2000
2001
2005
2006
Presidential election, second round: Lagos wins with 51.31% of vote 
(January)
Pinochet returns to Chile (March)
Legislative elections: Concertacion wins 47.9% of vote for lower house 
compared to the right-wing coalition’s 44.27%
Presidential election, first round: Michelle Bachelet (Socialist) receives 
45.96%of vote to Sebastian Pinera’s (RN) 25.41%
Legislative elections: Concertacion wins 51.76% of vote for lower house 
compared to the right-wing coalition’s 38.72%
Presidential election, second round: Bachelet wins with 53.5% of vote 
(January)
Pinochet dies (December)
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Appendix 2: Political events in Brazil, 1964-2006
Military period
1964 Military coup deposes President Joao Goulart (who had succeeded Janio Quadros 
following his resignation in 1961); General Humberto Castelo Branco becomes 
president
1965 Existing political parties banned and new rules for political parties introduced 
Two new parties established: ARENA (government) and MDB (opposition)
1982 Direct elections for governor replaced by indirect elections through state 
legislatures; mayors replaced by presidential appointees
1967 New constitution promulgated
General Artur Costa da Silva elected president by Congress
Military regime passes acts granting itself greater powers, including over national
security and suspending habeus corpus
1969 Costa da Silva leaves presidency following illness and replaced by military junta 
General Emilio Garrastazu Medici elected president by Congress
1974 General Ernesto Geisel elected president by Congress
1980 General Joao Baptista de Oliveira Figueiredo elected president by Congress 
Change of electoral legislation, abolishing ARENA and MDB and allowing 
registration of new political parties 
Former MDB politicians register PMDB as new party
1980 Workers’ Party (PT) founded
1982 Direct elections for state governors re-introduced
Legislative elections: PMDB receives 43% of vote for lower house, PDS/PPR (right- 
wing coalition) 43.2% and the PT 3.6%
1984 Political protests against the regime; social demands for direct presidential elections
New Republic (Sarney, Collorand Franco governments)
1985 Tancredo Neves (PMDB) elected president by Congress but dies before taking 
office; vice-president Jose Sarney succeeds to the presidency
1986 Legislative elections: PMDB receives 47.8% of vote for lower house, PFL 17.7% 
and the PT 6.9%
1988 New constitution promulgated
PSDB formed by break away faction of the PMDB
1989 Presidential elections: Fernando Collor de Mello elected in direct presidential 
elections, beating Luis Inacio ‘Lula’ da Silva (PT) in the second round
1990 Legislative elections: PMDB receives 19.3% of vote for the lower house, the PFL 
12.4%, the PT 10.2% and the PSDB 8.7%
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1992 Collor resigns and impeached; vice-president Itamar Franco succeeds to the 
presidency
1994 Fernando Henrique Cardoso (PSDB) appointed minister of finance; introduction of 
the anti-inflationary Real Plan
1994 Presidential election: Cardoso and his PSDB-PFL electoral coalition wins with 
54.3% of vote in first round
Legislative elections: PSDB wins 14% of vote for the lower house; PMDB receives 
20.3%, the PFL 12.8% and the PT 13.1%
Cardoso government
1998 Presidential election: Cardoso re-elected with 53.1 % of vote in first round
Legislative elections: PSDB wins 17.5% of vote for the lower house; PMDB receives 
15.2%, the PFL 17.3% and the PT 13.2%
2002 Presidential election: Lula wins, beating Jose Serra (PSDB) in second round
Legislative elections: PT wins 18.4% of vote for the lower house; PMDB receives 
13.4%, the PSDB 14.3% and the PFL 13.4%
Lula government
2006 Presidential election, Lula re-elected, beating Geraldo Alckmin (PSDB) in second 
round
Legislative elections: PT wins 15% of vote for the lower house; PMDB receives 
14.6%, the PSDB 13.6% and the PFL 10.9%
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Appendix 3: Timeline of education in Chile
Pre-1973
1971 National Congress on Education 
1973 ENU proposed
Military period
1973 Military coup; SUTE (teachers’ union) shut down
1974 Colegio de Profesores formed
1979 Pinochet speech on state and market reform and presidential directive
1980 New constitution promulgated
Decrees on decentralisation and deregulation of school system introduced
1981 Changes to freedom of association 
AGECH (independent teachers’ union) formed
1982 First PER evaluation of school children carried out
1984 Second PER evaluation of school children carried out 
Opposition take control of FECECH following elections
1985 Opposition take control of Colegio de Profesores following internal elections
1987 SIMCE methodology established
1988 SIMCE evaluation carried out for first time 
1990 Constitutional Organic Education Law (LOCE)
Concertacion governments
1990 Introduction of targeted policies (P900 and MECE)
1991 Teachers’ Statute
1992 Failed effort to reform LOCE
Reform of primary school curriculum started
Local elections introduce democratic control of schools
1993 Tax reform (changes include allowing state-subsidised private schools to introduce 
co-financing
1994 Brunner Commission
1995 Jorge Pavez elected to presidency of Colegio de Profesores 
Non-Concertacion Left take control of FECH following internal elections
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1996 Reform of primary school curriculum completed 
Reform of secondary school curriculum started 
Legislation on non-teaching staff passed
1998 Introduction of Whole School Day programme
Reform of secondary school curriculum completed
2006 Secondary school students protests against school system
Presidential Advistory Commission on Quality of Education (Garcia-Huibodro 
Commission)
2007 Concertacion-Alianza agreement on education reform 
Jaime Gajardo elected to presidency of Colegio de Profesores
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Appendix 4: Timeline of education in Brazil
Pre-Military period
1961 National education guidelines (LDB) passed
Military period
1967 New constitution promulgated
1968 University reform
1971 Reform of primary and secondary school systems 
1979 UNE reformed by university students
1981 Formation of independent ANDES (high education) and UNTE (primary and 
secondary school) teachers’ unions
1983 Calmon amendment detailing set amount of federal, state and municipal revenues 
to education
New Republic (Sarney, Collor and Franco governments)
1988 New constitution promulgated
1992 Society-wide protests, including visible secondary school mobilisation, against 
President Collor
1993 Ten Year Education Plan introduced
SAEB (primary school) tests carried out for first time
1994 National Accord agreed between President Franco and CNTE (teachers’ union)
Cardoso government
1995 Paulo Renato de Souza becomes minister of education 
Student protests
1996 New national educational guidelines (LDB) passed 
Constitutional amendment establishing FUNDEF passed 
Provao (higher education) evaluation introduced
1998 FUNDEF takes effect
Secondary school curricular guidelines introduced 
ENEM (secondary school) tests introduced 
University strikes
1999 Social protests versus government’s economic model (including teachers and 
students)
2001 Education Plan introduced
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Bolsa escola introduced at federal level 
University strikes
UNE monopoly on student cards ended
Lula government
2003 Cristovam Buarque becomes minister of education 
Bolsa familia introduced
Review of higher education 
Provao evaluation scrapped
2004 Buarque sacked as minister; replaced by Tarso Genro 
Sinaes evaluation introduced
University reform bill drafted (and not yet passed)
ProUni introduced
2005 Fernando Haddad replaces Genro as minister of education 
ProUni introduced
Prova Brasil (primary school) tests introduced
2006 Constitutional amendment establishing FUNDEB passed, to start from 2008
2007 Education Development Plan introduced 
FUNDEF expires
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Appendix 5: Comparative Expenditure on Education in Selected 
Countries, 1990-2005
Much comparative data exists on education spending at a global level. Distinctions must be drawn, 
however, between both total amounts (table 8) as well as those that disaggregate spending by public 
(table 9) and private forms. In the cases of Brazil and Chile, private sector funding in Chile constitutes 
a greater amount of the total amount allocated to education than in Brazil, thereby enabling it to spend 
closer to the OECD average or mean during the 1990s and 2000s (indeed, even exceeding it in 2000).
While the OECD data enables a comparison to be made between Brazil and Chile and the 
richer countries, it lacks data that enables a regional comparison to be made. Figures from UNESCO 
fill this gap. Effort has been made to provide data both from other countries in the region as well as 
other middle-income countries against which the Chilean and Brazilian cases may be compared. The 
countries are defined as middle-income by the World Bank (World Bank 2009) and includes all the 
examples cited below, with the exception of Cuba, which is presented as the prime example of 
socialism within the region.
Table 8: Expenditure on education institutions as a percentage of GDP, 1995-2005
1995 2000 2005
Brazil 3.7 3.7 4.4
Chile 5.1 6.7 5.7
EU19 average N/A N/A 5.5
OECD average N/A N/A 5.8
OECD mean for countries 
with 1995, 2000 and 2005  
data (24 countries)
5.5 5.3 5.6
Source: Table B2.1, OECD 2008
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Appendix 6: Interview methodology and schedule
1. Interview methodology
The thesis tackles the nature of social democracy, including its nature and impact on public policy, 
especially education. The main approach was through the use of three case studies in Brazil and 
Chile. While there is a considerable amount of secondary literature on the content of these policies, 
material related to social democrat policymakers and their perceptions of what they were trying to 
achieve in education was substantially less. With few exceptions (e.g. Souza 2005), the bulk deal with 
political issues more generally (e.g. Cardoso 2006, Palocci 2007). Without such material, I opted for 
the use of qualitative interviewing by which the secondary literature could be ‘tested’.
The interviews were therefore drawn from two main groups: those within and others outside of 
the social democratic governments studied. The use of both types of interviewees not only aided 
comprehension of the different values and interpretations of these actors, but were especially 
important given the working assumption that social democracy was distinguishable between Third Way 
and Participatory Left versions. For observers outside government and the policymaking process, 
detecting the difference between each could be difficult; interviews with participants within government 
provided an insight into what they understood those differences to be.
In addition, it provided an opportunity to engage in ‘snowball sampling’ (Esterberg 2002: 93), 
whereby interviewees could suggest additional respondents that I should contact. This was especially 
useful, since in trying to make the study of education policymaking in the three cases as 
comprehensive as possible, it helped to identify other social democrat and non-social democrat 
participants within the policymaking process that might have been otherwise overlooked.
The format of the interviews was therefore semi-structured and generally lasted for an hour on 
average. This provided sufficient space for the respondents to express themselves and get across the 
points they considered most relevant (Bell 1999; Mason 2002; Esterberg 2002). All the interviews 
were scribbled down in note form, with some also being subject to tape or digital recording at the same 
time. The use or non-use of the latter depended on several factors, including battery lifetime, interview 
location (e.g. a coffee house and senatorial tea room where the volume was too loud). The use of 
recordings was only done as a means to refer back if necessary.
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Following the interviews, the notes would be typed up in report form and including additional 
information such as when a respondent was prompted on a given subject or moved onto a topic of his 
or her own volition. Since the interviews were largely concerned with arguments and explanations of 
participants’ own and others’ actions, the need for verbatim transcription -  and hence recording of all 
interviews -  was removed.
One key limitation of the interview approach is the post facto rationalisation that respondents 
can engage in. In particular this involves a re-evaluation and re-interpretation of issues and events 
that may have occurred several years ago, allowing interviewees not only to respond to questions with 
the benefit of hindsight, but also to portray themselves in a positive light and paint others more 
negatively. Consequently, just as data generated from interviews helped ‘test’ secondary literature 
assumptions, so could contemporary material similarly ‘test’ respondents’ claims. While this was 
largely lacking within the policy process (e.g. minutes, emails, letters), those of social actors who the 
governments engaged with provided an alternative. These included materials from the most 
comprehensive of education archives during the periods studied: the teachers’ union archives in both 
countries.
2. Interview questionnaire
Given the semi-structured nature, no interview was exactly the same. However, I approached each 
respondent with a general set of topics and questions along with some that were more specifically 
tailored, depending on the nature of the interviewee and the context being studied (e.g. whether the 
interview was in Brazil or Chile). Generally, I had around 10-12 questions/topics in each interview. 
The following includes the type of general ones raised, regardless of interviewee:
1. Please provide some details of your background in the party/movement/government; what 
your history is in relation to the organisation and how you came to be appointed/selected.
2. Please define your own ideological position and stance and that of the organisation which 
you are connected to.
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3. Is there a difference, in your view, between the previous regime/government and [the 
Concertacion in Chile] / [PSDB and/or PT in Brazil]? Can you explain what you mean by 
your answer to this question?
4. Is there a difference, in your view, between [the Socialist Party and the Christian 
Democratic Party in Chile] / [PSDB and the PT in Brazil]? Can you explain what you mean 
by your answer to this question?
5. Where, in your view, is education policy made?
6. Which social groups are important in the education in your country?
7. What are [Concertacion/PSDB/PT] government relations like with each of those groups 
(private interests, teachers, students, parents, others)? Do some have more influence than 
others? If so, why?
8. What other points/topics would you like to raise that have not been covered in this 
interview? Who else do you recommend that I speak to in relation to these issues?
Other, more specific questions were also asked to each interviewee, depending on their role. The 
range of topics covered varied, including the following -  but which are by no means exhaustive:
1. Why did the Concertacion [in Chile] not return to the National Unified School (ENU) 
proposal first suggested during the Allende government after 1990?
2. Why did it take until 1980 for the Pinochet regime to instigate neo-liberal reforms? Why not 
before?
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3. Were the student-led protests in Chile during 2006 accidental? Why did they happen and 
what sustained them?
4. Were there differences between your organisation [civil society] and the different ministerial 
and adviser teams in the government? How would you distinguish these periods?
5. What employment legislation for teachers [in Chile] is used in private schools?
6. Why was -  and is -  there no national students’ union [in Chile]?
7. Why was civil society depoliticised in Chile after 1990?
8. What accounts for the change/shift from FUNDEF to FUNDEB in Brazil?
9. What do you understand neo-liberal education to be?
10. What is ‘participation’ in education?
11. What is ‘progressive’ education?
12. Why was the national students’ union (UNE) monopoly on student cards ended [in Brazil]?
13. Why did FUNDEF not include pre- or post-primary education funds?
14. Which political groups dominated your (i.e. student, teacher) organisation’s executive in the 
past and today?
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3. Interview schedule
The interviews were conducted in Brazil, Chile and the United States over the following time 
periods: August-September 2006, March-April 2007 and January-April 2008 in Brazil; August and 
November-December 2007 in Chile; and September 2007 in the US.
3.1. Brazilian interviews
Interview ee Position Conducted
interview ?
Location and  
date of 
interview
Type of 
intervie  
w
Aparecida da Silva, 
Fatima
International relations Secretary, CNTE (national 
education workers’ union)
Yes Brasilia, 13 
September 2006
Face-to-
face
Arelaro, Lisete University of Sao Paulo (USP) professor in education 
policy and member of Paulo Freire’s education team in 
Sao Paulo city (1989-92)
Yes Sao Paulo, 5 
March 2008
Face-to-
face
Arroyo, Miguel Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG) education 
professor and former Belo Horizonte education 
secretary (1993-97)
Yes Rio de Janeiro, 
18 March 2008
Face-to-
face
Beauchamp, Jeanete Pre-School and Primary School Education Secretary, 
Ministry of Education (MEC), since 2004
No N/A N/A
Brooke, Nigel Education Evaluation and Measures Group (GAME) 
Director, Education Faculty, UFMG
Yes Belo Horizonte, 
27 February 
2008
Face-to-
face
Buarque, Cristovam Brazilian education minister, 2003-04 Yes Brasilia, 7 April 
2008
Face-to-
face
Cardoso, Fernando 
Henrique
President of Brazil, 1995-2002 Yes Sao Paulo, 22 
April 2008
Face-to-
face
Castro, Maria Helena 
Guimaraes
National Institute of Educational Research (INEP) 
President, MEC (1995- 2002)
No N/A N/A
Chagas, Francisco Basic Education Secretary (current) and MEC political 
appointee since 2003
Yes Brasilia, 8 April 
2008
Face-to-
face
Costa, Marcio da Education Professor, Fderal University of Rio de 
Janeiro (UFRJ) and ex-'historic’ PT member
Yes Rio de Janeiro, 
24 January 2008
Face-to-
face
Cury, Carlos Education professor, UFMG No N/A N/A
Durham, Eunice USP Professor and MEC official (HE and Educational 
Policy Secretariats, 1990-1997)
Yes Sao Paulo, 6 
March 2008
Face-to-
face
Fernandes, Reynaldo National Institute of Educational Research (INEP) 
President, MEC (since 2005)
Yes Brasilia, 8 April 
2008
Face-to-
face
Franco, Thiago National secondary school students’ union (UBES) 
president, 2006
No N/A N/A
Goldemberg, Jose Brazilian education minister, 1991-92 Yes Rio de Janeiro, 
22 January 2008
Phone
Gouvea, Gilda Portugal Advisor to Paulo Renato Souza, MEC Yes Sao Paulo, 5 
March 2008
Face-to-
face
Henriques, Ricardo Economist, UFRJ and Literacy, Diversity and 
Continuing Education Secretary (SECAD), MEC
No N/A N/A
Monteiro, Leandro PSDB Executive Member on UNE (national union of 
university students)
Yes Sao Paulo, 30 
August 2006
Face-to-
face
Nacimento, Iracema Communication Coordinator for National Campaign for 
the Right of Education (Agao Educativa)
Yes Sao Paulo, 30 
August 2006
Face-to-
face
Petta, Gustavo UNE President, 2003-07 No N/A N/A
Pochmann, Marcio Economics professor, Unicamp, and President of 
Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA)
No N/A N/A
Rocha, Selma Director of PT think tank, Fundagao Perseu Abramo, 
education historian and advisor to Sao Paulo (1989- 
96) and Santo Andre municipal education secretariats
No N/A N/A
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Schuch, Luiz Henrique Secretary-General, ANDES (national university 
teachers’ union)
Yes Brasilia, 12 
September 2006
Face-to-
face
Schwartzmann, Simon Education professor, former IBGE president (national 
statistics agency)
Yes Rio de Janeiro, 3 
April 2007
Face-to-
face
Soares, Francisco UFMG professor and GAME (evaluation department) 
member
Yes Belo Horizonte, 
27 February 
2008
Face-to-
face
Souza, Paulo Renato Brazilian education minister, 1995-2002 Yes Sao Paulo, 5 
April 2007
Face-to-
face
Stumpf, Lucia International Relations Director, UNE (President since 
2007)
Yes Sao Paulo, 28 
August 2006
Face-to-
face
Vieira, Ju?ara Dutra CNTE President Yes Porto Alegre, 23 
March 2007
Face-to-
face
3.2 Chilean interviews
Interview ee Position Conducted
interview ?
Location and  
date of 
interview
Type of 
interview
Arellano, Jose Pablo Chilean education minister, 1997-2000 No N/A N/A
Assael, Jenny Advisor to President of the Colegio de Profesores 
(national teachers’ union), 1996-2007
Yes Santiago, 21 
November 2007
Face-to-
face
Aylwin, Mariana Chilean education minister, 2000-03 No N/A N/A
Bellei, Cristian Education sociologist, University of Chile No N/A N/A
Bitar, Sergio Chilean education minister, 2003-05 Yes Santiago, 21 
August 2007
Face-to-
face
Boccado, Giorgio FECH (University of Chile students’ union) President, 
2007
No N/A N/A
Bosch, Rodrigo President of CONACEP (private school gremio) Yes Santiago, 27  
November 2007
Face-to-
face
Brunner, Jose Joaquin Ex-Mineduc (Ministry of Education) official and Diego 
Portales University professor
Yes Santiago, 28 
August 2007
Face-to-
face
Catalan, Eduardo Former President, Asociacion Metropolitana de Padres 
y Apoderados
Yes Santiago, 15 
November 2007
Face-to-
face
Contreras, Dante Economics professor, University of Chile No N/A N/A
Cox, Cristian Ex-Mineduc official and Catholic University professor Yes Santiago, 28 
August 2007
Face-to-
face
Diaz, Francisco Head of Presidential Policy Unit, Chile (since 2006) Yes Santiago, 16 
August 2007
Face-to-
face
Dittborn, Paulina Mineduc chief of staff, 1981-88 and Education Sub- 
Secretary, 1988-89
Yes Santiago, 19 
November 2007
Face-to-
face
Elacqua, Gregory Technical Advisor to Sergio Bitar, Mineduc, 2003-05 Yes Princeton, 12 
September 2007
Face-to-
face
Gajardo, Jaime President of the Colegio de Profesores (since 2007) No N/A N/A
Garcia-Huidobro, Juan 
Eduardo
Head of Presidential Advisory Commission on 
Education 2006 and former advisor, Mineduc
Yes Santiago, 20  
August 2007
Face-to-
face
Grau, Nicholas FECH President, 2005-06 Yes Santiago, 22  
November 2007
Face-to-
face
Hardy, Clarisa Minister of Planning and Cooperation, 2006-08 No N/A N/A
Lagos, Ricardo Chilean education minister (1990-92) and President of 
Chile (2000-06)
No N/A N/A
Medrano, Patricia Economics professor associated with education, 
University of Chile
No N/A N/A
Munoz, Mauricio Public Policies Advisor to President Michelle Bachelet Yes Santiago, 9 
November 2007
Face-to-
face
Navia, Patricio Political science professor, New York University and 
Diego Portales University
No N/A N/A
Nunez, Ivan Ministerial Advisor, Mineduc (since 1990) Yes Santiago, 15 
November 2007
Face-to-
face
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Santiago, 21 
November 2007
Pancani, Dino Secondary School Student Leader, 1980s Yes Santiago, 20  
November 2007
Face-to-
face
Pena, Carlos Chancellor, Diego Portales University Yes Santiago, 18 
December 2007
Face-to-
face
Rodriguez, Carlos 
(Vice-President), 
Victoria Caceres 
(Secretary General) 
and Anthony Lenz 
(Secretary of Acts)
Non-teaching staff union leadership (CO NFEM UCH -  
Confederacion de Funcionarios de la Educacion 
Municipalizada de Chile)
Yes Santiago, 20  
November 2007
Face-to-
face
Romaguera, Pilar Sub-Secretary of Education, 2006 No N/A N/A
Soto, Clodile Metropolitan Santiago leader, Colegio de Profesores Yes Santiago, 24  
August 2007
Face-to-
face
Toha, Carolina PPD congresswoman and member of Presidential 
Advisory Commission on Education 2006
No N/A N/A
Valenzuela, Cesar 2006 secondary school student leader No N/A N/A
Velasco, Carolina Social policy researcher, Libertad y Desarrollo (right- 
wing think tank)
Yes Santiago, 14 
November 2007
Face-to-
face
Verdugo, Oswaldo President of the Colegio de Profesores (1986-95) No N/A N/A
Weinsten, Jose Advisor to education minister, Ricardo Lagos (1990- 
92) and Sub-Secretary of Education (2000-03)
Yes Santiago, 10 
December 2007
Face-to-
face
Zavala, Fernando FEUC (Catholic University of Chile students’ union) 
President, 2007
No N/A N/A
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